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This  thesis  examines  the  role  of  public  capital,  in  particular  "core  infrastructure",  in 
private  sector  production  in  the  United  States.  The  underlying  theme  is  the  importance 
of  the  individual  infrastructure  stocks,  in  particular  highways  and  streets,  water  and 
sewer  systems  and  "other  structures".  Two  different  empirical  approaches  are  used  to 
shed  light  on  a  number  of  issues.  In  the  first  study  in  Chapter  3,  two  cost  function 
models  are  estimated  using  data  for  the  total  private  business  sector,  one  using 
aggregate  infrastructure  data  and  the  other  using  disaggregated  infrastructure.  The 
parameter  estimates  are  used  to  calculate  optimal  infrastructure  stocks  (the  optimal 
total  infrastructure  stock  and  the  optimal  individual  stocks).  The  results  reveal  that, 
despite  the  fall  in  infi7astructure  investment  from  1968-82,  none  of  the  infrastructure 
stocks  was  undersupplied  over  the  sample  period.  The  estimated  output  elasticities  of 
the  different  infrastructure  stocks  are  significantly  lower  than  those  obtained  in 
previous  research.  In  the  second  study  in  Chapter  4,  use  is  made  of  recent 
developments  in  the  productivity  literature  to  construct  a  measure  of  manufacturing 
total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  that  takes  account  of  varying  returns  to  scale  and 
variable  labour  and  capital  utilisation  over  the  cycle.  The  adjusted  TFP  measure  is  used 
to  shed  light  on  the  causal  relationship  between  infrastructure  (total,  core  and 
disaggregated  core)  and  productivity  using  a  selection  of  autoregressive  model- 
building  techniques  and  causality  testing  procedures.  Contrary  to  the  stated  view  of 
many  infrastructure  researchers,  there  is  no  evidence  of  "reverse  causality",  ie, 
productivity  causing  infrastructure  investment.  There  is,  however,  evidence  that 
infrastructure  has  a  small  but  statistically  significant  positive  effect  on  TFP.  ffighways 
and  other  roads  are  the  most  productive  types  of  infrastructure,  followed  by  "other 
structures".  When  the  TFP  data  is  disaggregated,  the  finding  is  that  core  infrastructure 
affects  some  industries  more  than  others,  especially  those  that  are  capital  intensive  and 
have  the  largest  motor  vehicle  shares.  The  results  obtained  using  the  adjusted  TFP 
measure  differ  in  several  respects  to  those  obtained  using  the  standard  Solow  residual- 
the  Solow  residual  produces  evidence  of  reverse  causality;  infrastructure  is  found  to 
have  a  relatively  larger  (thought  not  as  statistically  significant)  effect  on  TFP  and  the 
results  are  not  robust  to  the  use  of  disaggregated  data. CONTENTS 
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Introduction: 
Motivation,  Definitions,  and  Thesis  Structure 
1.  Background 
In  many  countries  the  public  sector  owns  most  of  the  physical  infrastructure,  the 
absence  or  neglect  of  which  means  private  economic  activity  would  be  either 
impossible  or  greatly  hindered.  In  a  broad  sense  physical  infrastructure  contributes  to 
the  provision  of  all  public  services,  from  national  defence,  maintenance  of  law  and 
order  and  fire  prevention  to  education,  health  care  and  envirom-nental  protection,  and 
the  supply  of  power,  water,  waste  disposal  and  transportation  networks.  This  type  of 
capital  often  accounts  for  a  significant  portion  of  the  national  wealth.  In  the  United 
States,  for  example,  over  a  third  of  the  total  capital  stock  is  publicly  owned. 
The  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  to  examine  the  role  of  public  capital  in  private 
sector  production,  in  particular  the  role  of  "core"  infrastructure  -  the  large  capital- 
intensive  "natural  monopolies"  such  as  highways,  water  and  sewer  lines  and  mass 
transit.  These  types  of  capital  arguably  have  the  most  direct  and  instantaneous  effect 
on  private  production.  The  most  general  characteristic  of  core  infrastructure  is  that 
services  are  supplied  through  a  networked  delivery  system,  designed  to  serve  a  large 
number  of  users. 2 
It  is  not  difficult  to  see  why  infrastructure  matters.  One  need  only  imagine  the 
difficulties  encountered  by  firms  operating  in  countries  which  lack  adequate 
communications  networks  and  basic  amenities.  It  is  also  not  difficult  to  envisage  the 
contribution  of  infrastructure  at  the  margin.  Because  most  publicly  provided  goods 
exhibit  at  least  some  degree  of  consumption  rivalry,  new  capital  expenditures  are 
required  to  meet  increased  demand  and,  as  time  passes,  to  support  changes  in  the 
nature  and  geographic  location  of  economic  activity. 
The  importance  of  infrastructure  to  the  regional  and  urban  econon-fic 
development  process  has  long  been  recognised.  For  example,  studies  have  analysed 
whether  public  capital  crowds  out  or  crowds  in  private  capital  and  thus  whether 
infrastructure  is  a  useful  tool  for  inter-regional  competition  for  private  investment. 
However,  ocused  on  the 
., 
since  the  late  1980s,  a  considerable  amount  of  research  has  f 
importance  of  public  capital  as  a  macro  policy  instrument;  not  for  the  type  of  demand 
management  that  was  popular  during  the  Great  Depression,  but  for  stimulating  the 
supply-side  of  the  economy  by  enhancing  private  factor  productivity.  Analysis  of  the 
link  between  public  capital  and  private  sector  productivity  was  originally  motivated  by 
the  finding  that  the  slowdown  in  many  countries'  productivity  growth  rates  in  the  early 
1970s  coincided  with  an  "infrastructure  slowdown"  of  comparable  severity,  as 
government  spending  was  redirected  towards  the  provision  of  consumption  goods. 
The  focus  in  this  thesis  is  on  the  importance  of  infrastructure  capital  to  private 
production  in  the  United  States  (U.  S.  ).  The  U.  S.  was  chosen  as  the  economy  of  focus 
partly  because  a  wealth  of  public  capital  data  is  available  for  this  country  and  partly  so 
that  the  results  of  the  empirical  research  could  be  compared  with  existing  studies,  most 
of  which  use  U.  S.  data.  Despite  the  significant  increase  in  macro  infrastructure 
research  in  recent  Vears.  there  remain  many  unanswered  questions.  Firstly,  there  has 3 
been  very  little  investigation  of  the  importance  of  the  different  types  of  infrastructure 
to  private  producers.  In  the  U.  S.  the  public  sector  owns  many  different  types  of  capital. 
It  is  possible  that  some  types  (eg,  courthouses  and  fire  stations)  have  no  effect  on 
productivity,  while  others  have  either  an  indirect  effect  (eg,  schools  and  hospitals)  or 
direct  effect  (eg,  highways  and  water  mains).  With  the  analysis  of  the  different  types  of 
infrastructure  as  the  underlying  theme,  the  thesis  takes  a  somewhat  eclectic  approach, 
using  two  different  empirical  approaches,  each  of  which  sheds  light  on  a  number  of 
unresolved  issues.  The  first  approach  involves  estimating  a  series  of  cost  function 
models,  the  second  involves  estimating  autoregressive  models  and  conducting  causality 
tests. 
2.  Thesis  Structure 
The  thesis  is  divided  into  four  chapters-  the  first  two  provide  background  information 
on  the  infrastructure  literature  and  the  history  of  public  investment  in  the  U.  S. 
, 
the 
second  two  consist  of  the  empirical  studies  that  make  up  the  majority  of  the  research. 
In  the  next  few  pages  a  summary  is  provided  of  the  techniques  employed  in  each  of  the 
chapters  and  the  contributions  they  make  to  the  infrastructure  literature. 
Chapter  1:  Review  of  the  Literature 
The  main  empirical  approaches,  findings  and  criticisms  of  the  existing  body  of 
infrastructure  research  are  summarised  and  discussed  in  this  chapter.  Its  primary 
purpose  is  to  highlight  opportunities  for  new  research.  The  main  empirical  approaches 
in  the  inftastructure  literature  are  the  production  function  and  duality  approaches.  The 4 
latter  involves  estimating  cost  and  profit  functions.  The  cost  function  approach  has 
been  used  by  a  host  of  researchers  in  recent  years  to  determine  whether  infrastructure 
reduces  private  sector  costs  and  to  establish  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between 
public  capital  and  private  inputs.  In  motivation  of  the  empirical  analysis  conducted  in 
Chapter  3,  reasons  are  provided  why  the  cost  function  approach  is  preferred  to  the 
production  function  approach,  in  particular  the  fact  that  private  inputs  are  treated  as 
endogenous  variables  and  the  availability  of  a  richer  menu  of  analytical  statistics.  The 
main  results  of  the  various  studies  are  summarised.  It  is  clear  that  several  issues  have 
not  been  addressed,  in  particular  concerning  optimality,  the  role  of  the  different 
infrastructure  stocks  and  the  effect  of  input  prices  on  the  demand  for  infrastructure. 
The  catalyst  for  the  upsurge  in  infrastructure's  macro  effects  was  the 
observation  that  ,  in  the  U.  S.  and  other  countries,  the  slowdown  in  productivity  growth 
coincided  with  a  slowdown  in  infrastructure  investment.  However,  some  authors  have 
argued  that  infrastructure  may  not  cause  productivity,  rather  the  relationship  runs  in 
the  opposite  direction-  because  infrastructure  is  a  normal  good,  productivity  gains  that 
lead  to  increases  in  income  lead  to  increases  in  the  demand  for  infrastructure  services. 
In  motivation  of  the  empirical  analysis  conducted  in  Chapter  4,  attention  is  drawn  to 
the  fact  that  there  has  been  very  little  formal  analysis  of  the  causal  relationship  between 
the  two  variables.  More  importantly,  those  studies  that  use  a  direct  measure  of  total 
factor  productivity  (TFP)  have  not  made  use  of  recent  developments  in  the 
productivity  literature  that,  by  accounting  for  variable  factor  utilisation  over  the  cycle, 
allow  researchers  to  get  closer  to  the  true  relationship  between  inffastructure 
investment  and  productivity. 5 
Chapter  2:  Analysis  of  the  Severity  and  Causes  of  the  Inftastructure  Slowdown 
This  chapter  makes  use  of  the  wealth  of  public  capital  data  available  from  the  U.  S. 
Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis.  It  is  used  to  illustrate  what  researchers  refer  to  as  the  * 
"infrastructure  slowdown"  -  the  period  of  falling  public  investment  from  1968-82.  The 
slowdown  is  also  illustrated  by  comparing  public  investment  with  a  variety  of  measures 
of  private  economic  activity  (private  investment,  GDP,  growth  of  the  labour  force  and 
TFP).  The  public  capital  data  is  divided  into  its  chief  components  in  order  to  identify 
those  types  of  capital  that  suffered  most  severely  from  the  spending  cuts  and  those  that 
were  relatively  unaffected.  This  information  is  useful  in  interpreting  the  results  of  the 
main  studies  in  Chapter  3  and  Chapter  4.  The  causes  of  the  infrastructure  slowdown 
are  then  examined  and  particular  attention  is  paid  to  the  way  that  higher  levels  of 
economic  depreciation,  caused  by  changes  in  the  composition  of  the  public  capital 
stock,  may  have  contributed  to  the  slowdown. 
Chapter  3:  Calculating  Optimal  Public  Capital  Stocks 
One  of  the  advantages  of  the  cost  function  approach  is  that  it  provides  a  convenient 
framework  for  the  estimation  of  optimal  capital  stocks.  To  date,  however,  the  quantity 
of  public  capital  that  is  optimal  to  U.  S.  private  production  has  not  been  calculated. 
Calculating  this  measure  is  useful  because  the  finding  that  public  capital  has  a 
significant  output  or  cost  elasticity  does  not  necessarily  mean  more  investment  is 
required.  The  benefits  have  to  be  weighed  against  the  cost  of  providing  the  additional 
capital.  This  is  done  using  shadow  value  techniques. 
An  examination  of  the  literature  also  reveals  that  none  of  the  cost  function 
studies  compare  the  benefits  of  the  different  types  of  infrastructure.  To  redress  thýs,  the 
optimal  quantities  of  the  different  types  of  core  infrastructure  (roads-  water  and  sewer 6 
systems  and  other  structures)  are  estimated.  This  exercise  is  worthwhile  because,  just 
as  a  finding  that  infrastructure  has  a  large  output  or  cost  elasticity  does  not  imply  that 
more  investment  is  required,  a  finding  that  the  overall  stock  of  infrastructure  is  sub- 
optimal  does  not  imply  that  there  should  be  more  of  every  type  of  public  capital.  Also, 
most  of  the  cost  function  studies  focus  only  on  the  importance  of  public  capital  to  the 
manufacturing  sector.  While  it  is  possible  that  infrastructure  provides  more  benefits  to 
manufacturers  than  to  other  sectors,  it  is  also  likely  that  the  benefits  enjoyed  by  many 
other  sectors  are  by  no  means  insignificant.  The  transportation  industry,  for  example,  is 
likely  to  benefit  from  an  increase  or  improvement  in  roads  (which  make  up  the  majority 
of  the  core  infrastructure  stock).  Thus,  omitting  non-manufacturing  from  the  analysis 
will  lead  to  inaccurate  estimation  of  the  optimal  capital  stocks.  In  this  chapter  data  is 
used  for  the  total  non-farm  private  business  sector  which  includes  the  mining, 
manufacturing,  construction,  transportation,  utility  and  service  sectors. 
Two  cost  function  studies  are  carried  out,  using  the  Generalised  Leontief 
specification.  The  parameter  estimates  obtained  from  each  are  inserted  into  optimal 
capital  stock  equations,  along  with  a  series  of  private  sector  variables,  and  the  resulting 
optimal  capital  stocks  are  compared  with  the  actual  capital  stocks  over  the  period 
1959-94.  The  first  study  uses  aggregate  infrastructure  data  to  determine  whether  the 
overall  stock  of  core  public  capital  is  under  or  oversupplied.  In  the  second  study,  the 
stock  of  core  infrastructure  is  disaggregated  and  the  optimal  amount  of  each  type  of 
capital  (roads,  water  and  sewer  systems,  and  "other  structures")  is  estimated. 
The  study  contains  a  number  of  additional  innovations.  Optimal  infrastructure 
elasticities,  which  show  the  responsiveness  of  the  optimal  capital  stocks  to  changes  in 
factor  prices  and  output,  are  also  calculated  using  the  parameters  from  the  two  models. 
Using  techniques  developed  by  Dale  Jorgenson  and  Zvi  Griliches,  a  measure  of 7 
aggregate  public  capital  input  is  computed  by  Divisia  quantity  aggregation.  The  public 
capital  index  takes  account  of  the  fact  that  some  types  of  capital  are  more  productive 
than  others  -  assets  with  high  user  costs  are  more  productive  in  equilibrium  than  assets 
with  lower  user  costs.  To  my  knowledge,  none  of  the  U.  S.  infrastructure  studies  has 
employed  these  techniques. 
To  estimate  the  optimal  capital  stocks,  data  is  required  on  the  prices  of  labour, 
private  capital  and  public  capital.  The  studies  in  the  infi7astructure  literature  differ 
considerably  in  their  treatment  of  these  variables  for  tax  purposes.  The  optimal  capital 
stock  estimates  are  compared  under  a  number  of  different  taxation  scenarios.  To  start, 
pre-tax  user  costs  of  capital  are  used.  The  rental  price  of  private  capital  is  then 
adjusted  to  account  for  various  investment  incentives  and  the  system  of  taxing 
corporate  profits.  The  rental  price  of  public  capital  is  adjusted  to  take  account  of  the 
excess  burden  of  taxation.  The  labour  wage  rate  is  also  converted  into  an  after-tax 
measure.  Other  more  minor  innovations  are  discussed  in  the  chapter  itself 
The  results  reveal  that,  despite  the  slowdown  in  the  growth  rate  of  the  core 
infrastructure  stock,  this  type  of  capital  was  never  underprovided  over  the  sample 
period.  Using  disaggregated  data  the  finding  is  also  that  none  of  the  three  types  of  core 
infrastructure  was  suboptimal.  However,  there  were  times  when  one  type  of 
inftastructure  would  be  moving  towards  a  state  of  underprovision  while  another  was 
becoming  increasingly  oversupplied. 
Chapter  4:  Using  Adjusted  Measures  of  Productivity  to  Resolve  the  Causality  Issue 
The  research  in  this  chapter  is  motivated  by  the  fact  that  most  studies  in  the 
inftastructure  literature  that  use  a  direct  measure  of  total  factor  productivity  have 
ignored  developments  in  the  productivity  literature.  The  aim  is  to  analyse  the 8 
relationship  between  infrastructure  investment  and  U.  S.  manufacturing  using  two 
alternative  measures  of  total  factor  productivity;  one  based  on  Robert  Solow's  famous 
derivation  and  another  based  on  developments  by  Robert  Hall  and  Susanto  Basu  to 
take  account  of  possible  increasing  returns  to  scale  and  variable  factor  usage  over  the 
cycle.  The  adjusted  TFP  measure  is  constructed  using  manufacturing  materials  usage 
data,  which  measures  the  degree  to  which  labour  and  capital  usage  vary  during 
expansions  and  contractions.  Each  of  these  measures  is  used  to  answer  a  number  of 
questions:  does  infrastructure  investment  cause  TFP  or,  as  several  authors  have 
argued,  does  the  relationship  run  in  the  opposite  direction?  Which  types  of 
infrastructure,  if  any,  are  the  most  productive?  If  infrastructure  is  productive  does  it 
account  for  much  of  the  variation  in  the  TFP  growth  rate?  Which  manufacturing 
industries  benefit  the  most  from  infrastructure  investment? 
The  original  Solow  residual  is  used  in  the  analysis  for  comparative  purposes 
and  because  it  is  the  preferred  measure  of  TFP  in  a  considerable  amount  of 
econometric  research,  including  the  infrastructure  literature.  The  adjusted  TFP 
measure  is  employed  because  it  arguably  reflects  "true"  efficiency  changes  more 
accurately  than  the  Solow  residual.  The  NBER  manufacturing  productivity  database  is 
used  to  construct  a  variety  of  standard  and  adjusted  residuals:  the  first  set  is 
constructed  from  aggregate  data  for  total,  durable  and  nondurable  manufacturing;  the 
second  set  uses  disaggregated  data  for  each  of  the  20  two-digit  SIC  industries.  The 
latter  is  used  to  determine  which  industries  benefit  most  from  infrastructure 
investment.  While  it  would  be  preferable  to  calculate  an  adjusted  TFP  measure  for  the 
entire  private  business  sector,  data  linutations  preclude  such  an  exercise.  Nevertheless 
interesting  insights  into  iriffastructure's  role  are  derived  by  comparing  the  results 9 
obtained  using  the  adjusted  measure  of  TFP  with  the  Solow  residual  and  the  results  of 
other  infrastructure  studies. 
The  productivity  measures  are  put  to  a  number  of  uses.  Several  authors  have 
alluded  to  the  possibility  that  infrastructure  does  not  Granger  cause  productivity  but 
rather  that  productivity  gains  result  in  new  public  investment.  However,  very  little 
empirical  analysis  has  been  conducted  to  determine  the  relationship  between  the 
variables.  To  establish  whether  there  is  evidence  to  support  the  "reverse  causality" 
hypothesis,  autoregressive  models  that  introduce  dynamic  effects  from  infrastructure 
investment  are  constructed  using  Akaike's  Final  Prediction  Error  Criterion  and  other 
statistical  lag-length  selection  criteria.  A  number  of  causality  tests  are  conducted  within 
this  framework  and  extensive  diagnostic  tests  are  conducted  to  confirm  the  robustness 
of  the  causality  test  results  and  the  adequacy  of  the  models. 
The  original  and  adjusted  TFP  measures  produce  very  different  results 
concerning  infrastructure's  impact  on  productivity.  While  the  original  Solow  residual 
produces  some  evidence  of  reverse  causality,  the  adjusted  residual  produces  evidence 
of  uni-directional  causality  from  infrastructure  to  productivity.  Causality  tests  are 
performed  using  a  variety  of  different  infrastructure  and  productivity  measures.  The 
Solow  residual  produces  inconsistent  results  at  different  levels  of  aggregation. 
However,  the  results  obtained  using  Basu's  measure  of  TFP  are  far  more  satisfactory. 
No  evidence  of  reverse  causality  is  found  using  either  aggregate  or  disaggregated 
inftastructure  data.  Disaggregated  infrastructure  data  reveals  that  investment  in  roads, 
utilities,  and  transit  systems  affect  productivity.  When  individual  industry  TFP 
measures  are  included  in  the  analysis  the  finding  is  that  infrastructure  investment 
affects  some  industries  but  not  others 10 
Once  the  causality  issue  has  been  resolved  the  next  step  is  to  estimate  the  magnitude  of 
the  relationship  between  public  investment  and  TFP.  Again  the  different  TFP  measures 
produce  different  results.  Whether  use  is  made  of  aggregate  or  disaggregated 
infrastructure  data,  the  autoregressive  estimates  obtained  using  the  adjusted 
productivity  measure  are  relatively  smaller  but  more  significant  than  those  obtained 
using  the  Solow  residual.  Thus  it  is  not  possible  to  agree  with  certain  infrastructure 
researchers  that  at  least  a  quarter  of  the  productivity  growth  slowdown  can  be 
explained  by  the  fall  in  infrastructure  investment.  Nor,  however,  is  it  possible  to  agree 
with  other  researchers  that  the  relationship  between  the  variables  is  purely  spurious.  It 
is  likely  that  infrastructure  investment  has  a  positive  effect  on  private  productivity  but 
this  effect  is  quite  small. 
The  approaches  followed  in  the  two  studies  in  Chapters  3  and  4  are  quite 
different,  the  one  making  use  of  a  formal  specification  incorporating  infrastructure's 
impact  on  variable  costs;  the  other  using  no  formal  specification,  treating  each  variable 
as  endogenous  within  an  autoregressive  framework.  Furthermore,  the  one  chapter 
makes  use  of  data  for  the  whole  private  business  sector;  the  other  uses  manufacturing 
data  only.  A  conunon  finding  in  both  studies  is  that  infrastructure  has  a  significant 
effect  on  the  private  production  process  and  the  different  infrastructure  stocks  vary  in 
importance.  The  results  of  both  studies  yield  caution  against  exaggerating 
infrastructure's  importance,  however.  The  cost  function  approach  reveals  that  at  no 
time  over  the  sample  period  was  the  infrastructure  stock  seriously  undersupplied.  The 
autoregressive  framework  reveals  that  infrastructure  investment  has  only  a  small  effect 
on  the  productivity  growth  rate.  Each  of  the  empirical  approaches  has  a  number  of 
advantages  and  disadvantages  which  are  discussed  in  greater  detail  in  each  of  the 
chapters  and  the  conclusion  to  the  thesis. II 
3.  Concluding  Comments 
Before  proceeding  it  is  also  necessary  to  mention  some  of  the  important  issues  that  are 
not  analysed  in  this  thesis.  First,  it  is  obvious  that  many  of  the  benefits  provided  by  the 
public  capital  stock  are  enjoyed  by  consumers  rather  than  producers.  While  some  of 
these  benefits,  eg,  improved  health  and  leisure  facilities,  accrue  indirectly  to  producers, 
others  do  not.  An  analysis  of  consumption  benefits  falls  outside  the  scope  of  this  thesis. 
Another  important  issue  is  the  relative  role  of  the  private  and  public  sectors  in 
the  provision  of  infrastructure  services.  In  the  infrastructure  literature,  the  terms 
"infrastructure"  and  "public  capital"  are  used  interchangeably.  However,  it  is  necessary 
to  point  out  that  in  the  U.  S.  some  of  the  capital  owned  by  the  private  sector  can  be 
classified  as  infrastructure.  Examples  include  electric  and  gas  utilities,  communication 
networks,  educational  institutions  and  certain  transportation  networks.  Similarly,  the 
public  sector  owns  certain  types  of  capital  that  are  not  part  of  the  country's 
infrastructure.  A  good  example  is  state-owned  equipment  which  is  made  up  of  a 
variety  of  private  goods  ranging  from  power  tools  and  garden  equipment  to  computers 
and  motor  vehicles. 
In  recent  years  there  has  been  growing  interest  in  the  U.  S.  in  the  role  of  the 
private  sector  in  the  provision  of  infrastructure  services.  While  markets  work  best  in 
providing  pure  private  goods  or  services,  many  types  of  infrastructure  are,  arguably,  as 
much  private  goods  as  they  are  public  goods.  For  example,  most  of  the  services 
Ii  ing  infrastructure  provides  are  excludable  in  a  specific  sense  -  their  use  depends  on  gaini 
access  to  a  facility  or  network,  for  example  by  connection  to  piped  water  and  gas  or 
access  to  a  section  of  the  highway  network,  and  service  use  may  be  metered  and 
charged  for.  Once  a  user  is  connected  to  the  network  or  transport  facility,  the  degree 12 
of  rivalry  depends  on  the  costs  (including  congestion)  imposed  on  existing  users  or  on 
the  service  supplier  when  an  additional  service  unit  is  consumed.  It  has  in  the  past  been 
common  in  many  countries  not  to  charge  users  for  the  volume  of  some  utility  services 
consumed  because  the  marginal  supply  cost  has  been  considered  negligible,  congestion 
has  been  absent,  or  because  technological  constraints  have  prevented  volume  pricing. 
However,  growing  congestion  as  networks'  capacities  become  fully  utillsed  and 
technical  innovations  in  metering  consumption  have  made  it  possible  and  desirable  to 
price  many  infrastructure  services  like  other  private  goods.  Where  regulation  is 
required  because  a  particular  type  of  infrastructure  produces  negative  externalities,  it 
can  be  narrowly  focused  on  market  imperfections  while  pern-fitting  wide  scope  for 
competition  in  other  components  of  the  sector.  While  the  sunk  costs  that  charactense 
the  provision  of  many  infrastructure  services  are  a  potential  source  of  natural 
monopoly,  technological  and  other  differences  make  it  possible  to  "unbundle"  the 
components  of  a  sector  that  involve  natural  monopoly  from  those  that  can  be  provided 
more  competitively. 
In  conclusion,  the  fact  that  many  infrastructure  services  are  as  much  private 
goods  as  they  are  public  goods  arguably  paves  the  way  for  a  meaningful  role  for  the 
private  sector  in  future  years.  Other  services  may  remain  in  the  public  domain.  The 
above  comments  are  provided  for  background  information  purposes  only.  A  rigorous 
analysis  of  the  relative  roles  of  the  public  and  Private  sector  falls  outside  the  scope  of 
this  thesis. 13 
Chapter  I 
The  Role  of  Public  Capital  in  Private  Production: 
A  Review  of  the  Literature 
1.  Introduction 
The  number  of  studies  focusing  on  public  infrastructure  has  ballooned  since  Aschauer 
(1989a,  b)  and  Munnell  (1990a,  b)  uncovered  a  positive  and  statistically  significant 
relationship  between  this  variable  and  private  productivity.  '  Several  reviews  of  the 
infrastructure  literature  have  already  been  carried 
OUt2  So 
,  rather  than  simply  listing  the 
main  results  of  previous  empirical  work,  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  highlight 
opportunities  for  new  research  and  provide  a  platform  for  the  two  studies  that  account 
for  the  majority  of  the  research  in  this  thesis.  Some  of  the  results  of  previous  work  are 
also  provided  as  background  information. 
'  Although  Aschauer  and  Munnell  sparked  off  the  public  capital  debate,  a  number  of  studies  (eg, 
Ratner.  1983)  had  previously  analysed  infrastructure's  effect  at  the  national  level.  The  link  between 
public  investment  and  economic  activity  was  analysed  analytically  by  Arrow  and  Kurz  (1970)  and  the 
role  of  infrastructure  has  for  a  long  time  been  an  important  area  of  research  in  the  literature  on 
regional  and  urban  development.  Nevertheless,  Aschauer's  and  Munnell's  work  attracted 
policymakers'  attention  to  the  fact  that  infrastructure  may  be  a  macroeconomic  policy  instrument. 
'  For  example.  those  by  the  Federal  Highway  Administration  (1992),  Gillen  (1996),  Gramlich  (1994). 
Hurst  (1994)  and  Munnell  (1993). 14 
The  infrastructure  literature  is  almost  entirely  empirical  in  nature.  Broadly,  two 
approaches  have  received  the  most  attention:  the  production  function  approach  and  the 
duality  approach.  The  latter  involves  the  estimation  of  cost  and  profit  functions.  Early 
work  involved  estimation  of  aggregate  Cobb-Douglas  production  functions,  with 
public  capital  included  as  an  input.  The  implausible  results  obtained  in  these  studies  led 
to  the  use  of  more  complex  functional  forms,  richer  data  sets  consisting  of  data  across 
time  and  space  and  econometric  techniques  that  account  for  non-stationary  variables. 
In  reviewing  this  literature  a  point  that  has  to  be  stressed  is  that  many  of  the  results  of 
the  various  studies  are  not  comparable  and  it  Is  often  difficult,  without  replicating,  to 
know  to  what  innovations  differences  in  results  should  be  attributed:  the  use  of  a 
different  geographic  dataset,  economic  sector,  functional  form,  econometric  technique, 
adjustment  to  variables,  etc. 
Developments  in  the  production  function  literature  were  accompanied  by  work 
using  the  duality  approach  by  a  number  of  authors  such  as  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992), 
Lynde  and  Richmond  (1992),  and  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  (1994).  These  studies  address 
some  of  the  problems  encountered  in  the  estimation  of  production  functions  and,  by 
allowing  for  adjustments  in  firms'  decision  variables,  provide  a  richer  menu  of 
analytical  statistics  that  allows  researchers  to  investigate  how  firms  benefit  from  an 
expansion  of  the  public  capital  stock. 
Despite  the  significant  increase  in  infrastructure  research  in  recent  years  there 
remain  many  unanswered  questions.  First,  the  finding  that  various  measures  of  public 
capital  have  a  significant  effect  on  productivity  does  not  answer  the  question  as  to 
whether  the  benefits  outweigh  the  cost  of  providing  additional  capital.  Public  capital 
contributes  independently  to  firms'  output  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  purchased  on  a  per 
Linit  basis.  Local  governments,  for  example,  supply  infrastructure  in  return  for  lump 15 
sum  property  tax  payments  and  the  amount  of  public  capital  supplied  is  determined  by 
a  political  process  over  which  firms  have  no  direct  control.  Although  most  studies  in 
the  infrastructure  literature  treat  infrastructure  capital  as  a  fixed  unpaid  factor  of 
production,  new  public  projects  impose  a  cost  to  society  in  the  form  of  higher  tax 
payments.  Thus  the  optimal  infrastructure  stock  can  be  derived  by  balancing  the  cost 
savings  enjoyed  by  the  private  business  sector  against  the  cost  to  society  of  providing 
the  additional  capital.  Much  of  the  recent  research  using  the  duality  approach  also 
focuses  on  the  importance  of  infrastructure  to  the  manufacturing  sector,  either  in  the 
U.  S.  or  in  other  countries.  This  is  justifiable  in  the  sense  that  a  more  complete  set  of 
input  data  is  available  for  this  sector  and  manufacturing  is,  arguably,  the  sector  that 
derives  most  benefits  from  this  type  of  capital.  However,  there  are  other  sectors  that 
are  likely  to  benefit  from  infrastructure  investment  either  directly  or  indirectly  and  so 
more  investigation  is  needed  into  the  extent  of  infrastructure's  impact  on  total  private 
business  production  possibilities. 
Second,  it  is  also  clear  that  studies  that  make  use  of  a  direct  measure  of  total 
factor  productivity  (TFP)  rely  on  standard  constructions  based  on  Solow  (1957).  ' 
However,  as  Malley  et  aL  (1998)  point  out,  the  standard  Solow  residual  ignores 
considerations  pertaining  to  market  power,  returns  to  scale  and  variable  factor 
utilisation  over  the  business  cycle.  If  the  Solow  residual  does  not  measure  "true") 
t  onship  productivity  growth  ,  it  is  possible  that  conclusions  drawn  about  the  rela  I 
between  productivity  and  infrastructure  based  on  this  residual  are  invalid.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  in  Chapter  4  the  focus  moves  from  infrastructure  to  issues  relating  to 
'  These  include  production  function  studies,  studies  that  use  a  growth  accounting  framework  and 
studies  in  which  causality  tests  are  carried  out. 16 
productivity  measurement.  There  are  a  number  of  uses  to  which  alternative  measures 
of  productivity  can  be  put.  For  example,  many  surveys  of  the  infrastructure  literature 
raise  the  question  of  "reverse  causation"  (productivity  gains  generating  increases  in 
public  investment).  However,  there  has  been  very  little  empirical  investigation  of  the 
causal  relationship  between  the  two  variables. 
Third,,  regardless  of  the  empirical  approach,  more  work  is  needed  on  the 
importance  of  the  different  types  of  public  capital.  For  example,  do  increases  in  the 
different  types  of  public  capital  have  opposite  effects  on  the  demand  for  labour  and 
capital?  Are  some  types  of  infrastructure  optimal  and  others  suboptimal?  Do  some 
types  of  infrastructure  Granger  cause  TFP  and  others  not? 
This  chapter  is  divided  up  as  follows.  In  Section  2a  brief  overview  is  provided 
of  the  different  ways  in  which  public  capital  is  hypothesised  to  affect  private 
production.  In  Section  3  an  outline  is  provided  of  the  production  function  approach 
and  the  results  of  the  various  national-level  and  state-level  studies  are  summarised.  The 
main  criticisms  of  this  approach  are  also  highlighted.  In  Section  4  the  advantages  of  the 
cost  function  approach  are  reported  and  the  wide  variety  of  infrastructure  impacts  that 
can  be  uncovered  using  this  approach  are  derived.  Finally,  the  main  results  of  the 
various  studies  are  reported.  In  Section  5a  brief  summary  is  provided  of  the  second 
duality  approach  which  involves  estimation  of  profit  functions.  In  Section  6  avenues 
for  new  research  (most  of  which  receive  attention  in  the  remaining  chapters  of  the 
thesis)  are  highlighted. 17 
2.  The  Transmission  Mechanism 
It  is  important  to  distinguish  between  infrastructure  effects  that  reveal  themselves  on 
the  demand  side  and  those  that  reveal  themselves  on  the  supply  side.  The  immediate 
impact  of  an  increase  in  infrastructure  spending  is  to  stimulate  demand  for  construction 
workers,  engineers  and  other  types  of  labour  and  factor  inputs  required  for  the  actual 
building  of  a  road  or  facility.  The  increased  demand  for  such  resources  has  a  prompt 
and  positive  effect  on  output  and  growth.  Public  works  projects  were  used 
aggressively  in  the  U.  S.  during  the  Great  Depression  to  provide  employment  and 
stimulate  income  growth.  Policies  adopted  in  Japan  and  proposed  in  the  European 
Community  in  recent  years  have  also  been  motivated  on  these  grounds.  4  Stimulating 
demand,  however,  offers  only  one  channel,  and  rather  a  short-lived  one,  through  which 
public  capital  affects  private  econon-fic  activity.  The  more  important  and  longer-lasting 
effects  occur  on  the  supply  side. 
According  to  Meade  (1952),  there  are  two  ways  in  which  public  capital  can 
affect  private  production.  One  is  as  an  "enviromnental"  factor  that  enhances  the 
productivity  of  private  inputs.  In  terms  of  this  hypothesis,  infrastructure  investment 
produces  positive  production  externalities.  '  As  shown  by  Hulten  and  Schwab  (1991b), 
if  these  externalities  augment  all  inputs  to  the  same  degree,  a  change  in  the  quantity  of 
public  capital  acts  like  a  fEcks-neutral  shift  in  the  production  function: 
Qt  =  O(G,  f)  -  F(Lt 
5, 
Kj 
lo  (1) 
where  Q,  is  value-added  output,  0()  is  an  index  of  Fficks-neutral  technical  change,  G, 
4  See  IMF  (1993,  p.  34)  and  EC  (1993)  for  discussions  of  the  Japanese  proposals  Of  August  1992  and 
April  1993  and  the  June  1993  EC  summit  proposals  rcspectivclv. 
The  benefits  are  similar  to  those  discussed  by  Romer  (1986), 18 
represents  services  from  the  public  capital  stock,  L,  is  labour  input  and  K,  is  private 
capital.  In  the  Hicks-neutral  world,  an  increase  in  public  investment  raises  the  marginal 
products  of  labour  and  private  capital.  For  example,  an  uncongested  transportation 
network  allows  firms  to  deliver  products  faster,  reduce  inventories,,  centralise  work  to 
take  advantage  of  economies  of  scale  and  hire  a  broader  range  of  people  from  a  wider 
geographical  area. 
The  other  way  in  which  public  capital  affects  private  output  is if  it  enters  the 
production  function  as  a  direct  but  unpaid  factor  of  production.  The  correct 
specification  of  the  production  function  in  this  case  is 
0,  -  F(L,  K,  G,  ).  (2) 
The  public  good  has  the  characteristics  of  a  private  good  though  it  is  not  supplied 
through  a  market-clearing  process.  Public  capital  does  not  augment  the  productivity  of 
the  private  sector  but  increases  in  G  lead  to  increases  in  Q  if  the  marginal  product  of 
public  capital  is  positive.  It  is  likely  that  certain  types  of  infrastructure  may  enter  the 
production  function  as  a  direct  input  as  well  as  enhance  the  productivity  of  other 
inputs. 
The  third  way  in  which  infrastructure  can  increase  output  (as  opposed  to 
productivity)  is  by  attracting  private  inputs  into  a  region  or  country  and  thereby 
shifting  the  production  function  outwards.  If  more  or  better  infrastructure  provides 
cost  savings  (or  some  other  benefit),  one  would  expect  firms  to  relocate  from  regions 
with  a  low  quantity  or  poor  quality  of  infrastructure  to  regions  with  a  large  quantity  or 
high  quality  of  infrastructure  capital.  This  is  why  Seitz  and  Licht  (1995)  argue  that 
public  capital  may  be  a  strategic  weapon  for  inter-regional  (and  maybe  international) 
competition. 19 
With  public  investments  that  reduce  travel  time  (roads,  highways,  airports  and  mass 
transit)  many  of  the  time  savings  accrue  directly  to  consumers  or  workers  and  not  to 
firms.  Reduced  commuting  time  could  lead  to  more  time  being  spent  at  work  but  this 
would  add  to  both  output  and  hours  paid  for,  not  necessarily  to  output  per  hour.  It  is 
more  likely  that  reduced  commuting  time  increases  the  amount  of  leisure  time  and 
hence  improves  welfare.  However,  to  the  extent  that  workers  are  compensated  for  the 
cost  of  their  travel,  increased  public  spending  on  transport  inffastructure  should  lower 
the  cost  of  producing  a  given  level  of  out  PUt. 
6 
3.  The  Production  Function  Approach 
3.1  Introduction 
Production  function  studies  are  divided  into  two  main  groups:  those  that  use  national 
data  and  those  that  use  state  or  regional  data.  Studies  using  state-level  production 
functions  have  generally  concluded  that  public  capital  has  a  positive  effect  on 
productivity,  but  the  effect  is  smaller  than  that  uncovered  by  studies  using  national- 
level  data.  The  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  is  the  most  popular  functional  form 
in  these  studies.  Following  (2),  public  capital  enters  the  production  function  as  a  fixed 
unpaid  factor  of  production- 
Q_  OLßL  K 
ßK 
Gß,  9  3, 
(3) 
6  To  the  extent  that  workers  are  employed  up  to  the  point  where,  at  the  margin,  productivity  is  equal 
to  real  wages.  the  increased  public  investment  could  lead  to  lower  productivity.  Hence  there  are 
conceptual  reasons  why  one  would  not  expect  public  infrastructure  investment  to  increase 
productivity 20 
where  8L,  8K,  and  8G  are  the  output  elasticities  of  labour,  private  capital  and  public 
capital  respectively  and  time  subscripts  are  omitted  for  simplicity.  Taking  logarithms  of 
both  sides  the  equation  can  either  be  estimated  with  output  as  the  dependent  variable 
(eg,  Munnell,  1993)  or  after  transforming  Q  into  a  measure  of  capital,  labour  or  total 
factor  productivity  (eg,  Aschauer  1989a  and  Munnefl  1990a). 
3.2  Aggregate  Production  Function  Studies 
Aschauer  (1989a)  estimated  a  transformed  version  of  (3)  using  national  data  for  the 
U.  S.  from  1949  to  1985.  flis  basic  premise  is  that: 
'Expansions  of  public  investment  spending  should  have  a  larger  stimulative 
impact  on  private  sector  output  than  equal-sized  increases  in  public 
consumption  expenditure.  Specifically,  public  investment  is  argued  to  induce 
an  increase  in  the  rate  of  return  to  private  capital  and,  thereby,  to  stimulate 
private  investment  expenditure.  "  (p.  178) 
Rather  than  crowding  out  private  investment,  Aschauer  argues  that  public  investment 
stimulates  private  investment  by  increasing  the  rate  of  return  to  private  capital.  To 
transform  the  left-hand  side  into  output  per  unit  of  capital  a  number  of  assumptions  are 
made  about  returns  to  scale.  The  first  specification  of  technology  Aschauer  considered 
was  increasing  returns  to  scale  over  L,  K  and  G  but  constant  returns  to  scale  (CRS) 
over  private  inputs  (flL  +  BK=  1).  This  assumption  is  broadly  consistent  with  the 
argument  that  industries  with  increasing  returns  to  scale  are  likely  to  be  publicly 21 
operate  .7 
In  this  case,  private  factors  may  be  paid  according  to  their  marginal 
productivities  and  private  output  will  be  exhausted.  Under  this  assumption  (3)  becomes 
q-k  -0+  ßL(l-k)+ 
ßG9 
3- 
where  lower-case  letters  denote  logarithms  and  q-k=  ln(QIK) 
,  the  average  product 
of  capital.  Assuming  competitive  product  and  factor  markets,  Aschauer  also  derives 
the  following  measure  of  total  factor  productivity 
p-q-a  1-a  k=O+pc  LKg,  (5) 
where  aL  and  qK  are  the  shares  of  labour  and  capital  in  total  product  respectively.  Otto 
and  Voss  (1994)  point  out  that  (5)  has  important  implications  for  standard  calculations 
of  the  Solow  residual.  If  aggregate  production  is  correctly  described  by  (2)  then  the 
variable  p  cannot  be  interpreted  as  a  measure  of  total  factor  productivity.  This  requires 
removing  the  contribution  of  public  capital  8,, 
,  g.  In  this  case  total  factor  productivity, 
0,  is  measured  properly  as  (p  -  8Gg)  and  the  variable  p  is  by  definition  positively 
related  to  the  level  of  public  capital. 
If  it  is  argued  that  the  assumption  of  increasing  returns  is  unrealistic  (eg,  due 
to  congestion  effects)  over  the  relevant  range,  then  j8L  +  8K+,  8G=  1.  The  residual  is 
the  implicit  rent  earned  by  the  public  service.  The  productivity  of  private  capital 
becomes 
q-k  =  0+J8L(l-k)+J8G(9-k).  (6) 
7  One  rationale  behind  public  provision  of  infrastructure  arises  from  economies  of  scale  in  production. 
The  acquisition  and  distribution  of  water,  for  example,  may  allow  for  substantial  decreases  in  cost 
along  with  increases  in  the  scale  of  production.  While  pricing  mechanisms  can  be  developed  to  ensure 
an  efficient  allocation  of  resources,  it  is  also  necessary  in  such  cases  to  allow  a  monopolist  to  engage 
in  the  whole  of  the  production.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  most  efficient  or  most  easily  monitored 
producing  entity  is  the  government  itself. 22 
In  this  case  if  private  factors  are  paid  according  to  their  marginal  products,  private 
output  will  not  be  fully  distributed.  Note  that  (4)  and  (6)  are  nested  in  the  following 
more  general  specification 
'k 
-k  q-k=O+PK 
+  J6G9  +  PL  (1 
(7) 
where  18'K  =  18K  +  18L  -  1.  Equation  (7)  is  the  basis  of  Aschauer's  (I  989a)  and  other 
researchers'  empirical  analyses.  If  the  estimate  of  8G  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant,  the  conclusion  is  that  public  capital  enhances  the  productivity  of  private 
capital.  If  the  estimated  coefficient  for  8'  were  not  significantly  different  from  zero,  K 
the  hypothesis  of  increasing  returns  to  scale  in  all  three  inputs  would  not  be  rejected 
and  (4)  would  become  the  focus  of  the  analysis.  However,  if  the  estimated  coefficient 
for  8'  is  not  significantly  different  from  that  estimated  for  8G,  with  the  opposite  sign  K 
(ie,  0',  =  -,  6G),  then  the  hypothesis  of  constant  returns  to  scale  in  all  three  inputs  would 
8 
not  be  rejected  and  (6)  would  be  the  equation  to  estimate. 
Aschauer  obtained  an  estimate  of  0.39  for  )6G  7  the  output  elasticity  of  the 
public/private  capital  output  ratio.  This  means  that  aI  per  cent  increase  in  the  ratio  of 
public  capital  to  private  capital  raises  productivity  -  output  per  unit  of  private  capital  - 
by  0.39  per  cent.  9  Aschauer  also  found  that  "core  infrastructure"  contributes  most  to 
productivity  growth.  The  core  includes  highways  and  streets,  mass  transit,  airports, 
electrical  and  gas  facilities  and  water  and  sewer  systems.  The  core  has  an  output 
elasticity  of  0.24  which,  given  its  size,  implies  a  rate  of  return  of  almost  150  per  cent. 
8  Other  variables  are  also  added  to  the  estimating  equation  such  as  time  trends  and  the  capacity 
utilisation  rate  to  control  for  business  cycle  effects. 
9  Ratner  (1983)  found  an  output  elasticity  of  0.058  with  data  from  1949  to  1973.  However.  the  data 
has  been  substantially  revised  since  then.  Tatom  (1991)  re-cstimated  Ratner's  model  using  the  new 
data  and  obtained  an  output  elasticity  of  0.28. 23 
Public  capital's  rate  of  return  is  calculated  by  differentiating  (3)  with  respect  to  G- 
,Q  PGOLOL 
C 
K,  6KG'6"-' 
=  flG 
31  (8) 
CG  G 
where  6ýQlcU,  is  the  marginal  product  of  government  capital.  In  1994  the  total 
infrastructure  stock  was  $2.1  trillion  and  output  for  the  private  business  sector  was 
$4.6  trillion,  thus  an  estimate  of  0.39  implies  a  rate  of  return  of  85  per  cent. 
Munnell's  (I  990a)  results  supported  Aschauer's  finding  of  a  significant  and 
large  effect  of  public  capital  on  productivity.  The  dependent  variable  was  transformed 
to  output  per  unit  o  abour  and  regressed  on  a  constant,  private  capital  per  hour, 
public  capital  per  hour  and  capacity  utilisation.  The  production  function  was 
constrained  to  constant  returns  to  scale.  An  output  elasticity  of  0.33  was  obtained  for 
output  per  hour  with  respect  to  public  capital.  A  number  of  other  production  function 
studies  have  been  conducted  using  aggregate  data  for  other  countries  (eg,  Bajo-Rubio 
and  Sosvilla-Rivero,  1993,  for  Spain  and  Otto  and  Voss,  1994,  with  Australian  data). 
These  studies  obtain  estimates  of  infrastructure's  output  elasticity  ranging  from  0.19  to 
0.45. 
3.3  Criticisms  of  the  Production  Function  Approach 
3.3.1  Ae  Estimates  are  Sensitive  to  the  Choice  of  Dataset 
The  production  function  studies  have  attracted  criticism  from  a  number  of  authors.  The 
estimated  output  elasticities  for  public  capital  and  the  rates  of  return  implied  by  them 
have  been  criticised  as  being  "implausible"  (Aaron,  1990;  McGuire,  1992),  "grossly 
inflated"  (Schultze,  1990)  and  for  "straining  credulity"  (Montgomery,  1990).  Aaron 24 
Table  1.  Sensitivity  Testing  of  the  National  Aschauer  &  Munnell  Specifications. 
Aschaper  qquation: 
Data  set  used  Public  capital  coefficient 
Aschauer  data  (1949-85) 
Munnell  data  (1949-85) 
Munnell  data  (1949-87) 
0.39 
0.42 
0.24 
Munnell  %Wtjon: 
Data  set  used 
Munnell  data  (1949-87) 
Munnell  data  (1949-85) 
Aschauer  data  (1949-85) 
Public  capital  coefficient 
0.35 
0.64 
0.34 
Note:  I'lie  first  set  of  coefficients  result  from  regressing  output  divided  by  private  capital  (all  variables 
in  logs)  on  a  constant,  tune  trend,  labour  divided  by  private  capital,  public  capital  divided  by  private 
capital,  and  capacity  utilisation.  The  second  set  result  from  regressing  output  divided  by  employment  on  a 
constant,  employment,  private  capital,  public  capital  and  the  capacity  utilisation  rate. 
points  out  that,  based  on  Aschauer's  estimated  elasticities,  the  stock  of  core 
infrastructure  would  have  to  increase  over  five-fold  to  equalise  the  marginal 
productivity  of  private  capital  and  core  infrastructure.  Nienhaus  (1991)  conducted 
several  tests  on  the  effects  of  mixing  the  data  sets  and  equations  used  by  Aschauer 
(1989a)  and  Munnell  (1990a,  b).  The  results  of  these  sensitivity  tests  are  reported  in 
Table  1.  The  coefficient  estimates  vary  considerably,  which  leads  Nienhaus  to  conclude 
that  the  two  authors'  national  level  results  lack  robustness.  Using  Munnell's  data 
Nienhaus  (1991)  also  tested  a  different  split  of  the  sample  (1951-69  and  1970-87)  and 
found  that  for  the  period  to  1969  the  public  capital  output  elasticity  was  0.54  and 
significant.  However,  for  the  period  1970-87  the  public  capital  coefficient  is 
insignificant.  Nienhaus  notes  that  this  insignificant  result  is  all  the  more  important 
because  this  is  the  period  (1970-87)  in  which  the  decline  in  the  rate  of  public  capital 
growth  occurred.  His  conclusion  is  that  although  a  very  high  elasticity  for  output  with 
respect  to  public  capital  or  core  public  capital  is  obtained  when  estimating  aggregate 25 
U.  S.  production  functions  using  annual  post-World  War  11  data  (0.25  to  0.50),  this 
relationship  seems  to  have  disappeared  or  weakened  since  1970.  When  Berndt  and 
Hansson  (1992)  estimated  one  of  the  equations  of  Aschauer  (1989a)  and  Munnell 
(I  990a)  using  Swedish  data,  they  obtained  a  number  of  unrealistic  coefficient 
estimates.  10  The  authors  are  critical  of  aggregate  production  function  studies  for  a 
number  of  reasons: 
"The  highly  restrictive  Cobb-Douglas  functional  form  is  hardly  ever 
employed  anymore;  more  flexible  functional  forms  are  used  instead.  Second, 
there  is  a  serious  issue  of  what  is  endogenous  and  what  is  exogenous,  and 
the  extent  to  which  the  production  function  estimates  -  Cobb-Douglas  or 
translog  -  suffer  ftom  a  simultaneous  equations  bias.  Specifically,  the  right- 
hand  variables  in  the  various  equations  estimated  by  Aschauer  and  Munnell 
include  measures  of  labour  input  and  utilisation  (either  capacity  utilisation  or 
the  state  unemployment  rate)  and  strong  arguments  have  been  made  that  in 
this  type  of  a  context  such  variables  should  be  treated  as  endogenous,  not 
exogenous;  in  such  a  case  estimation  by  OLS  produces  biased  and 
inconsistent  parameter  estimates.  "  (p.  S  15  5) 
It  is  for  these  reasons  that  many  authors  have  chosen  to  estimate  cost  functions  instead 
of  production  functions.  I  will  return  to  the  relative  merits  of  each  approach  in  Section 
4. 
10  For  example,  for  the  Aschauer  specification  the  coefficient  estimates  for  G  and  L  are  greater  than  I 
and  the  estimate  on  K  is  -1.67.  implying  a  negative  marginal  product  for  private  capital  since  the 
implicit  estimated  elasticity  of  output  is  -0.67. 26 
3.3.2  Ae  Relationship  Between  Output  and  Public  Capital  is  a  Coincidence 
Several  authors  have  pointed  out  that  the  data  used  in  a  number  of  studies  is  not 
stationary  and  that  the  relationship  between  public  capital  and  private  sector  * 
productivity  is  spurious.  For  example,  Tatom  (1993b)  states  that  the  level  of  the  public 
capital  stock  and  the  level  of  business  sector  output  per  hour  have  correlations  of 
roughly  0.95  but,  when  first  differences  are  taken  the  two  series  have  correlations  that 
are  essentially  zero. 
Tatom  (1991,1993a)  calculates  the  degree  of  integration  of  the  data,  finding 
that  the  dependent  variable  ln(QIK)  is  integrated  of  degree  one,  while  the  variable 
ln(GIK)  is  integrated  of  degree  two.  Using  first  differences  and  including  a  time  trend 
Tatom  finds  that  the  effect  of  public  capital  becomes  insignificantly  different  from  zero. 
Ford  and  Poret  (1991)  also  use  differenced  data  to  carry  out  their  production  function 
study  on  a  selection  of  OECD  countries  and  find  that  the  relationship  between  public 
capital  and  productivity  is  not  robust  for  all  countries.  When  public  capital  is 
significant,  the  coefficients  for  private  inputs  are  often  implausible.  Hulten  and  Schwab 
(199  1  a)  and  Jorgenson  (199  1)  also  find  that  the  relationship  between  public  capital  and 
productivity  is  not  found  when  first  differencing  is  used.  Munnell  (1993)  counters  these 
findings,  arguing  that  first  differencing  produces  problems  of  its  own- 
"No  one  would  expect  growth  in  capital  stock,  whether  private  or  public,  in 
one  year  to  be  correlated  with  the  growth  in  output  in  that  same  year.  In  fact, 
equations  estimated  in  this  form  often  yield  implausible  coefficients  for 
labour  and  private  capital  as  well  as  for  public  capital  (Evans  and  Karras, 
1994;  Hulten  and  Schwab,  1991  a).  None  of  the  cntics  concludes  from  these 27 
n-us-specified  equations,  however,  that  private  capital  and  labour  lack  a 
significant  effect  on  private  sector  output.  "  (p.  32) 
Against  first-differencing  it  is  also  argued  that  it  destroys  any  long-term  relationship  in  rý 
the  data.  Instead  it  should  be  tested  whether  the  variables  are  cointegrated,  adjust  them 
and  estimate  accordingly.  Duggal  et  al.  (1995)  also  argue  that  there  are  specification 
problems  in  all  of  the  studies  that  use  first-differenced  data.  " 
3.3.3  The  Relationship  Runs  in  the  Opposite  Direction 
Several  surveys  of  the  infrastructure  literature  12  have  questioned  whether  public  capital 
affects  productivity  or  whether  the  relationship  runs  in  the  opposite  direction.  " 
However,  very  little  research  has  been  conducted  into  the  causality  issue.  An  exception 
is  Tatom  (1993c),  whose  point  is  that- 
'Many  researchers  have  noted  that  regions  of  the  United  States  and  countries 
that  have  relatively  high  income  and  productivity  have  relatively  more  public 
capital  per  worker  and  per  person.  Such  an  observation  suggests  that 
infrastructure  boosts  private-sector  productivity,  but  others  view  that 
observation  as  simply  confirmation  that  higher-income  voters  normally 
demand  more  of  all  goods,  including  the  services  of  public  capital  stocks.  " 
13) 
''  As  Lynde  and  Richmond  (1993a)  point  out  many  studies  ignore  the  effect  of  energy  price  changes 
on  productivity. 
12  For  example,  those  by  the  Federal  Highway  Administration  (1992).  Gillen  (1996),  Gramlich  (1994) 
and  Hurst  (1994)  and  Munnell  (1993). 
13  Causality  from  productivity  to  infrastructure  is  referred  to  as  reverse  causality  in  the  rest  of  the 
thesis. 28 
To  the  extent  that  the  productivity  slowdown  led  to  lower  real  incomes,  growth  in  the 
demand  for  infrastructure  services  may  have  slowed.  Furthermore,  the  productivity 
slowdown  may  have  squeezed  government  budgets,  leading  to  less  infrastructure 
spending.  Causality  may  in  fact  run  in  both  directions:  more  public  capital  may  help 
produce  more  output  and  the  subsequent  rise  in  income  may  lead  voters  to  demand 
more  infrastructure. 
There  is  some  evidence  that  public  capital  is  a  normal  good.  Borcherding  and 
Deacon  (1972)  calculated  large  and  statistically  significant  income  elasticities  for 
highways  and  water  and  sewer  system  expenditures  in  the  United  States.  These  two 
types  of  infrastructure  account  for  roughly  47  per  cent  of  the  total  non-military  public 
capital  stock.  According  to  Tatom  (1993c),  there  is  strong  evidence  of  reverse 
causality.  He  finds  that  the  growth  rate  of  the  public  capital  stock  does  not  Granger 
cause  total  factor  productivity  in  the  private  business  sector  and  the  reverse  test  fails  to 
reject  causation  from  total  factor  productivity  growth  to  public  capital  growth.  Due  to 
the  focus  on  causality  and  related  issues  in  Chapter  4  it  is  worth  outlining  Tatom's 
methodology  briefly.  Tatom  tests  for  causality  between  the  logarithm  of  total  factor 
14 
productivity  , 
0,,  and  two  infrastructure  variables:  the  change  in  the  logarithm  of  the 
constant  dollar  net  non-military  public  capital  stock,  Agt,  and  the  log  of  the  constant 
dollar  flow  of  public  investment,  In  It.  Up  to  4  lags  of  each  variable  were  added  to  the 
estimating  equations  and  examined  for  a  statistically  significant  effect. 
"  According  to  Tatom  (1993c),  TFP  for  the  total  business  sector  is  output  divided  1w  a  weighted 
average  of  labour  and  private  capital,  le.  the  standard  Solow  residual, 29 
The  following  results  were  obtained  using  a  sample  period  from  1949-1990  (t-stats  in 
parentheses): 
Ot  0.094  -  0.019  In  It-, 
(2.11)  (1.81) 
R2=0.05  DW  1.79 
(9) 
Because  the  estimate  on  In  I, 
-, 
is  statistically  insignificant,  Tatom  concludes  that  there 
is  no  evidence  that  public  capital  formation  causes  the  growth  of  TFP.  15  The  following 
are  the  results  of  the  reverse  causality  tests,  first  using  the  growth  rate  of  public 
capital: 
A&  =  0.00  1+  1.05  7Agt-l  +  0" 
0949t-2 
-  0.266Agt-3+  0.0590tI  + 
0.0600t-2 
(1.11)  (7.31)  (0.48)  (2.19)  (2.59)  (2.73)  (10) 
R2=0.97  DW  =  1.85 
and,  second,  using  the  logarithm  of  investment: 
In  It  -  0.173  +  1.169  In  It-,  -  0.209 
In,, 
-2+  0.8930tl  +  0.732ot-2 
(1.42)  (8.15)  (1.54)  (2.58)  (2.17) 
R2=0.97  DW  =  1.98 
According  to  Tatom,  the  results  reported  in  (10)  and  (11)  provide  evidence  that  TFP 
causes  public  capital  formation.  However,  there  are  several  points  worth  making  about 
this  causality  testing  procedure.  First,  Tatom  does  not  specify  whether  the  TFP 
variable  is in  levels  or  differences  (ie,  the  growth  rate  of  total  factor  productivity).  It 
appears  that  data  in  both  levels  and  differences  was  used  without  checking  for  stability. 
Second,  Tatom  does  not  specify  how  lag-lengths  were  selected.  It  would  appear  that 
this  was  on  the  basis  of  t-stat  significance.  Third,  the  empirical  adequacy  of  the 
equations  was  not  investigated  sufficiently.  16  However,  the  most  important  criticism  of 
Similarly.  no  statistically  significant  relationship  was  found  using  lags  of  49, 
For  example.  the  Durbin  Watson  test  for  serial  correlation  is  unreliable  when  the  estimating 
equation  contains  lagged  dependent  variables. 30 
Tatorn's  approach  is  his  use  of  the  standard  Solow  residual  to  represent  productivity 
growth.  This  issue  is  discussed  in  Section  6. 
There  are  other  causality  studies  in  the  infrastructure  literature  but  most 
attempt  to  identify  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  public  investment  and  private 
investment,  rather  than  TFP  and  thus  establish  whether  public  investment  crowds  out 
or  crowds  in  private  investment.  Like  so  many  studies  in  the  infrastructure  literature 
the  results  are  not  directly  comparable  due  to  differences  in  econometric  technique  and 
the  various  variables.  For  example,  Ramirez  (1994)  concludes  that  changes  in  public 
investment  precede  and  add  significantly  to  the  explanation  of  variations  in  private 
investment  expenditures  along  the  U.  S.  -Mexico  border.  However,  he  uses  a  rather 
simplistic  Granger  causality  testing  procedure,  adding  lags  on  an  ad  hoc  basis. 
Erenburg  and  Wohar  (1995)  adopt  a  more  rigorous  approach:  the  multivariate  Granger 
causality  testing  procedure  is  combined  with  Akaike's  Final  Prediction  Error  Criterion. 
A  battery  of  diagnostic  tests  is  then  performed  to  check  the  adequacy  of  the  results. 
Although  econometrically  rigorous,  a  possible  drawback  of  this  study  is  the  use  of 
public  equipment  investment  as  the  relevant  infrastructure  variable.  This  measure  of 
public  capital,  consisting  of  assets  such  as  lawn  and  garden  equipment,  computers  and 
vehicles  is  unlikely  to  have  as  direct  an  effect  on  private  production  as  Aschauer's 
measure  of  core  infrastructure. 
17 
3.4  Regional  and  State  Level  Production  Functions 
Munnell  (1993)  concedes  that  the  output  elasticities  obtained  from  aggregate 
production  functions  are  "too  large  to  be  credible".  It  does  not  make  sense  for  private 
I  -,  See  Katz  and  Herman  (1997).  Table  A,  for  a  list  of  the  components  of  the  public  equipment  stock. 31 
capital  to  have  a  smaller  impact  than  public  capital.  As  an  alternative,  several 
researchers  have  estimated  production  functions  using  more  geographically 
disaggregated  data  (at  the  state  or  regional  level).  On  balance,  these  studies  provide  ' 
evidence  of  a  role  for  public  infrastructure  in  boosting  private  productivity,  albeit  a 
much  reduced  one  compared  with  estimated  output  elasticities  of  the  aggregate 
studies.  The  use  of  pooled  data  sets  such  as  these,  it  is  argued,  provide  more 
observations  with  inherent  variation  because  of  the  difference  in  size  and  structure  of 
the  various  states'  economies.  By  supplementing  variation  over  time  with  variation 
across  space  any  criticism  of  spurious  correlation  across  time  is  mitigated.  It  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  some  of  these  papers  contain  potential  biases.  For  example,  if  the 
measure  of  public  capital  that  enters  the  state  production  function  is  the  own  public 
capital  stock,  this  implies  that  an  additional  road  in  Texas  affects  output  in  Texas 
alone,  and  ignores  the  productivity  benefits  of  Texan  roads  that  accrue  to  other  states. 
Furthermore,  many  of  the  results  cannot  be  compared  directly  with  the  national-level 
studies.  Apart  from  using  data  disaggregated  at  the  geographic  level,  many  of  the 
state-level  and  regional-level  studies  use  data  for  just  one  sector  (ie,  manufacturing) 
and  incorporate  other  econometric  innovations. 
Munnell  (I  990b),  using  state  level  data  for  1970-86,  obtains  a  lower  estimate 
of  public  capital's  output  elasticity  compared  with  her  aggregate  study  (0.15  compared 
with  0.33).  The  elasticities  for  private  capital  and  labour  are  0.31  and  0.59 
respectively.  Public  and  private  capital  were  calculated  for  the  state  level  using 
investment  spending  profiles.  Eisner  (1991)  did  further  work  with  Munnell's  data  and 
found  that  public  capital  is  still  significant  when  the  data  are  arranged  to  allow  for 
cross-sectional  variation.  This,  however,  disappears  when  the  data  are  arranged  to 
allow  for  time  series  variation.  States  with  more  public  capital  per  capita  have  a  higher 32 
Table  2.  Sensitivity  Tests  ofMunnell's  1990b  State-level  Study. 
Dummy  Variable 
Munnell,  no  dummies 
State  Dummies  included 
Regional  dummies 
Keglonal  estimates 
East 
South 
Midwest 
West 
Public  C4Riýtal  Coefficient 
0.15* 
-0.02 
0.09* 
Public  C4pital  Coefficient 
0.11* 
0.17* 
0.14* 
0.08* 
*  Denotes  statistical  significance 
Source:  Nienhaus  (1991) 
level  of  per  capita  output  but  state  infrastructure  spending  does  not  increase  output  in 
the  same  year.  Eisner  regards  the  direction  of  causation  as  undecided  and  argues  that  a 
lag  structure  is  needed  to  understand  the  true  relationship  between  output  and  public 
capital.  Holtz-Eakin  (1994)  estimates  production  functions  that  control  for 
unobserved,  state-specific  characteristics  and  obtains  results  that  indicate  no  role  for 
public  capital  at  the  margin.  Estimates  obtained  by  other  authors  (eg,  Garcia-Nfila  and 
McGuire,  1992  and  Munnell,  1990b,  1993)  did  not  control  for  these  effects  in  this 
manner.  Nienhaus  (1991)  replicated  Munnell's  (1990b)  results  and  also  included  a 
number  of  dummy  variables.  When  state  dummy  variables  are  included  the  public 
capital  variable  becomes  insignificant  and  with  regional  dummy  variables  the  public 
capital  coefficient  is  smaller  but  significant.  Nienhaus  also  runs  separate  regressions  for 
groups  of  states,  obtaining  significant  coefficients  throughout.  A  summary  of  some  of 
these  results  is  contained  in  Table  2. 
McGuire  (1992)  tests  the  robustness  of  the  results  obtained  by  Munnell 
(1990b)  and  Garcia-Mila  and  McGuire  (1992)  using  variables  from  both  studies. 
Several  production  functions  are  estimated-  Cobb-Douglas  with  no  control  for  state 
effects.  Cobb-Douglas  with  control  for  state  fixed  and  random  effects,  and  translog 33 
Table  3.  Production  Function  Estimates  of  the  Output  Elasticity  of  Public  Capital  by 
Level  of  Geographic  Aggregation 
Author  Aggegation  Qptput  elasticity 
Aschauer  (I  989a)  National 
. 
39 
Holtz-Eakin  (1989)  National 
. 
39 
Munnell  (I  990a)  National 
. 
34 
Moomaw  &  Williams  (199  1)  States 
. 
25 
Costa,  Ellson  &  Martin  (1987)  States 
. 
20 
Eisner  (199  1)  States 
. 
17 
Garcia.  -1ý4ila  &  McGuire  (1992)  States 
. 
04 
Mera.  (1973)  Japanese  regions  . 
20 
Munnell  (I  990b)  States 
. 
15 
Duffy-Deno  and  Eberts  (199  1  Metropolitan 
. 
08 
Eberts  (1986)  Metropolitan 
. 
03 
'The  authors  use  personal  income  as  the  dependent  variable  instead  of  estimating  a  production  fianction. 
Source:  Munnell  (1993) 
with  no  control  for  state  effects.  Public  capital  is  found  to  have  a  strong  and 
statistically  significant  effect  on  gross  state  product  (elasticities  ranging  from  0.035  to 
0.394).  A  summary  of  some  of  the  production  function  estimates  of  the  output 
elasticity  of  public  capital  is  contained  in  Table  3.  The  coefficients  at  each  level  of 
aggregation  tend  to  be  sinUlar.  As  the  geographic  focus  narrows,  so  too  does  the 
output  elasticity  of  infrastructure.  This  is  perhaps  because  it  is  not  possible  to  harness 
all  the  benefits  of  a  specific  infrastructure  project  by  looking  simply  at  the  area  in 
which  it  exists.  There  are  spillover  effects  as  well.  The  studies  cannot  be  compared 
solely  on  the  basis  of  the  geographic  focus,  however. 
4.  Cost  Functions 
1  Cost  Functions  versus  Production  Functions 
A  number  of  authors  have  suggested  that  cost  functions  may  be  more  appropriate  for 
analysing  the  relationship  between  public  infrastructure  capital  and  the  private 34 
production  process.  Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1992)  favour  the  cost  function  approach 
because: 
'Estimating  equations  result  from  direct  differentiation  of  the  function,  and 
the  endogeneity  of  the  resulting  dependent  variables  is  consistent  with 
intuition.  " 
Cost  function  models  usually  consist  of  at  least  two  estimating  equations-  the  cost 
equation  and  the  input  demand  equation  for  labour  and,  in  the  case  of  long-run  cost 
functions,  the  input  demand  equation  for  private  capital.  Thus  in  the  cost  function 
approach  labour  and  private  capital  are  dependent  variables.  The  input  prices  are 
exogenous  variables.  In  contrast,  in  production  functions  the  input  levels  are 
i 
independent  variables,  raising  questions  about  endogeneity  and  exogeneity.  Friedlander 
(1990)  agrees  that  production  functions  suffer  from  an  important  problem  of  mis- 
specification: 
In  particular,  since  input  prices  affect  factor  utilisation  and  thus  where  firms 
are  positioned  on  their  transformation  function,  ornitting  them  in  an 
econometnc  analysis  of  technology  could  lead  to  substantial  biases  in  the 
estimated  technological  coefficients.  Of  course,  if  relative  input  prices  are 
constant  over  the  sample,  this  is  not  a  problem.  A  substantial  variation  in 
input  prices  over  the  sample  probably  would  be  a  legitimate  cause  for 
concern,  however.  "'  (p.  109) 
Estimating  a  cost  function  rather  than  a  production  function  incorporates  input  price 
effects  into  the  analysis.  The  differences  between  econometric  implementation  of  cost 
and  production  functions  are  summarised  in  Table  4. 35 
Table  4.  Cost  and  Proditctionfunctions:  Endogenous  and  Exoge"Ous  Variables 
Variable 
output 
Input  quantities 
Input  costs 
Input  prices 
Cost  function 
Exogenous 
Endogenous 
Endogenous 
Exogenous 
Production  function 
Endogenous 
Exogenous 
Exogenous 
Endogenous 
Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992)  add  that  estimation  of  a  cost  function  allows  economic 
content  to  be  added  to  the  analysis.  This  is  because  it  incorporates  the  assumption  of 
cost  minimisation.  Firms  choose  quantities  of  inputs  (including  public  capital)  to 
minimise  their  production  costs.  Declines  in  the  cost  of  producing  a  particular  level  of 
output  (given  constant  input  prices)  represent  an  increase  in  firms'  productivity.  As 
Gillen  (1996)  notes,  there  are  several  other  reasons  why  cost  functions  are  preferred. 
"The  production  function  approach  imposes  the  n-finimal  modelling  structure 
on  the  data  and  therefore  the  estimates  of  the  underlying  production 
technology  are  more  likely  to  be  biased  and  not  be  robust.  The  production 
approach  is  a  purely  technical  specification  between  inputs  and  outputs  and 
not  a  behavioural  one.  The  notion  of  an  expansion  path  is  not  considered  to 
simultaneously  determine  inputs  and  outputs.  Other  reasons  for  moving  to  a 
cost  function  approach  are  the  richer  menu  of  analytical  statistics,  the  explicit 
characterisation  of  optimising  behaviour  of  the  firm  and  the  lack  of  any  loss 
in  information  by  abandoning  the  production  function  approach.  "  (p.  49) 
As  the  dual  to  the  production  function  the  cost  function  reflects  technology.  It  can  also 
represent  the  dependence  of  costs  on  the  level  of  output  (scale  economies)  and  inputs 
that  are  fixed  in  the  short  run,  such  as  private  and  public  capital  (fixity).  If  public 
capital  is  included  as  an  argument  in  a  variable  (short-run)  cost  function  it  becomes  a 36 
factor  explaining  observed  external  scale  effects.  This,  according  to  Morrison  and 
Schwartz  (1997),  is  consistent  with  intuition  as  infrastructure  may  affect  the  shape  of 
the  long-run  average  cost  curve.  The  impact  of  infrastructure,  fixity  and  internal  scale 
economies  on  costs  can  be  specified  in  terms  of  the  elasticity  of  costs  with  respect  to 
output.  External  scale  economies  that  arise  from  outside  forces  with  public  good 
characteristics  will  cause  output  and  total  cost  changes  to  be  non-proportional.  In 
Section  4.2  a  brief  look  is  taken  at  the  various  "'analytical  statistics"  that  can  be 
computed  using  the  cost  function  approach. 
4.2  Cost  Functions:  The  Aeoretical  Framework 
Infrastructure's  effect  on  private  costs  can  be  illustrated  by  solving  the  firm's  cost 
minimisation  problem  subject  to  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  technology 
Min  PLL+PxK  -A 
(Li6L  K16KG18G 
- 
Q) 
,  (12) 
where  PKand  PL  are  the  prices  of  private  capital  and  labour  respectively.  The  necessary 
conditions  are: 
PL  -  APL  L16L-'K 
#K  GJOG 
=0.  and 
P  _￿ýßKLßL 
ßK 
-'GßG  =0-  KK 
Solving  for  L  and  K  gives 
#K 
GI  PK  fiL+)6K 
G- 
PL+fiK  Qi6L+,  8K 
,  and 
PI, 
19  K 
OL 
j6G  PL  i6L+16K  -P61+193K 
K*=  G0 
pl:  PL 
Equations  (15)  and  (16)  are  the  conditional  input  demand  equations  for  labour  and 
private  capital.  They  determine  the  quantities  of  labour  and  capital  that  minimise  firms' 37 
costs.  The  optimal  quantities  depend  partly  on  the  quantity  of  public  capital.  Using  the 
c0st-Tninimising  quantities  of  L  and  K,  total  costs  are  given  by 
, 
8G  j6K  16L  8K 
-8L  +  J6L+flK  JOL  +JOK  J6L  +  #6K  +flK  P  L+'OK 
L  16 
+ 
()6K 
=G  KýL 
+)6K  PL16  )6L 
PK  PL 
Assuming  constant  returns  to  scale  in  private  inputs  (ie,  8L+,  8K=  1),  the  impact  of  G 
on  costs  can  be  expressed  solely  in  terms  of  its  own  output  elasticity,  ie,  G 
-J8  G.  How 
do  changes  in  G  orflGaffect  C*?  The  higher  is  the  output  elasticity  of  G  the  lower  are 
costs  and  the  higher  is  G  the  lower  are  costs.  Unless  constant  returns  to  scale  are 
assumed,  the  importance  of  government  infrastructure  depends  on  18L  +J8K  I  the  output 
elasticities  of  labour  and  private  capital.  The  bigger  they  are  the  smaller  is  the 
exponential  term  in  absolute  terms.  The  larger  are  8,  +,  8,  the  smaller  is  the  shift 
down  in  cost  from  an  increase  in  public  infrastructure  capital,  ceteris  paribus.  The 
duality  existing  between  the  production  function  and  the  cost  function  is  called 
Shephard's  duality.  What  this  duality  suggests  is  that,  given  a  production  function,  it  is 
always  possible  to  derive  a  cost  function  that  reflects  the  same  production  technology. 
Irrespective  of  functional  form  the  cost  function  depends  on  the  level  of  output,  the 
prices  of  labour  and  private  capital  and  the  quantity  of  public  capital- 
F(Q,  P,  P  ,  G). 
As  Silberberg  (1990)  notes- 
"If  a  cost  function  satisfies  some  elementary  properties,  ie,  linear 
homogeneity  and  concavity  in  the  factor  prices,  then  there  in  fact  is  some 
(18) 
real,  unique  underlying  production  function.  "  (p.  313) 38 
Although  the  Cobb-Douglas  functional  form  is  popular  with  researchers  estimating 
production  functions,  its  dual  cost  function  is  not  popular  in  the  infrastructure 
literature.  This  is  because  it  incorporates  restrictive  assumptions  regarding  input 
substitutability.  Flexible  cost  functions,  such  as  the  translog  cost  function,  which  allow 
for  the  effect  of  a  change  in  input  prices  on  the  cost-miniýnising  ýnix  of  inputs  are 
preferred.  Below,  the  methodologies  of  some  of  these  studies  and  their  results  are 
discussed.  First  a  general  look  is  taken  at  the  direct  and  indirect  effects  of  public 
capital.  The  direct  effect  is  the  impact  of  G  on  costs;  the  indirect  effect  is  the  effect  of 
G  on  the  firm's  demand  for  labour  and  capital.  Differentiating  (18)  with  respect  to  G 
leads  to: 
X(Q,  P,,  P,  G)  ZG 
=-  6G 
,2  (19) 
where  ZG  is  the  change  in  private  production  cost  if  public  capital  increases  by  one 
unit.  ZGis  called  the  shadow  price  of  public  capital  or  the  willingness  to  pay  for  public 
services.  "  Infrastructure's  cost  elasticity  is 
XG  dInC 
CG 
cG  C  dInG 
(20) 
If  OTMU  is  defined  as  the  marginal  product  of  public  capital,  application  of  the 
Envelope  Theorem  provides  a  link  between  the  monetary  measure  ZGand  the  marginal 
product  of  public  capital'9: 
c  'C 
oF- 
cýG  C-C 
a) 
(21) 
18  The  negative  sign  converts  the  shadow  value  to  a  positive  number. 
19  See  Chambers  (1988). 39 
that  is,  the  marginal  product  of  infrastructure  is  equal  to  the  ratio  of  the  shadow  price 
of  G  to  marginal  production  cost,  PQ.  This  relation  provides  a  connection  between  the 
primal  (the  production  function)  and  the  dual  (the  cost  function).  The  indirect  effects 
can  be  illustrated  as  follows.  Applying  Shephard's  lemma  to  the  cost  function  (18) 
yields  the  cost-minimising  factor  demand  equations  for  labour,  L  *,  and  capital,  K*-. 
x, 
and 
OTK 
(22) 
These  cost-minimising  factor  demand  equations  depend  on  the  same  variables  as  the 
cost  function  (PL,  PK,  Q  and  G).  Differentiating  (22)  with  respect  to  G  it  is  possible  to 
see  how  the  demand  for  labour  and  capital  varies  as  G  is  increased.  For  example, 
X  02C 
oTL  6G 
(23) 
where  OL  *16G  is  the  labour  saving  (OL  *lc'G<  0)  or  extra  labour  demanded  (OL  *lc'G>  0) 
if  G  is  expanded  by  one  unit.  If  OV16G>o  the  public  capital  stock  and  labour  are 
complements  and  if  oT*1,6G<O,  they  are  substitutes.  Similarly  for  private  capital: 
x*  i92c 
6G  O'P,  X 
Substituting  the  cost-minimising  factor  demand  equations  from  (22)  into  the  cost 
equation  PLL  +  PKK,  the  cost  function  can  be  expressed  as 
PL  *+  PrK  *.  (24) 
Differentiating  (24)  with  respect  to  G  yields- 
OT  p  ow  (25)  PL 
(ý,  G 
+K 
týG 
, 40 
In  (25)  the  cost-saving  effects  of  G  are  decomposed  into  adjustment  effects  on  the 
demand  for  labour  and  private  capital.  Further  ways  of  analysing  the  relationship 
between  G  and  private  production  are  explored  in  Chapter  I 
4.3  Summary  ofEmpirical  Results 
A  great  deal  of  cost  function  research  has  been  conducted  in  recent  years.  Researchers 
have  experimented  with  aggregate  and  disaggregated  private  data  (manufacturing 
and/or  regional),  alternative  functional  forms  and  data  for  a  variety  of  countries.  In 
what  follows  some  of  the  most  widely  reported  results  are  discussed.  These  and  others 
are  summarised  in  Table  5. 
Lynde  and  Richmond  (1992)  analyse  the  impact  of  public  capital  on  the 
production  costs  of  the  U.  S.  non-financial  corporate  sector  using  share  equations 
derived  from  a  translog  cost  function.  The  marginal  product  of  capital  is  found  to  be 
positive,  implying  that  an  increase  in  the  stock  of  G  reduces  costs.  This  is  one  of  the 
few  cost  function  studies  that  uses  total  private  business  data.  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas 
(1994)  estimate  a  translog  cost  function  using  data  for  12  U.  S.  manufacturing 
industries  and  find  that  public  capital  significantly  reduces  manufacturing  costs.  The 
magnitudes  of  the  average  cost  elasticities  range  from  -0.11  to  -0.2  1,  implying  that 
infrastructure  has  a  significant  effect  on  private  production  but  a  smaller  effect  than 
that  implied  by  the  aggregate  production  function  studies.  Public  capital  is  adjusted  for 
capacity  utilisation  and  R&D  expenditures  are  included  in  the  cost  function.  Seitz  and 
Licht  (1995)  obtain  slightly  higher  elasticities  in  a  study  using  West  German 
manufacturing  data.  The  average  cost  elasticity  is  -0.22  but  they  range  ftom  -0.02  in 41 
Table  5.  Key  Results  qf  Cost  Function  Studies 
Author  Rata  set  Specification  G  Variable  Direct  Effect  Indirect  Effect 
ridt 
Hansson  (1"2) 
Swedish  private 
b 
Variable  cost  Core  public  capital  hifi-&qmcture  L=  Complement  & 
usiness  sector  fimction  Surplus  Substitute 
1960-88 
Co  d&S  nra  eitz  West  German  Translog  Core,  adjusted  by  Cost  savings,  L=  Substitute  (1"4)  manufacturing,  capacity  utilisation  XMG  =  -0.142  K=  Complement 
construction,  trade  rate  M  Substitute 
and  transport 
1960-88 
11olleyman  (1996)  U.  S.  Translog  Highway  stock,  H  Cost  increases,  L  Substitute 
manufacturing,  XH  K  Substitute 
4-digit  level,  --  =  0.022 
CW  C  M  Complement 
1969-86 
Keeler  &  Ying  U.  S.  trucking  Translog  Highway  stock  Cost  savings  (1988)  1960-88, 
regional  pooled 
Lynde  &  U.  S.  non-financial  Translog  Total  non-n-filitary  G  has  positive  L  Substitute 
Richmond  (1"2)  corporate  business  marginal  product  K  Complement 
sector  1958-89 
Lynde  &  U.  Y-  Translog,  Total  non-military  GIL  contributes  K  Substitute 
Richmond  manufacturing,  adjustments  for  to  QIL 
(1"3b)  1966-90,  value-  non-Adionarity 
added 
Morrison  &  U.  S.  Variable  Cost  Core  (highways,  Cost  savings, 
Schwartz  (1"7)  manufacturing,  Generalised  sewers  and  water)  X 
pooled  by  region,  Leontief  =  -0.16-0.31 
1971-87  PO=MC 
6G 
Nadiri  &  12  U.  S.  Translog,  Total,  adjusted  by  Cost  Savings,  L  Substitute 
Manumeas  manufacturing  CRS  for  private  capacity  utilisation  XG  K  Substitute 
(1"4)  industries  at  2-digit  inputs  rate 
CU  C=0-0.21  M=  Complement 
level 
1955-86 
Seitz  (1"3)  31  West  German  Generalised  Public  roads,  Cost  savings  L=  Substitute 
2-digit  industries,  Leontief  lengsh  of  K=  Complement 
1970-89  motorway  system 
Seitz  (1994)  31  West  German  Generalised  Total  and  core  Total:  L=  Substitute 
2-digit  Mdustries,  Leontief  XA6G  =  -0.002  K=  Complement 
1970-89  Core: 
XIcU  =  -0.004 
Seitz  &  Licht  West  German  Trdnslog  Total,  Cost  savings,  L=  Substitute 
manufacturing,  lagged  I  year  XG  K=  Complement 
regional  level 
ýu  C 
0.216 
Shah  (1"2)  26  Me)dcan  Translog  Total,  adjusted  by  Cost  savings  L=  Complement 
manufacturing  variable  cost  industries'  K=  Complement 
industries,  3-digit  ftinction  proportion  of  M=  Substitute 
leveL  1970-87  output 
Source:  Gillen  (1996)  and  original  papers. 
Bremen  to  -0.36  in  Nordrhein-Westfalen.  20  Shah  (1992)  applies  the  cost  function 
approach  using  data  for  26  industrial  sectors  in  Mexico.  He  calculates  the  rate  of 
return  on  public  capital  to  be  5-7  per  cent  compared  with  14-18  per  cent  for  private 
capital.  Lynde  and  Richmond  (1993b)  estimate  share  equations  derived  from  a  translog 
10  The  authors  note  that  the  cost  reducing  effects  are  largest  in  those  regions  which  have  the  largest 
areas.  This  might  be  because  almost  50  per  cent  of  the  public  capital  stock  consists  of  road  capital  and 
for  large  areas  a  well-developed  road  network  is  of  crucial  importance. 42 
cost  function  using  data  for  UK  manufacturing  and  conclude  that  public  capital  plays  a 
significant  role  in  the  production  of  value-added  output.  Decomposition  of  TFP  reveals 
that  from  1966-79  the  contribution  of  growth  in  the  ratio  GIL  accounted  for 
approximately  17  per  cent  of  the  growth  in  labour  productivity.  However,  in  the  1980s 
the  contribution  became  negative.  Keeler  and  Ying  (1988)  focus  upon  the  effect  of 
investment  in  the  inter-state  highway  system  on  costs  in  the  inter-city  trucking 
industry.  They  find  that  savings  in  trucking  costs  alone  covered  almost  one  third  of  the 
capital  costs  of  the  Federal-aid  highway  system  in  the  period  1950-73. 
An  important  aspect  of  manufacturing  cost  function  studies  is  the  determination 
of  the  technical  relationship  between  public  capital  and  private  capital  and  between 
public  capital  and  labour.  There  is  some  consensus  that  public  capital  and  labour  are 
substitutes  and  some  types  of  public  capital  are  complements  to  private  capital  (see 
Table  5). 
4.4  Implicationsfor  Employment 
Studies  that  have  used  the  cost  function  approach  have  produced  a  lower  rate  of  return 
for  public  capital  than  that  derived  from  either  national  or  regional  production 
functions.  Because  public  capital  has  generally  been  found  to  be  a  substitute  for  labour 
these  studies  also  raise  a  number  of  employment  issues.  As  Hurst  (1994)  notes,  this 
result  is  not  counter-intuitive'. 
'Where  roads  are  of  poorer  quality  vehicle  maintenance  is  greater.  Equally, 
uncertain  deliveries  of  goods  mean  that  inventories  must  be  higher.  Both  of 
these  activities  would  imply  more  employment.  In  the  long  run  increased 
private  sector  productivity  could  lead  to 
-greater  investment  and  more 43 
employment,.  but  in  the  interim  problems  of  unemployment  could  be 
exacerbated.  "  (p.  67) 
There  has  been  relatively  little  examination  of  the  effect  of  infrastructure  investment  on 
employment,  although  Hurst  mentions  a  few.  Botham  (1983)  studied  the  impact  of 
transport  infrastructure  on  regional  employment  in  28  regions  of  the  United  Kingdom 
for  the  period  1961-66  (the  period  of  construction  of  the  national  highway  system). 
The  conclusion  is  that  the  impact  of  the  highway  system  on  the  regional  distribution  of 
employment  was  quite  small.  Other  studies,,  however,  (for  example,  Dodgson,  1974) 
have  found  positive  impacts  on  regional  employment  growth.  In  a  study  of 
employment  in  Minnesota,  Stephanides  and  Eagle  (1986,1988)  found  that  there  was  no 
relationship  between  spending  on  state  highways  and  employment  growth. 
Employment  went  up  slightly  in  the  year  following  an  increase  in  spending  but  dropped 
to  its  original  level  after  three  years.  The  regional  distribution  of  employment  could  be 
affected,,  however.  In  regions  near  large  cities  retail  sector  jobs  appear  to  be 
transferred  to  the  urban  area  when  communications  infrastructure  is  improved.  The 
employment  impacts  of  public  investment  may  be  very  difficult  to  identify.  The 
evidence  tends  to  suggest  that  public  capital  and  labour  are  short-run  substitutes.  The 
long-term  effect  will  depend  upon  the  level  and  type  of  private  investment  that  is 
"crowded-in"  to  a  particular  location  by  the  enhanced  public  capital  stock. 44 
5.  Prorit  Functions 
In  a  few  studies  in  the  infrastructure  literature  a  profit  function  is  estimated  to  ascertain 
the  role  of  public  capital  in  production.  21  Duality  work  in  this  thesis  is  based  on  the 
cost  function  approach  so  the  following  discussion,  based  on  Lynde  (1992),  is 
provided  as  background  information  only.  Profits  in  the  economy  can  be  expressed  as 
/T  =  PQ  Q-  PL  L-P,,  K,. 
) 
where  7r  is  profit,  PQQ  is  revenue  and  PLL  and  PKK  are  labour  and  capital  costs 
(26) 
respectively.  The  profit  rate  is  thus 
17  = 
PQQ-PLL-PKK 
(27) 
- 
rlr 
7 
qK 
where  q  is  the  private  capital  deflator  or  price  of  capital  goods.  To  incorporate  public 
capital  in  the  analysis  it  is  assumed  that  the  production  function  includes  G  as  an 
unpaid  input 
Q=  OF(L,  K,  G) 
- 
(28) 
In  terms  of  Euler's  Theorem- 
ýQ=o 
dF 
L+O  oF  K+O  OT,  G,  (29) 
OT  X  CU 
where  v  measures  the  degree  of  homogeneity.  Under  competitive  market  conditions  in 
product  and  factor  markets  the  marginal  products  of  labour  and  private  capital  equal 
their  respective  real  rental  prices: 
0  OT 
= 
PI, 
.  and  (30) 
OT  PC) 
II -  See  Deno  (1988)  and  Lynde  and  Richmond  (1993a) 45 
p, 
K 
P2  (31) 
Using  (31),  (29)  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  labour's  revenue  share  PLLIPQQI,  . 
TG  Capital's  revenue  share  PKKIPQQ  and  public  capital's  implicit  revenue  share  0o 
CG  Q 
,v=  aL  +aK+aG  ,  (32) 
where  as  are  revenue  shares.  Dividing  (27)  by  PQQ  the  profit  rate  can  be  expressed  in 
terms  of  private  revenue  shares: 
a,  -  aj 
P'ý-),, 
(33) 
qK 
which  can  be  rewritten,  using  (32)  as: 
PQ12 
17  =  (1-r  +ac  (34) 
qK 
Finally  the  real  profit  rate  is  given  by: 
i7,  R 
=  (]-,  v  +a,  )  Q 
(35) 
K 
If  there  are  constant  returns  to  scale  in  private  and  public  inputs(ie,  y=  1),  (3  5) 
reducesto- 
HR=  OF  G 
, 6G  K 
(36) 
In  Chapter  2  it  will  be  shown  that  the  ratio  GIK  has  fallen  in  the  U.  S.  since  the  m1d- 
1960s.  This  implies  that  the  profit  rate  has  fallen  unless  there  have  been  compensating 
increases  in  infrastructure's  marginal  productivity. 
Lynde  (1992)  derives  the  relationship  between  the  profit  rate  and  a  production 
function  and  shows  that  the  profit  rate  depends  on  the  amount  of  private  capital,  the 
ratios  of  labour  to  private  capital  and  public  to  private  capital  and  returns  to  scale. 46 
Public  capital  owned  by  states  and  local  governments  is  found  to  contribute  to  output 
and  profits.  The  marginal  productivity  of  public  capital  has  fallen  significantly  since  the 
1970s. 
Lynde  and  Richmond  (1993a)  estimate  profit  share  equations  using  aggregate 
time  series  data  for  the  United  States.  They  control  for  nonstationarity  in  the  variables 
22 
and  analyse  the  effect  of  intermediate  input  price  changes  on  value-added  . 
Productivity  changes  are  divided  into  four  components,  one  of  which  is  changes  in  the 
ratio  of  public  capital  to  labour.  An  average  estimate  of  0.20  for  public  capital's  output 
elasticity  is  obtained  (ie,  approximately  half  that  obtained  in  production  function 
studies  that  use  national-level  data)  and  approximately  40  per  cent  of  the  slowdown  in 
labour  productivity  growth  is  attributed  to  the  decline  in  the  public  capital/labour  ratio. 
6.  Avenues  for  New  Research 
6.1  Introduction 
The  previous  sections  reveal  that  production  functions  attribute  to  infrastructure  an 
implausible  role  or  are  not  robust.  The  cost  function  method  has  produced  what  are 
arguably  more  realistic  results.  There  are  opportunities  for  further  research  within  this 
framework.  Other  opportunities  for  new  research  are  discussed  in  the  following 
subsections. 
22  Lynde  and  Richmond  point  out  that  the  effect  on  productivity  growth  of  changes  in  the  prices  of 
intermediate  goods.  especially  energy  prices,  is  a  subject  of  some  debate  in  the  productivitýý  literature. 
The  authors  find  that  these  changes,  along  with  the  effects  of  returns  to  scale  and  technology.  account 
for  59  per  cent  of  the  decline  in  labour  productivitv  growth. 47 
62  Disaggregated  Inftastructure  Data 
One  aspect  of  the  debate  researchers  have  largely  ignored  is  the  importance  to  the 
private  business  sector  of  the  various  components  of  the  infrastructure  stock. 
Exceptions  include  Deno  (1988),  Munnell  (1990b,  1993),  and  Hulten  and  Schwab 
(1991b).  The  reason  this  information  is  valuable  is  intuitively  obvious.  The  finding  that 
infrastructure  investment  on  the  whole  has  a  high  rate  of  return  does  not  inform 
policymakers  how  much  spending  is  required  on  the  different  types:  schools,  highways, 
water  treatment  facilities,  fire  stations,  passenger  terminals,  etc. 
The  results  obtained  by  Deno  (1988)  and  Munnell  (1990b,  1993)  reveal  that 
the  contributions  of  the  different  types  of  public  capital  to  productivity  and  their 
relationships  with  private  inputs  tend  to  vary.  Deno  estimates  a  translog  profit  function 
using  regional  manufacturing  data  and  three  infrastructure  stocks:  highways,  water 
systems  and  sewer  systems.  Input  demand  and  output  supply  elasticities  are  calculated 
using  the  resulting  parameter  estimates.  These  reveal  that  all  three  types  of  public 
capital  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  supply  of  manufacturing  output.  A  10  per  cent 
increase  in  highway  and  sewer  capital  leads  to  an  increase  in  output  of  approXimately  3 
per  cent.  A  similar  increase  in  water  capital  generates  an  increase  in  output  of  0.07  per 
cent.  All  three  complement  private  labour  and  private  capital.  This  finding  suggests 
that,  from  a  regional  policy  point  of  view,  policymakers  can  use  public  capital  to 
promote  employment  growth  in  this  sector  as  well  as  expansion  of  the  private  capital 
stock.  The  derived  elasticity  estimates  indicate  that  highway  capital  is  the  most 
effective  policy  tool  for  achieving  this  goal  and  water  capital  is  the  least  effective.  The 
results  obtained  by  Deno  using  aggregate  infrastructure  data  are  of  an  unreasonable 
magnitude,  however.  The  estimated  output  elasticity  is  0.68,  higher  than  that  obtained 48 
in  any  of  the  aggregate  production  function  studies.  23Deno  puts  this  down  to  the  fact 
that  the  total  measure  includes  a  wide  range  of  public  capital  inputs  all  of  which  may  be 
employed  by  manufacturing  firms  either  directly  or  indirectly.  However,  it  is  worth 
noting  that  "apportioned"  infrastructure  data  is  used  in  this  study  -  the  public  capital 
stock  is  multiplied  by  the  percentage  of  a  region's  population  that  is  employed  in 
manufacturing.  This  apportionment  is  designed  to  account  for  the  collective  nature  of 
public  capital  and  the  fact  that  it  is  subject  to  congestion.  This  adjustment  ignores  the 
non-rivalrous  nature  of  much  of  the  public  capital  stock  and  possible  spillover  benefits 
from  one  region  to  another.  Most  studies  in  the  infrastructure  literature  do  not  adjust 
the  public  capital  stock  in  this  way.  " 
Munnell  (I  990b,  1993)  estimates  Cobb-Douglas  and  translog  production 
functions  using  state-level  manufacturing  data  and  data  for  the  state  highway  stock, 
water  and  sewer  systems  capital  and  "other  public  capital"  . 
2'  The  results  are  different  in 
many  respects  to  those  obtained  by  Deno  (1988).  In  both  of  Munnell's  studies  water 
and  sewer  systems  were  found  to  have  the  largest  output  elasticity  (0.12  and  0.15 
respectively),  followed  by  highways  (0.06  and  0.04  respectively).  The  coefficient 
estimate  on  other  public  capita126  was  found  to  be  statistically  insignificant.  Together, 
the  components  of  this  stock  make  up  a  large  fraction  of  the  total  non-military 
23  Because  spillovers  between  states  and  regions  are  not  captured  using  geographically  disaggregated 
data  one  would  expect  the  output  elasticity  of  infrastructure  to  be  lower  than  that  obtained  in 
aggregate  studies. 
24  Use  of  unapportioned  data  generates  countcrintuitive  results,  eg,  negative  output  elasticities. 
25  It  should  be  noted  that  no  comprehensive  measures  of  state  public  or  private  capital  are  available.  In 
the  case  of  public  capital,  state  capital  series  were  created  using  annual  state  public  investment  data 
and  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  depreciation  and  discard  schedules.  In  the  case  of  private  capital 
the  total  stock  was  apportioned  on  the  basis  of  each  state's  activity  in  agriculture,  manufacturing  and 
non-manufacturing. 
26  This  stock  consists  of  equipment,  schools,  hospitals,  industrial  buildings  and  other  buildings 
(general  office  buildings,  police  and  fire  stations,  courthouses,  auditoriums,  garages  and  passenger 
terminals).  conservation  and  other  structures  (electric  and  gas  facilities,  transit  systems  and  airfields). 49 
infrastructure  stock  -  on  average  45.9  per  cent  of  the  total  stock  over  the  estimating 
period.  Estimates  of  cross-product  terms  indicate  that  highways  and  streets  are 
substitutes  for  private  capital.  In  Munnell's  opinion: 
"This  seems  quite  reasonable  in  that  smooth,  well-maintained  roads  will 
reduce  the  wear  and  tear  on  commercial  vehicles.  Moreover,  private 
employers  or  developers  may  sometimes  be  required  to  build  their  own 
access  roads.  "  (p.  20) 
Water  and  sewer  systems  are  strong  complements  to  private  capital.  Munnell  argues 
that  this  finding  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  these  inputs  are  generally  publicly 
provided  "and  clearly  augment  private  production.  " 
Using  a  growth  accounting  framework,  Hulten  and  Schwab  (1991b)  find  that 
none  of  the  public  capital  stocks  is  productive.  Earlier  it  was  pointed  out  that  the 
specification  in  (2)  may  have  important  implications  for  standard  calculations  of  the 
Solow  residual.  To  obtain  an  accurate  measure  of  TFP  requires  removing  the 
contribution  of  public  capital.  The  standard  equation  for  the  growth  rate  of  the  Solow 
residual  is 
FLL  oT  KK 
0  dL  QL  AX  QK 
(37) 
where  OoTIOL  is  the  marginal  product  of  labour  and  OOTIX  is  the  marginal  product 
27 
of  capital  . 
If  (2)  is  the  correct  specification  of  the  production  function  (37)  should 
have  an  extra  term  appended  on  the  right-hand  side: 
Chapter  4  contains  a  ftdl  derivation  of  the  Solow  residual. 50 
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ýGQG 
where  0  oT  G6 
is  the  public  capital  output  elasticity,  multiplied  by  the  growth  rate 
. 
XQG 
of  public  capital.  If  this  term  is  omitted,  the  standard  Solow  residual  attributes  G's 
contribution  to  output  growth  to  the  Hicksian  efficiency  term.  Thus  the  following 
adjustment  has  to  be  made  to  obtain  the  "true"  Hicksian  efficiency  term- 
ö-.  ös 
- 
ßG 
ü 
31  0  es 
(39) 
where  6'510s  is  the  Solow  residual  and  8,  is  public  capital"s  output  elasticity.  To 
obtain  an  estimate  of  18G,  Hulten  and  Schwab  (1991b)  regress  the  Solow  residual  on 
the  growth  rate  of  public  capital  as  well  as  disaggregated  public  capital  (highways, 
water  and  sewers  and  other  public  capital).  All  output  elasticities  are  found  to  be 
insignIficant.  Some  of  the  earlier  criticisms  apply  to  the  empirical  implementation  of 
this  approach.  It  is  likely  that  W10s  and  OIG  are  integrated  to  different  orders  and 
below  it  will  be  argued  that  the  Solow  residual  is  arguably  not  an  accurate  measure  of 
"true"  TFP.  However,  from  (39)  it  is  also  clear  that  the  estimating  equation  should 
contain  1§  16) 
,  the  "true"  Hicksian  efficiency  term.  This  is  a  difficult  problem  to 
overcome  as  a  measure  of  this  variable  is  not  directly  available.  The  authors  use  a 
constant  and  time  dummies  as  a  proxy  for  6)  /0 
. 
Thus  the  estimating  equation 
suffers  from  specification  error  and  this  may  explain  the  insignificance  of  the  public 
capital  measures. 
In  summary,  studies  carried  out  thus  far  with  disaggregated  infrastructure  data, 
in  particular  those  by  Deno  and  Munnell,  reveal  that  deternuning  the  contfibution  of 
different  types  of  capital  provides  important  additional  information  to  policymakers.  In 51 
the  next  two  subsections  some  of  the  uses  to  which  disaggregated  data  can  be  put  are 
described. 
6.3  The  Calculation  of  Optimal  Inftastructure  Stocks 
One  of  the  advantages  of  the  cost  function  framework  is  that  it  can  be  used  to  calculate 
optimal  infrastructure  stocks.  However,  in  only  two  studies  in  the  literature  have 
optimal  stocks  been  estimated:  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992)  using  data  for  the  Swedish 
private  business  sector  and  Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1996)  using  data  for  New  England 
manufacturing.  Optimal  stocks  have  not  been  calculated  using  U.  S.  data  at  a  more 
aggregated  level,  nor  have  optimal  quantities  of  the  individual  types  of  infrastructure 
been  estimated.  Most  cost  function  studies  seek  to  establish  the  shadow  value  of 
infrastructure  and  the  relationship  between  this  input  and  private  factor  inputs. 
The  methodology  used  to  construct  these  measures  is  outlined  in  detail  in 
Chapter  3.  The  basic  principle  involves  balancing  the  cost  savings  enjoyed  by  the 
private  business  sector  against  the  costs  to  society  of  providing  the  additional  capital. 
In  equilibrium,  the  infrastructure  stock  is  optimal  if  the  marginal  benefit  and  marginal 
cost  of  public  capital  are  equal: 
cG 
(40) 
where  PG  is  the  one-period  user  cost  of  public  capital.  Much  of  the  recent  cost 
function  research  also  focuses  on  the  importance  of  infrastructure  to  the  manufacturing 
sector,  either  in  the  U.  S.  or  other  countries  . 
2'  This  is  justifiable  in  the  sense  that  a  more 
complete  set  of  input  data  is  available  for  this  sector.  However,  there  are  other  sectors 
Exceptions  include  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992)  and  Lynde,  and  Richmond  (1992). 52 
that  benefit  from  infrastructure  investment.  These  are  some  of  the  issues  addressed  in 
Chapter  3. 
64  Focusing  on  the  Other  Variable  in  the  Analysis 
It  is  also  clear  that  studies  that  make  use  of  a  direct  measure  of  total  factor 
29 
productivity  rely  on  standard  constructions  of  TFP  based  on  Solow  (1957). 
However,  as  Malley  et  al.  (1998)  point  out,  the  standard  Solow  residual  ignores 
considerations  pertaining  to  market  power,  returns  to  scale  and  variable  factor 
utilisation  over  the  business  cycle.  If  the  Solow  residual  does  not  measure  "true' 
productivity  growth,  it  is  possible  that  conclusions  drawn  about  the  relationship 
between  productivity  and  infrastructure  based  on  this  residual  are  invalid.  In  Chapter  4 
the  focus  moves  from  infrastructure  to  issues  relating  to  productivity  measurement.  A 
measure  of  TFP  is  derived  that  takes  account  of  non-constant  returns  to  scale  and 
unobserved  changes  in  labour  and  capital  utilisation.  There  are  a  number  of  uses  to 
which  such  a  measure  can  be  put,  one  of  which  would  be  a  re-examination  of  the  role 
of  different  types  of  public  capital.  In  Section  3.3.3  the  possibility  of  "reverse 
causality"  between  infrastructure  and  productivity  was  discussed.  An  adjusted  measure 
of  TFP  can  be  used  to  re-examine  the  direction  of  causation  between  the  variables. 
29  These  include  production  function  studies,  studies  that  use  a  growth  accounting  framework  and 
studies  in  which  causality  tests  are  carried  out.  An  exception  is  Lýmdc  and  Richmond  (1993b)  who 
adjust  their  measure  of  labour  productivity  to  account  for  increasing  returns  to  scale. 53 
Conclusion 
The  two  most  popular  empirical  approaches  in  the  infrastructure  literature  are  the 
production  function  and  the  duality  approach.  The  results  of  the  various  studies  are 
often  difficult  to  compare  due  to  the  use  of  datasets  that  differ  by  sector  or  by  country 
or  in  the  level  of  geographical  aggregation,  and  due  to  differences  in  econometric 
technique.  Although  they  rekindled  interest  in  infrastructure's  role  in  private 
production  in  the  late  1980s,.  there  is  some  evidence  that  the  results  of  production 
function  studies  are  not  robust  and  that  the  methodology  suffers  from  a  number  of 
weaknesses  that  are  overcome  by  the  duality  approach.  There  has  been  a  significant 
amount  of  infrastructure  research  using  a  variety  of  cost  and  profit  function 
specifications  and  datasets.  These  studies  generally  attribute  to  infrastructure  a 
significant  role  in  the  private  production  process.  For  example,  shadow  values  and 
elasticity  values  indicate  that  increases  in  infrastructure  reduce  private  costs. 
Unanswered  questions  remain,  however,  in  particular  concerning  optimality.  The 
finding  that  public  capital  reduces  private  costs  is  not  the  only  information  in  which 
policymakers  are  interested.  It  is  also  important  to  weigh  these  cost  savings  against  the 
cost  of  infrastructure.  This  exercise  is  performed  in  Chapter  3. 
Turning  to  the  other  variable  of  focus,  the  growth  rate  of  factor  productivity,  it 
is  clear  that  many  studies  that  directly  calculate  TFP  base  their  measure  on  Solow 
(1957).  However,  use  of  this  measure  may  cause  the  wrong  conclusion  to  be  drawn 
about  infrastructure's  effect  on  the  private  sector.  The  residual  fails  to  take  account  of 
varying  returns  to  scale  and  variable  labour  and  capital  utilisation  over  the  cycle.  The 
latest  developments  in  the  productivity  literature  are  used  in  Chapter  4  to  estimate  an 54 
adjusted  measure  of  TFP  growth  and  uncover  the  relationship  between  infrastructure 
investment  and  the  "true"  productivity  growth  rate. 
Regardless  of  the  approach  adopted  ,  it  is  useful  to  compare  the  roles  of  the 
different  types  of  infrastructure  in  the  production  process.  Public  capital  ranges  from 
short-lived  equipment  to  long-lived  roads  and  other  networks.  It  is  likely  that  the  roles 
of  the  various  stocks  differ  significantly.  In  the  next  chapter  a  closer  look  is  taken  at 
the  different  types  of  public  capital. 55 
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Chapter  2 
An  Analysis  of  the  Severity  and  Causes  of  the 
Infrastructure  Slowdown 
1.  Introduction 
The  state  and  local  governments  in  the  United  States  own  over  $2.2  trillion  of 
equipment,  buildings  and  other  structures,  accumulated  over  more  than  a  century.  A 
significant  portion  of  this  wealth  was  acquired  in  the  two  decades  following  the 
Second  World  War:  in  1946  state  and  local  governments  possessed  $424  billion  of 
capital,  by  the  end  of  the  1960s  this  figure  had  risen  to  $1.2  trillion.  '  In  the  postwar 
years  the  U.  S.  was  in  what  Seely  (1993)  describes  as  the  "golden  age  of  infrastructure 
development",  with  massive  amounts  being  spent  on  roads,  schools  and  public  utilities. 
However,  at  the  end  of  the  1960s  the  golden  age  came  to  an  end.  Public  investment  fell 
year  after  year  for  more  than  a  decade.  By  1982  investment  expenditures  were  30  per 
cent  lower  than  in  1968.  The  situation  improved  thereafter  but  by  the  end  of  the  1980s 
there  was  little  more  investment  than  there  had  been  in  the  Sixties.  Books  with  titles 
such  as  America  in  Ruins  and  Fragile  Foundations2argued  that  the  U.  S.  was  now  in 
The  latter  two  figures  and  all  other  figures  are  expressed  in  1987  dollars  for  comparative  purposes. 
unless  othenNise  stated. 
I -  National  Council  on  Public  Works  Improvement.  (1988). 61 
an  era  of  "Crumbling"  infrastructure.  Dissection  of  the  public  investment  data  reveals 
that  some  categories  were  worse  affected  than  others.  Roads  and  schools  were  the 
main  victims  of  the  cutbacks.  Eventually  spending  was  insufficient  to  offset  the  ' 
depreciation  of  these  stocks  and  so  the  "infrastructure  slowdown"  turned  into  an 
"infrastructure  decline".  Spending  on  other  types  of  public  capital  fell  but  neither  as 
severely  nor  for  such  a  prolonged  time.  However,  the  cutbacks  were  severe  enough  to 
see  the  growth  rates  of  all  the  different  types  of  infrastructure  fall  well  below  levels 
seen  in  the  1950s  and  1960s. 
A  crucial  issue  that  the  infrastructure  literature  seeks  to  resolve  is  whether  the 
infrastructure  slowdown  contributed  to  the  productivity  growth  slowdown  that  also 
reared  its  head  in  the  early  1970s.  At  this  time,  public  investment  was  falling  relative  to 
most  measures  of  private  economic  activity  (GDP,  private  investment  and  the  growth 
of  the  workforce),  However,  productivity  growth  was  not  necessarily  lower  for  this 
reason.  First,  it  might  be  argued  that  falling  public  investment  in  the  1970s  was  a 
logical  consequence  of  the  high  levels  seen  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.  Secondly,  it  is 
unlikely  that  all  types  of  public  capital  influence  private  productivity  directly.  Reduced 
spending  on  educational  buildings,  for  example,  may  have  had  very  little  effect  on 
educational  attainment  and  to  the  extent  that  it  did,  the  effect  on  labour  productivity 
would  possibly  only  have  been  felt  with  a  very  long  lag.  With  streets  and  highways  the 
story  is  possibly  different.  As  the  principle  component  of  the  core  (productive) 
infrastructure  stock,  it  is  possible  that  the  decline  in  road  spending  contributed  to  some 
extent  to  the  productivity  slowdown. 
In  this  chapter  a  closer  look  is  taken  at  the  various  types  of  public  capital  to 
determine  which  were  most  severely  affected  during  the  infrastructure  slowdown  and 
why  the  slowdown  occurred.  The  main  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  provide 62 
background  information  for  the  empirical  work  in  the  remaining  chapters.  The 
structure  is  similar  to  that  of  Gramlich  (1994)  and  Tatom  (1993).  This  chapter 
contributes  to  the  existing  body  of  knowledge  by  focusing  on  the  role  of  economic 
depreciation  and  certain  components  of  the  core  infrastructure  stock. 
In  Section  2a  close  look  is  taken  at  the  changing  roles  of  the  federal  and  state 
governments  in  the  provision  of  infrastructure.  The  individual  components  of  the 
nonmilitary  public  capital  stock  are  then  examined  in  order  to  judge  their  relative 
importance.  In  Section  3  the  infrastructure  slowdown  is  illustrated  using  a  wide  variety 
of  measures.  Public  investment  is  compared  with  GDP,  private  investment  and  growth 
in  the  U.  S.  population  and  labour  force.  The  infrastructure  data  is  dissected  in  order  to 
determine  which  types  of  public  capital  experienced  the  most  serious  cutbacks.  In 
Section  4a  number  of  causes  of  the  infrastructure  slowdown  are  analysed.  Particular 
attention  is  paid  to  the  effect  of  economic  depreciation  on  the  growth  of  the  public 
capital  stock.  In  Section  5  the  link  between  the  productivity  slowdown  and  the 
infrastructure  slowdown  is  analysed,  with  particular  reference  to  spending  on  roads. 
2.  The  Composition  of  U.  S.  Capital 
2.1  Private  versus  Public 
Although  the  private  sector  owns  most  of  the  tangible  wealth  in  the  U.  S.,  the  public 
sector  accounts  for  one  third  of  the  total  stock  of  nonresidential  capital 63 
Table  1.  Private  and  Public  Net  Nonresidential  Capital  Stocks,  1994 
Capital  Stock  Billions  of  1987  dollars  %  of  Total 
Total  7.755.8  100 
Total  Private  5.144.4  66.3 
Non-fann  5,009.2  64.6 
Farm  135.2  1.7 
Total  Public  2,611.4  33.7 
Military  468.8  6.0 
Non-military  2,142.6  27.6 
Federal  278.7  3.6 
State  &  Local  1,863.8  24.0 
Table  2.  Federal  &  State  and  Militaty  and  Non-military  Capital,  %  Shares,  1944-94 
1944  1954  1964  1974  1984  1994 
Share  of  states 
in  total  G  33  51  60  70  72  71 
Share  of  states 
in  nonmilitary  G  66  75  81  85  86  87 
Share  of  nonmilitary 
G  in  total  G  50  68  74  82  84  82 
Share  of  nonmilitary 
G  in  Federal  G  26  35  35  41  43  37 
(Table  1).  In  1994  there  was  $2.6  trillion  of  public  capital,  seven  times  more  than  in 
1925.  The  public  capital  stock  can  be  divided  into  two  major  categories-  federal  and 
state  capital  and  military  and  nonmilitary  capital.  The  Federal  Goverment  owns  all  the 
military  capital  (which  accounts  for  18  per  cent  of  the  total)  and  the  state  govermments 
3 
own  most  of  the  rest  . 
The  states'  share  of  total  and  total  nonmilitary  public  capital 
3  Seely  (1993)  explains  that  the  U.  S.  Congress  severely  limited  the  Federal  Goverrument's  role  in  the 
provision  of  non-military  capital  from  the  outset.  The  first  major  debate  involved  the  Gallatin  Plan.  a 
proposal  for  federal  road  development  which  was  proposed  in  1808  and  ultimatcly  rejected  by 
Congress. 64 
Table  3.  Composition  of  Public  Capital 
1944  1954  1964  1974  1984  1994 
Equipment 
Industrial  buildings 
Schools 
Hospitals 
Other  buildings 
Highways  &  streets 
Conservation 
Other  structures  b 
Sewers  ' 
Water  Supply 
d 
15.0  8.1  6.8  7.2  6.9  9.7 
9.4  7.2  3.5  1.5  1.3  1.0 
10.7  13.1  16.3  18.2  15.7  13.9 
2.8  3.9  3.1  2.8  3.0  2.6 
6.3  6.1  6.8  8.3  10.1  11.7 
32.2  34.8  38.0  36.7  34.3  32.3 
8.5  10.1  9.1  8.3  8.5  7.3 
4.6  5.2  5.1  6.0  7.2  7.6 
5.5  6.2  6.5  6.5  8.2  8.6 
5.0  5.3  4.7  4.5  4.7  5.3 
100  100  100  100  100  100 
Note:  '  Includes  general  office  buildings,  police  &  fire  stations,  courthouses,  auditoriums,  garages,  passenger 
bd 
terminals.  Includes  electric  &  gas  facilities,  transit  systems,  airfields.  '  Includes  treatment  plants.  Largely  water 
mains  and  distribution  Imes. 
increased  considerably  after  the  Second  World  War,  levelling  off  in  the  1970s  (Table 
2).  This  trend  occurred  mainly  because  the  relative  magnitude  of  the  nonmilitary 
capital  stock  increased  considerably  after  the  War,  rising  from  50  per  cent  in  1944  to 
82  per  cent  in  1974.  From  this  point  on,  all  references  to  the  public  capital  stock  are 
confined  to  nonmilitary  capital.  Furthermore,  although  the  states  own  most  of  the 
nonmilitary  capital,  it  is  clear  from  Table  2  that  a  significant  portion  of  federal  capital  is 
nonmilitary  in  nature.  Therefore  all  references  to  the  public  capital  stock  are  to 
nonmilitary  federal  and  state  capital. 
2.2  The  Different  Types  of  Public  Capital 
Table  3  shows  the  relative  importance  of  the  different  components  of  the  total 
infrastructure  stock  at  various  points  in  time  ftom  1944-1994.  Roads,  schools, 
hospitals  and  water  systems  have  all  shrunk  as  a  percentage  of  total  infrastructure;  the 
rest  have  all  grown  in  importance.  However,  there  has  been  considerable  variation 
-1  it  also  excludes  investment  in  residential  buildings,  as  does  the  private  investment  series  which 
appears  later 65 
along  the  way,  as  a  cursory  examination  of  the  table  makes  clear.  Equipment  is  a 
relatively  small  component  of  public  capital,  accounting  for  only  9.7  per  cent  of  the 
total  in  1994.  This  compares  with  private  capital,  where  equipment  makes  up  48  per 
cent  of  the  total  capital  stock.  The  bulk  of  the  public  capital  stock  is  comprised  of 
structures.  Roads  are  by  far  the  largest  component,  despite  their  relative  decline  in 
importance  since  the  mid-1960s.  By  1994  roads  accounted  for  32  per  cent  of  the 
public  capital  stock.  Educational  buildings  are  another  important  category,  although 
their  importance  has  also  declined  since  the  mid-  1970s. 
3.  The  Infrastructure  Slowdown 
3.1  Ae  Public  Investment  Slowdown,  1968-82 
From  1959  to  1994  total  government  purchases  of  goods  and  services  in  the  U.  S. 
almost  doubled,  rising  from  $475  billion  to  $923  billion.  Infrastructure  spending  also 
almost  doubled  over  this  period,  rising  from  $65  billion  to  $125  billion.  However,  as 
Figure  I  makes  clear,  investment  was  far  more  volatile  than  other  types  of  spending. 
Over  the  ten-year  period  from  1959  to  1968,  investment  grew  by  5.3  per  cent  per  year. 
There  was  then  a  sharp  reversal,  with  spending  declining  by  2  per  cent  a  year  so  that  by 
1982  investment  in  infrastructure  was  close  to  levels  last  seen  in  the  early  1960s.  In 
fact.,  at  no  time  since  the  1850s  has  public  investment  experienced  such  a  prolonged 
period  of  decline. 66 
Figure  1.  Total  Government  Purchases  (excluding  investment)  and 
Non-military  Government  Investment  (7bg  scales,  investment  L.  H.  S) 
Investment  -------  Government  Purchases 
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Figure  2.  Investment  in  Roads  and  Educational  Buildings  versus 
Other  Public  Investment  (7og  scales) 
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An  important  question  is  whether  there  was  a  decline  in  all  types  of  public  investment 
or  just  a  few  categories.  Figure  2  divides  the  public  capital  stock  into  two  components* 
roads  and  schools  and  the  rest.  It  w3pears  that  the  large  decline  in  investment  in  streets 67 
Figure  3.  Roads  versus  Other  Core  Investment  (log  scale,  roads  L.  H.  S) 
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and  highways  and  educational  buildings  contributed  most  to  the  decline  in  public 
investment  from  the  late  1960s.  The  slowdown  in  other  investment  was  not 
insignificant,  however,  declining  for  several  years  after  1968  and  only  starting  to  grow 
significantly  from  1984. 
In  Chapter  I  it  was  mentioned  that  public  capital  can  be  placed  into  two 
groups:  the  productive  core,  consisting  of  highways  and  streets,  sewer  systems,  water 
supply  facilities,  utilities,  transit  systems  and  airports;  and  the  rest  which  does  not 
contribute  directly  to  private  production,  consisting  of  buildings  (schools,  hospitals, 
courthouses  etc.  )  and  conservation  structures  (water  resource  projects  aimed  at  flood 
and  erosion  control).  5  In  Figure  3  core  investment  is  divided  into  its  two  major 
5  Although  some  public  capital  is  arguably  more  productive  than  others,  almost  all  creates  an 
environment  in  which  private  production  can  take  place.  A  healthy  workforce  is  a  productive 
workforce.  so  hospitals  and  conservation  are  important.  An  educated  worker  contributes  more  to  GDP 
than  his  unskilled  colleague  so  investment  in  schools  affects  productivity,  even  if  only  with  a 
considerable  tag.  Infrastructure  doesn't  only  facilitate  private  production.  As  Gramlich  (1994)  points 
out,  a  large  share  of  the  benefits  of  increased  infrastructure  investment  involve  improved  security. 
personal  time  saving,  a  cleaner  environment.  and  improved  outdoor  recreation  -  benefits  that  are 
difficult  to  measure  and  not  included  in  official  measures  of  national  output. 
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Figure  4.  Non-military  Government  Capital  Stock  1950-94  (log  scale) 
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components:  roads  and  the  rest.  Clearly  there  was  a  significant  decline  in  roads 
investment  from  the  late  1960s.  Although  the  decline  in  other  core  investment  was  not 
as  prolonged,  it  took  more  than  a  decade  for  investment  in  these  types  of  infrastructure 
to  exceed  levels  last  seen  in  the  late  1960s.  From  1950  to  1968  other  investment  grew 
by  6.8  per  cent  per  year  but  then  declined  until  1973.  From  1974  growth  resumed  but 
at  a  much  slower  rate  than  in  earlier  decades.  Between  1974  and  1994  average  annual 
growth  in  "other  core"  investment  was  only  1.4  per  cent  per  year. 
The  infrastructure  slowdown  can  also  be  pictured  using  stock  measures.  The 
evolution  of  the  total  infrastructure  stock  since  1950  is  illustrated  in  Figure  4.  The  fall 
in  investment  spending  from  the  late  1960s  to  the  early  1980s  is  apparent  from  the 
"hump"  in  the  graph,  which  represents  a  fall  in  the  growth  rate  of  the  infrastructure 
stock.  In  Table  4  the  growth  rates  of  the  individual  infrastructure  stocks  are  illustrated 
over  two  different  periods:  1950-72,  a  period  of  rapid  growth  and  1973-94,  a  period  of 
slow  growth.  Clearly  most  types  of  ca-pitall  can  be  blamed  for  the  "infrastructure  crisis") 
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Table  4.  Growth  Rates  of  Individual  Inftastructure  Stocks,  1950-94 
1950-72  1973-94 
Core  infrastructure: 
Highways  &  streets  4.1  0.8 
Sewer  systems  3.9  3.1 
Water  supply  3.1  2.3 
Utilities,  transit 
systems  &  airports  3.8  2.7 
Buildings: 
Educational  5.9  0.2 
Hospitals  2.8  1.1 
Other  4.7  3.2 
Conservation 
&  development  3.0  0.8 
Equipment  4.7  2.8 
Every  type  of  capital  experienced  slower  growth  after  1972.  However,  some 
contributed  to  the  decline  more  than  others.  For  example,  the  stock  of  roads  grew  by 
only  0.8  per  cent  per  year  in  the  second  period,  compared  with  4.1  per  cent  in  the  first 
period.  In  comparison  the  growth  rate  of  sewers  systems  (also  a  component  of  core 
infrastructure)  slowed  from  3.9  per  cent  to  3.1  per  cent.  The  reason  both  stock  and 
flow  measures  are  analysed  is  because  the  latter  do  not  take  account  of  economic 
depreciation.  Depreciation  has  played  a  role  in  the  infrastructure  slowdown.  Its  role 
will  be  discussed  further  in  Section  4.3. 
3.2.  Public  Investment  vs.  Private  Investment 
Another  way  of  illustrating  the  infrastructure  slowdown  is  to  compare  infrastructure 
spending  with  various  private  sector  variables.  For  example,  the  ratio  of  public  to 
private  investment  has  more  than  halved  over  the  last  30  years,  falling  from  a  peak  of 70 
Figure  5.  Ratio  of  Public  to  Private  Investment,  1959-94 
Figure  6.  Ratio  of  Public  to  Private  Capital  Stock,  1925-94 
0.44  in  1963  to  0.19  in  1994  (Figure  5).  However,  it  did  increase  slightly  from  the  mid- 
1980s  when  the  level  of  public  investment  took  off  again.  The  GK  ratio  is  illustrated  in 
Figure  6.  The  ratio  peaked  in  1944  when,  for  every  $  1.00  of  private  capital,  there  was 
$0.62  of  public  capital.  This  trend  is  not  surprising  given  that  the  public  sector  had  an 
abnormally  large  share  of  economic  activity  In  th.  -.  U.  S.  during  the  Great  Depression 
and  the  Second  World  War.  Further  perspective  on  the  fall  in  investment  in 71 
Figure  7.  Public  Investment  (log  scale,  L.  H.  S)  and  the  Ratio  of 
Public  to  Private  Investment,  1865-1994 
the  1970s  and  the  relative  roles  of  the  public  and  private  sector  is  obtained  by 
examining  even  longer  data  series.  This  way  investment  during  the  slowdown  can  be 
compared  not  just  with  the  high  levels  of  the  1950s  and  1960s  but  with  other  times 
during  the  20th  Century.  In  fact,  the  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  provides 
investment  data  going  right  back  to  the  19th  Century.  It  is  clear  from  Figure  7  that  the 
growth  rate  of  public  investment  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  was  not  abnormally  high. 
Although  levels  of  investment  in  the  1970s  were  higher  than  at  most  other  times  in  the 
history  of  the  U.  S.,  the  growth  rate  was  very  low  after  1968.  It  is  also  interesting  to 
look  at  the  public/private  investment  ratio  over  a  longer  period.  Ignoring  the  period  of 
the  Great  Depression  and  the  Second  World  War  when  the  ratio  was  abnormally  high, 
it  is  apparent  that  public  investment  grew  faster  than  private  investment  in  the  years 
leading  up  to  the  infrastructure  slowdown.  Although  the  ratio  fell  thereafter,  it  did  not 
6Notc  that  the  years  of  the  Second  World  War  have  been  omitted  because  they  distort  the  picture. 
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Figure  8.  Private  (L.  H.  S)  and  Public  Investment  as  a  Share  of  GDP 
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fall  below  levels  seen  at  most  other  times  in  the  United  States'  history. 
3.3.  Public  Investment  and  GDP 
Another  way  of  examining  the  infrastructure  slowdown  is  to  compare  public 
investment  with  GDP.  Over  the  period  1959-94  infrastructure  investment  has  averaged 
2.8  per  cent  of  GDP  (other  spending  18  per  cent).  Investment  peaked  at  3.9  per  cent  in 
1966  and  bottomed  out  at  2.0  per  cent  in  1984  (Figure  11).  Comparing  private 
investment  with  GDP  a  different  picture  is  obtained.  The  share  of  private  fixed 
nonresidential  investment  in  GDP  has  steadily  increased  over  the  years,  from  8.6  per 
cent  in  1959  to  12.6  per  cent  in  1994. 
After  increasing  significantly  in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  most  types  of 
infrastructure  declined  relative  to  GDP  between  1974  and  1994  (Table  5).  Some 
categories  have  increased  as  a  percentage  of  GDP,  however.  Investment  in  water  and 
sewer  systems  grew  as  a  result  of  federal  grants  in  terms  of  the  1972  Clean  Water  Act. 
An  increase  in  spending  on  public  utilities,  transit  systems  and  airports  saw 73 
Table  5.  Total  Public  Capital  in  the  United  States  by  Type  1954-94 
Capital  Stock  1994  stock 
Percentage  of  GDP 
(1987  dollars)  1964  1974  1984  1994 
Core  infrastructure:  1,154.7  30.9  31.4  27.6  25.0 
Highways  &  streets  692.9  21.6  21.5  17.3  15.0 
Sewer  systems  184.5  3.7  3.8  4.2  4.0 
Water  supply  113.7  2.7  2.6  2.4  2.5 
Utilities,  transit 
systems  &  airports  163.6  2.9  3.5  3.7  3.5 
Building:  624.8  17.0  18.1  15.2  13.5 
Educational  297.2  9.3  10.7  7.9  6.4 
Hospitals  56.7  1.8  1.7  1.5  1.2 
Other  270.9  5.9  5.7  5.8  5.9 
Conservation 
&  development  156.2  5.2  4.9  4.3  3.4 
Equipment  206.8  3.8  4.2  3.5  4.5 
Total  2,142.5  56.8  58.5  50.5  46.5 
Note:  GDP  is  for  the  private  busuiess  sector. 
the  share  of  "other  structures"  in  GDP  rise  from  2.9  per  cent  of  GDP  to  3.5  per  cent  of 
GDP.  Thus  most  of  the  different  core  infrastructure  stocks  grew  relative  to  GDP 
during  the  "infrastructure  slowdown".  An  exception  was  the  stock  of  roads  which 
shrank  from  21.6  per  cent  to  15  per  cent  of  GDP.  The  fact  that  roads  are  such  a  large 
component  of  the  core  infrastructure  stock  had  the  effect  that  the  core's  share  of  GDP 
fell  from  31  per  cent  in  1964  to  25  per  cent  in  1994. 
3.4  Per  Capita  Measures  of  Public  Capital 
Finally,  the  infrastructure  slowdown  can  be  illustrated  by  taking  a  look  at  what  has 
happened  to  public  capital  measured  in  per  capita  terms.  The  population  of  the  U.  S. 
has  more  than  doubled  over  the  last  70  years,  rising  from  122  million  in  1925  to  260 
million  in  1994.  This  translates  into  growth  of  I-I  per  cent  per  year.  The  overall  stock 74 
Figure  9.  Core  G  per  Person  (R-  H.  S)  andper  Labour  Force  Member,  194  7-1994 
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of  capital  grew  by  3.1  per  cent  per  year  during  this  period  and  thus  the  per  capita  stock 
of  government  capital  has  risen  by  approximately  2  per  cent  per  year.  There  was 
$8,220  of  infrastructure  capital  per  person  in  1994,  almost  four  times  as  much  as  in 
1925.  By  the  time  the  infrastructure  slowdown  started  in  the  late  1960s,  the  population 
was  growing  at  a  much  slower  rate  than  it  had  been  in  the  1950s  and  early  1960s  and 
so  there  was  never  a  decline  in  the  quantity  of  G  per  capita.  The  quantity  of 
infrastructure  per  labour  force  member  did,  however,  decline  during  the  slow  growth 
years.  Infrastructure  per  labour  force  member  is  a  more  suitable  measure  to  use  if  the 
focus  is  on  labour  productivity.  7  Figure  9  shows  that  this  stock  grew  considerably  until 
1972.  After  that7  as  the  "baby  boom"  generation  started  entering  the  work  force,  the 
variable  declined  at  the  rate  of  0.3  per  cent  per  year  until  1994. 
The  capital  stock  is  measured  relative  to  the  labour  force,  not  employment,  to  remove  variations 
caused  by  the  business  cycle. 75 
Table  6.  Public  Investment:  an  International  Comparison 
Public  Investment  as  a  Percentage  of  Private  Investment 
Period  U.  S.  Canada  Germany  U.  1c  Japan 
1960-64  18.7  23.4  17.9  13.2  41.4 
1965-69  19.3  21.6  19.6  7.4  45.8 
1970-74  14.8  19.2  19.7  9.1  45.5 
1975-79  11.1  15.3  19.1  6.1  59.8 
1980-84  9.3  14.0  15.4  5.0  55.6 
1985-89  10.0  13.1  13.2  4.5  38.9 
Public  Investment's  Share  in  GDP 
Period  U.  S.  Canada  Gennany  U.  1c  Japan 
1960-64  2.6  4.1  3.9  2.0  7.8 
1965-69  2.8  4.1  3.9  1.3  8.0 
1970-74  2.3  3.6  4.0  1.6  8.5 
1975-79  1.8  3.1  3.3  1.1  8.8 
1980-84  1.5  2.7  2.8  0.8  8.5 
1985-89  1.5  2.4  2.3  0.8  6.5 
Source:  Tatom  (1993). 
3.5  An  International  Comparison 
As  Tatorn  (1993)  and  Ford  and  Poret  (1991)  point  out,  it  is  difficult  to  compare  the 
evolution  of  public  capital  in  different  countries  because,  for  example,  relatively  large 
holdings  of  capital  that  in  other  countries  would  be  held  by  the  public  sector  are  owned 
by  the  private  sector  in  the  United  States.  This  is  especially  the  case  in  transportation, 
communications  and  electric  and  gas  utilities.  Thus  it  is  difficult  to  compare  the 
absolute  level  of  the  public/private  investment  ratio  in  the  U.  S.  and  Japan. 
Nevertheless  a  comparison  of  trends  in  public  investment  ratios  provides  an 
interesting  story.  With  the  exception  of  Japan,  both  the  public/private  investment  ratio 
and  public  investment's  share  in  GDP  have  declined  in  all  the  countries  illustrated  in 
Table  6.  Thus  the  decline  in  public  capital  formation  in  the  U.  S.  was  not  unique. 76 
Figure  10.  Relative  Price  of  Public  Capital  (L.  H.  S)  and 
the  PubliclPrivate  Investment  Ratio,  1950-1994 
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4.  Reasons  for  the  Slowdown 
There  are  several  possible  explanations  as  to  why  the  infrastructure  slowdown 
occurred,  including  the  rise  in  the  relative  price  of  public  capital,  the  change  in  the 
composition  of  the  public  capital  stock  and  pressure  on  state  governments'  finances. 
1.  The  Rising  Price  OfPubfic  Capital 
If  the  relative  price  of  new  public  capital  is  defined  as  the  price  of  new  public  capital 
divided  by  the  price  of  new  private  capital,  then  it  is  possible  to  determine  whether 
changes  in  relative  price  have  had  an  effect  on  the  accumulation  of  public  capital 
relative  to  private  capital  in  the  post-war  period.  8  It  appears  from  Figure  10  that  there 
8  The  cost  of  public  capital  is  measured  as  the  public  capital  deflator,  obtainct!  Uy  dividing  the  current 
stock  of  public  capital  by  the  constant  dollar  stock.  The  price  of  private  capital  is  derived  in  a  similar 
fashion.  These  measures  are  different  to  the  one-period  prices  or  user  costs  of  private  and  public 
capital  that  are  calculated  in  Chapter  3 77 
is  some  evidence  of  a  negative  relationship  between  the  relative  price  and  the 
public/private  investment  ratio-  when  the  relative  price  of  public  capital  rises  (falls)  the 
investment  ratio  falls  (rises).  The  correlation  coefficient  for  the  two  series  is  -0.71. 
While  increases  in  the  price  of  private  capital  (relative  to  either  public  capital  or 
labour)  are  likely  to  have  a  significant  effect  upon  the  private  sector's  decisionmaking 
process,  public  investment  is  also  driven  by  political  priorities,  for  example  demands 
from  state  electorates  that  funds  be  spent  on  welfare  programmes  or  that  taxes  be 
reduced. 
4.2  7he  Pressure  on  State  Finances 
The  reasons  for  the  slow  growth  in  U.  S.  infrastructure  are  many  and  varied.  Dalenberg 
and  Eberts  (1988)  argue  that  for  certain  cities  much  of  the  problem  can  be  traced  to  an 
ageing  industrial  base  which  acts  like  a  double-edged  sword,  reducing  the  tax  base  and  Cý 
increasing  the  need  for  welfare  programmes.  Furthermore,  as  time  passes  the  location 
of  economic  activities  changes  but  local  govenunents  are  obliged  in  many  cases  to 
maintain  a  large  portion  of  the  existing  infrastructure  even  when  it  is  used  below 
capacity.  States  may  have  placed  a  brake  on  their  spending  because  much  of  it  was 
financed  by  petrol  taxes  and  the  effective  tax  rate  has  fallen  more  at  this  level  than  at 
the  federal  level.  Local  governments  whose  role  it  has  been  to  build  schools,  hospitals 
and  police  stations  and  local  streets  have  also  suffered  funding  pressures  as  a  result  of 
caps  being  placed  on  property  taxes.  Policymakers  faced  with  tough  budget  decisions 
have  often  found  it  easier  to  cut  back  on  public  investment  rather  than  consumption 
spending.  Furthermore,  according  to  Mudge  (1996),  there  was  a  significant  change  in 
government's  role  in  the  economy  in  the  late  1960s  with  the  Great  Society  Programs 
leading  to  increased  involvement  at  all  levels  of  government  in  social  programmes. 78 
It  was  shown  in  Section  I  that  the  Federal  Government  plays  only  a  minor  role  in  the 
direct  acquisition  of  public  capital.  However,  it  has  played  a  significant  role  in 
financing  state  and  local  capital  formation.  It  has  been  argued  that  reduced  federal 
financing  is  to  blame  for  the  infrastructure  slowdown.  For  example,  Dalenberg  and 
Ul- 
ju,  berts  (1988)  note  that  federal  grants-in-aid  dropped  to  20  per  cent  of  local 
government  receipts  in  1985  from  a  high  of  30  per  cent  in  the  late  1970s.  9  However, 
there  are  reasons  why  it  can  be  argued  that  the  federal  government  is  not  to  blame  for 
the  infrastructure  slowdown.  First,  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  (1986)  has  shown 
that  there  is  a  considerable  degree  of  substitutability  between  federal  and  state  and 
local  financing  of  state  and  local  public  spending.  Tatom  (1993)  shows  that  federal 
grants  aimed  specifically  at  state  and  local  capital  formation  grew  at  a  far  faster  rate 
than  GDP  from  1989  to  1993.  However,  there  was  little  change  in  the  overall  public 
investment  percentage  of  GDP.  The  boost  from  the  federal  budget  was  offset  by 
reduced  funding  at  the  state  and  local  levels.  New  federal  funding  for  state  and  local 
government  capital  spending  may  well  finance  projects  that  would  have  in  any  case 
been  carried  out.  The  savings  generated  by  federal  grants  are  then  used  to  fund  more 
pressing  current  expenditure. 
Second,  the  decline  in  federal  grants-in-aid  to  state  and  local  govermuents 
relative  to  overall  spending  only  occurred  over  a  decade  after  the  decline  in  public 
sector  investment.  Figure  II  makes  it  clear  that  federal  grants  peaked  in  importance  in 
19787  12  years  after  investment's  share  of  GDP  started  failing.  Also 
,  investment  started 
to  pick  up  from  1985  although  the  share  of  federal  grants  continued  falling  for  several 
years.  Third,  while  states  and  localities  undertake  almost  all  spending  on  nonmilitary 
9  Federal  grants  to  state  and  local  governments  include  funding  for  other  programs  besides  capital 
outlays 79 
Figure  11.  Grants-in-Aid  (L.  H.  S)  versus  Public  Investment  (relative  to  GDP) 
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public  capital,  the  federal  government  provides  matching  contributions  for 
transportation  and,  more  recently  environmental  projects.  Thus  the  decision  to  invest 
in  federally  assisted  spending  depends  on  the  willingness  of  state  and/or  local 
governments  to  meet  federal  matching  requirements. 
4.3  The  Role  of  Economic  Depreciation 
The  effect  of  economic  depreciation  on  the  public  capital  stock  has  received  no 
attention  in  the  infrastructure  literature.  However,  an  increase  in  economic 
depreciation  accelerated  the  infrastructure  slowdown  to  a  small  extent.  In  Section  3  it 
was  pointed  out  that  the  change  in  the  stock  of  infrastructure  from  year  to  year  is 
determined  not  only  by  investment  spending  but  by  economic  depreciation  too. 80 
Figure  12.  Average  Economic  Depreciation  Rates,  1959-94. 
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This  is  because  the  infrastructure  stock  in  any  year  t  is  defined  as: 
G=  G1  +I-  (1) 
where  G,  is  the  stock  of  public  capital  in  year  t,  It  is  public  investment  and  Dt  is 
economic  depreciation.  The  depreciation  rate  is  equal  to 
Dt 
G, 
(2) 
The  important  point  is  that  the  annual  depreciation  rate  of  the  public  capital  stock  does 
not  remain  constant.  As  the  composition  of  the  public  capital  stock  changes  so  too 
does  the  depreciation  rate.  This  is  because  assets  with  longer  lives  have  lower 
depreciation  rates  than  assets  with  shorter  lives.  Figure  12  shows  the  average 
depreciation  rates  of  the  various  types  of  infrastructure  over  the  period  1959-94.  As  is 
to  be  expected,  equipment  has  the  highest  depreciation  rate  because  assets  like  cars 
and  computers  have  shorter  lives  than  buildings  and  other  structures.  However,  there  is 
also  a  significant  difference  between  the  depreciation  rates  of  the  different  types  of 
structures  owned  by  the  public  sector.  For  example,  hospitals  depreciate  IL  y  ctli  aost  one 
percentage  point  per  year  more  than  sewers. 81 
Figure  13.  Average  Depreciation  Rate,  Total  Inftastructure,  1959-94 
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Since  the  late  1960s,  the  average  depreciation  rate  of  the  total  infrastructure  stock  has 
gradually  increased,  representing  a  fall  in  the  life  of  assets  owned  by  the  public  sector 
(Figure  13).  This  implies  that  the  slowdown  in  the  growth  of  public  capital  caused  by 
the  fall  in  investment  spending  from  the  late  1960s  to  the  early  1980s  was  exacerbated 
by  the  change  in  asset  mix.  In  order  to  estimate  the  contribution  of  the  increased 
depreciation  rate  to  the  infrastructure  slowdown,  the  infrastructure  stock  from  1969 
(one  year  after  infrastructure  investment  turned  down  and  the  year  when  the 
depreciation  rate  started  to  rise)  was  recalculated  using  (1)  but  keeping  the 
depreciation  rate  fixed  at  its  1969  level  of  3.5  per  cent.  It  is  clear  from  Figure  14  that  if 
the  composition  of  the  infrastructure  stock  had  remained  the  same  as  in  1969,  the 
infrastructure  stock  would  have  been  significantly  higher,  despite  the  fall  in  investment. 
In  fact,  there  would  have  been  12.6  per  cent  ($245  billion)  more  public  capital.  'O  This 
simple  exercise  reveals  two  important  points.  Firstly,  the  way  economic  depreciation  is 
calculated  is  crucial  to  infrastructure  researchers  or  anyone  using  capital  stock  data. 
"  Of  course  this  simple  calculation  makes  the  unrealistic  assumption  that  the  changing  depreciation 
rate  has  no  effect  on  the  public  sector's  investment  decisions. 
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Figure  14.  Public  Capital  Stocks:  Actual  and  Constant  Depreciation  Rates 
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The  difference  between  a  depreciation  rate  of  3.6  per  cent  and  4.0  per  cent  makes  itself 
felt  over  a  long  period,  such  as  20  years.  This  issue  will  be  raised  again  in  Chapter  3 
when  economic  depreciation  rates  are  used  again  to  calculate  the  price  of  capital  and 
to  construct  measures  of  capital  input.  Second,  the  infrastructure  stock  should  not  be 
viewed  as  just  one  measure.  It  is  made  up  of  numerous  different  types  of  buildings, 
machinery  and  structures.  Spending  $1  billion  in  any  year  on  roads  rather  than  on 
equipment  has  important  implications  for  the  level  of  the  overall  public  capital  stock.  In 
five  years'  time  there  will  be  considerably  more  road  capital  remaining,  resulting  in  a 
higher  overall  capital  stock.  The  question  is,  how  much  investment  is  required  to  keep 
the  capital  stock  growing  at  a  constant  rate?  In  the  presence  of  depreciation  the 
growth  rate  of  public  capital  can  be  calculated  from  (1): 
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Figure  15.  Capital  Stock  GrOWth  Rate:  Constant  vs.  Decreasing 
Depreciation  Rate,  58  Periods 
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where  %AGt  is  the  target  growth  rate  of  public  capital  and  t,  (IIG,  I)  can  be  defined  as 
the  public  capital  investment  rate.  For  the  public  capital  stock  to  keep  growing  at 
%AGt 
.  the  investment  rate  must  be 
it  =  %AG,  +  St 
- 
(4) 
From  (3)  it  can  be  seen  that  if  the  depreciation  rate  is  4  per  cent  the  capital  stock's 
growth  rate  will  only  fall  from,  say,  4  to  2  per  cent  if  the  investment  rate  falls  from  8  to 
6  per  cent.  For  this  to  occur  in  a  single  period,  the  level  of  investment  would  have  to 
fall.  The  effect  of  a  fall  in  the  investment  growth  rate  is  illustrated  by  the  "Constant" 
line  in  Figure  15.  ''  For  the  first  five  periods  investment  and  the  capital  stock  grow  by  4 
per  cent  a  year.  There  is  then  a  slowdown  in  investment  growth  from  4  to  2  per  cent 
with  the  result  that  the  capital  stock's  growth  rate  starts  decreasing,  eventually  settling 
at  2  per  cent. 
"  "Constant"  refers  to  the  fact  that,  in  this  example,  the  economic  depreciation  rate  remains  constant 
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Figure  16.  Depreciation's  Share  of  Total  Public  Investment,  1950-94 
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The  importance  of  changes  in  the  composition  of  the  capital  stock  (and  hence  its 
depreciation  rate)  coupled  with  a  fall  in  the  investment  growth  rate  can  also  be 
illustrated  using  simple simulation  techniques.  The  'Decreasing"  line  in  Figure  15  also 
illustrates  the  effect  of  a  slowdown  in  investment  growth  after  period  five.  However,  it 
is  assumed  that  the  depreciation  rate  falls  each  year  for  10  years  from  4  per  cent  to  2.5 
per  cent.  This  is  analagous  to  a  swing  towards  core  infrastructure  structures  like  roads 
and  water  and  sewer  systems.  The  depreciation  rate  then  remains  fixed  at  2.5  per 
cent.  12  Despite  the  slowdown  in  investment  growth,  the  capital  stock  continues 
growing  at  4  per  cent  a  year  for  a  further  ten  periods  because  of  the  lower  depreciation 
rate.  Eventually,  as  the  depreciation  rate  settles  at  2.5  per  cent,  the  effect  of  slower 
investment  growth  becomes  apparent  and  the  growth  rate  of  the  infrastructure  stock 
talls  gradually  to  2  per  cent. 
The  depreciation  rates  in  each  of  the  ten  periods  after  period  five  are:  3.85,3.70,3.55,3.40,3.26. 
3.12,2.98.2.85,2.72,  and  2.59  per  cent  respectively 
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Figure  17.  The  Public  Capital  Investment  Rate,  1950-94 
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What  this  simple  exercise  illustrates  is  that  changes  in  the  composition  of  the  public 
capital  stock  could  alleviate  any  investment  slowdown.  Of  course  the  opposite  is  also 
true.  If  the  average  depreciation  rate  were  to  rise  (as  it  did  from  1969)  any  investment 
slowdown  would  be  exacerbated.  It  was  mentioned  above  that  part  of  every  dollar 
invested  represents  replacement  of  worn  out  infrastructure  and  part  represents 
increases  in  the  capital  stock.  Whereas  depreciation  consumed  47  cents  of  every  dollar 
invested  from  1950  until  1968,  it  consumed  on  average  68  cents  from  1969-94  (Figure 
16).  Interestingly,  although  investment  was  growing  by  3.9  per  cent  per  year  between 
1983  and  1994,  depreciation  claimed  $0.70  of  every  dollar  invested,  compared  with 
just  $0.66  during  the  investment  decline.  This  can  explained  by  the  fact  that  although 
investment  fell  from  1968,  the  investment  rate,  it  =  IIG,  l  remained  relatively  high  for  a 
number  of  years.  Similarly,  although  investment  was  growing  rapidly  in  the  1980s  and 
1990s  the  investment  rate  was  very  low  following  many  years  of  low  investment.  How 
fast  investment  is  growing  does  not  necessarily  indicate  how  fast  the  capital  stock  is 
growing.  The  investment  rate  is  also  important  (Figure  17). 
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Figure  18.  Share  of  Roads  in  Core  Inftastructure  Stock,  1950-94 
4.4  Highways  and  Streets 
It  is  worth  paying  particular  attention  to  what  has  happened  to  the  stock  of  roads 
because  this  is  by  far  the  largest  component  of  the  public  capital  stock  and,  along  with 
educational  buildings,  contributed  most  to  the  public  capital  slowdown.  More 
importantly,  roads  account  for  the  majority  of  the  core  (directly  productive) 
infrastructure  stock,  despite  their  relative  decline  in  importance  over  the  years  (Figure 
18).  Several  authors  (for  example,  Tatom,  1993)  argue  that  the  slowdown  in  highway 
growth  was  a  logical  consequence  of  the  completion  of  the  interstate  highway  system. 
As  Cain  (1997)  points  out,  the  prosperity  of  the  postwar  years  and  the  autornobile- 
based  suburbanisation  of  the  U.  S.  population  increased  the  demand  for  new  roads. 
Furthermore,  the  1956  Interstate  ffighway  Act,  with  a  preamble  citing  national  defence 
concerns,  -  authorised  a  42,500  mile  system  of  limited  access,  high-speed  roadways.  The 
work  was  to  be  done  by  the  states  with  90  per  cent  of  the  funding  conung  from  the 
federal  government. 87 
Table  7.  Average  Annual  Per  Capita  State  and  Local  Government 
Highway  Spending  and  Revenue  (Constant  1982  dollars) 
Expenditure 
Current  Capital  Highway 
user  taxes 
1965-69  71  146  117 
1970-74  71  125  116 
1975-79  73  94  96 
1980-84  72  84  75 
1985-89  77  95  85 
Source:  Netzer  (1992) 
The  stock  of  highways  and  streets  rose  sharply  from  the  early  1960s  until  the  mid 
1970s  but  the  growth  rate  declined  thereafter  as  interstate  construction  slowed  and  the 
previously  built  highways  depreciated.  The  stock  of  roads  grew  by  4.28  per  cent  from 
1960-69,  by  1.23  per  cent  between  1970-79  and  by  only  0.89  per  cent  between  1980- 
94.  Netzer  (1992)  blames  the  decline  in  capital  spending  for  highways  not  on  the 
completion  of  the  interstate  system  but  on  the  way  the  highway  system  is  financed. 
About  70  per  cent  of  all  funding  comes  from  highway-user  sources,  directly  and 
indirectly.  The  decline  in  highway  capital  spending  reflects  a  decline  in  highway-user 
revenue.  Average  annual  per  capita  highway  user  tax  receipts  declined  by  more  than 
one  third  from  the  1965-74  period  to  the  early  1980s  (Table  7).  With  current  spending 
(for  traffic  operations  etc.  )  remaining  relatively  constant,  capital  spending  also  declined 
sharply.  Netzer  (1992)  notes  that  there  is  an  obvious  explanation  as  to  why  highway 
tax  revenues  declined.  With  very  few  exceptions  motor  fuel  taxes  are  based  on  the 
physical  volume  of  fuel  sold  and  because  of  increased  vehicle  fuel  efficiency  less  taxes 
have  been  collected.  "  While  states  are  free  to  change  the  basis  of  taxation  or  increase 
13  The  average  amount  of  ftiel  consumed  per  vehicle  fell  by  20  per  cent  from  1970-89. 88 
fuel  tax  rates,  many  electorates  have  voted  not  to  raise  adequate  funds  to  support 
highway  spending  needs.  Netzer  also  argues  that  state  and  local  governinents  should 
have  adequate  replacement  strategies  in  which  they,  like  private  firms,  weigh 
replacement  costs  against  ongoing  repair  costs.  He  argues  that  financing  systems 
should  not  encourage  the  substitution  of  capital  for  operating  expenditures.  For 
example,  the  Federal  Government  should  not  offer  financial  inducements  only  to  build 
new  plant  and  equipment  at  new  sites  rather  than  repair  and  replace  components  of  the 
existing  capital  stock. 
5.  Public  Capital  and  Productivity 
In  Section  3  the  fall  in  infrastructure  investment  was  compared  with  trends  in  various 
private  sector  variables,  namely  GDP,  private  investment  and  the  size  of  the  labour 
force.  The  core  infrastructure  stock  declined  relative  to  all  three  from  the  1960s.  It  is 
interesting  to  compare  the  historical  pattern  of  infrastructure  growth  with  that  of  direct 
measures  of  productivity.  Table  8  compares  the  growth  rates  of  three  infrastructure 
variables  (total,  core  and  disaggregated  core)  with  that  of  productivity  over  three  time 
periods.  14  It  is  clear  that  the  two  sets  of  measures  have  a  sin-filar  pattern-.  the  growth 
rates  for  both  fell  from  the  1970s.  Whether  the  infrastructure  slowdown  contributed  to 
the  productivity  growth  slowdown  or  not  cannot  be  ascertained  from  a  simple 
comparison  of  growth  rates,  however.  More  convincing  arguments  are  derived  from  a 
formal  analysis  of  the  variables,  for  example  by  conducting  Granger  causality  tests 
14  The  TFP  growth  rate  is  the  standard  Solow  residual  which,  though  not  the  most  accurate  measure  of 
productivity.  Nvill  sufficc  for  the  purposes  of  this  discussion. 89 
Table  8.  Comparison  of  Public  Capital  and  Productivity  Growth  Rates,  1960-89 
1960-69  1970-79  1980-89 
Growth  in  Dublic  cgpital  (%  p.  a.  ) 
Total  public  capital  4.31  2.00  1.38 
Core  infrastructure  3.99  2.06  1.30 
Highways  &  streets  4.28  1.23  0.59 
Other  core  4.33  3.00  2.19 
Growth  in  productiyi1y  (%  p.  a.  ) 
Labour  productivity  2.90  1.31  1.28 
Total  factor  productivity  1.82  0.60  0.87 
Source:  Aschauer  (1993)  and  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis 
within  a  multivariate  framework  and  subjecting  the  results  to  rigorous  diagnostic 
testing.  Nevertheless  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  intuitive  evidence  indicating  that  the 
decline  in  certain  types  of  investment  had  a  negative  effect  on  productivity.  For 
example,  there  is  some  evidence  that  roads  were  more  congested  in  the  years  following 
the  massive  cutbacks  in  investment  than  in  previous  years.  The  Federal  flighway 
Administration  forecast  that  urban  highway  congestion  would  increase  by  436  per  cent 
by  2005  unless  the  interstate  highway  system  was  improved  (U.  S.  Department  of 
Transportation,  1987).  Increased  congestion  on  roads  networks  increases  business 
costs  and  therefore  affects  productivity.  However,  roads  were  not  the  only  type  of 
investment  subject  to  cutbacks.  If  the  other  components  of  the  core  (water  and  sewer 
systems  capital  and  other  structures)  are  productive,  then  it  is  possible  that  the  halving 
in  the  growth  rate  of  these  types  of  capital  has  had  an  effect  on  TFP.  New  light  is  shed 
on  these  issues  in  Chapter  4. 90 
6.  Conclusion 
The  analysis  in  this  chapter  serves  a  number  of  purposes.  The  first  aim  is  to  illustrate 
the  infrastructure  slowdown  that  took  place  from  the  late  1960s  to  the  early  1980s  and 
place  it  in  the  context  of  developments  in  the  private  economy.  There  has  been  a 
substantial  increase  in  the  quantity  of  public  capital  since  the  Second  World  War. 
However,  public  investment  has  not  kept  up  with  growth  of  the  private  economy, 
falling  relative  to  private  investment,  GDP  and  the  labour  force.  More  importantly,  due 
to  the  emphasis  in  this  thesis  on  the  importance  of  the  different  infrastructure  stocks  to 
the  private  production  process,  the  aim  has  been  to  illustrate  the  growth  paths  of  the 
different  types  of  infrastructure,  especially  the  components  of  the  core  that  are 
analysed  in  greater  detail  in  the  remaining  chapters.  It  is  clear  that  growth  in  all  the 
components  of  the  core  infrastructure  stock  slowed  between  1973  and  1994.  At  one 
extreme  the  growth  rate  of  the  roads  stock  (accounting  for  more  than  60  per  cent  of 
the  core  in  the  post-war  period)  fell  from  4.1  per  cent  in  the  1950-72  period  to  0.8  per 
cent  in  the  1973-94  period.  At  the  other  extreme,  the  stock  of  sewer  capital  fell  from 
3.9  per  cent  to  3.1  per  cent.  Relative  to  GDP,  only  roads  fell  significantly.  To  the 
extent  that  core  infrastructure  is  productive,  it  is  possible  that  slow  growth  in  each  of 
these  types  of  capital  contributed,  in  varying  degrees,  to  the  productivity  slowdown. 91 
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Data  Appendix 
All  private  and  public  capital  stock  data  (including  investment  and  economic 
depreciation)  were  obtained  from  the  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  Fixed 
Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth  diskettes.  All  measures  are  in  constant  1987  dollars 
unless  otherwise  stated.  Net  stocks  of  nonresidential  capital  were  used  to  construct  the 
various  ratios  and  other  measures. 
All  of  the  remaining  data  was  obtained  from  the  Economic  Report  of  the  President 
(various  years).  This  includes  data  for  GDP,  government  purchases,  the  population,  the 
labour  force  and  grants  in  aid.  Where  applicable  all  measures  were  in  constant  1987 
dollars. 93 
Chapter  3 
Are  the  Public  Capital  Stocks  Optimal?  Results  for  the 
Private  Business  Sector,  1959-94 
1.  Introduction 
One  of  the  advantages  of  the  cost  function  approach  is  that  it  can  be  used  to  determine 
the  optimal  stock  of  public  capital.  This  is  useful  because  the  finding  that  public  capital 
has  a  positive  and  significant  output  or  cost  elasticity  does  not  necessarily  mean  that 
there  should  be  extra  spending  on  infrastructure  (ie,  that  the  public  capital  stock  is 
suboptimal).  The  benefits  of  increased  investment  -  measured  as  increased  business 
output  or  lower  business  costs  -  have  to  be  weighed  against  the  cost  of  providing  the 
additional  capital.  In  the  absence  of  user  charges,  the  direct  cost  of  most  infrastructure 
services  is  zero.  Thus  firms  could  be  expected  to  demand  more  public  investment  as 
long  as  the  additional  capital  lowers  their  costs.  Of  course,  this  is  not  the  whole  story. 
New  public  projects  impose  a  cost  on  society  in  the  form  of  higher  taxes.  Thus,  in  the 
absence  of  infrastructure  user  charges,  the  optimal  public  capital  stock  is  derived  by 
balancing  the  cost  savings  enjoyed  by  the  private  business  sector  against  the  costs  to 
society  of  providing  the  extra  capital. 94 
Optimal  public  capital  stocks  have  been  derived  in  only  two  cost  function  studies  in  the 
infrastructure  literature:  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992)  using  data  for  the  Swedish  private 
business  sector  and  Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1996)  using  data  for  manufacturing  in 
New  England.  Most  cost  function  studies  examine  other  important  and  related  issues 
concerning  infrastructure's  effect  on  the  private  production  process.  For  example, 
Lynde  and  Richmond  (1992),  estimating  a  translog  cost  function  using  data  for  the 
non-financial  corporate  business  sector,  find  that  public  capital  has  a  positive  marginal 
product,  that  the  hypothesis  of  constant  returns  to  scale  is  accepted  when  public  capital 
is  included  with  private  capital  and  labour,  and  establish  that  public  and  private  capital 
are  complements.  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  (1994),  estimating  a  translog  cost  function 
using  ata  for  the  manufacturing  sector,  find  that  the  effect  of  public  capital  on  costs 
varies  significantly  across  industries. 
Another  relatively  unexplored  avenue  in  the  infrastructure  literature  is  the 
importance  of  the  individual  infrastructure  stocks  to  the  private  business  sector.  None 
of  the  cost  function  studies  and  very  few  production  function  studies  use  disaggregated 
infrastructure  data.  Instead,  focus  has  fallen  on  the  effects  of  two  aggregate  public 
capital  measures-  the  total  public  capital  stock  and  the  narrower  core  infrastructure 
stock,  which  contains  only  those  types  of  capital  that  are  expected  to  have  a  direct 
effect  upon  private  sector  production.  The  type  of  disaggregation  that  has  received 
most  attention  in  the  literature  is  that  in  which  all  variables  are  disaggregated  by 
geographic  region  (Costa  et  al.,  1987;  Mera,  1973;  Eberts,  1986;  Garcia-Nfila  and 
McGuire,  1992,  -  and  Hulten  and  Schwab,  1991a).  Just  as  these  studies  proVide  useful 
information  about  the  productivity  of  public  capital  in  different  regions  of  the  United 
States,  a  study  that  divides  the  Infrastructure  stock  Into  its  various  components 
provides  useful  information  about  the  role  of  the  different  types  of  capital  in  private 95 
production.  The  reason  this  information  is  valuable  is  intuitively  obvious.  The  finding 
that  infrastructure  investment  on  the  whole  has  a  high  rate  of  return  does  not  inform 
policymakers  how  much  spending  is  required  on  the  different  types:  schools,  highways, 
sewer  systems,  police  stations,  passenger  terminals  etc. 
In  this  chapter  the  optimal  core  infrastructure  stocks  for  the  period  1959-94  are 
calculated  using  data  for  the  U.  S.  private  business  sector.  The  stock  of  core  is  then 
disaggregated  so  that  the  optimal  amount  of  each  type  of  infrastructure  (roads,  water 
and  sewer  systems,  and  "other  structures")  can  be  calculated.  The  output  elasticities  of 
the  different  types  of  public  capital  are  also  estimated  and  compared  with  the  results  of 
the  production  function  studies  reported  in  Chapter  1.  Following  Berndt  and  Hansson 
(1992)  and  Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1997)  the  analysis  is based  on  cost-side  marginal 
products  (shadow  values).  Shadow  values  are  computed  as  the  potential  cost  savings 
arising  from  a  decline  in  the  variable  inputs  required  to  produce  a  given  amount  of 
output,  when  infrastructure  investment  is  increased.  The  optimal  infrastructure  stocks 
are  calculated  by  equating  cost  savings  to  the  price  of  public  capital.  '  The  output 
elasticity  and  optimal  quantity  of  private  capital  are  also  calculated  for  comparative 
purposes. 
Apart  from  estimating  the  optimal  quantities  of  the  different  types  of  public 
capital,  this  study  includes  a  number  of  other  innovations.  For  the  estimations  using 
aggregate  public  capital  data,  the  public  capital  input  is  computed  by  Divisia  quantity 
aggregation.  As  Jorgenson  and  Griliches  (1967)  point  out,  simple  aggregation 
overlooks  the  fact  that  some  assets  are  more  productive  than  others  -  assets  with  high 
user  costs  are  more  productive  in 
1  As  has  already  been  mentioned  in  the  literature  review  in  Chapter  1.  public  infrastructure  also 
provides  benefits  to  consumers.  the  analysis  of  which  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis. 96 
equilibrium  than  assets  with  lower  rental  prices.  Divisia  aggregation  has  not  been 
applied  in  any  infrastructure  study  using  U.  S.  data.  I  also  expand  the  core 
infrastructure  stock  to  incorporate  the  "other  structures"  component,  which  includes 
2  the  stocks  of  electric  and  gas  facilities,  mass  transit  facilities  and  airfields.  Several 
infrastructure  studies  (for  example,  Morrison  and  Schwartz,  1997)  include  only  roads 
and  water  and  sewer  systems  in  their  definition  of  core  infrastructure.  Those  studies 
that  use  disaggregated  infrastructure  data  (Munnell  1990a  and  Hulten  and  Schwab 
1991b)  use  a  rather  broad  measure  of  "othee'  public  capital  that  includes  largely 
unproductive  types  of  public  capital  such  as  the  stocks  of  publicly  owned  buildings  and 
equipment. 
To  estimate  the  cost  function  and  calculate  the  optimal  capital  stocks,  data  is 
required  on  the  prices  of  labour,  private  capital  and  public  capital.  The  studies  in  the 
infrastructure  literature  differ  considerably  in  their  treatment  of  these  variables  for  tax 
purposes.  For  example,  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992)  do  not  adjust  any  of  their  variables 
for  taxation,  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  (1994)  adjust  the  price  of  labour  and  private  capital 
but  do  not  adjust  the  price  of  public  capital,  and  Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1997)  adjust 
the  prices  of  private  and  public  capital  but  not  the  wage  rate.  The  optimal  capital  stock 
calculations  are  compared  under  a  number  of  different  taxation  scenarios. 
Use  is  also  made  of  the  wealth  of  private  and  public  capital  data  available  from 
the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis.  For  example,  to  construct  accurate  rental  price 
measures  I  use  economic  depreciation  rates  that  are  sector-specific  (to  calculate  the 
user  cost  of  private  capital  in  each  industry)  or  asset-specific  (to  calculate  the  user  cost 
2  The  term  "other  structures"  is  used  by  the  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Econorruic  Analysis.  Other  structures 
include  electric  and  gas  facilities,  transit  svstems  and  airfields.  This  data  is  not  available  in  a  more 
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of  the  different  types  of  public  capital).  Many  infrastructure  studies  do  not  make  full 
use  of  the  available  depreciation  data.  For  example,  Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1997)  use 
the  same  economic  depreciation  rate  for  their  private  and  public  capital  rental  price 
measures.  To  calculate  the  rental  price  of  private  capital  in  different  sectors  of  the 
Swedish  economy,  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992)  use  asset  specific  depreciation  rates 
calculated  by  Hulten  and  Wykoff  (1981)  using  U.  S.  data.  Great  care  has  to  be  taken  in 
constructmg  rental  price  measures  because  of  their  importance  in  calculating  the 
Divisia  indices  and  optimal  capital  stock  measures. 
The  chapter  is  divided  into  nine  sections.  In  Section  2  the  theoretical 
framework  is  provided.  The  concept  of  the  shadow  value  of  infrastructure  and  the 
determinants  of  the  optimal  public  capital  stock  are  discussed.  Infrastructure's  output 
elasticity  is  derived  as  well  as  a  number  of  optimal  infrastructure  elasticities,  which 
show  the  direction  and  extent  of  factor  input  price  changes  on  the  optimal 
infrastructure  stock.  In  Section  3  the  proposed  functional  form  for  the  cost  function  is 
outlined  and  the  two  estimating  models  (one  using  aggregate  infrastructure,  the  other 
using  disaggregated  data)  are  derived.  The  optimal  capital  stock  equations  are  also 
derived  in  this  section.  In  Section  4  the  construction  of  the  private  and  public  capital 
Divisia  indices  and  the  rental  prices  of  the  capital  measures  is  discussed.  In  Section  5 
the  SUR  estimation  procedure  is  outlined  and  results  from  tests  for  contemporaneous 
error  covariance  are  reported.  In  Section  6  the  empirical  results  for  the  aggregate 
infrastructure  model  are  reported  and  discussed.  Next  the  optimal  stock  of  public 
capital  is  calculated  and  compared  with  the  actual  stock  to  determine  whether  there 
was  an  infrastructure  shortage  in  the  U.  S.  during  any  of  the  years  of  the  sample  pen 
In  Section  7  the  disaggregated  infrastructure  model  is  estimated  and  the  resulting 
optimal  stocks  of  roads,  water  and  sewer  systems  and  other  structures  are  calculated. 98 
Comparing  optimal  and  actual  capital  stocks  allows  one  to  establish  whether  increased 
spending  is  required  on  any  of  the  different  components.  In  both  models  use  is  made  of 
pre-tax  and  tax-adjusted  measures  of  the  price  of  labour  and  private  and  public  capital. 
In  Section  8  the  optimal  quantity  of  private  capital  is  calculated  and  there  is  some  brief 
discussion  as  to  why  this  measure  is  at  times  greater  than  or  less  than  the  actual  stock 
of  private  capital.  An  overall  summary  of  the  findings  is  provided  in  the  conclusion  M 
Section  9  and  further  information  is  provided  in  the  appendices. 
2.  Theoretical  Framework 
The  importance  of  public  capital  to  the  U.  S.  private  business  sector  is  gauged  by 
estimating  a  variable  cost  function,  with  infrastructure  included  as  a  fixed  unpaid  factor 
of  production.  Following  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992)  and  Morrison  and  Schwartz 
(1997),  the  analysis  is  based  on  cost-side  marginal  products  (shadow  values).  Shadow 
values  are  computed  as  the  potential  cost  savings  arising  from  a  decline  in  the  variable 
inputs  required  to  produce  a  given  amount  of  output,  when  the  public  capital  stock  is 
increased.  The  optimal  infrastructure  stocks  are  calculated  by  equating  cost  savings  to 
the  price  of  public  capital.  Given  standard  continuity  and  regularity  conditions  on  the 
production  function,  '  there  exists  a  cost  function  dual  to  the  production  function, 
having  the  general  form 
F(p,  (),  t,  (1) 
3  The  dual  cost  ftinction  is  assumed  to  be  increasing  in  output  and  prices,  and  homogeneous  of  degree 
I  in  prices.  It  is  assumed  that  the  purchase  prices  of  inputs  are  given. 99 
where  C  is  the  cost  of  buying  inputs,  p  is  a  vector  of  input  prices,  Q  is  output,  t  is  a 
time  trend  representing  technology  and  G  is  the  stock  of  public  capital.  Some  inputs, 
such  as  private  capital,  are  typically  fixed  in  the  short  run,  while  others  (labour,  energy 
and  other  intermediates)  are  variable.  In  the  short  run,  firms  choose  quantities  of 
variable  inputs  to  minimise  total  variable  costs,  Cv,  given  pv,  Q,  G,  f  and  K,  where  K  is 
capital  belonging  to  the  private  sector,  pv  is  a  vector  of  variable  input  prices  and  Cv  is 
the  sum  of  short-run  costs.  Following  Samuelson  (1953),  a  short-run  or  variable 
private  cost  function  can  be  specified  as 
Cv  -  F(pv,  Q,  t,  K,  G).  (2) 
For  the  total  cost  function  (1),  the  shadow  value  or  marginal  benefit  of  an  exogenous 
increase  in  G  is  defined  as 
--x 
ZG  ý 
and  the  shadow  value  for  the  variable  private  cost  function  is  defined  as 
ZVG 
Xv 
CJG 
(4) 
For  the  firm  minimising  short-run  variable  costs,  there  is  also  a  shadow  value 
relationship  involving  its  private  capital  stock.  The  shadow  value  of  private  capital  is 
defined  as 
Xv  zlw  --  X 
(5) 
The  partial  derivatives  will  be  negative  as  long  as  K  or  G  provide  variable  input  savings 
due  to  substitution  possibilities.  If  the  firm  were  in  long-run  equilibrium  with  respect  to 
its  private  inputs,,  then  the  marginal  benefits  of  K  would  just  equal  the  marginal  cost  of 
pnvate  capital.  Calling  the  ex  ante  one-pefiod  pfice  of  pfivate  capital  PK,  then  at  this 100 
long-run  equilibrium  point  the  optimal  amount  of  private  sector  capital,  K*,  is  that 
amount  at  which  the  marginal  benefit  equals  the  marginal  cost  ,  ie 
K=K*  'ýý  ZVK 
(6) 
Similarly,  the  optimal  amount  of  infrastructure  capital  is  that  amount  at  which  the 
marginal  benefit  equals  the  marginal  cost: 
G*  <::  >ZVG  =  PG 
*  (7) 
As  Morrison  (1988)  points  out,  this  is  a  standard  result  that  is  conceptually  obvious. 
The  market  and  implicit  values  of  a  capital  stock  must  be  equal  in  full  equilibrium  or 
further  adjustments  would  be  desirable.  4  Because  of  the  assumption  that  there  are  no 
private  costs  associated  with  infrastructure  capital,  firms  benefit  from  having  extra  G 
as  long  as  they  enjoy  further  cost  savings  from  substituting  G  for  other  inputs. 
However,  although  there  are  no  private  costs  associated  with  the  infrastructure  stock, 
there  are  social  costs.  If  the  social  cost  of  investing  in  one  more  unit  of  infrastructure 
capital  is  less  than  the  cost  savings  enjoyed  by  the  private  business  sector,  the 
expenditure  is  justified  because  there  is  a  net  benefit. 
These  concepts  are  illustrated  graphically  in  Figure  1.  The  curve  labelled  ZvG  is 
the  shadow  value  of  infrastructure.  Its  slope  (given  by  o7mlý6G  =  -0'ýCl  X)  is 
negative,  reflecting  diminishing  marginal  returns  (in  the  form  of  input  cost  savings)  to 
public  investment.  The  business  sector  would  ideally  like  infrastructure  investment  to 
take  place  up  to  the  point  where  the  marginal  benefit  is  zero  (ie,  ZvG  =  0).  From 
society's  viewpoint,  however 
,  infrastructure  investment  should  only  take 
-1  This  result  can  be  illustrated  analytically.  In  full  equilibrium  it  must  be  the  case  that  the  short-run 
average  cost  curve  and  long-run  average  cost  curve  are  tangent.  This  tangency  condition  is  c.  T'X=O. 
where  C--  Cv  +  PKK.  Differentiation  implies  that  -XI,  /cX  =  PK,  where  -Xv,  (W  is  by  definition  the 
shadow  value  Zix 
. 
In  the  short  run,  inputs  may,  not  be  instantaneously  adjustable,  resulting  in  a 
divergence  between  the  market  price  and  shadow  values  of  G  or  K. 101 
Figure  1.  Deriving  the  Optimal  Inftastructure  Stock 
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place  up  to  the  point  where  marginal  benefit  and  marginal  cost  are  equal  (G*  in  the 
diagram).  At  points  to  the  left  of  G*  marginal  benefit  exceeds  marginal  cost  and  the 
optimal  strategy  is  to  invest  more.  At  points  to  the  right  of  G*  the  cost  of  additional 
capital  is  not  covered  by  business  sector  cost  savings  and  the  optimal  strategy  is  to  let 
the  infrastructure  stock  depreciate.  A  problem  lies  in  measuring  the  one-period  social 
price  of  government  capital.  In  this  chapter  it  is  assumed  that  the  two  main  differences 
between  PKand  PGare  the  differential  cost  of  funds  to  each  sector  and  the  effects  of 
the  taxation  system.  This  issue  is  discussed  in  greater  detail  in  Section  4. 
The  optimal  capital  stock  equations,  K*  and  G*,  are  obtained  by  setting  the 
shadow  value  expressions  equal  to  the  respective  rental  price  measures,  ie- 
- 
6C" 
-9  and  K 
X 
- 
X, 
''=  PG 
* 
cr, 102 
Equations  (8)  and  (9)  can  then  be  solved  simultaneously  with  respect  to  K  and  G.  It  is 
easily  seen  from  (2),  (8)  and  (9)  that  the  optimal  private  and  public  capital  stocks  can 
be  expressed  as 
G(p,  Q,  P,  Pc  J,  and 
G*=G(p,,  t,  Q,  P  P, 
Focusing  on  (11),  it  is  clear  that  the  optimal  quantity  of  infrastructure  depends  on 
variable  input  prices  (for  example,  the  wage  rate  of  labour),  quasi-fixed  input  prices 
(the  rental  price  of  private  capital),  private  business  output  and  the  price  of  public 
capital. 
Several  points  are  worth  making  about  the  factors  that  influence  G*,  especially 
in  the  context  of  the  infrastructure  slowdown  discussed  in  Chapter  2.  From  1968  to 
1982  public  investment  fell  by  2.3  per  cent  per  year  and  this  event  alone  prompted 
U.  S.  policymakers  and  several  acadernic  researchers  to  question  the  adequacy  of  the 
nation's  infrastructure.  However,  it  is  clear  from  (11)  that  whether  the  infrastructure 
slowdown  translated  into  an  infrastructure  shortage  (ie,  whether  G<G  *)  was 
dependent  on  factors  other  than  the  growth  rate  of  public  investment.  For  example,  the 
level  of  unionisation,  the  introduction  of  investment  tax  incentives,  increases  in  interest 
rates  and  the  level  of  exports  are  all  factors  that  could  influence  the  variables  in  (11) 
and  thus  the  optimal  quantity  of  public  capital.  It  may  be  that  the  infrastructure 
slowdown  did  not  result  in  a  suboptimal  infrastructure  stock.  Similarly,  the  large-scale 
public  investment  of  the  1950s  and  1960s  may  have  been  followed  by  an  infrastructure 
shortage,  depending  on  the  magnitude  and  direction  of  changes  in  the  variables  in  (I  I). 103 
Equation  (11)  also  provides  an  indication  of  the  appropriate  public  sector  response  to 
the  discovery  of  an  infrastructure  shortage  of  surplus.  The  wedge  between  the  optimal 
and  actual  infrastructure  stock  in  any  year  t  can  be  defined  as 
ýpt  =  Gt  -  G,  *  (12) 
Both  positive  and  negative  values  of  ýp,  would  invoke  a  policy  response  if  the  policy 
goal  is  to  set  G  ==  G*.  5However,  it  is  clear  from  a  cursory  examination  of  the  factors 
influencing  G*  in  (11)  that  even  if  ýp,  #  0,  a  higher  or  lower  level  of  investment  is  not 
necessarily  warranted.  For  example,  it  could  be  that  the  infrastructure  surplus  or 
shortage  is  caused  by  a  change  in  the  rental  price  of  private  capital  which  in  turn  is 
caused  by,  for  example,  a  change  in  interest  rates.  A  reversal  in  the  public  investment 
policy  on  the  basis  of  this  change  would  be  proved  unwarranted  if  interest  rates 
6 
reverted  to  their  previous  level  after  a  short  period  of  time.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
permanent  increase  in  the  level  of  output  may  warrant  a  change  in  the  public 
investment  policy.  It  is  also  necessary  to  establish  the  direction  of  the  effect  of  changes 
in  input  prices  on  the  optimal  infrastructure  stock.  For  example,  if  public  capital  and 
private  capital  are  complements  then 
u* 
4ý9PK 
(13) 
in  other  words,  if  a  rise  in  the  rental  price  of  private  capital  leads  to  a  fall  in  the 
optimal  stock  of  infrastructure,  the  two  types  of  capital  are  complements.  Similarly,  if 
5  The  appropriate  policy  response  where  V,  <  0,  ceteris  paribus,  is  an  increase 
i 
in  public  investment- 
and  the  appropriate  policy  response  where  Vt  >  0,  ceteris  paribus,  Is  to  curtail  investment  and  let  the 
public  capital  stock  depreciate. 
6  For  example,  Moody's  Aaa  rate  rose  from  8.02  per  cent  in  1977  to  14.17  per  cent  in  198  1,  resulting 
in  a  significant  increase  in  the  user  cost  of  private  capital.  However.  by  1986  the  rate  had  fallen  to 
9.02  per  cent. 104 
;w  K 
>0,  (14) 
private  and  public  capital  are  substitutes.  It  is  possible  that  some  types  of  public  capital 
are  complements  while  others  are  substitutes.  For  example,  in  Chapter  I  Munnell's 
(1993)  results  on  substitutability  and  complementarity  were  discussed.  Munnell  found 
that  highways  and  streets  are  substitutes  for  private  capital,  and  water  and  sewer 
systems  are  complements.  She  justified  these  findings  on  the  grounds  that  well- 
maintained  roads  reduce  the  depreciation  rate  of  commercial  vehicles  whereas  water 
and  sewer  systems  are  generally  only  publicly  provided.  It  is  also  possible  to  establish 
whether  public  capital  complements  or  substitutes  for  labour,  ie,  whether 
(rj  *  ýG  * 
-<0  or  ->O.  , 
9PL  TL  (15) 
These  optimal  infrastructure  changes  can  be  converted  into  unitless  optimal 
infrastructure  elasticities: 
CG*  P 
EG*PK  -K,  and 
CTK  G* 
X*P 
CG*PL  =L 
dPL  G* 
It  is  likely  that  the  optimal  infrastructure  stock  is  inelastic  with  respect  to  factor  price 
c  anges,  ie- 
0<16G*41<1  '=pL7pK'  (18) 
Thus  if  G  and  K  are  complements,  a  25  per  cent  fall  in  PKdue  to,  for  example,  a  drop 
in  interest  rates  is  not  likely  to  lead  to  an  increase  in  G*  of  25  per  cent  or  more. 
It  is  also  possible  to  use  the  cost  function  framework  to  derive  infrastructure)  s  output 
elasticity,  and  thus  make  direct  comparisons  with  the  results  of  the  large  body  of 105 
production  function  research.  From  the  cost  minimisation  problem  the  shadow  value  of 
infrastructure  can  be  expressed  as 
c  'CV 
;[  4OF 
cG  x  (I9) 
where  A= 
6c"' 
, 
ie,  marginal  cost.  If  the  infrastructure  stock  is  in  long-run  equilibrium 
CQ 
Oe,  G=  G*): 
o'F 
-P 
c6G;, 
(20) 
G 
and  the  output  elasticity  of  infrastructure  (optimally  provided)  can  be  expressed  as 
=oTG 
PGG* 
QG* 
cG  Q  AQ 
The  output  elasticity  of  private  capital  can  also  be  derived  along  similar  lines-8 
CQK*  = 
dF  K* 
-- 
2PKK* 
(22) 
ox  Q  AQ 
All  of  the  above  measures  can  also  be  derived  for  the  individual  infrastructure  stocks. 
One  would  expect  aflow  measure  such  as  public  investment  to  more  elastic.  however. 
8 
be 
The  asN,  mmetry  between  the  two  output  elasticities  results  from  the  fact  that  infrastructure  enters  the 
cost  nummisation  problem  as  an  unpaid  factor  input. 106 
The  Estimating  Models 
To  calculate  the  optimal  capital  stocks  in  (6)  and  (7)  a  functional  form  for  the  cost  ' 
function  has  to  be  specified.  Most  empirical  studies  based  on  flexible  functional  forms 
have  used  the  translog  functional  form  developed  by  Christensen  et  al  (1973).  Its 
logarithmic  form  facilitates  empirical  imposition  of  homogeneity  constraints,  regularity 
conditions,  and  the  calculation  of  elasticities.  9  However,  Morrison  (1988)  points  out 
that  a  problem  with  using  the  translog  function  for  short-run  studies  is  that,  due  to  its 
nonlinear  logarithmic  form,  it  is  not  possible  to  analytically  compute  the  full 
equilibrium  level  of  the  fixed  inputs.  Instead  one  must  rely  on  iterative  numerical 
techniques.  Some  researchers,  she  points  out,  have  encountered  problems  in  obtaining 
numerical  convergence  with  the  translog  variable  cost  function  and  thus  with 
computing  estimates  of  long-run  elasticities.  10 
As  an  alternative,,  Morrison  (1988)  developed  a  Generalised  Leontief  (GL)  cost 
function  that  permits  the  steady-state  levels  of  quasi-fixed  inputs  to  be  derived.  The 
traditional  GL  cost  function  is  a  functional  form  in  the  square  root  of  prices.  "  A 
variety  of  generalisations  have  been  appended  to  account  for,  for  example,  technical 
change  and  returns  to  scale  (Parks,  1971;  Woodland,  1975;  Berndt  and  Khalad,  1979; 
and  Diewert  and  Wales,  1987)  and  for  fixed  inputs  (Mork,  1978  and  Mahmud  el  a/., 
1986).  These  extensions  vary  in  their  emphases  and  therefore  in  their  methods  used  for 
c  (generali  sing"  the  cost  function. 
9  Lynde  and  Richmond  (1992)  and  Nadiri  and  Marmineas  (1994)  are  two  of  the  most  widely  quoted 
infrastructure  studies  that  make  use  of  a  translog  functional  form. 
10  See,  for  example,  Berndt  and  Hesse  (1986). 
"  See  Berndt  (1990)  for  information  on  this  functional  form. 107 
Morrison  (1988)  extends  the  standard  GL  to  allow  for  fixed  inputs  in  a  manner 
comparable  to  Parks  (1971),  Woodland  (1975)  and  Diewert  and  Wales  (1987).  She 
kept  the  additive  structure  used  by  Parks  and  Woodland  and  the  interaction  and  price- 
sum  terms  of  Diewert  and  Wales.  However,  the  interaction  and  intercept  terms  in  the 
Diewert  and  Wales  studies  are  simplified  to  allow  for  a  symmetric  representation  of 
additional  arguments  of  the  cost  function,  thereby  facilitating  incorporation  of  multiple 
quasi-fixed  inputs  (for  example,  the  disaggregated  public  capital  stocks).  The  GL 
restricted  (or  variable)  cost  function  can  be  written  as 
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where  Pi  is  the  price  of  variable  input  i,  xkand  x,  are  the  stocks  of  quasi-fixed  inputs,  12 
and  s,,,  and  s,,  depict  the  remaining  arguments.  Demand  equations  can  be  derived  from 
(23)  based  on  Shephard's  lemma.  13  As  an  alternative,,  to  reduce  possible 
heteroskedasticity,  input-output  equations  can  be  derived  as  follows: 
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From  (23)  it  is  clear  that  if  variable  input  prices  increase  by  some  proportion  A,  Cv  will 
also  increase  by  A,  thereby  satisfying  linear  homogeneity  in  prices.  Similarly,  from  (24) 
12  These  inputs  are  subject  to  homogeneity  conditions  in  the  sense  that  scale  effects  are  dependent  on 
them.  By  contrast,  McFadden's  "environmental  variables"  discussed  in  Morrison  (1988)  and  Berndt 
and  Hansson  (1992)  may  have  impacts  on  a  firm's  costs  but  do  not  affect  scale  properties. 
13  Shephard's  lemma  states  that  the  optimal  (cost-minimising)  demand  for  input  i  can  simply  be 
derived  by  differentiating  the  cost  function  with  respect  to  P, 108 
it  is  apparent  that  if  input  prices  increase  equiproportionally,  factor  demands  remain 
constant. 
14 
Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1997)  and  Seitz  (1994)  are  two  studies  in  the 
infrastructure  literature  that  make  use  of  this  functional  form.  Morrison  and  Schwartz 
considered  five  inputs:  private  and  public  capital  (the  quasi-fixed  inputs),  production 
and  nonproduction  labour  and  energy  (the  variable  inputs).  "Q  was  gross  state 
manufacturing  output  net  of  non-energy  materials.  Because  the  focus  in  this  study  is  on 
the  effect  of  infrastructure  on  the  costs  of  the  total  private  business  sector,  value-added 
output,  rather  than  gross  output,  is  the  appropriate  measure.  The  only  variable  input  is 
labour  and  the  cost  function  includes  three  inputs:  private  capital  and  public  capital 
(aggregate  or  disaggregate  data)  and  production  workers'  hours.  Seitz  used  value- 
added  data  in  his  study  of  West  German  manufacturing.  However,  he  estimated  a  long- 
run  rather  than  a  short-run  cost  function  to  deternline  the  relationship  between  G,  L 
and  K. 
1  Aggregate  Inftastructure  Model 
The  measure  of  public  capital  used  by  Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1997)  includes 
highways,  water  and  sewer  capital.  Together  these  accounted  for  46.2  per  cent  of  the 
total  inftastructure  stock  in  1994.16 
14  Curvature  is  easily  tested  at  each  sample  point  by  determining  whether  oFCvlo'xk2  >0  and 
t-f  Ci 
7  1,  d3i2<0. 
15  Non-energy  materials  are  not  included  in  the  specification  due  to  difficulties  in  constructing  the 
appropriate  state-level  price  data  and  for  conceptual  reasons.  Attempts  to  include  non-energy 
materials,  which  represent  a  very  large  fraction  of  total  costs,  caused  the  estimates  to  be  more 
sensitive  to  specification  and  parameterisation. 
16  The  authors  state  that  the  estimated  impact  of  infrastructure  on  costs  is  smaller  when  "other"  public 
capital  is  included  in  the  analysis.  This,  they  say,  is  due  to  the  composition  of  other  capital, 
...  apparently  largely  containing  government  buildings  which  do  not  augment  efficiency". 109 
This  measure  of  productive  public  capital  is  expanded  to  include  the  "other  structures" 
component  (electric  and  gas  facilities,  transit  systems  and  airfields,  etc.  ),  while 
excluding  nonproductive  infrastructure  such  as  hospitals,  schools,  industrial  buildings 
and  other  buildings.  17  The  addition  of  other  structures  adds  a  further  7.6  per  cent  of 
the  total  infrastructure  stock  into  the  measure  of  G.  Incorporating  the  various 
variables,  the  cost  function  (23)  becomes: 
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where  PL  is  the  price  of  labour,  Q  is  value-added  output,  t  is  a  time  trend  denoting 
technology,  K  is  private  capital  and  G  is  infrastructure.  Using  Shephard's  lemma  the 
optimal  demand  for  labour  is  obtained: 
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where  L  is  hours  worked.  Following  Berndt  (1990)  and  Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1997) 
this  equation  is  transformed  into  an  optimal  input-output  equation  to  accommodate 
heteroskedasticity- 
17  The  "other  buildings"  component  includes  general  office  buildings,  police  and  fire  stations, 
courthouses.  auditoriums,  garages  and  passenger  terminals. 110 
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3.2  Disaggregated  Inftastructure  Model 
When  the  infrastructure  stock  is  disaggregated,  the  cost  function  (23)  becomes 
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where  GHis  street  and  highway  capital,  Gws  is  water  and  sewer  systems  capital  and  Go 
is  the  stock  of  other  structures.  Again,  using  Shephard's  lemma,  and  dividing  through 
by  Q  the  optimal  labour  input-output  equation  is  obtained: 
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it  is  clear  from  (28)  that  inclusion  of  the  extra  infrastructure  terms  leads  to  a  large 
increase  in  the  number  of  parameters  to  be  estimated  due  to  the  numerous  cross- III 
product  terms.  It  is  for  this  reason  -  to  conserve  degrees  of  freedom  -  that  water  and 
sewers  structures  were  combined  into  a  single  capital  stock  measure. 
3.3  Ae  Optimal  Capital  Stock  Equations 
From  (6)  and  (7)  the  optimal  private  and  public  capital  stocks  are  obtained  by 
differentiating  the  short-run  cost  function  with  respect  to  K  and  G,  setting  the  negative 
values  of  the  partial  derivatives  equal  to  PKand  PG  respectively  and  then  solving 
simultaneously  for  K*  and  G*,  the  optimal  quantities.  Differentiating  (25)  with  respect 
to  K  and  G  and  setting  the  negative  values  of  the  partial  derivatives  equal  to  the 
marginal  costs  of  the  respective  capital  stocks- 
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These  expressions  show  that  the  shadow  values  of  private  capital  and  core 
infrastructure  depend  not  just  on  the  size  of  the  capital  stocks  but  are  also  dependent 
on  the  level  of  GDP  and  the  price  of  labour.  Solving  (30)  with  respect  to  K  gives 
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Substituting  (3  2)  into  (3  1)  and  solving  for  G  generates  the  optimal  infrastructure  stock 
equation: 
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where  G*  is  the  optimal  quantity  of  public  capital.  In  a  similar  fashion  the  equation  for 
the  optimal  stock  of  private  capital,  K*,  is  derived: 
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Using  equations  (33)  and  (34)  the  optimal  capital  stocks  can  be  calculated  for  each 
year  of  the  sample  period.  The  equations  contain  both  parameters  (estimates  of  which 
are  obtained  by  estimating  the  system  of  equations  (25)  and  (27))  and  variables  (the 
rental  prices  of  the  two  types  of  capital,  the  price  of  labour  and  value-added  output). 
Similarly,  optimal  capital  equations  can  be  calculated  using  the  disaggregated 
infrastructure  model.  This  time  there  are  four  partial  derivatives  similar  to  (30)  and 
(3  1)  that  have  to  be  solved  simultaneously  one  for  private  capital  and  three  for  public 
capital  (roads,  water  and  sewer  systems,  and  other  structures). 
4.  Construction  of  Private  and  Public  Capital  Inputs  and  Rental  Price  Measures 
Before  presenting  the  results  from  estimating  the  above  systems  of  equations  and 
calculating  the  optimal  capital  stocks,  it  is  necessary  to  highlight  several  important 
issues  concerning  the  construction  of  the  aggregate  measures  of  private  and  public 
capital  and  the  formulation  of  capital  rental  prices. 113 
4.1  Private  and  Public  Capital  Inputs 
Both  types  of  capital  have  to  be  aggregated  by  type  and  across  sectors.  For  private 
capital  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  provides  private  capital  data  by  type 
(equipment  and  structures)  and  by  sector  (manufacturing,  mining,  etc.  ).  The  obvious 
way  of  aggregating  these  stocks  would  be  to  perform  a  simple  summation  of  the 
different  types  of  capital.  For  example,  the  aggregate  stock  of  private  capital  would  be 
calculated  by  performing  the  following  operation 
=  (35) 
where  K,  is  the  total  stock  of  private  capital  in  year  t  and  K,,,  is  the  total  stock  of 
capital  (equipment  and  structures)  in  sector  i.  In  a  sin-filar  fashion  the  total  stock  of 
public  capital  could  be  calculated: 
=  (36) 
where  Gt  is  the  total  stock  of  public  capital  in  year  t  and  Gj,,  Is  the  stock  of  capital  of 
type  i.  18  However,  the  problem  with  the  simple  aggregation  method  is  that  it  overlooks 
the  fact  that  some  assets  are  more  productive  than  others.  If  it  is  assumed  that 
producers  equate  the  marginal  product  of  any  type  of  capital  to  its  marginal  cost  (or 
user  cost),  capital  assets  with  high  user  costs  are  more  productive  in  equilibrium  than 
assets  with  low  rental  prices. 
"I  Where  each  type  of  capital  (roads.  water  and  sewers  etc.  )  is  the  sum  of  the  federal  and  state  and 
local  capital  stocks. 114 
This  inPOrtant  point  has  been  emphasised  by  Jorgenson  and  Griliches  (1967),  who 
calculated  an  aggregate  measure  of  private  capital  input  for  the  U.  S.  by  Divisia 
quantity  aggregation.  They  call  the  ratio  of  this  index  to  the  unweighted  sum  of  capital 
goods  the  average  quality  of  capital.  Quality  rises  if  the  stock  of  short-lived  assets  is 
growing  faster  than  the  stock  of  long-lived  assets  and  falls  if  the  amount  of  short-lived 
assets  is  growing  at  a  slower  rate  than  the  amount  of  long-lived  assets.  This  is  because 
short-lived  assets  have  higher  depreciation  rates  than  long-lived  assets  and  hence 
higher  user  costs  and  thus  higher  marginal  productivities. 
Following  Harper  et  al  (1995),  the  Tornqvist  discrete  approximation  to  the 
continuous  Divisia  index  was  employed  to  calculate  aggregate  measures  of  capital 
input  for  both  the  private  and  public  sectors.  This  index  has  a  number  of  attractive 
properties.  As  has  been  shown  by  Diewert  (1980),  it  can  be  viewed  as  an  exact  index 
corresponding  to  a  second-order  approximation  in  logarithms  to  an  arbitrary 
production  or  cost  function.  In  particular,  the  Tornqvist  index  places  no  prior 
restrictions  on  the  substitution  elasticities  among  the  goods  being  aggregated.  The 
index  is  defined  in  terms  of  the  rates  of  growth  of  the  different  capital  stocks.  The 
change  in  aggregate  capital  input  is  a  weighted  sum  of  the  changes  in  the  individual 
capital  stocks,  where  the  weights  are  the  arithmetic  averages  of  the  relative  cost 
shares.  For  example,  the  index  for  private  capital  is'9 
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ng  capital  is now  19  Note  subscripts  are  now  'T's  to  denote  further  disaggregation..  eg.  manufactu 
disaggregated  into  manufacturing  equipment  and  manufacturing  structures.  Further  disaggregation  is 
not  required  with  respect  to  G. 115 
Table  1.  Sectors  Contained  in  the  Index  of  Private  Capital 
Mining 
Manufacturing: 
Durable  Goods 
Nondurable  Goods 
Transportation  &  Public  Utilities: 
Railroad 
Local  and  Interurban  Passenger  Transit 
Trucking  and  Warehousing 
Water  Transportation 
Transportation  by  Air 
Pipelines  except  Natural  Gas 
Transportation  Services 
Communications 
Electric,  Gas  and  Sanitary  Services 
Wholesale  Trade 
Retail  Trade 
Finance,  Insurance  and  Real  Estate 
Services 
and  Pkt  is  the  ex  ante  rental  price  or  user  cost  of  equipment  or  structures  capital  in  one 
of  the  sectors.  It  is  clear  that  the  higher  the  user  cost  of  a  particular  capital  stock,  the 
greater  the  weight  attached  to  that  type  of  capital  in  the  aggregate  measure.  The 
economic  intuition  behind  this  result  is  that,  because  equipment  has  a  shorter  life  than 
buildings,  a  one  dollar  investment  in  equipment  provides  more  services  to  a  firm  in  any 
year  than  a  dollar's  investment  in  buildings.  Thus  equipment  is  given  a  greater 
weighting  in  the  measure  of  K,  To  obtain  the  quantity  index  itself  (as  opposed  to  its 
rate  of  growth)  a  base  must  be  chosen  for  the  index.  In  this  study  the  base  is  made 
equal  to  the  unweighted  sum  of  the  individual  capital  stocks  in  1987.  The  aggregate 
rental  price  is  found  by  dividing  total  capital  cost  by  aggregate  capital  input.  To 
construct  the  private  capital  index,  net  equipment  and  structures')  stocks  (measured  in 
constant  1987  dollars)  were  obtained  for  each  of  the  industries  listed  in  Table  1.  The 
index  of  core  public  capital  was  calculated  in  a  similar  fashion- 
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Figure  2.  Average  Economic  Depreciation  Rates,  Core 
I  tructure,  1959-94. 
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For  the  second  study,  using  disaggregated  infrastructure  data,  an  index  of  water  and 
sewer  systems  structures  was  also  obtained  using  (3  8).  All  the  public  capital  stocks 
used  in  this  chapter  can  be  classified  as  structures  so  at  first  glance  there  is  no  need  to 
perform  Divisia  aggregation  . 
20  However,  the  different  structures  depreciate  at  different 
rates.  The  length  of  life  of  a  highway  is  bound  to  be  different  to  the  length  of  life  of  an 
electric  facility  which,  in  turn,  is  bound  to  be  different  to  the  length  of  fife  of  a  water 
pipeline.  The  fact  that  each  type  of  structure  depreciates  at  a  different  rate  (and 
therefore  has  a  different  rental  price)  implies  that  the  various  infrastructure  stocks 
should  be  given  different  weightings  in  the  index  of  public  capital.  The  average 
economic  depreciation  rates  of  the  components  of  the  core  infrastructure  stock  are 
illustrated  in  Figure  2.  The  roads,  sewers  and  water  stocks  have 
20  of  course.  the  public  sector  also  owns  a  significant  quantity  of  equipment  (equipment  accounted  for 
9.7  per  cent  of  the  non-military  public  capital  stock  in  1994).  However,  this  capital  (computers  owned 
bv  the  IRS  etc.  )  does  not  have  a  direct  effect  upon  private  sector  production  (see  Chapter  2). 
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Table  2.  Comparison  of  Different  Private  Capital  Stock  Aggregation  Methods 
-  Growth  Rates 
(1)  (2) 
Time  span  Divisia  Direct  Composition 
aggregation  aggregation  effect:  (1)-(2) 
1948-1984  3.4  2.6  0.8 
1948-1973  3.6  2.6  1.0 
1973-1981  3.4  2.8  0.6 
1981-1984  2.3  2.1  0.2 
Source:  Bureau  of  Labour  Statistics  (1985),  quoted  m  Harper  et  al  (1995) 
very  similar  average  depreciation  rates.  The  stock  of  other  structures  depreciated  by 
over  half  a  percentage  point  more  per  year  than  the  other  stocks.  From  these  results 
one  would  expect  some,  but  very  little  difference,  between  a  measure  of  core  public 
capital  calculated  using  Divisia  aggregation  and  one  calculated  from  a  straight 
summation  of  individual  capital  stocks.  Divisia  aggregation  can,  however,  generate 
very  different  capital  stock  growth  rates  from  the  simple  aggregation  method.  Harper 
et  al  (1995)  calculate  the  difference  between  the  growth  rates  of  a  rental  price- 
weighted  Divisia  index  for  private  capital  and  a  simple  aggregation  private  capital 
stock  and  refer  to  the  difference  as  the  capital  composition  effect.  Since  the  Second 
World  War  this  effect  has  been  strongly  positive  in  the  U.  S.,  due  to  the  steady  shift  in 
the  investment  mix  toward  shorter-lived  equipment  assets  and  away  from  structures 
and  land.  As  can  be  seen  from  Table  2,  for  the  period  1948-1984  private  capital  input 
(using  Divisia  aggregation)  grew  by  3.4  per  cent  per  year,  while  the  capital  stock 
(using  direct  aggregation)  grew  by  only  2.6  per  cent  a  year.  Subtracting  the  one  from 
the  other,  the  composition  effect  of  0.8  per  cent  is  obtained.  According  to  Harper  et  al 
(1995),  one  underlying  reason  for  the  difference  between  the  two  measures  is  that 
equipment  grew  by  4.9  per  cent  per  year  while  nonresidential  structures  grew  by  2.8 
per  cent  per  year,  inventories  grew  at  3.3  per  cent  and  land  at  only  2.0  per  cent. 
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rate.  The  authors  found  that  the  importance  of  the  capital  composition  effect  has 
declined  considerably  over  time;  from  1948  to  1973  it  averaged  I  per  cent  per  year, 
while  from  1973  to  1981  it  fell  slightly  to  0.6  per  cent  per  year,  and  over  the  most 
recent  time  period  examined  by  the  authors  (1981-1984)  it  dropped  to  0.2  per  cent  per 
year.  The  annual  differences  between  the  newly  calculated  indices  of  private  and  public 
capital  and  simple  aggregation  methods  are  compared  in  Table  12,  Table  13  and  Table 
14  in  Appendix  B. 
4.2  The  Rental  Prices  of  Private  and  Public  Capital 
The  user  cost  or  rental  price  of  capital  -  the  opportunity  cost  of  owning  an  asset  -  is 
an  important  variable  in  the  analysis  and  thus  deserves  special  attention.  The  aim  of 
this  study  is  to  compare  actual  capital  stocks  with  optimal  capital  stocks  (both  private 
and  public).  From  (33)  and  (34)  it  can  be  seen  that  the  user  costs  of  both  types  of 
capital  appear  in  the  optimal  capital  stock  formulas 
.2' 
Furthermore,  the  user  cost  of 
capital  also  plays  an  important  role  in  the  calculation  of  the  indices  of  private  and 
public  capital.  In  fact,  it  is  only  this  variable  that  distinguishes  the  Tomqvist  indices 
from  simple  aggregation  of  capital  in  each  sector.  The  user  cost  of  capital  derives  from 
Jorgenson's  (1963)  model  of  investment  behaviour.  Two  rental  price  measures  were 
calculated  for  each  type  of  capital-  the  first  is  a  pre-tax  measure,  the  second  takes 
account  of  taxation  effects. 
21  Similarly.  when  public  capital  is  completely  disaggregated,  the  rental  prices  for  each  type  of  capital 
appear  in  each  of  the  optimal  capital  formulas. 119 
4.2.1  Ihe  Rental  Price  ofPrivate  Capital 
As  far  as  private  firms  are  concerned  if  the  user  cost  of  capital  is  relatively  high, 
ceterisparibus,  a  less  capital-intensive  technology  will  be  chosen,  and  vice-versa.  In  its 
simplest  form  the  rental  price  of  private  capital,  K,  of  type  k  is 
PK, 
k=  qk 
(r 
+,  5  J 
3,  (39) 
where  qkis  the  physical  capital  deflator  obtained  by  dividing  the  current  dollar  capital 
stock  by  the  constant  dollar  capital  stock,  reflecting  inflation  in  investment  prices,  r  is 
22  the  discount  rate  represented  by  Moody's  Aaa.  rate,  and  8k  is  the  rate  of  economic 
depreciation.  If  a  firm  purchases  an  asset  for  qkdollars,  the  cost  to  the  firm  in  any  time 
period  is  the  interest  paid  on  the  loan  to  purchase  the  asset  (alternatively,  the  return  the 
firm  could  have  earned  from  lending  qkdollars)  plus  the  depreciation  on  the  asset.  In 
the  neoclassical  model,  firms  desire  to  invest  up  to  the  point  where  the  marginal  return 
to  capital  assets  just  equals  the  opportunity  cost  of  owning  them.  The  pre-tax  measure 
of  private  capital  for  the  aggregate  private  business  sector  is  derived  from  (37)  and 
inserted  into  the  optimal  capital  stock  equations  (33)  and  (34).  Some  infrastructure 
studies  (eg,  Berridt  and  Hansson,  1992;  and  Seitz,  1994)  use  only  a  pre-tax  measure  of 
private  capital.  23  While  this  measure  was  used  to  calculate  one  set  of  optimal  capital 
stocks  for  comparative  purposes,  it  is  not  the  most  accurate  measure  of  the  cost  of 
capital  to  private  business.  The  fact  that  U.  S.  firms  have  in  the  past  been  able  to  claim 
investment  tax  credits  and  depreciation  of  their  capital,  has  reduced  the  user  cost  of 
capital  and  increased  the  desired  quantity  of  private  capital.  SirMlarly,  the  fact  that 
22  Moody's  Aaa  rate  probably  reflects  the  private  sector's  cost  of  borrowing  better  than.  for  example, 
the  rate  on  ten-year  Treasuries  (used  by  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas,  1994).  On  average  MoodV's  Aaa  rate 
is  9.1  per  cent  higher  than  the  rate  on  Treasuries  over  the  sample  period. 
23  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992)  did  not  include  corporate  taxes  in  their  private  rental  price  measure 
under  the  assumption  that.  in  many  cases.  assuming  the  marginal  corporate  tax  rate  in  Sweden  is  zero 
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corporate  income  tax  reduces  firms'  earnings  increases  the  cost  of  capital. 
Incorporating  various  elements  of  the  U.  S.  corporate  tax  system  into  the  analysis 
(investment  tax  credits,  capital  consumption  allowances,  and  corporate  income  tax) 
leads  overall  to  an  increase  in  the  user  cost  of  private  capital.  The  after-tax  price  of 
capital  is  on  average  32  per  cent  higher  than  the  pre-tax  measure. 
The  rise  in  the  price  of  private  capital  should  lead  to  a  fall  in  the  optimal  private 
capita  stock.  The  reason  for  this  can  be  found  by  referring  back  to  (6).  The  private 
business  sector  equates  the  marginal  benefit  of  increased  investment  with  the  cost  of 
extra  capital.  If  the  marginal  cost  of  capital  rises  in  the  presence  of  corporate  tax 
provisions,  marginal  cost  will  be  higher  than  marginal  benefit  in  the  short  run.  Firms 
stop  investing,  the  capital  stock  declines  due  to  depreciation,  until  costs  and  benefits 
are  equated  once  again.  Following  Jorgenson  and  Sullivan  (1981),  the  after-tax  price 
of  capital  is  defined  as 
PK, 
k=  qk  (r  +  45k 
)(1-  1  -UZ), 
I-u 
(40) 
where  i  is  the  investment  tax  credit,  -  u  is  the  corporate  income  tax  rate  and  z  is  the 
present  value  of  capital  consumption  allowances,  defined  as 
p(l  -  t)  /  (r  +  p)  7 
(41) 
where  p  is  the  capital  consumption  allowance  rate  obtained  by  dividing  capital 
i,  1987, 
consumption  allowances  by  the  total  capital  stock  (see  Bemste  n  and  Nadir 
1988,  and  1991).  Annual  measures  of  the  rental  price  of  private  capital  are  contained  in 
Table  15  in  Appendix  C.  The  presence  of  (I  -  u)  in  the  denominator  takes  account  of 121 
the  fact  that  the  corporation  tax  leaves  the  firm  only  (I  -  u)  of  each  dollar  earned,  in 
effect  increasing  the  cost  of  capital  by  the  reciprocal  of  that  amount,  J/(I  -  u)  . 
24 
Several  authors  make  adjustments  to  the  rental  price  to  take  account  of  the 
corporate  tax  system  (eg,  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas,  1994) 
. 
25  Since  industry-  specific  tax 
data  was  not  used,  incorporating  the  corporate  tax  system  into  the  rental  price  measure 
does  not  affect  the  calculation  of  the  aggregate  private  capital  input  in  (37).  However, 
from  (33)  and  (34)  it  is  clear  that  including  an  after-tax  measure  of  private  capital 
affects  the  size  of  the  optimal  private  and  public  capital  stocks. 
4.2.2  The  Rental  Price  ofPublic  Capital 
Deriving  the  rental  price  of  public  capital  is  somewhat  more  controversial.  Because 
individual  firms  do  not  directly  pay  for  many  of  the  infrastructure  services  they  use  (for 
example,  the  use  of  most  highways  and  streets),  it  could  be  argued  that  the  user  cost  of 
public  capital  is  zero.  Of  course,  firms  pay  a  share  of  the  cost  of  additional  public 
infrastructure  in  taxes,  suggesting  that  PGis  not  zero.  However,  for  many  authors  in 
the  infrastructure  literature  the  relationship  between  spending  on  G  and  the  taxes  firms 
24  The  presence  of  (I  -  u)  in  the  denominator  can  be  explained  in  a  more  rigorous  fashion.  Assuming 
competitive  equilibrium  and  the  absence  of  taxes,  total  revenue  equals  total  costs,  ie, 
PQQ  =  PKK  +  PLL.  Introducing  a  corporate  tax  at  rate  u  and  assuming  that  the  opportunitv  cost  of 
capital  is  not  deductible  but  wage  costs  are  deductible,  the  firm's  tax  liability  is  u(PQQ  -  PLL).  The 
zero  profits  condition  becomes:  PQQ  =  PKK  +  PLL  +  u(PQQ  -  PLL).  Rearranging  this  equation  yields 
PQQ  =  [PKI(I  -  u)]K  +  PLL.  Comparing  this  to  the  equilibrium  condition  without  taxes,  it  can  be 
seen  that  the  effective  cost  of  capital  has  risen  from  PK  to  PK  I(]  -  u). 
25  Contrary  to  the  literature  on  the  construction  of  rental  price  measures,  the  tax  adjustment  used  by 
Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  (1994)  does  not  include  the  term  (]-  u)  in  the  denominator,  resulting  in  a  tax- 
adjusted  measure  which  is  lower  than  the  pre-tax  measure.  The  after-tax  measures  calculated  bN- 
Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  and  those  calculated  in  this  study  differ  substantially  in  relatiN,  e  magnitude  (by 
a  factor  of  at  least  50  per  cent  in  most  years).  As  a  result  there  is  a  significant  difference  between 
optimal  capital  stocks  calculated  using  the  rental  price  of  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  and  the  rental  prices 
calculated  in  this  chapter.  There  are  other  adjustments  that  can  be  made  to  the  rental  price  measure. 
For  example.  Lynde  and  Richmond  (1992)  included  the  term  Aqk  to  reflect  the  change  in  the  price  of 
capital  goods  and  Hall  (1990)  argues  in  favour  of  including  the  dividend  yield  on  a  portfolio  of  stocks 
such  as  the  S&P  500  index  as  a  proxy  for  the  discount  rate. 122 
Pay  is  sufficiently  indirect  for  PG  to  be  left  equal  to  zero.  Of  course,  policymakers 
forniulating  public  spending  plans  are  not  just  interested  in  the  cost  of  public  capital  to 
firms.  They,  it  could  be  argued,  are  interested  in  investing  in  infrastructure  up  to  the 
point  w  ere  the  cost  savings  enjoyed  by  private  business  equal  the  cost  to  the  nation  as 
a  whole  of  providing  the  additional  capital.  Thus,  whereas  each  firm  equates  the 
marginal  cost  of  private  capital  and  the  marginal  benefit  of  that  capital,  policymakers 
equate  the  marginal  cost  of  public  capital  to  society  and  the  marginal  benefits  enjoyed 
26  by  firms.  Following  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992),  the  formula  for  the  aggregate  rental 
price  of  public  capital  is 
PG=  qc  , 
(r+45c  (42) 
where  qGis  the  physical  capital  deflator  for  core  infrastructure,  r  is  the  discount  rate 
and  gGis  the  economic  depreciation  rate  for  core  infrastructure.  Estimates  of  (42)  are 
obtained  from  (38).  A  further  three  user  cost  measures  are  used  to  study  the  effects  of 
disaggregated  infrastructure  capital- 
P,  q,  (r  +  15,  ) 
3, 
P,,  =  q,,,,  (r  +,  5,  ),  and 
Po  qo  (r  +,  50), 
(43) 
where  H  denotes  highways  and  streets,  WS  denotes  water  and  sewer  systems,  and  0 
denotes  other  structures.  The  discount  rate,  r,  was  approximated  by  the  rate  on  ten- 
26  Of  course,  the  public  sector  is  also  interested  in  the  benefits  consumers  derive  from  infrastructure 
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year  Treasury  Bills 
. 
27  Of  course,  the  public  sector's  investment  declsions  are  not 
directly  influenced  by  investment  tax  provisions.  Nevertheless  the  incidence  of  taxation 
may  still  affect  the  user  cost  of  public  capital.  The  concept  of  excess  burden  should 
Play  an  imPortant  role  in  any  study  of  whether  the  benefits  of  infrastructure  investment 
exceed  the  costs  of  raising  tax  revenue  to  finance  it.  The  measures  PG,  PH,,  Pws,  and  Po 
do  not  account  for  the  wedge  that  taxes  insert  between  the  demand  and  supply  prices 
of  privately  produced  goods.  These  tax  wedges  distort  private  decisions  and  lead  to 
losses  in  efficiency.  According  to  Jorgenson  and  Yun  (1991)  the  excess  burden 
imposed  on  the  U.  S.  economy  is  very  large.  The  authors  estimate  the  marginal  excess 
burden  of  the  U.  S.  tax  system  (the  efficiency  loss  per  dollar  for  the  last  dollar  of 
revenue  raised)  to  be  $0.39.  Ballard  et  aL  (1985)  also  found  that  the  marginal  excess 
burden  of  taxes  in  the  United  States  is  large.  The  welfare  loss  from  a  one  per  cent 
increase  in  distortionary  tax  rates  was  estimated  to  be  in  the  range  of  $0.17  -  $0.56  per 
dollar  of  extra  revenue.  This  leads  the  authors  to  conclude  that- 
"A  public  project  must  produce  marginal  benefits  of  more  than  $1.17  per 
dollar  of  cost  if  it  is  to  be  welfare  improving.  This  suggests  that  many 
projects  accepted  by  government  agencies  in  recent  years  on  the  basis  of  cost 
benefit  ratios  exceeding  unity  might  have  been  rejected  if  the  additional 
effects  of  distortionary  taxes  had  been  take  into  account.  "  (p.  128) 
27  Although  such  a  market  rate  of  interest  is  easily  observed,  it  is  questionable  whether  it  is  the 
appropriate  discount  factor  for  public  investment  decisions.  Arrow  and  Kurz  (1970)  point  out  that  if  it 
is  accepted  that  the  public  sector  has  an  obligation  to  future  generations,  the  social  rate  of  time 
preference  may  be  below  the  common  value  of  the  opportunity  cost  of  capital  and  the  individual  rate 
of  time  preference.  It  is  then  socially  advantageous  to  transfer  resources  for  consumption  to  social 
investment  because  of  the  divergence  between  social  and  individual  time  preferences.  The  appropriate 
rate  of  discount  on  ftiture  benefits  from  social  investment  will  be  an  aNerage  of  the  social  rate  of  time 
preference  and  the  opportunity  cost  of  capital,  with  weights  dependent  on  the  extent  to  which 
resources  are  drawn  from  consumption  to  investment. 124 
Figure  3.  Pre-tax  and  Tax-adjusted  Rental  Prices  of  Private 
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Note:  PK  and  PG  are  pre-tax  prices;  PKtax  and  PGtax  are  tax-adjusted  prices. 
The  after-tax  prices  of  public  capital  were  adjusted  in  accordance  with  Jorgenson's  and 
Yun's  estimate  of  the  marginal  cost  of  public  funds.  Estimates  of  the  rental  prices  of 
the  different  types  of  public  capital  are  contained  in  Table  15  Appendix  C.  Figure  3 
illustrates  the  different  aggregate  rental  prices  graphically.  The  fact  that  PG  <  PK  can 
be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  public  sector's  borrowing  costs  are  less  than  those  of 
the  private  sector  and,  more  importantly,  because  most  of  the  core  infrastructure  stock 
consists  of  long-lived  structures  that  have  low  depreciation  rates.  The  excess  burden  of 
taxation  and  the  taxation  of  profits  raise  the  respective  prices  of  public  and  private 
capital.  The  effect  of  adjusting  the  price  of  public  capital  in  this  way  is  illustrated  in 
Figure  4.  An  increase  in  the  price  of  public  capital  from  P,  '  to  P,;  leads  to  a  fall  in  the 
12. 
The  mag  itude  of  the  fall  depends  not  optimal  infrastructure  stock  from  G*  to  G*  ni 
only  on  the  size  of  the  excess  burden  but  also  on  the  shape  of  the  cost  function  ftom 
which  the  shadow  value  curve  is  derived.  The  greater  the  slope  of 125 
Figure  4.  Ihe  Effect  of  Excess  Burden  on  the  Optimal  Stock  of  h0rastructure 
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the  curve,  the  greater  the  error  in  estimating  G*  if  the  rental  price  of  public  capital  is 
calculated  incorrectly. 
4.2.3  Economic  Depreciation  Rates 
There  are  also  a  number  of  points  worth  making  about  economic  depreciation  rates, 
which  are  important  components  of  the  rental  price  measures.  Following  Berndt  and 
Hansson  (1992),  economic  depreciation  rates  were  initially  taken  from  Hulten  and 
Wykoff  (198  1).  Hulten  and  Wykoff  show  how  depreciation  can  be  estimated  using  an 
approach  that  relies  on  market  price  data.  The  change  in  an  asset  price  over  time  has 
two  components,  one  due  to  depreciation  and  one  due  to  inflation.  The  most 
significant  finding  of  their  research  is  the  approximately  geometric  form  of  the  age- 126 
28  price  profiles  for  assets.  This  implies  that  each  class  of  assets  can  be  characterised  by 
a  single  constant  rate  of  depreciation.  However,  the  depreciation  rates  calculated  by 
Hulten  and  Wykoff  (1981)  are  asset  specific,  not  sector  specific.  For  example,  instead  . 
of  calculating  the  individual  economic  depreciation  rates  for  equipment  and  structures 
in  the  wholesale  trade,  retail  trade,  and  finance,  insurance  and  real  estate  trade,  Berndt 
and  Hansson  (1992)  used  the  Hulten  and  Wykoff  depreciation  rate  for  "office, 
computing  and  accounting"  equipment  for  all  three  sectors  and  the  Hulten  and  Wykoff 
depreciation  rate  for  "connnercial  structures"  for  all  three  sectors. 
Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1997)  assume  that  the  private  and  public  capital 
depreciation  rates,  gKand  gGrespectively,  are  identical.  However,  comparisons  of  the 
service  lives  of  private  and  public  assets  in  recent  research  by  Katz  and  Herman  (1997) 
reveal  significant  differences  between  5Kand  SG.  Highways  and  streets,  water  systems, 
sewer  systems  and  other  structures  have  an  average  service  life  of  60  years;  private 
equipment  assets  have  an  average  service  life  of  14  years;  private  structures  have  an 
average  service  life  of  36  years.  Thus  the  assumption  that  8K  =  &Gbiases  upwards  the 
estimate  of  PG,  leading  to  inaccurate  estimation  of  G* 
Using  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (BEA)  data,  private  capital  depreciation 
rates  were  calculated  for  each  sector's  equipment  and  structures  stock  using  the 
formula- 
(5k.  t  - 
Dk, 
t 
Kk, 
t-l 
(44) 
where  Dkt  is  the  economic  depreciation  of  the  kth  capital  good  in  year  1,  measured  in 
28  See  Katz  and  Herman  (1997)  for  a  discussion  of  recent  adjustments  to  the  BEA's  method  of 
calculating  economic  depreciation.  The  authors  also  find  that  depreciation  takes  on  a  geometric 
pattern. 127 
1987  dollars  (see  Hulten  and  Wykoff,  1981).  The  same  formula  was  used  to  compute 
the  economic  depreciation  rates  of  the  different  types  of  public  capital.  The  average 
depreciation  rates  for  the  period  1959-94  are  listed  in  Table  16  in  Appendix  D.  The 
BEA  depreciation  rates  are  also  compared  with  the  Hulten  and  Wykoff  rates  (Table 
17)  used  by  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992).  It  is  clear  that  there  are  significant  differences 
between  the  two  sets  of  measures. 
In  summary,  considerable  attention  was  paid  to  the  construction  of  the  rental 
prices  of  private  and  public  capital  because  these  measures  are  important  for 
calculating  aggregate  capital  inputs  and,  more  importantly,  the  optimal  capital  stocks. 
Taken  together,  the  wrong  choice  of  interest  rate,  economic  depreciation  rate  and  tax 
adjustment  could  be  sufficient  to  produce  the  result  that  there  is,  for  example,  a 
substantial  shortage  of  capital  when  in  fact  the  stock  is  close  to  optimal  or  in  surplus. 
S.  The  Estimation  Procedure 
Before  the  results  from  estimating  the  various  models  are  presented,  some  comments 
about  the  estimation  procedure  are  necessary.  Equation  by  equation  OLS  is  possible 
because  the  estimating  equations  (25),  (27),  (28)  and  (29)  are  linear  in  the  parameters. 
However,,  it  is  also  possible  that  the  disturbances  across  the  cost  and  labour  input- 
output  equations  are  contemporaneously  correlated,  implying  that  the  disturbance 
covariance  matrix  is  nondiagonal.  In  that  case,  it  is  best  to  estimate  the  equations  as  a 
system  (for  example,  using  Zellner's  SUR  estimator)  . 
29Estimating  the  cost  and  labour 
19  See  Lynde  and  Richmond  (1992)  for  a  comparison  of  the  two  estimation  procedures, 128 
equations  by  OLS  assumes  the  following  specification  f  or  the  error  vectors  of  the  two 
equations 
e,  ece'  e  er  uc  e=-X 
0), 
E  cCL 
ee  er  eep0U. 
2 
[ 
L-  LCLL  L)_ 
(45) 
where  the  errors  of  the  cost  equation  [(25)  or  (28)],  ec,  and  the  errors  of  the  labour 
input-output  equation  [(27)  or  (29)],  eL,  are  uncorrelated  and  thus  the  off-diagonal 
blocks  of  the  covariance  matrix  are  zero.  To  take  account  of  the  fact  that  the  errors  for 
the  two  equations  may  be  contemporaneously  correlated,  consider  the  off-diagonal 
block  E[e  e'],  which  can  be  expressed  as  CL 
ecleLl  ecleL2  ...  ecleLn  (TCL  0  ...  0 
eC2eLl  eC2eL2  eC2eLn  0  UCL  ... 
0 
E[eceL'  E  (T  CLin  (46) 
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_j  L00... 
UCL 
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where  the  elements  on  the  diagonal  are  contemporaneous  covariances,  denoted  ac, 
and  the  off-diagonal  elements  are  covariances  between  the  equations'  errors  in 
different  time  periods  (taken  to  be  zero).  The  joint  error  vector  (45)  can  be  re-specified 
as 
[ec-  0721 
n 
t3-  CL 
In 
e-N 
(0), 
E  c21  =W 
eL-  0  aLCIn  UL 
n) 
(47) 
A  test  for  contemporaneous  error  covariance  is  based  on  the  following  Lagrange 
. 
30 
Multiplier  test  statistic  (Breusch  and  Pagan,  1980). 
XLm  =  nr  7 
31 
(48) 
11  See  Lyndc  and  Richmond  (1992)  for  an  application  of  this  test. 129 
Table  3.  Lqgrange  Multiplier  Testsfor  Contemporaneous  Error  Covariance 
XLm  =  nr 
Aggregate  Infrastructure  Model  23.15*** 
Disaggregated  Infrastructure  Model  27.05*** 
D-; 
Rejection  of  null  hypothesis  of  zero  contemporaneous  correlation  at  the  1  per  cent  level  at  least. 
where  r"  is  the  squared  correlation  coefficient  between  the  OLS  residuals  of  the  two 
equations.  Asymptotically,  XLm  is  distributed  as  a 
'X2 
(1)  random  variable.  Table  3 
contains  the  test  statistics  for  each  of  the  models.  In  each  case  the  hypothesis  of  zero 
contemporaneous  covariance  is  rejected.  This  implies  that  SUR  estimation  is  not 
equivalent  to  OLS  applied  separately  to  the  two  equations.  Because  each  equation 
contains  the  same  coefficient  vector  the  model  to  be  estimated  can  be  written  in  the 
form 
_[C]=[X,  +[e, 
]=Z, 
L  XL  eL 
(49) 
where  C  and  L  are  vectors  of  dependent  variables,  the  Xs  are  matrices  of  regressors 
and  v  is  the  common  parameter  vector  of  the  two  equations.  Using  (47)  and  (49),  the 
following  generalised  least  squares  estimator  is  obtained- 
IZIW  -Izl-l  zfw-ly,  where 
[Xc 
XL 
An  estimate  of  W  is  obtained  using 
(50) 
2  [e'e  iC  'ýL 
36  &2 
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where  use  is  made  of  the  least  squares  residuals  e,  and  eL  obtained  from  individually 
estimating  the  cost  and  labour  equations  and  there  are  36  observations  in  the  sample. 
In  summary,  the  SUR  technique  uses  equation-by-equation  OLS  to  obtain  an  estimate 
of  the  disturbance  covariance  matrix  W  and  then  does  generalised  least  squares,  given 
this  initial  estimate  of  W  The  estimates  of  W  can  be  updated  and  the  SUR  procedure 
can  be  iterated  until  changes  from  one  iteration  to  the  next  in  the  estimated  parameters 
and  the  estimated  W  become  arbitrarily  small.  Estimating  the  model  as  a  system  adds 
structure  to  it  and  leads  to  more  efficient  estimates.  The  additional  structure  and 
robustness,  as  well  as  the  increased  efficiency  of  the  estimates  (lower  standard  errors), 
support  the  systems  estimation  procedure. 
6.  Empirical  Results  -  Aggregate  Infrastructure  Model 
In  Section  6.1  the  results  from  estimating  the  aggregate  infrastructure  model  [(25)  and 
(27)]  and  performing  a  number  of  hypothesis  tests  are  presented  and  discussed.  In 
Section  6.2  the  optimal  infrastructure  stock  is  calculated  (under  a  number  of  scenarios 
regarding  the  tax  treatment  of  factor  prices). 
1.  Estimation  Results 
Results  from  estimating  (25)  and  (27)  by  SUR  are  contained  in  Table  4.  Two  versions 
of  the  model  were  estimated-  one  using  an  after-tax  measure  of  the  price  of  labour 
(following  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas,  1994),  and  the  other  using  the  wage  rate  with  no  tax 
adjustment  (Morrison  and  Schwartz,  1997,,  Berndt  and  Hansson,  1992,  and  Seitz, 
1994),  Following  Seitz  (1994),  no  a  priori  restrictions  were  imposed  on  the  parameters 131 
of  the  cost  function.  However,  a  Wald  test  of  the  restriction 
(5LQ  -=  YtQ  -=  YQQ  =  =  YQK  =  iVQG  =0  strongly  rejects  against  the  assumption  of  constant 
returns  to  scale.  Other  restrictions  to  the  model  to  test  the  appropriateness  of  the 
speci  cation  are  also  rejected.  These  include  constraints  on  the  'Y'  parameters  and  the 
fixed  effects  (both  independently  and  grouped).  Of  most  interest  is  the  test  to 
determine  whether  the  public  capital  variables  belong  in  the  model.  The  model  which 
includes  infrastructure  variables  was  tested  against  the  model  that  incorporates  the 
restriction:  45LG  =  VtG  : ý--  rQG  =  rGG  =  vGK=  0.  The  Wald  statistic  that  results  from  this 
test,  WG,  is  reported  in  Table  4.  Clearly,  the  test  rejects  strongly  in  favour  of  including 
the  infrastructure  terms.  Thus,  as  other  cost  function  studies  have  found,  infrastructure 
seems  to  have  a  significant  effect  on  private  sector  costs.  However,  it  is  only  when  the 
reductions  in  business  costs  are  weighed  against  the  cost  of  additional  infrastructure 
capital  that  it  can  be  determined  whether  the  core  public  capital  stock  is  suboptimal  or 
not. 
Given  the  complexity  of  the  functional  form,  the  estimated  parameters  have  no 
economic  interpretation.  As  can  be  seen  from  (25)  and  (27)  all  the  regressors  are 
multiplicative  combinations  of  two  to  four  variables.  Nevertheless,  the  adequacy  of  the 
model  can  be  tested  in  the  usual  way.  Most  of  the  coefficients  are  statistically 
significant  at  the  I  per  cent  level  at  least.  The  high  values  for  R2  show  that  the  model 
fits  the  data  very  well  but  are  not  unusual  in  cost  function  models  (Lynde  and 
Richmond,  1992,  and  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas,  1994  report  similar  values  for  k2  ).  The 
Durbin-Watson  statistics  lie  in  the  inconclusive  region  so  the  Breusch-Godfrey 
Lagrange  Multiplier  test  was  conducted  as  an  alternative.  Test  statistics  of  0.45  and 
0.06  respectively  mean  that  the  null  hypothesis  of 132 
Table  4.  Estimation  Results:  Aggregate  Inftastructure  Model,  1959-94 
_ 
Parameter 
au 
&t 
&Q 
rtQ 
rtt 
&K 
45LG 
rtK 
rQK 
rtG 
7QG 
, 
VKK 
GG 
YGK 
Model  I 
After-tax  Wa-ges 
-10.40*** 
(5.03) 
-0.7864*** 
(3.38) 
0.0065*** 
(5.08) 
0.0003*** 
(4.01) 
-0.0174*** 
(2.86) 
-0.1113E-05*** 
(5.49) 
-2.32* 
(1.78) 
27.97*** 
(6.11) 
-0.1333 
(1.38) 
0.0010** 
(2.48) 
1.08*** 
(4.47) 
-0.0090*** 
(6.19) 
-0.1679 
(0.48) 
-18.33*** 
(7.28) 
2.85*** 
(3.02) 
Model  2 
Pre-tax  Wmes 
-10.37*** 
(4.99) 
-0.7942*** 
(3.41) 
0.0065*** 
(5.06) 
0.0003*** 
(4.04) 
-0.0177*** 
(2.92) 
-0.11  12E-05*** 
(5.46) 
-2.22* 
(1.71) 
27.73*** 
(6.03) 
-0.1247 
(1.29) 
0.0010*** 
(2.41) 
1.08*** 
(4.43) 
-0.0090*** 
(6.12) 
-0.1973 
(0.57) 
-18.15*** 
(7.19) 
2.81*** 
(2.98) 
Diamostic  Tests 
R2  c 
LIQ 
DW  c 
LIQ 
LAI(-,  X,  (])  c 
LIQ 
JB  -j  (2)  C 
LIQ 
WG  --, 
/  (5) 
0.999 
0.998 
1.73 
2.23 
0.45 
0.06 
0.15 
0.20 
267.79 
0.999 
0.998 
1.72 
2.21 
1.37 
0.06 
4.52 
0.20 
261.74 
Note:  LM  =  Lagrange  Multiplier  test  for  first  order  serial  correlation;  JB  =  Jarque-Bera  normality  test 
statistic,  TJ'G  =  Wald  test  statistic  on  infrastructure  coefficients;  t-stats  in  parentheses  and  are 
computed  using  White  robust  heteroskedastic-consistent  standard  effors. 
Significant  at  the  I%  level  at  least. 
Significant  at  the  5%  level  at  least. 
Significant  at  the  10  %  level  at  least. 133 
seria  independence  cannot  be  rejected  for  either  equation.  The  Jarque-Bera  normality 
test  also  concludes  that  the  errors  of  the  two  equations  are  normally  distributed. 
Lynde  and  Richmond  (1993a,  b)  point  out  that  many  economic  time  series  are 
non-stationary  and  that  ordinary  statistical  inference  techniques  are  rendered  invalid  if 
applied  to  such  data.  Following  Vijverberg  et  al.  (1997),  to  address  concerns  of  K- 
possible  spurious  regression  results  the  residuals  of  the  two  equations  in  each  of  the 
models  were  tested  for  the  presence  of  unit  roots.  In  each  case  application  of  the 
augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  test  leads  to  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  of  a  unit 
root.  For  example,  for  the  cost  equation  in  Model  I  the  ADF  test  statistic  of  -5.69 
exceeds  the  MacKinnon  (1991)  critical  value  of  -4.25  leading  to  rejection  of  the  null 
hypothesis  of  a  unit  root  at  the  I  per  cent  level.  The  ADF  test  statistic  for  the  labour 
input-output  equation  is  -5.90.  The  parameter  estimates  obtained  using  the  wage  rate 
without  any  tax  adjustment  are  almost  identical  to  those  obtained  using  the  after-tax 
price  of  labour.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  optimal  capital  stocks  calculated 
using  the  two  sets  of  parameters  will  be  of  a  similar  magnitude.  Because  the  wage  rate 
itself  appears  in  the  optimal  public  and  private  capital  stock  equations,  different 
measures  of  the  wage  rate  may  have  a  substantial  effect  on  the  sIZe  of  the  optimal 
capital  stocks.  It  will  be  shown  below  that  whether  PL  is  adjusted  for  tax  purposes 
determines  in  certain  years  whether  some  types  of  capital  are  oversupplied  or  in 
shortage. 
The  question  of  endogeneity  is  an  issue  of  some  concern  in  the  infrastructure 
3'  For  example  ,  it  may  be  argued  that  the  private  business  sector  is  large  literature 
enough  that  output  should  be  considered  endogenous.  To  address  the  problem  of 
11  SCC  Morrison  and  Schwartz  (1997),  p.  1102,  and  Vijvcrberg  et  al.  (1997),  p.  270. 134 
possible  simultaneity  bias,  the  two  cost  function  models  were  re-estimated  for 
comparative  purposes  with  Q  instrumented  using  real  military  spending,  the  world  oil 
32  price  and  the  political  party  of  the  President.  There  was  very  little  difference  in  the 
magnitu  e  and  significance  of  the  resulting  parameter  estimates. 
62  The  Optimal  Inftastructure  Stock 
Like  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992),  the  main  reason  for  estimating  the  model  is  to  obtain 
parameter  estimates  that  can  be  inserted  into  the  optimal  infrastructure  stock  equation, 
(33),  along  with  data  on  the  price  of  labour,  the  user  costs  of  private  and  public  capital 
and  private  business  output.  Once  the  optimal  infrastructure  stock  is  estimated  it  can 
be  detemfined  whether  there  was  a  surplus  or  shortage  of  this  type  of  capital  over  the 
sample  period.  It  is  also  possible,  using  optimal  capital  stocks,  to  estimate  the  output 
elasticities  of  public  and  private  capital,  6,  ,,,  G*  and  EQK*'  Using  (2  1)  and  (22)  the 
elasticities  were  calculated  at  each  sample  point  by  replacing  the  term  A  (the  marginal 
cost  of  output)  with  the  observable  output  price,  PQ,  obtained  by  dividing  GDP 
expressed  in  current  prices  by  GDP  expressed  in  constant  prices.  The  estimates  are 
reported  in  Table  5.  It  is  worth  commenting  on  both  the  relative  and  absolute 
magnitude  of  infrastructure's  output  elasticity.  The  average  value  of  0.04  implies  that  a 
I  per  cent  increase  in  the  stock  of  core  public  capital  (if  optimally  provided)  leads  to  a 
0.04  per  cent  increase  in  business  sector  output.  This  estimate  is  at  the  very  low  end  of 
those  reported  in  the  literature  review  in  Chapter  1.  Those  researchers  who  regarded 
Aschauer's  (1989)  and  Munnell's  (I  990a)  estimates  of 
32  See  Chaptcr  4  for  a  more  complete  discussion  of  these  instruments. 135 
Table  5.  Output  Elasticities:  Inftastructure  and  Private  Capital 
c  QG*  '6QK*  '6QG*  EQK* 
1959  0.024  0.208  1977  0.046  0.341 
1960  0.024  0.216  1978  0.055  0.360 
1961  0.024  0.220  1979  0.063  0.376 
1962  0.025  0.208  1980  0.074  0.439 
1963  0.026  0.210  1981  0.078  0.474 
1964  0.026  0.212  1982  0.072  0.474 
1965  0.026  0.212  1983  0.060  0.419 
1966  0.029  0.229  1984  0.063  0.415 
1967  0.030  0.241  1985  0.055  0.374 
1968  0.032  0.264  1986  0.042  0.321 
1969  0.037  0.300  1987  0.043  0.359 
1970  0.043  0.328  1988  0.043  0.364 
1971  0.039  0.301  1989  0.040  0.350 
1972  0.038  0.299  1990  0.039  0.349 
1973  0.042  0.310  1991  0.037  0.335 
1974  0.055  0.356  1992  0,033  0.315 
1975  0.054  0.364  1993  0.028  0.289 
1976  0.047  0.352  1994  0.031  0.302 
Average  0.042  0.319 
is  the  output  elasticity  of  core  G  (optunally  provided);  e  is  the  elasticity  for  K.  QG  QK* 
the  output  elasticity  of  public  capital  to  be  too  high  (0.39  and  0.34  respectively), 
including  Munnell  herself,  were  more  convinced  by  estimates  from  regional  production 
function  studies  which  revealed  a  much  smaller  role  for  public  capital  (eg,  Munnell, 
1990b;  Eisner,  1991;  and  McGuire,  1992).  An  output  elasticity  of  0.15-0.20  was 
considered  to  be  far  more  realistic.  However,  the  above  estimates  imply  that 
infrastructure  ý1  s  impact  can  be  halved  and  then  halved  again.  It  is  also  interesting  to 
compare  the  output  elasticities  of  the  two  types  of  capital  when  optimally  provided. 
The  average  estimate  of  0.32  for  private  capital  is  of  a  reasonable  magnitude. 
However,  it  is  almost  8  times  higher  than  the  estimate  for  public  capital.  This  compares 
with  certain  production  function  studies  (eg,  Berndt  and  Hansson's  (1992)  application 136 
of  Munnell's  (1990a)  specification  to  Swedish  data)  in  which  public  capital  was  found 
to  have  an  output  elasticity  as  high  as  or  higher  than  that  of  private  capital. 
Dividing  the  optimal  infrastructure  stock,  G*,  by  the  actual  stock,  G,  it  IS  * 
possible  to  determine  the  extent  of  any  surplus  or  shortage  in  any  particular  year.  " 
Numbers  greater  than  one  imply  that  the  actual  capital  stock  is  smaller  than  the  optimal 
capital  stock  and  that  there  is  therefore  an  infrastructure  shortage.  Numbers  less  than 
unity  signify  an  infrastructure  surplus.  Note  that  four  different  ratios  are  calculated. 
The  first  two  are  obtained  using  the  tax-adjusted  wage  rate  (Nadiri  and  Mamuneas,, 
1994)  and  the  parameter  estimates  from  Model  I  in  Table  4.  The  first  of  these  uses 
before-tax  measures  of  private  and  public  capital  (Berndt  and  Hansson,  1992;  Lynde 
and  Richmond,  1992;  Seitz,  1994).  The  second  adjusts  the  user  cost  of  private  capital 
to  take  account  of  corporate  tax  provisions  (Morrison  and  Schwartz,  1997;  Nadiri  and 
Mamuneas,  1994)  and  the  cost  of  public  capital  to  take  account  of  the  excess  burden 
of  taxation  (Morrison  and  Schwartz,  1997).  The  second  pair  of  ratios  was  obtained 
using  the  pre-tax  wage  rate  (Morrison  and  Schwartz,  1997;  Seitz,  1994;  Lynde  and 
Richmond,  1992;  Berndt  and  Hansson,  1992)  and  the  parameter  estimates  from  Model 
2.  The  results  are  best  illustrated  graphically.  All  four  sets  of  ratios  have  the  same 
pattern  over  time  so,  before  examining  the  effect  of  adjusting  input  prices  on  the  level 
of  the  ratios,  it  is  interesting  to  examine  this  pattern  using  just  one  of  the  measures. 
Arguably,  the  most  accurate  set  of  ratios  is  that  derived  using  all  input  prices  (labour 
and  both  types  of  capital)  adjusted  for  tax  purposes.  These  ratios  reflect  most  closely 
the  firm's  cost  of  labour  and  capital  and  the  opportunity  cost  of  new  infrastructure. 
The  ratios  calculated  with  these  adjustments  are  illustrated  graphically  in  Figure  5. 
33  Note  that  the  actual  capital  stock  is  the  Divisia  index  of  core  public  capital 137 
Figure  5.  Ratio  of  Optimal  to  Actual  Core  Inftastructure  Stock, 
1959-94. 
On  average,  the  infrastructure  stock  was  close  to  optimal  over  the  entire  sample 
period.  The  average  optimal/actual  ratio  was  0.95,  pointing  to  a  small  surplus.  The 
ratios  do  not  vary  greatly  in  magnitude.  The  highest  value  of  G*IG  over  the  course  of 
the  sample  period  is  0.992,  observed  in  1964;  its  lowest  value  is  0.907,  observed  in 
1994.  However,  there  was  substantial  variation  in  the  growth  rate  of  G  and  the  growth 
rates  of  the  various  variables  that  influence  G*  over  the  period.  Figure  5  provides  two 
interesting  pieces  of  evidence.  First,  even  though  public  capital  may  have  a  positive 
output  elasticity,  when  the  marginal  cost  of  public  capital,  PG,  is  taken  into 
consideration  (as  it  is  in  deriving  G*),  the  benefits  derived  by  firms  may  not  cover  the 
cost  of  providing  the  additional  capital.  In  fact  it  is  quite  feasible  for  the  infrastructure 
surplus  to  be  deepening  at  the  same  time  that  its  output  elasticity  is  increasing.  For 
example,  ftom  1964  to  1974  the  optimal/actual  ratio  fell  ftom  0.99  to  0.93  while  . 6Qc* 
increased  from  0.03  to  0.06.  These  movements  are  due  to  the  complex  rnix  of  factors 
that  influence  G  *,,  G  and  - 
It  is  possible,  for  example,  that  a  decrease  in  PK,  the 138 
user  cost  Of  private  capital,  will  lead  to  an  increase  in  6,,,  * 
but  G*,,  G  will  fall  because 
the  change  in  the  actual  public  capital  stock,  G,  is  greater  than  the  PK-induced  increase 
in 
Second,  it  is  interesting  to  observe  that  for  part  of  the  period  in  which  the 
optimal/actual  ratios  were  rising  and  therefore  moving  closer  to  underprovision  (eg,. 
1959-64),  the  actual  capital  stock  was  also  growing  at  a  rapid  rate.  Similarly,  for  part 
of  the  time  that  the  ratios  were  falling  (eg,  1969  to  1974)  public  investment  was  also 
falling.  These  apparent  contradictions  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  op,  the  deviation 
of  G  from  G*,,  depends  not  just  on  the  quantity  of  infrastructure  investment  but  on  the 
level  of  economic  activity  and  the  prices  of  infrastructure  complements  and  substitutes 
(eg,  private  capital  and  labour).  For  example,  from  1959-64  the  movement  in  the 
optimal/actual  ratio  towards  a  state  of  underprovision  took  place  partly  because  of  the 
23  per  cent  increase  in  the  labour  wage  rate,  PL,  over  this  period.  This  increase  was  far 
higher  than  those  in  PGand  PK(4  per  cent  and  -8  per  cent  respectively).  If  G  and  L  are 
substitutes  and  G  and  K  are  complements  these  price  movements  would  have 
contributed  to  the  large  increase  in  G*  at  the  beginning  of  the  sample  period.  These 
relationships  will  be  explored  further  in  the  subsections  that  follow. 
Although  public  investment  fell  significantly  from  1968-82,  the  resulting  fall  in 
the  growth  rate  of  G  did  not  lead  to  a  significant  increase  in  the  G*IG  ratio.  This  is 
because  the  growth  rate  of  G*  also  slowed  significantly  over  this  period.  From  the  late 
1960s  the  user  costs  of  private  and  public  capital  increased  markedly,  fuelled  mainly  by 
increases  in  long-term  interest  rates  (see  Figure  3  ).  34  The  variables  PG  and  PKboth 
34  For  example.  the  interest  rate  on  10-ycar  Treasuries  increased  from  5.07  per  cent  in  1967  to  13.91 
per  cent  in  198  1. 139 
appear  in  te  optimal  infrastructure  equation  thus,  to  the  extent  that  K  and  G  are 
complements  and  increases  in  PG  lead  to  a  fall  in  the  demand  for  infi7astructure  (see 
Figure  4),  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  G*IG  ratio  rose  by  only  a  smaH  amount  despite  - 
the  year-on-year  declines  in  investment.  The  ratio  did  not  increase  in  the  early  1980s 
despite  the  gradual  decline  in  the  two  rental  price  measures,  however.  Although  these 
falls  led  to  an  increase  in  G*,,  the  actual  public  capital  stock,  G,  was  growing  faster  in 
this  time  period  due  to  the  large  increases  in  public  investment  that  took  place  from 
1984  onwards  (see  Table  18,  Appendix  E). 
The  slowdown  in  infrastructure  investment  during  the  1970s  and  the 
persistence  of  an  infrastructure  surplus  during  the  sample  period  must  also  be  viewed 
ag  . 
35  There  was  substantial  igainst  the  backdrop  of  events  in  the  previous  two  decades 
infrastructure  investment  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.  From  1950-68  the  core 
infrastructure  stock  (measured  in  constant  dollars)  grew  by  4.09  per  cent  per  year, 
more  than  doubling  in  size  from  $335  billion  to  $719  billion.  Thus  although 
infrastructure  investment  declined  from  1969  to  1982,  it  could  be  argued  that  sufficient 
capital  had  been  accumulated  in  previous  decades  to  support  the  level  of  economic 
activity  that  existed  in  the  1970s.  For  example,  in  1968  before  the  start  of  the 
infrastructure  investment  decline,  the  ratio  of  public  capital  to  GDP,  G1Q,  was  0.3  1;  in 
1982  after  almost  14  years  of  consecutive  declines  in  infrastructure  investment  the 
ratio  was  still  0.3  1. 
An  important  question  is  whether  the  optimal/actual  ratios  provide  valuable 
information  to  policymakers  formulating  infrastructure  spending  plans.  First  it  must 
35  See  Chapter 140 
again  be  emphasised  that  the  analysis  focuses  solely  on  the  infrastructure  benefits  (cost 
savings)  that  accrue  to  the  private  business  sector.  To  the  extent  that  the  core 
infrastructure  stock  provides  consumption  benefits,  the  optimal/actual  ratios  are 
16  potentially  understated.  Second,  the  discovery  of  an  overall  shortage  or  surplus  of 
public  capital  does  not  imply  that  the  U.  S.  Government  should  invest  in  infrastructure 
or  curtail  spending  ain-flessly.  This  is  because  the  focus  is  not  on  the  demand-side 
benefits  of  infrastructure  investment  but  on  the  supply-side  effects.  Different  types  of 
G  will  have  different  effects  on  private  production  which  would  first  have  to  be 
identified.  Then  it  would  have  to  be  established  whether  any  of  these  measures  are  in 
shortage  or  oversupplied.  This  is  the  main  reason  for  also  estimating  the  model  with 
disaggregated  infrastructure  data. 
It  must  also  be  remembered  that  infrastructure  investments  are  lumpy  and  have 
long  lives.  This  means  that  the  appearance  of  an  infrastructure  shortfall  in  any  one  year 
does  not  necessarily  justify  extra  spending  by  the  Government.  Policymakers  must  first 
be  satisfied  that  the  shortfall  is  likely  to  persist.  It  is  clear  from  the  optimal 
infrastructure  stock  equation  that  even  if  the  actual  inffastructure  stock  remains 
constant  the  optimal/actual  ratios  will  change  in  size  from  year  to  year.  For  example,  if 
the  prices  of  factors  that  are  public  capital  substitutes  or  complements  change 
significantly,  this  will  affect  the  size  of  the  optimal  infrastructure  stock.  Thus 
policymakers  have  to  be  aware  that  changing  economic  conditions  affect  the  demand 
for  infrastructure.  For  example,  in  1965  the  optimal/actual  ratio  was  0.99,  implying 
that  the  public  capital  stock  was  very  close  to  its  optimal  level.  By  1975  a  surplus  had 
appeared  -  the  optimal/actual  ratio  fell  to  0.93.  However,  this  surplus  was  generated 
36  They  are  also  understated  to  the  extent  that  the  discount  rate,  r,  used  to  calculate  P,;  is  too  high. 141 
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Figure  6.  Comparison  of  OptimallActual  Ratios, 
Pre-tax  and  Tax-adjusted  Rental  Price  Measures 
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without  significant  increases  in  infrastructure  investment  after  1965  (Table  18, 
Appendix  E).  From  1966  to  1968  there  was  some  growth  in  investment  but  from  1969 
to  1975  there  were  year-on-year  declines.  Yet  this  level  was  still  high  enough  to  cause 
a  swing  from  an  optimal  state  to  a  surplus  of  roughly  7  per  cent. 
6.3  Tax-Adjusted  Input  Prices  versus  Pre-tax  Prices 
It  is  interesting  to  compare  optimal/actual  ratios  calculated  under  different  assumptions 
concerning  the  effect  of  taxation  on  the  prices  of  labour,  private  capital  and  public 
capital.  The  ratios  are  illustrated  graphically  in  Figure  6.  The  ratios  G*IG  and 
GTax*IG  are  calculated  using  the  coefficient  estimates  from  Model  I  and  by  inserting 
the  after-tax  price  of  labour  in  (33),  the  equation  for  G*.  The  ratios  G*.  `G  are 
calculated  using  the  pre-tax  prices  of  private  and  public  capital,  the  ratios  GTax*,  G  are 
cqlcolated  using  tax-adjusted  capital  prices. 
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The  ratios  G*IG(Pre-tax  wage)  and  GTax*IG(Pre-tax  Wage)  are  calculated  using  the 
coefficient  estimates  from  Model  2  and  by  inserting  the  pre-tax  price  of  labour  into  the 
equation.  The  ratios  G*IG  (Pre-tax  wage)  are  calculated  using  the  pre-tax  prices 
of  private  and  public  capital;  the  ratios  G  Tax  *IG(  Pre-tax  wage)  are  calculated  using 
tax-adjusted  capital  prices.  While  all  four  sets  of  ratios  have  the  same  pattern  over 
time,  there  are  differences  in  the  levels  of  the  ratios.  These  differences  are  not  large 
and  do  not  alter  the  initial  finding  that  there  was  surplus  infrastructure  over  the  sample 
period.  However,  the  finding  that  G*IG  >  GTax*IG  implies  that,  once  PKis  increased 
to  take  account  of  the  fact  that  corporate  profits  are  taxed  and  PGis  increased  to  take 
account  of  the  excess  burden  of  the  tax  system,  the  desired  quantity  of  public  capital 
falls. 
64  Public  Capital:  Complement  or  Substitute? 
It  is  clear  that  Figure  6  provides  interesting  information  regarding  the  relationship 
between  private  and  public  inputs.  The  ratios  G*IG  and  G*IG(Pre-tax  wage)  both  use 
the  same  user  costs  of  capital  but  the  former  uses  the  lower  tax-adjusted  wage  rate.  It 
is  clear  that  lowering  the  wage  rate  decreases  the  desired  capital  stock  (leading  to 
smaller  optimal/actual  ratios),  implying  that  labour  and  public  capital  are  substitutes  (a 
similar  result  was  obtained  by  Berndt  and  Hansson,  1992;  Deno,  1988;  Shah,  1992). 
Similarly,  increasing  the  user  cost  of  private  capital  by  adjusting  it  for  tax,  lowers  the 
desired  amount  of  public  capital,  implying  that  public  and  private  capital  are 
complements  (the  same  result  was  obtained  by  Deno,  1988;  Conrad  and  Seitz,  1992, 
Lynde  and  Richmond,  1992,  and  Shah,  1992).  It  is  possible  to  calculate  the  elasticity 
of  G*  with  respect  to  PK  and  PL  and  therefore  measure  the  responsiveness  of  G*  with 
respect  to  changes  in  the  prices  of  private  inputs. 143 
Table  6.  Optimal  Inftastructure  Elasticities,  1959-94 
'6G*P 
6 
G*P  '6G*P  EG*P 
L  K  L  K 
1959  0.0208  -0.0231  1977  0.02147  -0.0246 
1960  0.0200  -0.0222  1978  0.02257  -0.0280 
1961  0.0193  -0.0214  1979  0.02257  -0.0269 
1962  0.0176  -0.0196  1980  0.02602  -0.0310 
1963  0.0172  -0.0192  1981  0.02858  -0.0340 
1964  0.0163  -0.0182  1982  0.02789  -0.0326 
1965  0.0154  -0.0173  1983  0.02509  -0.0291 
1966  0.0166  -0.0187  1984  0.02568  -0.0301 
1967  0.0169  -0.0190  1985  0.02356  -0.0276 
1968  0.0202  -0.0227  1986  0.02083  -0.0239 
1969  0.0222  -0.0251  1987  0.02400  -0.0272 
1970  0.0216  -0.0245  1988  0.02494  -0.0283 
1971  0.0190  -0.0215  1989  0.02430  -0.0275 
1972  0.0186  -0.0211  1990  0.02434  -0.0275 
1973  0.0194  -0.0222  1991  0.02300  -0.0259 
1974  0.0216  -0.0253  1992  0.02194  -0.0245 
1975  0.0223  -0.0258  1993  0.02053  -0.0228 
1976  0.0220  -0.0252  1994  0.02174  -0.0244 
Average  0.02156  -0.02467 
Note:  'cG*pL  andeG*p.,  are  the  elasticities  of  the  optimal  infrastructure  stock  with  respect  to  labour  and 
private  capital  respectively. 
The  computed  elasticities  are  reported  in  Table  6.  They  all  have  the  anticipated  signs, 
confirming  that  G  and  K  are  complements  and  G  and  L  are  substitutes.  37  It  is  also  clear 
that  G*  is  inelastic  with  respect  to  PKand  PL.  Taking  the  average  values 
ofeG*pL  and 
EG*PK 
.a  10  per  cent  increase  in  the  price  of  labour  leads  to  a  0.22  per  cent  increase  in 
G*  and  a  10  per  cent  increase  in  the  price  of  private  capital  leads  to  a  0.25  per  cent  fall 
in 
37  Although  substitutability  between  L  and  G  suggests  declining  employment  given  the  level  of  output 
Q.  to  the  e.  xtcnt  that  increases  in  G  induce  increases  in  0.  the  negative  effect  on  L  may  be  countered 
by  an  increase  in  output  supply. 144 
7.  Empirical  Results  -  Disaggregated  Infrastructure 
7.1  Estimation  Results 
The  study  using  aggregate  core  infrastructure  data  points  to  there  having  been  a  small 
surplus  of  infrastructure  in  terms  of  the  cost  savings  this  type  of  capital  generates  for 
private  business.  On  balance,  however,  the  infrastructure  stock  was  very  close  to 
optim  . 
An  important  question  is  whether  some  types  of  public  capital  were 
oversupplied  and  others  were  in  shortage  at  various  times  over  the  sample  period.  To 
determine  this,  the  core  infrastructure  stock  has  to  be  divided  into  its  component  parts 
(highways  and  streets,  GH,  water  and  sewers,  Gws,  and  other  structures,  Go)  and  the 
disaggregated  model,  consisting  of  equations  (28)  and  (29),  is  estimated  using  SUR. 
The  resulting  parameter  estimates  are  used  to  derive  the  optimal  infrastructure  stocks. 
Once  again  two  separate  models  are  estimated  so  that  the  effects  of  adjusting 
input  prices  for  tax  purposes  can  be  analysed-  Model  I  uses  the  tax-adjusted  wage 
rate;  Model  2  uses  pre-tax  wages.  The  estimation  results  are  reported  in  Table  7.  Most 
of  the  coefficient  estimates  are  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  5  per  cent  level 
at  least.  The  model  fits  the  data  well,  as  indicated  by  the  high  values  of  R2  and  the 
cost  and  labour  input-output  equations  do  not  suffer  from  serially  correlated, 
heteroskedastic  or  non-normally  distributed  errors.  Once  again  ADF  tests  on  the 
residuals  of  the  two  equations  lead  to  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  of  a  unit  root. 
The  ADF  test  statistic  for  the  cost  equation  of  Model  I  is  -7.69  and  the  test  statistic 
for  the  labour  input-output  equation  is  -5.53,  both  of  which  exceed  the  MacKinnon 
(1991)  critical  value  of  -4.25,  leading  to  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  at  the  I  per 
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Table  7.  Parameter  Estimates:  Disaggregated  Inftastructure  Model,  1959-94 
Paramete  Model  L  After-tax  wages  Model  2:  Pre-tax  Wages 
Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat 
a  LL  -22.48  (5.81)***  -22.08  (5.67)*** 
(5Lt  1.48  (3.87)***  1.50  (3.86)*** 
15LQ  0.02  (5.36)***  0.01  (5.21)*** 
r  IQ  0.0005  (3.69)***  0.0005  (3.67)*** 
IV  u  -0.03  (2.54)**  -0.03  (2.65)** 
),  QQ  -0.26E-05  (4.93)***  -0.25E-05  (4.80)*** 
(5LX  -10.67  (4.16)***  -10.65  (4.04)*** 
'5LGH  -5.59  (1.03)  -5.22  (0.99) 
(5LG,,  55.23  (2.38)**  57.92  (2.50)** 
(5LGO  113.35  (4.66)***  107.23  (4.79)*** 
rX  -0.40  (3.89)***  -0.39  (3.94)*** 
7  QK  0.0039  (4.26)***  0.0040  (4.16)*** 
Y  IG,  -0.27  (1.37)  -0.25  (1.27) 
rQG,,  0.002  (1.57)  0.002  (1.55) 
dy  fGwz  2.29  (2.09)**  2.44  (2.24)** 
r  QG,,  -0.018  (2.32)**  -0.019  (2.42)** 
r  IG,  3.60  (4.16)***  3.39  (4.27)*** 
r  QGO  -0.04  (6.06)***  -0.04  (6.27)*** 
r  KK  -1.52  (2.21)**  -1.57  (2.30)** 
r  G,,  G,  -15.69  (5.82)***  -15.07  (5.81)*** 
r  GzG,,  -44.18  (1.82)*  -47.11  (1.96)** 
7  GOGO  -218.92  (4.55)***  -208.53  (4.60)*** 
VG  K  -1.86  (1.66)*  -1.91  (1.75)* 
Y  Gw.  TK 
11.55  (3.04)***  11.41  (2.91)*** 
r  GOK  30.74  (3.93)***  31.15  (3.91)*** 
7  G,  6.61  (1.36)  5.42  (1.19) 
Y  GHGO  76.75  (4.71)***  74.25  (4.66)*** 
r  -118.13  (4.71)***  -116.53  (4.53)*** 
-------------  Model  I  ------------  --------------  Model  2  -------------- 
R2  DW  JB  --j  (2)  R2  DW  JB  -,  j  (2) 
c  0.9999  3.39  0.40  0.9999  3.41  0.35 
LIQ  0.9997  3.06  0.02  0.9998  3.11  0.02 
Note:  JB  =  Jarque-Bera  normality  test  statistic;  t-stats  are  computed  using  White  robust 
heteroskedastic-consistent  standard  errors.  ***  Significant  at  the  I%  level  at  least,  **  Significant  at 
the  5%  level  at  least,  *  Significant  at  the  10  %  level  at  least. 146 
Table  8.  Hypothesis  Test  Results  -  Inftastructure  Variables 
Wald  Test  Model  I  Model  2 
W  __X2(  G  18)  3262.39  3168.01 
W  H  _12  1  (7)  128.23  133.10 
wws  -x 
2  (7)  90.55  96.85 
W  0  _X2(  13)  196.48  190.06 
W  KWS  _,  X2(  13)  1871.22  1990.94 
WKO  -X 
2(  13)  493.90  507.78 
W  WS,  o  _X2(  13)  838.66  861.01 
Note:  Subscripts  denote  variables  omitted  for  test  purposes.  For  example,  Wws,  o  tests  the  exclusion  of 
the  water  and  sewer  and  other  structures  stocks,  ie,  whether  roads  are  the  only  type  of  infrastructure 
that  affect  private  sector  costs.  Degrees  of  freedom  in  parentheses. 
The  importance  of  the  various  infrastructure  variables  in  each  of  the  models  was 
established  by  carrying  out  a  series  of  Wald  tests.  The  results  are  reported  in  Table  8. 
The  statistic  WGresults  from  testing  whether  all  three  infrastructure  terms  should  be 
included  in  the  models.  The  highly  significant  chi-square  values  indicate  that 
infrastructure  as  a  whole  is  an  important  component  of  the  models.  Hypothesis  tests 
were  then  conducted  to  determine  whether  any  of  the  individual  infrastructure  stocks 
should  be  excluded.  Specifically,  WHtests  whether  the  highways  and  streets  variable 
should  be  omitted  and  Wpvs  and  Wo  test  for  the  inclusion  of  water  and  sewer  systems 
capital  and  other  structures  respectively.  All  three  tests  reject  in  favour  of  including  the 
relevant  infrastructure  variable  in  the  model.  Tests  were  also  carried  out  by  excluding 
pairs  of  infrastructure  variables.  For  example,  WKo  tests  whether  water  and  sewer 
systems  are  the  only  type  of  infrastructure  that  determines  private  costs.  The  restriction 
is  strongly  rejected.  Restrictions  on  other  pairs  of  disaggregated  infrastructure  are  also 147 
strongly  rejected.  The  conclusion  therefore  is  that  each  type  of  infrastructure  affects 
private  costs.  "  The  finding  that  Wws,  o  is  significantly  different  from  zero  is  of 
particular  interest.  This  is  the  statistic  obtained  from  testing  whether  highways  and 
streets  are  the  only  type  of  infrastructure  that  affects  private  sector  costs.  There  are 
numerous  studies  in  the  transportation  literature  that  seek  to  establish  the  importance 
of  various  measures  of  highways  and  other  roads  on  different  measures  of  economic 
development.  "  In  particular,  HoUeyman  (1996)  examines  the  relationship  between 
highways  and  manufacturing  costs  using  a  translog  specification.  However,  values  of 
the  Wws,  o  test  statistic  imply  that  omitting  the  water  and  sewer  and  other  structures 
variables  omits  important  infrastructure  effects. 
There  are  a  number  of  possible  drawbacks  to  estimating  the  cost  function 
model  using  disaggregated  infrastructure  data.  First,  degrees  of  freedom  are  quickly 
consumed  because  of  the  addition  of  cross-product  terms.  Second,  there  is  the  issue  of 
near  multicollinearity.  As  Greene  (1993)  points  out,  the  higher  the  correlation  between 
the  regressors,  the  less  precise  the  estimates  will  be.  When  the  regressors  are  highly 
correlated,  small  changes  in  the  data  can  produce wide  swings  in  the  parameter 
estimates,  and  coefficients  have  low  significance  levels  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  R2  in 
the  regression  may  be  quite  high.  The  estimated  models  do  not  suffer  from  these 
problems.  Most  of  the  coefficients  are  significant  and  alterations  to  the  data  do  not 
affect  the  estimates  substantially.  40  However,  a  joint  significance  test  on  parameter 
38  Other  restrictions  to  the  model  to  test  the  appropriateness  of  the  specification  are  also  rejected. 
These  include  constraints  on  the  "t"  parameters  and  the  fixed  effects  (both  independently  and 
grouped).  The  assumption  of  constant  returns  to  scale  is  also  strongly  rejected. 
39  See  Fisher  (1997)  for  a  survey  of  the  literature. 
40  For  example.  there  is  little  difference  between  the  parameter  estimates  of  Model  I  and  Model  2. 
Further-more,  parawcter  esilmates  that  appear  in  the  optimal  capital  stock  equations  and  that  are 
common  to  both  the  aggregate  and  disaggregated  infrastructure  models  have  the  same  signs.  I 
examined  correlations  using  detrended  infrastructure  vanables.  The  correlation  coefficient  bet-ween 
Ii  is  -0.67.  and  (Tivs  is  -0.52,  between  GII  and  Go  it  is  0.85-,  and  between  Glis  and  Go  it  i 148 
estimates  with  insignificant  t-stats,,  ie  i5LGH 
H 
=  V'GH  =  rQG  =  vG", 
ws  0,  produces  a  chi- 
square  value  that  rejects  in  favour  of  including  these  variables  in  the  models.  Thus 
there  does  appear  to  be  some  colfinearity  between  the  variables  which  will  lead  to 
increases  in  the  variance  of  the  estimated  coefficients.  it  is  important  to  Point  Out, 
however,  that  the  estimates  are  unbiased.  Furthermore,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
parameter  estimates  determine  the  level  of  the  optimal  actual  ratios  but  not  the  pattern 
of  the  ratios.  Thus,  to  the  extent  that  some  of  the  parameter  estimates  from  the 
disaggregated  infrastructure  model  have  higher  standard  errors,  leading  potentially  to 
less  accurate  measures  of  the  optimal  infrastructure  stocks,  this  has  no  effect  on  the 
analysis  of  whether  some  types  of  infrastructure  were  becoming  suboptimal  while 
others  were  moving  towards  a  state  of  excess  supply.  This  is  one  of  the  main  uses  of 
the  ratios  calculated  in  this  section. 
There  is  an  alternative  method  of  estimating  the  effect  of  individual 
infrastructure  stocks  on  private  sector  costs.  The  aggregate  infrastructure  model 
(equations  (28)  and  (29))  can  be  re-estimated  using  individually  the  stocks  of  roads, 
water  and  sewer  systems  capital  and  other  structures  capital.  In  this  way,  the  degrees 
of  freedom  are  increased  because  the  number  of  cross-product  terms  is  dramatically 
reduced.  Furthermore,  because  only  one  infrastructure  variable  is  included  in  each 
model  any  problems  caused  by  near  multicollinearity  are  remedied.  However,  this 
estimation  method  omits  the  important  cross-effects  between  infrastructure  variables. 
For  example,  using  the  estimates  from  the  models  in  Table  7,  the  optimal  infrastructure 
stocks  are  obtained  by  solving  four  equations  simultaneously- 
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The  resulting  optimal  capital  stocks  are  functions  of  the  same  private  sector  variables 
as  the  aggregate  optimal  infrastructure  stock  (ie,  PL,  PK,  and  Q)  as  well  as  the  rental 
pnces  of  each  of  the  three  different  types  of  public  capital- 
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Estimating  the  model  with  infrastructure  variables  included  one  at  a  time  ignores  the 
cross  effects  of  infrastructure  rental  prices,  which  are  important  to  the  extent  that  one 
type  of  infrastructure  may  act  as  a  complement  or  substitute  for  another  type  of  public 
capital.  The  optimal  infrastructure  stocks  and  optimal  infrastructure  elasticities  were 
computed  using  the  parameter  estimates  reported  in  Table  7.  The  results  are  reported 
in  the  subsections  that  follow. 
7.2  Output  Elasticities 
Estimates  of  the  output  elasticities  of  the  different  infrastructure  stocks  (calculated 
using  optimal  values)  are  reported  in  Table  9.  The  estimates  reveal  that  highways  and 
streets  have  the  highest  elasticity,  followed  by  water  and  sewer  structures  and  other 
structures.  The  average  values  imply  that  aI  per  cent  increase  in  the  stock  of  roads 
leads  to  an  increase  of  0.03  per  cent  in  business  output;  aI  per  cent  increase  in  water 
and  sewer  structures  leads  to  an  increase  of  approXimately  0.01  per  cent;  and  aI  per 
cent  increase  in  other  structures  capital  also  leads  to  an  increase  of  approximately  0.0  1. 
These  estimates  are  lower  than  those  obtained  in  previous  infrastructure  research.  For 
example  ,  it  was  reported  in  Chapter  I  that  Munnell  (1990b,  1993)  obtained  estimates 
of  0.12  and  0.15  for  the  output  elasticity 150 
Table  9.  Output  Elasticities:  Disaggregated  Inftastructure 
CQH* 
16QWS*  EQO*  CQH*  . 6QWS-  .6  QO* 
1959  0.017  0.004  0.002  1977  0.029  0.010  0.005 
1960  0.017  0.004  0.002  1978  0.036  0.011  0.006 
1961  0.017  0.004  0.002  1979  0.042  0.013  0.007 
1962  0.017  0.004  0.002  1980  0.049  0.015  0.008 
1963  0.018  0.005  0.002  1981  0.050  0.017  0.009 
1964  0.018  0.005  0.002  1982  0.045  0.016  0.008 
1965  0.018  0.005  0.002  1983  0.037  0.014  0.007 
1966  0.020  0.005  0.003  1984  0.039  0.014  0.008 
1967  0.020  0.006  0.003  1985  0.035  0.012  0.007 
1968  0.022  0.006  0.003  1986  0.026  0.010  0.005 
1969  0.025  0.007  0.004  1987  0.026  0.010  0.006 
1970  0.029  0.008  0.004  1988  0.026  0.010  0.006 
1971  0.025  0.008  0.004  1989  0.024  0.010  0.005 
1972  0.025  0.008  0.004  1990  0.024  0.010  0.005 
1973  0.028  0.008  0.004  1991  0.022  0.009  0.005 
1974  0.037  0.011  0.006  1992  0.019  0.008  0.005 
1975  0.036  0.011  0.006  1993  0.016  0.007  0.004 
1976  0.030  0.011  0.005  1994  0.018  0.008  0.005 
Average  0.027  0.009  0.005 
EQH*  7  eQws*  and  eQo*  are,  respectively,  the  elasticities  of  roads,  water  and  sewers  and  other  structures. 
of  WS,  implying  that  aI  per  cent  increase  in  water  and  sewer  structures  leads  to  an 
increase  of  between  0.12  and  0.15  per  cent  in  output.  Munnell  obtained  estimates  of 
0.06  and  0.04  for  the  output  elasticity  of  highways  and  streets.  These  estimates  for 
roads  are  much  closer  to  those  reported  in  Table  9.  Munnell's  estimate  of  the  output 
elasticity  of  other  infrastructure  (which  included  a  variety  of  infrastructure  measures 
not  contained  in  0)  was  found  to  have  a  negative  value. 
7.3  Complements  or  Substitutes? 
Before  illustrating  the  optimal/actual  ratios  it  is  worthwhile  analysing  the  elasticities  of 
the  optimal  infrastructure  stocks  with  respect  to  the  prices  of  private  capital  and 151 
labour.  The  results  are  reported  in  Table  10.  In  Table  6  the  elasticities  for  aggregate 
infrastructure  were  reported  and  it  was  shown  that  the  core  infrastructure  stock 
complements  private  capital  and  substitutes  for  labour.  When  the  public  capital  data  is 
disaggregated  the  findings  are  the  same:  each  of  the  infrastructure  stocks  complements 
private  capital  and  acts  as  a  labour  substitute.  The  mean  values  of  the  elasticities  imply 
that  a  10  per  cent  fall  in  the  price  of  private  capital  leads  to  an  increase  of  0.15  per  cent 
in  the  optimal  stock  of  highways,  an  increase  of  0.33  per  cent  in  the  optimal  stock  of 
water  and  sewer  capital  and  an  increase  of  0.50  per  cent  in  the  stock  of  other 
structures.  Similarly,  a  10  per  cent  increase  in  the  wage  rate  leads  to  increases  of  0.10 
per  cent,  0.33  per  cent  and  0.51  per  cent  in  the  respective  optimal  stocks.  It  is  also 
clear  that  the  elasticities  do  not  vary  much  over  the  sample  period.  From  the  figures 
reported  in  Table  10  it  can  be  seen  that 
6  1,  and  'ff*PK 
I<  1'6". 
'K 
I< 
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Of  course,  this  does  not  imply  that  a  given  change  in  the  price  of  one  of  the  private 
inputs  leads  to  a  smaller  absolute  increase  in  the  optimal  stock  of  highways  and  streets 
than  in  water  and  sewers  or  other  structures.  Flighways  and  streets  accounted  for,  on 
average,  66  per  cent  of  core  infrastructure  over  the  sample  period,  water  and  sewers 
and  other  structures  accounted  for,  on  average,  22  per  cent  and  12  per  cent 
respectively.  Weighting  the  elasticities  by  the  shares  of  the  different  infrastructure 
stocks  in  the  total  measure  of  G  allows  the  elasticities  to  be  compared  from  a  slightly 
different  perspective.  The  weighted  average  elasticities  are  also  reported  in  Table  10. 152 
Table  10.  Optimal  Inftastructure  Elasticities,  1959-1994 
c 
'ff*PK 
6 
WS*PK 
6 
O*PK  '6H*PL  EWS*P 
L 
eo*p 
L 
1959  -0.0118  -0.0277  -0.0417  0.0083  0.0271  0.0424 
1960  -0.0115  -0.0282  -0.0411  0.0082  0.0276  0.0417 
1961  -0-0111  -0.0283  -0.0404  0.0080  0.0277  0.0411 
1962  -0.0102  -0.0265  -0.0379  0.0070  0.0259  0.0386 
1963  -0.0100  -0.0262  -0.0375  0.0068  0.0257  0.0382 
1964  -0.0095  -0.0250  -0.0362  0.0065  0.0245  0.0369 
1965  -0.0090  -0.0237  -0.0347  0.0061  0.0233  0.0354 
1966  -0.0100  -0.0256  -0.0376  0.0067  0.0251  0.0383 
1967  -0.0103  -0.0263  -0.0384  0.0069  0.0258  0.0392 
1968  -0.0129  -0.0311  -0.0452  0.0089  0.0304  0.0461 
1969  -0.0148  -0.0343  -0.0497  0.0103  0.0336  0.0506 
1970  -0.0145  -0.0342  -0.0490  0.0097  0.0335  0.0499 
1971  -0.0124  -0.0303  -0.0438  0.0084  0.0297  0.0447 
1972  -0.0121  -0.0294  -0.0433  0.0082  0.0288  0.0442 
1973  -0.0131  -0.0305  -0.0456  0.0085  0.0298  0.0466 
1974  -0.0154  -0.0351  -0.0512  0.0094  0.0343  0.0524 
1975  -0.0160  -0.0366  -0.0524  0.0102  0.0357  0.0536 
1976  -0.0155  -0.0353  -0.0515  0.0105  0.0345  0.0526 
1977  -0.0151  -0.0341  -0.0506  0.0102  0.0333  0.0517 
1978  -0.0167  -0.0360  -0.0541  0.0104  0.0350  0.0554 
1979  -0.0172  -0.0367  -0.0552  0.0099  0.0357  0.0566 
1980  -0.0209  -0.0426  -0.0626  0.0124  0.0414  0.0642 
1981  -0.0238  -0.0464  -0.0740  0.0149  0.0451  0.0694 
1982  -0.0225  -0.0456  -0.0661  0.0150  0.0443  0.0677 
1983  -0.0194  -0.0406  -0.0597  0.0130  0.0396  0.0611 
1984  -0.0205  -0.0409  -0.0618  0.0132  0.0398  0.0634 
1985  -0.0186  -0.0374  -0.0574  0.0117  0.0364  0.0588 
1986  -0.0153  -0.0325  -0.0507  0.0103  0.0317  0.0518 
1987  -0.0181  -0.0364  -0.0571  0.0129  0.0356  0.0583 
1988  -0.0192  -0.0372  -0.0593  0.0137  0.0364  0.0605 
1989  -0.0186  -0.0362  -0.0579  0.0134  0.0354  0.0591 
1990  -0.0187  -0.0364  -0.0580  0.0135  0.0356  0.0592 
1991  -0.0173  -0.0348  -0.0551  0.0127  0.0341  0.0562 
1992  -0.0163  -0.0330  -0.0526  0.0122  0.0323  0.0536 
1993  -0.0150  -0.0304  -0.0495  0.0114  0.0297  0.0504 
1994  -0.0164  -0.0317  -0.0526  0.0122  0.0310  0.0536 
Average  -0.0153  -0-0334  -0.0503  0.0103  0.0326  0.0512 
Weighted  -0.0100  -0.0075  -0.0060  0.0067  0.0074  0.0061 
Note:  H.  If  S.  and  0  denote  highways  &  and  streets',  water  &  sewer  structures  and  other  structures 
respectively.  cH.  p,,  is  the  elasticity  of  the  optimal  stock  of  highways  &  streets  with  respect  to  the  price 
of  private  capital.  Weighted  averages  calculated  using  the  respective  infrastructure  shares. 153 
Figure  7.  Highways  &  Streets:  Optimal  to  Actual  Ratios,  1959-94 
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7.4  Optimal  Inftastructure  Stocks 
7.4.1  Highways  &  Streets 
The  set  of  optimal/actual  ratios  for  streets  and  highways  is  illustrated  graphically  in 
Figure  7.  The  ratios  were  calculated  using  tax-adjusted  data.  From  1959  to  1964  there 
was  a  small  shortage  of  road  capital,  as  indicated  by  ratio  values  greater  than  unity. 
From  then  until  the  end  of  the  sample  period  there  was  excess  capital.  However,  with 
an  average  ratio  value  of  0.96,  the  road  stock  was  close  to  optimal  over  the  period. 
Ignoring  the  level  of  the  ratios,  it  is  clear  that  they  have  a  sinfilar  pattern  to  those  of  the 
aggregate  core  infrastructure  stock  (see  Figure  5).  This  can  be  explained  by  the  fact 
that  roads  account  for  almost  two  thirds  of  the  aggregate  measure. 
It  is  interesting  to  observe  the  pattern  of  the  optimal/actual  ratios  in  relation  to 
the  development  of  the  U.  S.  interstate  highway  system  (Figure  8).  For  example, 
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Figure  8.  Highways  &  Streets:  OptimallActual  ratios  (R.  H.  S) 
Compared  with  Roads  Growth  Rate  (L.  H.  S),  194  7-94. 
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between  1960  and  1973  the  H*1H  ratio  fell  from  1.03  to  0.91.  The  road  surplus 
deepened  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  optimal  stock  of  roads,  H*,  was  growing  by  3.1 
per  cent  per  year  during  this  period.  This  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that,  from  the 
mid-1950s,  there  was  large-scale  investment  in  the  U.  S.  interstate  highway  system 
which  saw  the  stock  of  roads  grow  by  4.6  per  cent  per  year  between  1953  and  1969. 
In  the  period  1960-73  the  average  annual  growth  rate  was  lower  but,  at  3.9  per  cent 
per  year,  enough  to  cause  the  optimal/actual  ratio  to  fall  steadily  from  1960.  Growth  in 
H*  was  induced  mainly  by  growth  in  Q  of  3.8  per  cent  per  annum. 
Between  1974  and  1983  the  H*1H  ratio  rose  from  0.91  to  0.98.  It  is  interesting 
to  observe  that  this  trend  towards  underprovision  occurred  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  H* 
was  growing  by  only  1.3  per  cent  per  year  over  this  period.  However,  cutbacks  in 
capital  expenditure  on  roads,  following  almost  two  decades  of  rapid  expansion,  meant 
that  the  ratio's  denominator,  H,  grew  by  only  0.5  per  cent  per  year  ftom  1974.  The 155 
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Note:  HTAX*IH  and  H*IH(Pretax  wage)  are  tax-adjusted  and  pre-tax  ratios  respectively 
decline  in  the  growth  rate  of  H*  was  caused  by  a  slowdown  in  the  average  annual 
growth  rate  of  output  to  1.7  per  cent  per  year  and  a  substantial  increase  in  the  user 
costs  of  public  and  private  capital.  Although  the  price  of  labour  (a  substitute  for  roads) 
rose  by  7.0  per  cent  per  year  between  1974  and  1983,  average  annual  increases  in  the 
price  of  K  (a  complement)  and  increases  in  PH  were  9.8  per  cent  and  10.0  per  cent 
respectively.  Coupled  with  the  fact  that 
IEH*PL  I 
"ý- 
1'6H*PK  I, 
the  relative  increase  in  capital 
rental  prices  had  the  effect  of  pulling  the  growth  rate  of  H*  down.  It  is  also  interesting 
to  comment  on  the  average  level  of  the  ratios  during  the  infrastructure  slowdown. 
Although  road  investment  fell  dramatically  from  $33.5  billion  in  1968  to  $15.2  billion 
in  1982,,  this  slowdown  seems  to  have  had  little  effect  on  the  private  business  sector,  as 
illustrated  by  the  fact  that  the  optimal/actual  ratio  only  increased  by  5.4  per  cent  from 
0.93  to  0.98.  The  fact  that  street  and  highway  capital  grew  very  slowly  from  the  mid- 
1970s  until  1985  does  not  necessaffly  imean  that  roads  were  neglected.  This  slowdown 
may  have  been  a  natural  consequence  of  the  large-scale  investment  that  took  place 
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from  the  late  1950s  and  throughout  the  1960s  and  a  rational  response  to  increases  in 
PH 
Figure  9  compares  ratios  calculated  using  tax-adjusted  factor  input  prices  with 
* 
ratios  ca  culated  using  only  pre-tax  prices.  Clearly,  there  is  very  little  difference  in  the 
results.  This  can  be  explained  by  the  elasticities  reported  in  Table  10,  which  reveal  that 
the  optimal  roads  stock  is  relatively  insensitive  to  changes  in  input  prices. 
7.4.2  Water  and  Sewer  Systems 
Figure  10  compares  the  optimal  and  actual  stocks  of  water  and  sewer  systems  capital. 
The  figure  contains  two  sets  of  ratios.  The  lower  line  is  drawn  using  ratios  calculated 
with  after-tax  input  prices;  the  second  line  consists  of  ratios  computed  using  only  pre- 
tax  prices.  In  each  case  the  ratio  levels  point  to  a  surplus  of  water  and  sewer  capital 
over  the  entire  sample  period.  The  average  values  of  the  after-tax  and  pre-tax  ratios 
are  0.92  and  0.93  respectively.  Again  the  most  interesting  information  derives  from 
analysing  the  pattern  of  the  ratios.  In  1959  there  was  a  significant  surplus  of  water  and 
sewer  capital,  as  indicated  by  optimal/actual  ratios  of  0.69  and  0.70.  The  existence  of  a 
surplus  can  in  part  be  explained  by  events  after  the  Second  World  War.  The  stock  of 
water  and  sewer  systems  not  only  grew  at  a  slower  rate  from  1942-46  but  shrank  as 
depreciation  exceeded  investment  as  resources  were  channelled  from  non-military 
public  investment  into  military  investment.  From  1950  investment  in  water  and  sewer 
structures  took  off  rowing  by  4.8  per  cent  per  year  over  the  next  nine  years.  Thus  it 
19 
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Figure  10.  Water  &  Sewers:  Optimal  to  Actual  Ratios,  1959-94. 
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Note:  g,  STAX*IWS  and  WS*IWS(Pretax  wage)  are  tax-adjusted  and  pre-tax  ratios  respectively. 
a  state  of  underprovision  from  1959,  however,  with  the  surplus  having  almost  entirely 
disappeared  by  1973.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  this  trend  occurred  despite  a 
significant  increase  in  the  stocks  of  these  two  types  of  capital:  from  1959-73  the 
average  annual  growth  rate  of  WS  was  3.4  per  cent  per  year.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
desired  capital  stock  WS*  grew  by  5.8  per  cent  per  year  during  this  period,  fuelled  in 
part  by  growth  of  the  private  economy  (Q  grew  by  3.9  per  cent  per  year)  and  changes 
in  factor  prices.  Although  the  prices  of  both  labour  (a  substitute  for  WS)  and  private 
capital  (a  complement)  increased  during  this  period,  the  growth  rate  of  PL  outstripped 
that  of  capital  by  a  significant  margin  (0.9  per  cent  per  year).  With  the  elasticities  of 
WS*  with  respect  to  PL  and  PKbeing  almost  identical,  the  most  significant  effect  of  the 
input  price  changes  on  WS*  was  felt  on  the  upside.  Unlike  certain  types  of 
infrastructure,  there  is  little  evidence  of  a  slowdown  in  the  growth  of  these  types  of 
public  capital  from  the  1970s.  The  actual  stock  of  water  and  sewer  structures,  WS, 
grew  by  2.6  per  cent  per  year  between  1974  and  1994.  This  growth  was 
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Figure  11.  Other  Structures:  Optimal  Stock  Divided  by  Actual, 
1959-94. 
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sufficient  to  keep  pace  with  the  growth  of  the  private  economy  over  this  period.  In 
1974  the  ratio  of  water  and  sewer  investment  to  private  GDP  was  6.6  per  cent.  In 
1994  it  was  still  6.6  per  cent.  This  may  explain  why  there  was  little  change  in  the 
optimal/actual  ratios  from  the  early  1970s. 
7.4.3  Other  Structures 
The  optimal/actual  ratios  for  "other  structures"  capital  are  illustrated  in  Figure  11. 
Again  two  sets  are  reported-  those  computed  using  after-tax  data  (OTAX*10)  and 
those  computed  using  pre-tax  data  (O*IOPretax  wage).  Although  electric  and  gas 
facilities,  mass  transit  facilities  and  other  publicly  owned  structures  have  a  significant 
effect  upon  private  sector  costs,  these  types  of  capital  were  not  in  shortage  over  the 
sample  period.  The  average  ratios  were  0.86  and  0.92  respectively,  pointing  to  a  not 
insignificant  surplus  of  these  types  of  capital. 
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The  optimal/actual  ratios  increased  at  the  beginning  of  the  sample  period,  for  the  same 
reason  that  the  WS*IWS  ratios  increased:  although  the  actual  stock  of  other  structures 
was  growing,  the  desired  stock,  0*,  grew  at  a  faster  rate,  fuelled  by  increases  in  the 
price  o  labour  relative  to  capital  and  increases  in  private  output.  Since  1982  the 
optimal  stock  has  been  growing  at  a  faster  rate  than  the  actual  stock  and,  as  a  result, 
the  optimal/actual  ratio  has  gradually  risen  from  0.85  to  0.92  in  1994.  Although  the 
actual  stock  of  other  structures,  0,  grew  by  2.2  per  cent  per  year,  the  desired  capital 
stock  grew  by  2.8  per  cent  per  year  due  to  a  significant  decrease  in  the  prices  of  capital 
relative  to  labour  (eg,  PL  grew  2.9  per  cent  per  year,  PK  declined  by  0.7  per  cent  per 
year  between  1982  and  1994). 
7.4.4  Summary  of  Results 
The  stocks  of  roads,  water  and  sewer  systems  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  other  structures 
were,  on  average,  all  close  to  optimal  over  the  sample  period.  However,  there  is  quite 
a  lot  of  variation  in  the  patterns  of  the  ratios  (Figure  12).  In  particular  ,  it  is  clear  that  at 
the  beginning  of  the  sample  period  the  optimal/actual  ratios  for  roads  were  moving  in 
the  opposite  direction  to  those  of  water  and  sewer  structures  and  other  structures.  This 
can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  H  was  growing  at  a  rapid  rate  as  the  interstate 
highway  system  was  under  construction.  However,  as  the  previous  discussion  made 
clear,  it  is  not  just  changes  in  ratio  denominators  (the  actual  growth  rates  of  the 
different  types  of  infrastructure)  that  explain  variations  in  the  ratios.  The  optimal 
infrastructure  elasticities  reveal  that  some  types  of  capital  are  more  responsive  to 
factor  price  changes  than  others.  For  example,  the  elasticities  for  other  structures  are 
between  three  and  five  times  higher  than  the  elasticities  for  highways  and 160 
Figure  12.  Comparison  of  OptimallActual  Ratios:  Roads, 
Water  &  Sewer  Systems  and  Other  Structures 
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streets.  This  partly  explains  why  the  40  per  cent  decline  in  the  price  of  private  capital 
relative  to  the  price  of  labour  induced  a  bigger  increase  in  0*  than  in  H*  or  WS*, 
leading  to  a  rise  in  0*/0  between  1981  and  1994. 
In  Chapter  2  the  "infrastructure  slowdown"  was  highlighted.  From  1969  to 
1982  annual  investment  in  public  infrastructure  fell  from  $109  billion  to  $77  billion  and 
only  returned  to  1969  levels  at  the  end  of  the  1980s.  As  a  result,  all  the  infrastructure 
stocks  grew  at  slower  rates  from  the  early  1970s  than  in  the  previous  two  decades. 
Many  researchers  believe  that  this  infrastructure  slowdown  had  a  significant  effect 
upon  private  production.  However,  it  appears  from  the  results  reported  in  the 
preceding  subsections  that  the  private  sector  would  not  have  benefited  much  from 
increases  in  total  G  or  any  of  its  components.  Examining  this  issue  further,  the  first 
part  of  Table  II  lists  the  annual  growth  rates  of  the  various  components  of  the  core 
infrastructure  stock  over  the  sample  period.  The  sample  has  been  divided  into  two 
parts:  the  first  is  a  period  of  rapid  growth  in  the 
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Table  II-  Comparison  ofInftastructure  Growth  Rates  and  Optimal,  Actual  Ratios 
1959-72  1973-94 
Growth  in  Public  Cgpital  Stock(%  p.  a.  ) 
Highways  &  Streets  4.04  0.84 
Water  &  Sewers  3.50  2.64 
Other  Structures  5.30  2.69 
Optimal/Actual  Ratios  (averages) 
I-Eghways  &  Streets  0.97  0.95 
Water  &  Sewers  0.87  0.94 
Other  Structures  0.84  0.88 
Note:  (1)  During  each  of  the  years  1959-1972  the  growth  rate  of  core  infrastructure  was  above  average;  from 
1973-1994  it  was  below  average.  (2)  Optixnal/actual  ratios  are  averages. 
infrastructure  stock;  the  second  is  a  period  of  slow  growth.  The  second  part  of  the 
table  contains  average  optimal/actual  ratios  for  the  different  types  of  infrastructure 
over  the  same  time  periods.  Each  type  of  infrastructure  grew  rapidly  from  1959-72  and 
each  grew  at  a  slower  rate  from  1973-94.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  the  slowdown 
was  particularly  marked  in  the  case  of  highways  and  streets.  The  growth  rate  of  other 
structures  almost  halved  and  the  growth  rate  of  water  and  sewer  structures  fell  by  over 
25  per  cent.  If  the  different  types  of  infrastructure  had  continued  to  grow  at  their 
1959-72  rates,  by  1994  the  stock  of  roads  would  have  been  98  per  cent  higher  than  it 
actually  was;  the  stock  of  water  and  sewers  capital  would  have  been  20  per  cent  higher 
and  the  stock  of  other  structures  would  have  been  74  per  cent  higher.  The  crucial 
question  is  whether  the  private  business  sector  would  have  benefited  from  extra 
infrastructure.  In  terms  of  the  optimal/actual  ratios  the  conclusion  is  that  the  private 
business  sector  would  not  have  benefited.  Looking  at  the  average  optimal/actual  ratios 
reported  in  Table  II  and  ignoring  the  values  of  the  ratios  whether  they  are 162 
numbers  greater  than  or  less  than  unity)  and  concentrating  instead  on  the  extent  to 
which  they  change  between  the  two  periods,  it  is  clear  that  the  infrastructure 
slowdown  did  not  have  a  significant  effect  on  private  business  sector  costs.  The 
average  ratio  for  highways  and  streets  hardly  moved  between  time  periods  (in  fact  it 
decreased),  implying  that  once  the  interstate  highway  system  was  completed  there  was 
no  need  to  increase  the  stock  of  roads  by  4  per  cent  a  year.  Although  the  growth  rate 
of  water  and  sewer  systems  slowed  by  almost  one  percentage  point  for  20  years,  this 
led  to  an  increase  of  only  8  per  cent  in  the  optimal/actual  ratio.  Furthermore,  the  level 
of  the  ratios  implies  that  the  stocks  of  these  types  of  capital  remained  close  to  optimal 
after  1973.  Finally,  despite  the  fact  that  the  growth  rate  of  this  type  of  capital  fell  by  50 
per  cent  between  1973  and  1994  there  was  only  a5  per  cent  increase  in  the 
optimal/actual  ratio.  Furthermore,  to  the  extent  that  faith  can  be  placed  in  the  levels  of 
the  ratios,  the  increase  in  the  optimal/actual  ratio  was  not  large  enough  to  justify  extra 
spending  on  other  structures:  the  average  level  of  the  ratios  points  to  the  existence  of  a 
not  insignIficant  surplus. 
Finally,  it  is  worth  commenting  on  the  comparability  of  the  results  from  the 
aggregate  and  disaggregated  infrastructure  models.  The  weighted  average  of  the 
disaggregated  optimal/actual  ratios  can  be  compared  with  those  derived  from  the 
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aggregate  infrastructure  model  . 
Obviously  the  two  sets  are  not  identical  because  the 
relevant  optimal  equations  contain  a  number  of  different  variables  and  parameter 
estimates.  However,  the  two  sets  are  similar  in  a  number  of  respects.  The  simple 
correlation  coefficient  between  the  two  sets  has  a  value  of  0.93,  which  is  very  high 
considering  the  relevant  variables  are  ratios.  The  average  ratios  are  also  of  a  siniilar 
1  The  disaggrcgatcd  optimal/actual  ratios  are  weighted  by  their  respective  infrastructure  shares. 163 
magnitu  e:  0.94  for  the  disaggregated  model  compared  with  0.96  for  the  aggregate 
infrastructure  model.  I  also  carried  out  a  likelihood  ratio  test  to  select  between  the 
restricted  (aggregate)  and  unrestricted  (disaggregated)  models.  "  The  resulting  chi- 
square  value  of  37.3  (13  degrees  of  freedom)  rejects  in  favour  of  the  disaggregated 
model. 
8.  Private  Capital 
Although  the  focus  is  on  calculating  optimal  infrastructure  stocks,  the  optimal  stock  of 
private  capital  was  also  calculated  for  comparative  purposes  . 
4'  Figure  13  graphically 
illustrates  the  optimal/actual  ratios  for  private  capital.  One  set  uses  after-tax  measures, 
the  other  uses  pre-tax  measures.  The  average  optimal/actual  ratios  are  0.73  and  0.79 
respectively.  These  ratios  provide  some  guidance  as  to  whether  faith  should  be  placed 
in  the  levels  of  the  optimal/actual  infrastructure  ratios.  To  the  extent  that  firms  are  cost 
minimisers  one  would  expect  the  private  sector  in  the  long  run  to  attempt  to 
accumulate  capital  up  to  the  point  where  K=K*.  In  the  short  run  the  two  measures 
may  not  be  equal  due  to  specific  failures  in  the  market  mechanism.  It  may  be  that  Ke 
K*  not  because  individual  firms  in  the  economy  do  not  make  efficient  use  of  their 
labour  and  capital  but  because  the  allocation  of  labour  or  of  capital  among  firms  or 
sectors  is  not  efficient.  An  external  shock  to  the  economy  may  alter  the  relative 
profitabilitY  of  labour  or  capital  used  in  different 
. 12  See  Enders  (1995).  pp.  312-315  for  a  description  of  this  test. 
43  To  dcrive  the  optimal  private  capital  stocks.  parameter  estimates  from  the  disaggregated 
infrastructure  model  were  inserted  into  the  K*  equation. 164 
Figure  13.  Ratio  of  Optimal  to  Actual  Private  Capital  Stock,  1959-94. 
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Note:  KTAX*/K  and  K*/K(Pretax  wage)  are  tax-adjusted  and  pre-tax  ratios  respectively 
activities  but  the  adjustment  process  in  terms  of  which  labour  and  capital  are 
reallocated  to  achieve  aggregate  efficiency  may  fail  to  take  place  because  of 
institutional  or  marketplace  price  rigidities.  It  is  also  likely  that  K  -;  eK*  in  the  short  run 
because  investment  in  many  types  of  private  capital  is  lumpy.  Nevertheless,  in  the  long- 
run,  one  would  expect  the  private  capital  stock  to  be  close  to  optimal. 
The  fact  that  there  was  surplus  private  capital  throughout  the  sample  period 
may  be  due  to  a  number  of  factors,  eg,  mismeasurement  of  input  prices  (in  particular 
those  of  private  and  public  capital)  or  estimation  issues.  Adjusting  variables  for  tax 
purposes  clearly  has  little  effect  on  the  outcome.  Regardless  of  whether  the  ratio  levels 
provide  reliable  information,  it  is  still  possible  to  glean  interesting  insights  by  analysing 
the  pattern  of  the  optimal/actual  ratios  and  by  examining  the  effect  of  changes  in 
various  private  economic  measures  on  the  optimal 165 
Figure  14.  Comparison  of  the  Relative  Price  of  Private  Capital  (RHS) 
with  the  OptimallActual  Private  Capital  Ratio  (LHS),  1959-94. 
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infrastructure  stocks,,  both  of  which  form  the  backbone  of  the  analysis  in  preceding 
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sections.  The  pattern of  the  private  capital  optimal/actual  ratios  is  also  worthy  of 
further  examination.  If  the  relative  price  of  private  capital  is  defined  as  PKIPL,  the  price 
of  capital  divided  by  the  labour  wage  rate,  then  one  would  expect  an  increase  in  the 
private  capital  optimal/actual  ratio  (signalling  the  need  to  accumulate  capital  at  the 
expense  of  labour)  if  there  were  a  decrease  in  the  relative  price  of  capital.  It  is  clear 
from  Figure  14  that  this  inverse  relationship  between  K*1K  and  PKIPL  existed 
throughout  the  sample  period.  The  relative  price  of  capital  declined  until  1965  as 
hourly  wages  rose  from  $0.97  to  $1.28  and  the  user  cost  of  capital  declined  by  7.3  per 
cent  (see  Table  15  in  Appendix  Q.  This  led  to  an  increase  in  the  private  capital 
optimal/actual  ratio.  The  trend  in  the  relative  price  of  capital  was  upwards  from  1965 
44  Note  that  the  finding  that  the  optimal/actual  ratios  for  G  have  a  value  closer  to  unity  than  those  for 
K  does  not  imply  that  the  public  sector  is  better  at  allocating  resources  thaa  +he  private  sector.  It  has 
already  been  stated  that  the  optimal  infrastructure  stock  ignores  benefits  accruing  to  private 
consumers  and  is  possibly  understated  to  the  extent  that  the  estimates  of  PG  are  too  low.  If  these 
factors  were  taken  into  consideration  the  finding  may  be  that  the  relative  divergence  of  G  from  G*  Is 
greater  than  the  divergence  of  K  from  K*. 166 
to  1981.  Although  wages  were  rising  by  6.8  per  cent  per  year  on  average,  the  user  cost 
of  capital  was  rising  at  an  even  faster  rate,  fuelled  by  a  tripling  in  interest  rates  between 
45  1965  and  1981.  As  a  result  the  optimal/actual  ratio  fell  from  0.86  to  0.64  in  1981. 
From  the  early  1980s  the  relative  price  of  private  capital  fell  by  39  per  cent  because  of 
reductions  in  the  user  cost  of  capital,  coupled  with  wage  growth  of  approximately  3 
per  cent  per  year.  This  led  to  a  49  per  cent  rise  in  K*  between  1981  and  1994. 
However,  this  did  not  lead  to  a  dramatic  increase  in  the  optimal/actual  ratio  after  1981 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  actual  capital  stock,  K,  was  growing  by  almost  3  per  cent  per 
year 
9.  Conclusion 
In  this  chapter  the  cost  function  approach  has  been  used  to  calculate  the  optimal 
quantity  of  core  infrastructure  in  the  U.  S.,  where  optimality  is  expressed  in  terms  of 
cost  savings  enjoyed  by  the  private  business  sector.  The  motivation  for  calculating 
optimal  stocks  is  to  compare  the  marginal  benefit  of  infrastructure  investment  with  the 
marginal  cost  of  this  investment.  The  finding  that  infrastructure  has  a  significant  effect 
on  private  costs  does  not  necessarily  justify  extra  public  investment.  The  derivation  of 
the  optimal  infrastructure  stock,  G*,  reveals  that  the  optimal  quantity  of  public  capital 
depends  on  a  number  of  variables-  the  prices  of  private  factor  inputs,  the  level  of 
output  and  public  capital's  own  user  cost,  PG.  Thus  the  level  of  public  investment  must 
not  be  examined  in  isolation  but  in  the  context  of  changes  to  variables  that  determine 
the  optimal  level  of  infrastructure.  Following  Morrison  (1988),  Morrison  and  Schwartz 
45  As  measured  by  Moody's  Aaa  rate. 167 
(1997)  and  Seitz  (1994),  a  two-equation  model  based  on  the  Generalised  Leontief  cost 
function  was  estimated  and  the  parameter  estimates  were  inserted  into  the  optimal 
capital  stock  equations.  A  similar  approach  was  followed  by  Berndt  and  Hansson 
(1992)  using  data  for  the  Swedish  private  business  sector. 
The  output  elasticities  of  G  and  K  (evaluated  where  G=  G*  and  K=  K*) 
reveal  that  infrastructure  has  a  positive  but  small  elasticity  compared  with  previous 
estimates  obtained  by  infrastructure  researchers  and  compared  with  private  capital. 
Estimates  of  the  optimal  infrastructure  elasticities  reveal  that  G  and  K  are  complements 
and  G  and  L  are  substitutes.  The  ratios  of  the  optimal  core  infrastructure  stock  to  the 
actual  infrastructure  stock  reveal  that,  despite  the  slowdown  in  the  growth  of  the 
public  capital  stock  from  the  early  1970s,  a  shortage  of  infrastructure  capital  never 
developed.  The  user  cost  of  private  capital  increased  substantially  from  the  early  1970s 
and,  because  G  and  K  are  complements,  the  slow  growth  in  G  was  coupled  with  slow 
growth  in  G*.  It  was  also  illustrated  that  the  different  ways  of  treating  the  input  prices 
of  public  and  private  capital  and  labour  for  tax  purposes  has  an  effect  on  the  levels  of 
the  optimal/actual  ratios  but  does  not  alter  any  of  the  findings  significantly. 
The  next  step  was  to  disaggregate  the  core  infrastructure  variable  and  compute 
the  optimal  quantity  of  highways  and  streets,  water  and  sewer  systems  and  other 
structures.  The  motivation  for  calculating  the  optimal  quantity  of  each  type  of 
infrastructure  is  that  if  there  is,  for  example,  a  surplus  of  core  infrastructure  this  does 
not  justify  cutting  back  on  public  investment.  Some  of  the  individual  infrastructure 
stocks  may  be  oversupplied  while  others  are  in  shortage.  Furthermore,  some  types  of 
infrastructure  may  be  moving  towards  a  state  of  underprovision  while  the  surplus  of 
others  may  be  deepening.  It  is  precisely  this  diversity  that  is  uncovered  when  the 
optimal  infrastructure  stocks  are  calculated.  There  are  also  a  number  of  similarities 168 
between  the  different  components  of  core  infrastructure.  Each  type  of  capital  has  a 
significant  effect  on  private  sector  costs  and  each  has  a  positive,  though  small,  output 
elasticity.  The  highest  elasticity  is  0.027  for  roads  followed  by  0.009  for  water  and 
- 
sewer  systems  and  0.005  for  other  structures.  None  of  the  individual  stocks  was 
undersupplied  on  average  over  the  sample  period.  The  average  optimal/actual  ratio  for 
roads  was  0.96;  the  average  ratio  for  water  and  sewers  was  0.92  and  the  average  ratio 
for  other  structures  was  0.86.  Each  type  of  infrastructure  complements  private  capital 
and  substitutes  for  labour. 
The  optimal  infrastructure  equation  (11)  provides  some  insights  into  the 
appropriate  policy  response  to  a  finding  that  G*  G.  It  is  clear  that  G*  can  vary 
without  any  change  in  public  investment.  Thus  before  the  public  investment  policy  is 
altered  to  address  any  shortfall  or  surplus  of  G,  policymakers  must  ensure  that  the 
change  in  the  variable(s)  responsible  for  causing  G*  to  increase  or  decrease  will  not  be 
reversed.  This  is  especially  important  given  that  infrastructure  investments  are  lumpy 
and  long  lived. 
Estimates  of  the  private  capital  stock  indicate  that  there  was  a  significant 
surplus  of  this  type  of  capital  over  the  sample  penod.  To  the  extent  that  the 
optimal/actual  ratio  for  private  capital  should,  in  the  long  run,  be  close  to  unity,  it  may 
be  argued  that  too  much  faith  should  not  be  placed  in  the  levels  of  the  optimal/actual 
ratios  for  the  different  types  of  infrastructure.  However,  the  patterns  (whether  G,  H, 
WS  and  0  are  moving  closer  to  or  further  away  from  G*,  H*,  WS*  and  0*  )  do 
provide  interesting  information.  Some  types  of  infrastructure  are  more  sensitive  to 
changes  in  private  economic  variables  than  others.  This,  coupled  with  the  fact  that 
there  were  significant  variations  in  the  growth  rates  of  the  actual  infrastructure  stocks 
over  the  sample  period,  ensured  that  the  optimal/actual  ratios  moved  in  different 169 
directions  at  different  times.  Variations  in  the  K*1K  ratio  can  be  explained  by  the  cost 
of  private  capital  relative  to  labour-  the  lower  the  relative  cost  of  capital,  PKIPL,  the 
higher  the  desired  capital  stock. 
While  the  results  obtained  in  this  chapter  provide  interesting  insights  into  public 
capital's  role  in  production  there  are  a  number  of  issues  that  have  to  be  addressed  in 
future  research.  For  example,  the  focus  on  value-added  inputs  ignores  changes  in 
labour  composition  and  energy  price  responses.  46This  omission  can  be  explained  partly 
by  data  availability  and  partly  by  the  need  to  preserve  degrees  of  freedom  in  the 
estimated  models.  This  problem  could  be  overcome  using  data  for  a  set  of 
manufacturing  industries.  The  focus  on  the  total  private  business  sector  is  justified  on 
the  grounds  that  sectors  other  than  manufacturing  are  likely  to  benefit  from 
inf-rastructure  investment.  Furthermore,  in  calculating  the  optimal  quantity  of  an 
aggregate  national  measure  such  as  G  with  respect  to  the  cost  savings  generated  for  zn 
only  one  sector,  it  would  not  be  surprising  to  find  that  there  is  an  infrastructure 
surplus.  Nevertheless  given  the  availability  of  a  wider  set  of  data  on  the  various  inputs 
and  the  advantages  of  using  gross  data  rather  than  value-added  data,  it  may  be 
worthwhile  conducting  a  similar  analysis  using  data  for  the  manufacturing  sector. 
The  rental  price  of  public  capital,  PG,  is  an  important  variable  in  the  analysis. 
Substantial  care  was  taken  in  constructing  this  measure:  the  economic  depreciation 
rates  are  asset  specific  and  the  discount  rate  reflects  the  lower  opportunity  cost  of 
public  sector  funds.  Optimal  stocks  were  calculated  using  measures  of  PGwith  and 
without  adjustment  for  the 
46  This  point  is  emphasised  by  Lynde  and  Richmond  (1993a)  who  incorporate  intcrmediate  price 
effects  in  their  analysis  of  the  slowdown  in  U.  S.  labour  productivity  growth. 170 
excess  burden  of  the  tax  system.  Nevertheless  it  could  be  argued  that  more  research  is 
required  into  constructing  measures  of  the  marginal  cost  of  public  capital  which  take 
fuller  account  of  social  preferences. 
Finally,  a  criticism  of  most  cost  function  studies  is  that  the  shadow  value  of 
infrastructure,  -6Cvlc'G,  does  not  take  account  of  the  fact  that  the  benefits  in  the  first 
year  after  the  investment  may  not  be  representative  of  the  annual  benefits  over  the  life 
of  the  investment.  For  example,  it  may  take  time  for  firms  to  adjust  their  mix  of  inputs 
and  other  aspects  of  the  production  process  in  response  to  changes  in  the  public 
investment  policy  and  it  is  possible  that  they  do  not  take  full  advantage  of  such 
investments  in  the  first  year.  Larger  cost  savings  may  only  be  realised  several  years 
after  the  investments  take  place.  The  time  lag  between  new  investment  taking  place 
and  the  realisation  of  benefits  by  the  private  sector  provides  scope  for  further  research. 
This  issue  will  be  mentioned  again  in  Chapter  4. 171 
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Appendix  A 
Data  Sources 
Private  and  Public  Capital  Data 
Data  for  the  separate  components  of  the  private  and  public  capital  stocks  was  obtained 
from  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis'  (BEA)  diskettes:  Fixed  Reproducible 
Tangible  Wealth  in  the  United  States  1925-1994.  All  stock  measures  are  net  of 
economic  depreciation.  The  private  capital  data  excludes  residential  capital.  To 
calculate  investment  deflators  for  use  in  the  rental  price  measures,  current  dollar  stocks 
were  divided  by  constant  dollar  stocks  (measured  in  1987  dollars).  The  BEA  also 
provides  econon-fic  depreciation  totals  for  each  type  of  capital  and  these  were  used  to 
calculate  the  economic  depreciation  rates. 
Value-added  Output 
This  data  was  obtained  from  the  Economic  Report  of  the  President.  It  includes  only 
the  output  of  the  private  business  sector  (excluding  farms)  and  is  measured  in  1987 
dollars.  Data  on  hours  was  obtained  from  the  same  source. 
Wages,  Interest  Rates 
The  wage  rate  in  the  non-farm  private  business  sector,  PL,  was  obtained  from  the 
Economic  Report  of  the  President.  Following  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  (1994),  it  was 
multiplied  by  one  minus  the  corporate  income  tax  rate  to  convert  it  into  an  after-tax 
measure.  The  interest  rate  on  ten-year  treasuries  (used  to  calculate  the  user  cost  of 
public  capital)  and  Moody's  Aaa  ten-year  rate  (used  to  calculate  the  user  cost  of 
private  capital)  were  also  obtained  from  the  Economic  Report  of  the  President. 
Corporate  Taxation  Data 
The  data  used  to  calculate  the  after-tax  user  cost  of  private  capital  comes  from  the 
same  sources  as  that  used  by  Nadin  and  Mamuneas  (1994).  Data  on  the  corporate 
income  tax  rate  was  obtained  from  Auerbach  (1983)  and  Jorgenson  and  Sullivan 
(1981).  Following  Nadifi  and  Mamuneas  (1994),  after  1983  the  corporate  tax  rate  is 
taken  to  be  0.46,  the  constant  rate  over  1979-1982.  The  investment  tax  credit  until 
1980  is  taken  from  Jorgenson  and  Sullivan  (1981);  for  1981  8  per  cent  is  used  and  for 
1982  to  1986  a  rate  of  7.5  per  cent  is  used.  Data  on  capital  consumption  allowances 
was  obtained  from  the  Economic  Report  qf  the  President. 176 
Appendix  B 
Comparison  of  Capital  Aggregation  Methods 
In  Section  3  the  construction  of  aggregate  measures  of  public  and  private  capital  using 
Divisia  aggregation  is  discussed.  In  Table  12  the  stock  of  core  calculated  from  an 
unweighted  summation  of  its  components  is  compared  with  the  stock  of  core 
calculated  by  Divisia  aggregation.  Dividing  the  latter  by  the  former  results  in  what 
Jorgenson  and  Griliches  (1967)  refer  to  as  the  average  quality  of  capital. 
Two  points  are  worth  noting.  First,  the  two  stocks  of  capital  were  almost 
identical  at  the  beginning  of  the  sample  period.  In  fact  the  difference  is  a  mere  $124 
million.  Secondly,,  there  has  been  virtually  no  change  in  the  average  quality  of  capital 
over  time.  This  is  not  what  one  would  expect  at  first  glance  because  the  composition 
of  the  core  infrastructure  stock  has  changed  significantly  over  the  sample  period.  In 
1959  the  stock  of  roads  accounted  for  69  per  cent  of  the  core  infrastructure  stock;  by 
1994  it  accounted  for  60  per  cent.  Predictably,  the  share  of  the  remaining  components 
has  increased.  The  sewers'  percentage  has  increased  from  12  per  cent  to  16  per  cent, 
the  water  percentage  from  9.4  to  9.8  per  cent;  and  other  structures  from  9  per  cent  to 
14  per  cent. 
The  reason  there  has  been  no  change  in  the  average  quality  of  core  capital  is 
that  most  of  its  components  have  the  same  length  of  life  (ie,  the  same  depreciation 
rates  and  hence  the  same  prices  and  marginal  productivities).  In  Table  13  the  average 
quality  of  the  private  capital  stock  is  calculated.  It  is  clear  that  the  average  quality  of 
private  capital  has  increased  over  time,  rising  from  0.93  in  1959  to  1.01  in  1994.  This 
reflects  the  fact  that  the  weighted-average  depreciation  rate  of  private  capital  has 
increased  gradually  over  time,,  reflecting  a  slight  shift  to  shorter-lived  (more 
productive)  assets. 177 
Table  12.  Comparison  of  Core  Inftastructure  Stocks:  Unweighted  Summation 
and  Divisia  Aggregation,  1959-94  (millions  of  198  7  dollars) 
(1)  (2)  (2)/(1) 
Date  Unweighted  Divisia  Average 
Summation  Aggregation  Quality 
59  468364  468488  1.0002 
60  490379  490338  0.9999 
61  514240  514042  0.9996 
62  539105  538667  0.9991 
63  566643  566139  0.9991 
64  595458  594931  0.9991 
65  625241  624831  0.9993 
66  655787  655396  0.9994 
67  685944  685820  0.9998 
68  718971  719063  1.0001 
69  746926  747250  1.0004 
70  772364  772839  1.0006 
71  795481  796005  1.0007 
72  816555  817185  1.0008 
73  835739  836484  1.0009 
74  854149  854699  1.0006 
75  870554  870789  1.0003 
76  886548  886955  1.0005 
77  899942  900698  1.0008 
78  911551  912368  1.0008 
79  923917  924325  1.0004 
80  935293  935059  0.9997 
81  945828  945275  0.9994 
82  955610  955154  0.9995 
83  964943  964707  0.9997 
84  975413  975302  0.9998 
85  989300  989290  0.9999 
86  1003545  1003530  0.9999 
87  1020817  1020817  1.0000 
88  1036012  1035933  0.9999 
89  1051600  1051525  0.9999 
90  1069562  1069480  0.9999 
91  1089087  1089010  0.9999 
92  1108708  1108716  1.0000 
93  1131093  1131324  1.0002 
94  1154682  1155064  1.0003 178 
Table  13.  Comparison  of  Private  Capital  Stocks:  Unweighted  Summation 
and  Divisia  Aggregation,  1959-94  (millions  of  198  7  dollars) 
Date  (1)  (2)  (2)/(1) 
Unweighted  Divisia  Average 
Summation  Aggregation  Quality 
59  1435368  1328974  0.9258 
60  1482360  1371622  0.9252 
61  1525999  1409320  0.9235 
62  1577726  1456945  0.9234 
63  1630569  1507307  0,9244 
64  1700296  1575388  0.9265 
65  1798061  1671679  0.9297 
66  1909431  1785207  0.9349 
67  2007885  1884004  0.9383 
68  2110868  1991646  0.9435 
69  2222308  2108231  0.9486 
70  2317864  2203560  0.9506 
71  2402373  2287325  0.9521 
72  2495899  2384049  0.9551 
73  2619173  2516157  0.9606 
74  2732005  2633671  0.9640 
75  2801513  2705511  0.9657 
76  2867289  2777423  0.9686 
77  2956523  2876981  0.9730 
78  3080649  3017671  0.9795 
79  3228687  3183854  0.9861 
80  3363903  3328005  0.9893 
81  3502157  3475714  0.9924 
82  3605328  3582688  0.9937 
83  3687820  3672113  0.9957 
84  3824699  3820636  0.9989 
85  3985629  3983704  0.9995 
86  4110354  4111516  1.0002 
87  4213285  4213285  1.0000 
88  4324264  4328943  1.0010 
89  4439731  4447983  1.0018 
90  4543085  4547630  1.0010 
91  4602904  4606550  1.0007 
92  4655956  4664140  1.0017 
93  4760779  4788893  1.0059 
94  4924247  4984440  1.0122 179 
Table  14.  Comparison  of  Different  Private  Capital  Stock  Aggregation  Methods 
------  Growth  Rates  ------ 
(1)  (2) 
Time  span  Divisia  Direct  Composition 
aggregation  aggregation  effect:  (l)-(2) 
1959-1994  3.7  3.5  0.2 
1959-1969  4.3  4.1  0.2 
1970-1979  3.7  3.4  0.3 
1980-1989  2.9  2.8  0.1 
1990-1994  1.9  1.6  0.3 
In  Table  2  the  two  capital  stock  aggregation  methods  were  compared.  The  figures 
were  taken  from  Harper  et  aL  (1995).  An  updated  version  of  this  table  is  reproduced  in 
Table  14.  It  is  clear  that  the  effect  of  Divisia  aggregation  is  felt  more  in  some  periods 
than  others.  This  reflects  the  fact  that  the  weighted-average  depreciation  rate  of  private 
capital  has  increased  gradually  over  time,  reflecting  a  slight  shift  to  shorter-lived  (more 
productive)  assets. 
Over  the  entire  sample  period  the  Divisia  index  of  private  capital  grew  0.2  per 
cent  per  year  faster  than  the  aggregate  capital  stock  calculated  in  the  usual  way. 
Although  small  in  absolute  terms,  over  the  36-year  sample  period  this  translates  into  7 
per  cent  more  capital. 180 
Appendix  C 
Rental  Prices  of  Private  and  Public  Capital 
Table  15.  Estimates  of  the  Prices  of  Private  and  Public  Capital,  1959-94 
PK  PK(TWC)  PG  PG(TaX)  PH  PWS  PO  PH(TWC)  PWS(TWC)  Po(Two 
1959  0.0357  0.0492  0.0164  0.0240  0.0156  0.0168  0.0177  0.0228  0.0246  0.0259 
1960  0.0357  0.0486  0.0159  0.0232  0.0151  0.0165  0.0173  0.0220  0.0241  0.0253 
1961  0.0356  0,0477  0.0155  0.0226  0.0146  0.0161  0.0170  0.0214  0.0235  0.0248 
1962  0.0358  0.0447  0.0162  0.0236  0.0154  0.0164  0.0176  0.0225  0.0240  0.0257 
1963  0.0359  0.0445  0.0166  0.0242  0.0159  0.0167  0.0180  0.0232  0.0244  0.0263 
1964  0.0368  0.0449  0.0172  0.0250  0.0164  0.0172  0.0187  0.0239  0.0252  0.0274 
1965  0.0378  0.0454  0.0180  0.0263  0.0173  0.0180  0.0190  0.0253  0.0262  0.0277 
1966  0.0412  0.0511  0.0207  0.0301  0.0201  0.0202  0.0223  0.0293  0.0295  0.0325 
1967  0.0438  0.0544  0.0219  0.0320  0.0215  0.0211  0.0236  0.0313  0.0309  0.0345 
1968  0.0481  0.0634  0.0247  0.0360  0.0241  0.0240  0.0265  0.0352  0.0351  0.0388 
1969  0.0531  0.0755  0.0297  0.0433  0.0292  0.0284  0.0318  0.0426  0.0415  0.0464 
1970  0.0597  0.0845  0.0352  0.0514  0.0351  0.0329  0.0370  0.0512  0.0481  0.0540 
1971  0.0606  0.0793  0.0331  0.0483  0.0323  0.0327  0.0351  0.0472  0.0478  0.0512 
1972  0.0635  0.0820  0.0353  0.0515  0.0344  0.0352  0.0373  0.0502  0.0514  0.0545 
1973  0.0693  0.0913  0.0426  0.0622  0.0424  0.0405  0.0442  0.0619  0.0591  0.0645 
1974  0.0851  0.1145  0.0589  0.0859  0.0599  0.0535  0.0596  0.0875  0.0781  0.0870 
1975  0.0949  0.1265  0.0614  0.0896  0.0608  0.0600  0.0639  0.0888  0.0876  0.0933 
1976  0.0987  0.1300  0.0588  0.0859  0.0568  0.0611  0.0624  0.0829  0.0891  0.0911 
1977  0.1035  0.1348  0.0625  0.0912  0.0606  0.0639  0.0658  0.0885  0.0933  0.0961 
1978  0.1174  0.1563  0.0832  0.1215  0.0840  0.0792  0.0843  0.1226  0.1157  0.1230 
1979  0.1352  0.1788  0.1057  0.1544  0.1092  0.0950  0.1052  0.1595  0.1386  0.1536 
1980  0.1690  0.2304  0.1324  0.1933  0.1365  0.1197  0.1323  0.1993  0.1747  0.1932 
1981  0.2047  0.2786  0.1537  0.2244  0.1542  0.1480  0.1573  0.2252  0.2160  0.2297 
1982  0.2095  0.2833  0.1429  0.2086  0.1401  0.1439  0.1493  0.2045  0.2100  0.2179 
1983  0,1952  0.2553  0.1276  0.1863  0.1243  0.1293  0.1335  0.1815  0.1887  0.1950 
1984  0.2049  0.2698  0.1474  0.2152  0.1461  0.1450  0.1521  0.2133  0.2117  0.2220 
1985  0.1951  0.2478  0.1358  0.1982  0.1358  0.1303  0.1394  0.1983  0.1902  0.2035 
1986  0.1762  0.2134  0.1068  0.1559  0.1057  0.1034  0.1106  0.1544  0.1509  0.1615 
1987  0.1834  0.2512  0.1158  0.1691  0.1142  0.1134  0.1195  0.1668  0.1655  0.1744 
1988  0.1942  0.2677  0.1252  0.1828  0.1240  0.1220  0.1288  0.1810  0.1780  0.1880 
1989  0.1951  0.2683  0.1236  0.1804  0.1218  0.1203  0.1285  0.1779  0.1756  0.1877 
1990  0.2006  0.2775  0.1255  0.1832  0.1237  0.1212  0.1322  0.1806  0.1769  0.1930 
1991  0.1958  0.2682  0.1176  0.1717  0.1155  0.1134  0.1254  0.1686  0.1656  0.1831 
1992  0.1909  0.2569  0.1089  0.1591  0.1049  0.1096  0.1159  0.1531  0.1600  0.1692 
1993  0.1831  0.2392  0.0988  0.1442  0.0941  0.1011  0.1053  0.1373  0.1476  0.1537 
1994  0.1942  0.2599  0.1164  0.1699  0.1116  0.1183  0.1234  0.1629  0.1727  0.1801 
Note:  PK,  PG,  PH,  P",  Po  are  the  pre-tax  Prices  Of  Private  capital,  core  public  capital,  highways  and  streets, 
(T  x  "(Tax  an  (Tax)  are 
water  and  sewer  systems  and  other  structures  respectively.  PK(Tax),  PG(Tax),  PH  a  ),  P  ),  d  po 
after-tax  prices. 181 
Appendix  D 
Average  Economic  Depreciation  Rates,  BEA  Data. 
Table  16.  Average  Rates  ofEconomic  Depreciation,  1959-94,  BEA  Data 
Private  Business  Sector  Equipment  Structures 
Mining  0.162  0.117 
Manufacturing: 
Durables  0.103  0.055 
Nondurables  0.117  0.056 
Transportation  &  Public  Utilities 
Railroad  0.083  0.052 
Local  &Interurban  0.127  0.075 
Trucking  &  Warehousing  0.186  0.050 
Water  Transportation  0.079  0.046 
Transportation  byAir  0.102  0.039 
Pipelines  Except  Gas  0.209  0.047 
Transportation  Services  0.079  0.053 
Communications  0.122  0.043 
Electric,  Gas  &  Sanitary  0.090  0.040 
Wholesale  Trade  0.168  0.042 
Retail  Trade  0.167  0.050 
Finance,  Insurance  &  Real  Estate  0.150  0.041 
Services  0.157  0.049 
Public  Sector  Capital  Type 
Equipment  0.116 
Industrial  Buildings  0.071 
Educational  Buildings  0.034 
Hospital  Buildings  0.035 
Other  Buildings  0.033 
Highways  &  Streets  0.028 
Sewer  Systems  0.027 
Water  Supply  0.028 
Other  Structures  0.034 182 
Table  17.  Comparison  ofPublic  Capital  Economic  Depreciation  Rates,  1959-94 
BEA  Bemdt  &  Hansson 
Private  Capital 
Mining  Structures  0.117  0.056 
Manufacturing  Structures  0.055  0.036 
Railroad  Structures  0.052  0.018 
Service  Structures  0.049  0.029 
Retail  Equipment  0.167  0.206 
Wholesale  Equipment  0.168  0.206 
Finance,  Insurance  &  Real 
Estate  Equipment  0.150  0.206 
Public  Capital 
Highways  &  Streets  0.028  0,100 
Sewer  Systems  0.027  0.100 
Water  Supply  0.028  0.100 
Other  Structures  0.034  0.030 
Table  17  compares  some  economic  depreciation  rates  calculated  using  BEA  data  with 
rates  used  by  Berndt  and  Hansson  (1992),  based  on  Hulten  &  Wykoff  (1981).  It  is 
especially  among  the  infrastructure  stocks  that  the  depreciation  rates  calculated  using 
BEA  data  diverge  significantly  from  those  used  by  Berndt  and  Hansson. 183 
Appendix  E 
Investment  Figures 
Table  18.  Annual  Investment  Figures:  Core  Inftastructure, 
1960-94  (Millions  of  198  7  Dollars) 
Date  Total  %A  Roads  %A  WatSew  %A  Other  %A 
60  35416  0.195  25032  -1.846  6291  -1.100  4093  17.513 
61  37891  6.988  26844  7.238  6603  4.959  4444  8.575 
62  39441  4.091  28286  5.371  7254  9.859  3901  -12.219 
63  42823  8.574  30769  8.778  7391  1.888  4663  19.533 
64  44797  4.609  30521  -0.806  9255  25.219  5021  7.677 
65  46322  3.404  31372  2.788  9669  4.473  5281  5.178 
66  48021  3.667  33131  5.606  9097  -5.915  5793  9.695 
67  48424  0.839  32635  -1.497  8639  -5.034  7150  23.424 
68  52170  7.735  33526  2.730  10967  26.947  7677  7.370 
69  47616  -8.729  31222  -6.872  9092  -17.097  7302  -4.884 
70  45908  -3.587  30472  -2.402  8383  -7.798  7053  -3.410 
71  44093  -3.953  30215  -0.843  8150  -2.779  5728  -18.786 
72  42935  -2.626  28311  -6.301  8086  -0.785  6538  14.141 
73  41334  -3.728  26343  -6.951  8525  5.429  6466  -1.101 
74  41154  -0.435  23067  -12.436  11185  31.202  6902  6.742 
75  39699  -3.535  21591  -6.398  12631  12.928  5477  -20.646 
76  39842  0.360  21258  -1.542  12037  -4.702  6547  19.536 
77  37767  -5.208  19930  -6.247  10810  -10.194  7027  7.331 
78  36476  -3.418  18646  -6.442  10891  0.749  6939  -1.252 
79  37714  3.394  18812  0.890  11820  8.529  7082  2.060 
80  37214  -1.325  17812  -5.315  12327  4.289  7075  -0.098 
81  36861  -0.948  17779  -0.185  11526  -6.497  7556  6.798 
82  36565  -0.803  18211  2.429  10432  -9.491  7922  4.843 
83  36576  0.030  19002  4.343  9908  -5.023  7666  -3.231 
84  38176  4.374  20963  10.320  9851  -0.575  7362  -3.965 
85  42087  10.244  21492  2.523  10807  9.704  9788  32.953 
86  43016  2.207  22853  6.332  12173  12.640  7990  -18.369 
87  46619  8.375  25304  10.725  13377  9.890  7938  -0.650 
88  45120  -3.215  25751  1.766  13627  1.868  5742  -27.664 
89  47280  4.787  25888  0.532  13663  0.264  7729  34.604 
90  49033  3.707  27118  4.751  14127  3.396  7788  0.763 
91  51241  4.503  28160  3.842  14803  4.785  8278  6.291 
92  51997  1.475  29026  3.075  14594  -1.411  8377  1.195 
93  55446  6.633  30956  6.649  15091  3.405  9399  12,200 
94  57377  3.482  32997  6.593  15005  -0.569  9375  -0.255 
Note:  Total=total  core-.  Roads=highways  &  streets;  Watsew--water  &  sewers,  Other--other  structures 184 
Chapter  4 
The  Relationship  Between  Infrastructure  Investment  and 
Adjusted  Total  Factor  Productivity:  Results  from  Causality 
Tests  and  the  Estimation  of  Autoregressive  Models 
1.  Introduction 
Several  reviews  of  the  infrastructure  literature'  have  questioned  whether  public  capital 
affects  productivity  or  whether  the  relationship  between  the  variables  runs  in  the 
opposite  direction:  if  infrastructure  is  a  non-nal  good,  high  rates  of  productivity  growth 
which  lead  to  higher  levels  of  income  will  lead  to  increased  demand  for  infrastructure 
services.  It  is  important  to  determine  the  direction  of  causation.  Causation  one  way 
implies  that  public  investment  is  a  macro  policy  variable  that  can  have  an  important 
supply-side  effect  on  economic  growth,  causation  the  other  way  supports  'Vagner's 
Law",,  that  public  expenditure  is  merely  a  passive  variable,  responding  to  changes  in 
the  level  of  income  in  the  economy.  2  There  is  only  one  study  (Tatom,  1993)  in  which 
the  causal  relationship  between  the  two  variables  has  been  tested.  All  other  causality 
'  For  example,  Eisner  (1991).  Federal  Highway  Administration  (1992).  Gillen  (1996).  Gramlich 
(1994),  Hurst  (1994),  Munnell  (1993).  and  Musgrave  (1990). 
2  See  Sahni  and  Singh  (1984). 185 
testing  in  the  infrastructure  literature  attempts  to  identify  the  nature  of  the  relationship 
between  public  investment  and  private  investment,,  rather  than  total  factor 
productivity.  3  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  exaýnine  the  relationship  between  - 
infrastructure  investment  and  total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  in  U.  S.  manufacturing. 
The  differential  effects  of  infrastructure  in  more  disaggregated  analyses  is  a 
focus  of  this  thesis.  Thus,  apart  from  determining  the  direction  of  causation,  there  are  a 
number  of  other  issues  that  have  to  be  addressed.  If  infrastructure  "causes" 
productivity  growth,  which  types  of  infrastructure  are  the  most  productive?  Does 
infrastructure  account  for  a  significant  portion  of  the  variation  in  productivity?  Has  this 
effect  declined  over  time?  Which  industries  rely  most  on  public  capital?  An  attempt  is 
made  to  answer  all  these  questions  in  this  chapter. 
Use  is  made  of  a  multivariate  autoregressive  framework  that  incorporates 
dynamic  effects  and  allows  each  variable  to  be  treated  as  endogenous  within  a  multi- 
equation  system.  In  addition  to  the  obvious  advantage  of  not  imposing  a  priori 
exogeneity  assumptions,  this  framework  also  relieves  the  researcher  of  the  burden  of 
having  to  specify  the  structural  relationship  between  public  capital  and  productivity,  as 
the  autoregressive  model  can  be  interpreted  as  a  general  system  of  reduced  form 
equations  for  the  variables.  However,  within  this  framework  meaningful  economic 
hypotheses  can  be  tested. 
The  Final  Prediction  Error  Criterion  of  Akaike  (1969a,  b)  is  used  to  construct 
the  models  by  statistically  determining  the  appropriate  number  of  lags  for  each  of  the 
variables.  Causality  tests  are  then  carried  out  within  this  framework.  As  in  previous 
chapters,  the  focus  is  on  the  importance  of  different  infrastructure  aggregates.  In 
3  For  example.  Eberts  and  Fogarty  (1987).  Erenburg  and  Wohar  (1995).  Looney  and  Frederiksen 
(1981)  and  Ramirez  (1994). 186 
Chapter  2  it  was  shown  how  stocks  of  the  different  types  of  public  capital  have  grown 
at  very  different  rates  since  the  1950s.  In  Chapter  3  it  was  shown  that  if  the  core 
infrastructure  stock  is  in  some  sense  optimal,  this  does  not  rule  out  the  existence  of  a 
shortage  or  surplus  of  some  of  its  components.  Thus  it  is  possible  that  the  choice  of 
infrastructure  variable  will  influence  the  results  of  the  causality  testing  procedure. 
Three  different  measures  of  infrastructure  investment  are  included  in  the  analysis-  total 
public  investment,  investment  in  core  infrastructure  and  disaggregated  core 
4  investment 
. 
The  results  overturn  Tatom's  (1993)  finding  and  other  researchers'  stated  view 
that  infrastructure  does  not  cause  productivity  growth.  Growth  in  both  total  and  core 
infrastructure  investment  Granger  causes  the  TFP  growth  rate.  Using  disaggregated 
core  infrastructure  data  it  is  possible  to  establish  which  of  the  individual  infrastructure 
stocks  are  the  most  productive.  Causality  tests  reveal  that  only  road  investment  affects 
TFP  growth.  The  results  also  provide  evidence  to  support  the  "reverse  causation" 
hypothesis  but  the  evidence  is  mixed:  the  TFP  growth  rate  causes  growth  in  total 
public  investment  but  not  in  core  investment.  A  similarly  ambiguous  relationship  is 
found  using  disaggregated  data  -  infrastructure  is  found  to  be  both  a  nonnal  good  and 
an  inferior  good. 
Several  authors,  including  I-licks  (1979),  Zellner  (1979)  and  Simon  (1970)  have 
emphasised  that  the  results  of  any  causality  testing  procedure  cannot  be  viewed  in 
isolation  from  economic  theory.  In  other  words,  they  argue  against  the  mechanical 
application  of  causality  tests  in  favour  of  "measurement  with  theory".  For  example, 
there  is  consensus  in  the  infrastructure  literature  (see  Aschauer,  1989,  and  Morrison 
and  Schwartz,  1997)  that  core  public  investment  will  have  a  greater  effect  on  the  TFP 
"  InN,  cstnicnt  in  highwaý's  and  streets.  water  and  sewer  systems  structures  and  other  structures 187 
growth  rate  than  total  investment.  Thus  one  would  expect  inclusion  of  core  investment 
to  lead  to  a  lower  mean  square  error  than  inclusion  of  total  investment.  Similarly,  the 
finding  that  productivity  gains  result  in  spending  on  some  types  of  infrastructure  but 
not  others  does  not  conform  to  economic  theory,  indicating  that  further  investigation  is 
required.  5  To  refute  claims  that  the  results  are  a  function  of  the  lag-length  selection 
criterion  used,  causality  tests  are  carried  out  using  four  other  criteria.  The  results  are 
identical  -  the  TFP  growth  rate  causes  some  types  of  public  investment  but  not  others. 
The  next  step  is  to  analyze  the  variables  used  in  the  analysis  more  closely,  in  particular 
the  TFP  measure,  which  is  constructed  under  a  number  of  simplifying  assumptions.  As 
Malley  et  aL  (1998)  point  out,  standard  constructions  of  TFP  ignore  considerations 
pertaining  to  market  power,  returns  to  scale  and  variable  factor  utilization  over  the 
business  cycle.  If  the  Solow  residual  does  not  measure  "true"  productivity  growth,  it  is 
possible  that  conclusions  drawn  about  the  relationship  between  productivity  and  any 
other  variable  are  invalid.  6  This  observation  has  important  implications  for  many  other 
studies  in  the  infrastructure  literature,  most  of  which  use  a  measure  of  TFP  based  on 
Solow  (1957). 
Since  Solow's  seminal  work,  substantial  progress  has  been  made  in  the 
construction  of  alternative  TFP  measures.  For  example,  Hall  (1990)  modifies  the 
Solow  residual  to  take  account  of  departures  away  from  constant  returns  to  scale  and 
perfect  competition.  Basu  (1996),  building  on  Hall's  work,  adjusts  the  residual  to  take 
'  See  Rubinfeld  (1987)  and  Comes  and  Sandler  (1996)  on  the  demand  for  public  goods  and  near 
public  goods. 
6  For  example,  examining  the  interaction  between  employment  and  TFP  growth,  Malley  et  al.  (1998) 
illustrate  that  the  common  practice  of  including  Solow  residuals  in  VARs  picks  up  an  artificial 
correlation  over  the  cycle  between  TFP  and  employment  which  arises  due  to  factor  utilisation  effects. 
7  For  example,  Aschauer.  1989;  Munnell  1990a;  Ford  and  Poret,  1991,  Hulten  and  Schwab,  1991b; 
Moomaw  and  Williams.  1991.  and  Tatom,  1993.  An  exception  is  Lynde  and  Richmond  (1993)  who 
analyse  a  productivity  measure  that  incorporates  increasing  returns  to  scale. 188 
account  of  variations  in  factor  usage.  These  developments  are  used  to  construct  a 
second  TFP  measure  that  allows  the  relationship  between  infrastructure  and 
productivity  to  be  re-examined.  The  results  are  quite  different  to  those  obtained  using  ' 
the  standard  Solow  residual.  No  evidence  of  feedback  between  the  variables  is  found 
using  the  new  measure,  a  one-way  relationship  exists  from  infrastructure  investment  to 
the  TFP  growth  rate.  The  results  are  also  robust  to  the  use  of  infrastructure  data  at 
different  levels  of  aggregation.  Furthermore,  when  the  infrastructure  data  is 
disaggregated,  it  is  not  just  road  investment  which  is  found  to  cause  productivity  - 
investment  in  other  structures  also  affects  the  TFP  growth  rate. 
The  productivity  data  is  also  disaggregated  and  causality  tests  are  perfonned 
using  the  adjusted  TFP  measure  calculated  for  each  of  the  20  two-digit  SIC  industries. 
The  results  reveal  that  infrastructure  investment  affects  productivity  growth  in  some 
industries  far  more  than  in  others.  The  spread  of  results  is  explained  by  structural 
differences  between  industries  -  infrastructure  determines  the  productivity  growth 
rates  of  the  most  capital-intensive  industries,  in  particular  those  that  use  the  road 
network  the  most  intensively. 
Apart  from  qualitative  evidence  of  infrastructure's  relationship  with 
productivity,  quantitative  evidence  of  infrastructure's  impact  on  the  TFP  growth  rate  is 
also  provided.  The  estimates  obtained  using  adjusted  multifactor  productivity  impute 
to  infrastructure  a  much  smaller  role  than  those  obtained  using  the  Solow  residual. 
Thus  it  is  difficult  to  agree  with,  for  example,  Aschauer  (1993)  that  up  to  a  quarter  of 
the  productivity  growth  slowdown  can  be  explained  by  the  fall  in  infrastructure 
investment.  Nor,,  however,  is  it  possible  to  agree  with  Hulten  and  Schwab  (1991  a)  or 
Jorgenson  (1991)  and  others  that  the  relationship  between  the  variables  is  purely 
spun*ous.  it  is  likely  that  infrastructure  investment  has  a  positive  effect  on  private 189 
productivity  but  this  effect  is  quite  small,  smaller  even  than  that  implied  by  the  results 
of  regional  production  function  and  cost  function  studies.  8 
Due  to  data  availability  the  focus  is  only  on  the  manufacturing  sector.  - 
However,,  because  the  data  is  in  differences  (growth  rates)  there  is  no  danger  of 
underestimating  infrastructure's  importance  simply  because  the  manufacturing  sector  is 
only  one  component  of  the  private  business  sector.  9  However,  to  the  extent  that 
manufacturing  productivity  and  productivity  in  the  rest  of  the  economy  are  determined 
by  different  factors,  the  results  obtained  in  this  chapter  cannot  be  extrapolated  to  the 
other  sectors. 
The  chapter  is  divided  up  as  follows.  In  Section  2  the  Solow  residual  is  derived 
and  estimated.  In  Section  3  the  causality  testing  procedure  is  described  and  tests  are 
conducted  using  the  total  manufacturing  Solow  residual  and  different infrastructure 
aggregates.  Infrastructure's  impact  on  productivity  is  estimated  using  a  number  of 
autoregressive  models.  In  Section  4  the  adjusted  measure  of  TFP  is  derived.  Following 
Hall  (1990),  the  original  Solow  residual  is  first  modified  to  allow  for  imperfect 
competition  and  varying  returns  to  scale.  Next,  following  Basu  (1996),  a  measure  is 
derived  that  takes  account  of  variations  in  labour  and  capital  usage.  In  Section  5  this 
measure  is  compared  with  the  original  Solow  residual  and  the  variations  of  it  (for 
example,  labour  and  capital  productivity)  used  in  the  infrastructure  literature.  In 
Section  6  the  relationship  between  infrastructure  investment  and  adjusted  TFP  growth 
is  re-examined.  The  impact  of  different  types  of  public  investment  (total,  core  and 
disaggregated)  on  the  TFP  growth  rate  is  also  estimated.  In  Section  7  individual 
industry  TFP  measures  are  constructed  and  the  causality  testing  procedure  is  repeated, 
The  results  of  these  studies  arc  discussed  in  the  literature  mview  in  Chapter  1. 
This  , N,  as  an  issue  in  Chapter  3.  where  data  in  levels  NN,  cre  employed. 190 
Finally,  the  findings  are  summarised  in  Section  8  and  a  number  of  issues  are  addressed 
in  the  appendices. 
2.  Derivation  of  TFP  (Solow,  1957) 
The  starting  point  is  the  standard  neoclassical  production  function 
0,  F(L,,  M,  Kj,  (1) 
where  0,  represents  an  index  of  flicks  neutral  technical  change,  implying  that  the  ratio 
of  marginal  products  remains  unchanged  for  a  given  capital/labour  ratio;  F  is  a 
homogeneous  constant  returns  to  scale  production  function,  Q,  is  real  gross  output, 
and  L,  Mt  and  Kt  are  real  labour,  material  and  capital  inputs.  Most  of  the  production 
functions  in  the  infrastructure  literature  use  value-added  data.  Basu  (1996),  however, 
notes  that  much  of  the  empirical  literature  estimating  production  functions  from  gross- 
output  data  tests  and  rejects  the  conditions  needed  for  the  existence  of  a  value-added 
function.  'O  Taking  logs  of  (1)  and  differentiating  with  respect  to  time  gives 
dInQ,  dInO, 
Fd 
In  F(Lt 
3, 
M,  Kj 
dt  dt  di 
which  is  the  same  as 
0  OT  I- 
-+--  -  L+ 
0  O-L  TO 
I- 
i9F  i-  9F  1- 
-  M+--K> 
cM  F(.  )  X  F(.  ) 
where  0,  ý:?  0  and  Fo  =F(L,  M,  Kd. 
(2) 
(3) 
10  See  Jorgenson,  Gollop  and  Fraumcni  (1987).  Basu  and  Fernald  (1997)  show  that  using  value-added 
data  creates  bias  when  estimating  returns  to  scale,  a  matter  that  is  taken  up  in  Section  4. 191 
From  (1)  it  can  be  seen  that 
1=0 
(4) 
Substituting  (4)  into  (3)  and  multiplying  the  second  term  of  (3)  by  LIL,  the  third  by 
MIM  and  the  fourth  by  KIK: 
Q=o 
+0  oT  LL 
+0  oT  MM 
+0  oT  K  K. 
Q0  iLQL  cVQM  XQK 
(5) 
The  marginal  products  of  the  various  inputs  190FIcl,  OfflcW  and  eoFIX  are 
replaced  with  revenue  shares  by  solving  the  firm's  cost-minimisation  problem.  Total 
costs  are  equal  to 
C  ýPLL  +  PAN+  PKK,  (6) 
where  PL  is  the  nominal  labour  wage  rate,  Pm  is  the  price  of  materials  and  PK  is  the 
rental  price  of  capital.  If  a  profit-maximising  firm  seeks  to  minimise  the  cost  of 
producing  a  given  level  of  output,  Q,  its  profit-maximising  problem  can  be  expressed 
as 
Min  C--PLL+PmM+PKK  s.  OF(L,  M,  K). 
L,  M,  K 
The  Lagrangean  function  used  to  solve  this  cost-minimisation  problem  is 
A=  PLL+PmM+PKK  +  A(Q  -  OF(L,  M,  K)), 
and  the  corresponding  first  order  conditions  are 
£9A 
=  PL  -AO  03.  (9) 
(9A 
=  PA,  -  lie  0,  and  (10) 
cm  cm 
OA 
Pý:  -AO 
OF 
=  0. 192 
Dý 
Reaffanging  (9),  (10)  and  (11): 
(T  0--  gL  A, 
0  oF 
= 
PM 
.  and 
cv  A 
4ýF  0_- 
x  ;L 
Substituting  these  values  into  (5)  gives 
Q=e  + 
PL  LL+  Pmm  M+  PKKK 
Q0  AQ  L  AQ  M  AQ  K 
The  term  A  is  marginal  cost.  Under  the  assumption  of  perfect  competition, 
PQ  =A  and  (15)  becomes 
Q=O 
+ 
PL  LL+  Pmm  M+  PKK  K 
Q0  PQQ  L  PQQ  M  PQQ  K' 
where  PLLIPQQ,  PmMIPQQand  PKKIPQQ  are  the  respective  costs  of  labour, 
materials  and  capital  in  relation  to  total  revenue,  PQQ.  Because  perfect  competition 
implies  that  constant  returns  to  scale  (CRS)  are  present,  (16)  can  be  rewritten  as 
+aL 
L 
+a  mm  +a 
KK 
,  where 
0  'L  ,M  'K 
L 
PLL 
M  TmM  KL 
a,  -a  and  a  =(]-a  -am)= 
QQ 
p  QQ  ptttt 
PQ 
Rearranging  (17)  the  growth  rate  of  TFP  is  obtained: 
LL 
MK 
-a  'L_  at  m  -a,  K* 
Total  factor  productivity  is  expressed  as  the  excess  of  the  growth  rate  of  output  over 
the  growth  rates  of  the  labour,  material  and  capital  inputs,  where  these  are  weighted  by 
their  relevant  revenue  shares. 193 
Equation  (18)  can  be  expressed  more  simply  as 
AO  =  Aq,  -  aLAIt  -  amAm,  -a 
KAk 
ttttt 
where  0,1  and  m  and  k  are  the  logs  of  0,  L,  M  and  K  respectively. 
2.1  Calculating  TFPfor  U.  S.  Manufacturing,  1959-91 
(19) 
The  continuous  time  formula  (19)  for  calculating  the  Solow  residual  has  to  be  modified 
slightly  for  empirical  purposes  so  that  it  is  valid  in  discrete  time.  Tornqvist  (1936) 
measured  growth  between  two  points  in  time  by  using  logarithmic  differences  and  uses 
arithmetic  averages  as  weights.  The  residual  is  transformed  as  follows 
AO  =  Aq  -  aLAI,  -  amAm  -a  KAk  where  tttttt)  (20) 
A  Ot  =  In( 
0' 
, 
Aq,  =  In  Qt=  In 
L'  ), 
Am,  =  In( 
), 
At  =In(  ot-1  Qt-, 
A, 
Lt-,  mt-, 
aL  =(a'+  aL,  )12,  am  =(am+  am)  12,  and  a'  =(a'+  a',  )  12.  tt  t-  tt  t-I  tt  t- 
Thus  far  it  has  been  assumed  that  TFP  growth  is  completely  deterministic.  A  random 
term  v,  can  be  added  to  reflect  the  stochastic  nature  of  productivity  growth.  TFP 
growth  can  then  be  viewed  as  the  sum  of  a  constant  underlying  growth  rate  A  0,  plus  a 
random  component  v,  Thus  the  estimated  residual  is 
LAit  -  -MAmt  --KAkt  AOt  +  vt  =  Aqt  -at  ata,  (21) 
Estimates  of  the  growth  rate  of  TFP  for  aggregate  manufacturing  were  obtained  using 
the  NBER  productivity  database.  "  Figure  I  is  a  plot  of  the  Solow  residual  over  the 
period  1959-91.  The  graph  gives  the  impression  that  the  TFP  growth  rate  is 
procyclical-  in  years  of  expansion  the  residual  is  large  and  positive;  in  years  of 
11  Data  sources  arc  listed  in  Appendix  A. 194 
Figure  1.  Manufacturing  Output  Growth  (Left  Scale)  verms 
0.12 
0.1 
0.08 
0.06 
0.04 
0.02 
0 
-0.02 
-0.04 
-0.06 
-0.08 
-0.1 
0.04 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.03 
Solow  Residual,  1959-91 
contraction  the  residual  is  low  or  negative.  Basu  (1996)  lists  three  reasons  why  the 
productivity  growth  rate  maybe  procyclical.  First,  measured  fluctuations  in 
productivity  may  reflect  exogenous  changes  in  production  technology.  Second, 
productivity  (correctly  measured)  may  be  procyclical.  because  of  increasing  returns  to 
scale  -  the  economy  endogenously  becomes  more  efficient  by  moving  to  higher  levels 
of  activity.  Third,  if  inputs  are  systematically  mismeasured,  measured  productivity  may 
be  procyclical  even  if  true  productivity  doesn't  change.  I  return  to  the  issue  of  whether 
the  Solow  residual  is  an  accurate  measure  of  TFP  in  Section  4.  First  the  relationship 
between  this  variable  and  public  investment  will  be  examined. 195 
3.  Causality  Testing  and  Estimation  of  Autoregressive  Models 
3.1  Introduction 
Granger  (1980)  points  out  that  high  contemporaneous  correlation  between  two 
variables  has  no  bearing  on  whether  a  causal  linkage  exists  between  them.  If 
productivity  and  infrastructure  are  highly  correlated  this  is  consistent  with  four 
different  hypotheses:  i)  public  investment  leads  to  TFP  growth,  ii)  TFP  growth  leads  to 
increases  in  public  investment,  iii)  TFP  and  public  investment  are  causally  independent, 
and  iv)  public  investment  and  TFP  are  mutually  causal,  implying  that  there  is  feedback 
between  the  variables.  The  third  explanation  implies  that  productivity  and 
infrastructure  are  themselves  influenced  by  other  common  factors.  The  second  scenario 
-  that  productivity  growth  may  lead  to  increased  infrastructure  investment  -  has  been 
highlighted  by  a  number  of  authors  in  response  to  large  estimates  of  public  capital's 
output  elasticity.  Eisner  (1991)  observed  that  U.  S.  regions  with  relatively  high 
productivity  have  a  relatively  higher  stock  of  infrastructure.  He  puts  the  higher  level  of 
infrastructure  capital  down  to  the  "reverse  relationship"  between  productivity  growth 
and  public  investment.  The  argument  is  that  higher  income  voters  normally  demand 
more  of  all  goods,  including  public  capital.  Although  many  authors  allude  to  the 
possibility  of  reverse  causation,  only  Tatom  (1993)  conducts  tests  to  establish  the 
nature  of  the  relationship.  ffis  conclusion  is  that- 
"Neither  the  growth  rate  of  the  public  capital  stock  nor  the  level  of  public 
sector  investment  cause  total  factor  productivity  growth.  On  the  contrary, 
the  growth  of  private  sector  productivity  causes  both  measures  of  public 
capital  formation.  "'  (p.  6) 196 
Causality  tests  have  been  performed  in  other  studies  in  the  infrastructure  literature  but 
with  private  investment,  not  productivity,  as  the  secondary  variable.  The  aim  of  these 
studies  is  to  establish  whether  infrastructure  investment  crowds  out  or  crowds  in 
private  investment  and  thus  whether  it  is  what  Seitz  and  Licht  (1996)  refer  to  as  a 
"strategic  weapon  for  interregional  competition".  12  However,  like  Aschauer  (1989) 
who  sparked  off  interest  in  the  role  of  public  capital  in  production,  the  focus  in  this 
thesis  is  on  the  relationship  between  infi7astructure  and  productivity.  Although  Tatom's 
(1993)  study  generated  interest  in  the  causality  issue,  it  did  not  make  use  of 
developments  in  the  causality  literature,  in  particular  those  related  to  lag-length 
selection.  13  When  Batten  and  Thornton  (1985)  investigated  the  extent  to  which 
different  lag-length  selection  criteria  can  be  relied  upon  in  testing  Granger  causality 
between  money  and  income,  they  found  that  ad  hoc  approaches,  such  as  considering  a 
few  arbitrary  lag  structures  or  using  some  "rule  of  thumb",  can  produce  misleading 
results.  14  Even  models  using  different  statistical  criteria  for  selecting  the  lag  structure 
12  See  Chapter  1. 
13  In  fact,  it  appears  that  proper  Granger  causality  tests  were  not  even  performed  with  the  arbitrarily 
chosen  lag  structures.  Variables  were  added  to  each  equation  simply  according  to  whether  their  t-stats 
were  significant.  Furthermore,  Granger  causality  tests  require  that  the  data  be  stationary  (see  Nelson 
and  Kang,  198  1,  Lfitkepohl,  1982b,  and  Kang,  1985).  This  issue  was  not  addressed  by  Tatom  (1993). 
Since  the  variables  used  in  this  chapter  are  already  rates  of  change  they  are  likely  to  be  stationary. 
However,  following  Lfitkepohl  (1991),  stability  tests  were  carried  out  on  each  of  the  systems 
estimated.  See  Appendix  B  for  further  details.  Engle  and  Granger  (1987)  and  Kearney  and 
MacDonald  (1987)  have  pointed  out  the  importance  of  testing  for  cointegration  prior  to  conducting 
causality  tests.  Engle  and  Granger  point  to  the  fact  that  the  "standard'  vector  autoregression  estimates 
derived  from  differenced  data  are  mis-specified  if  the  variables  are  cointegrated  because  the  error 
correction  term  is  excluded.  I  tested  for  cointegration  in  the  various  systems  using  the  Johansen  and 
Juselius  (1990)  procedure  and  in  each  case  find  that  I  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no 
cointegration.  Thus  there  appears  to  be  no  stable  long-run  relation  between  the  various  variables.  This 
does  not,  however,  preclude  the  existence  of  a  short-run  causal  linkage  between  them.  See  Enders 
(1995)  for  a  discussion  of  this  procedure. 
14  For  example,  in  tests  of  M2  on  nominal  income,  the  lag  structure  of  44  suggests  that  income  does 
not  Granger  cause  M2,  while  the  8-8  structure  produces  the  opposite result.  Batten  and  Thornton 
(1985)  also  note  that:  "The  evidence  also  suggests  that  the  intuitively  appealing  rule  of  thumb  -  that 
the  lag  on  the  dependent  variable  be  relatively  long  to  account  for  possible  autocorrelation.  while  the 
lag  on  the  hypothesised  independent  variable  be  relatively  short  to  conserve  degrees  of  freedom  -  does 
not  perform  well  either"  (p.  170). 197 
can  yield  contradictory  conclusions.  The  typical  model  selection  criteria  trade  off  the 
bias  associated  with  a  parsimonious  parameterisation  against  the  inefficiency  associated 
with  overparameterisation.  Because  various  criteria  give  different  weights  to  the  - 
bias/efficiency  trade  off,  they  can  select  quite  different  lag  structures.  Several  methods 
for  identifying  the  system  of  equations  are  suggested  in  the  literature.  As  Ramanathan 
(1993)  explains  15 
, 
the  different  criteria  are  all  based  on  the  mean  square  error  (ESS17), 
multiplied  by  some  Penalty  factor  that  depends  on  the  complexity  of  the  model  as 
measured  by  the  number  of  regression  coefficients  to  be  estimated.  16  Ramanathan 
compares  models  chosen  by  the  following  statistics:  Akaike's  Information  Criterion 
(Akaike,  1974),  the  FPE  Criterion  (Akaike  1969a,  b),  HQ  (Hannan  and  Quinn,  1979), 
Schwarz  (1978)  and  Rice  (1984).  17  He  emphasises  that  the  above  statistics  do  not 
answer  the  question  as  to  whether  one  of  the  models  should  be  rejected  in  favour  of 
the  other.  In  principle  such  a  selection  can  be  made  by  the  testing  of  nested  hypotheses. 
FPE  is  the  lag-length  selection  criterion  used  throughout  this  chapter.  The  choice  of 
this  statistic  is  based  on  its  popularity  in  the  causality  testing  literature"  and  evidence 
from  a  number  of  authors  that  it  performs  well  in  identifying  the  appropriate 
15  See  pp.  280-281. 
16  As  Charezma  and  Deadman  (1997)  explain,  each  criterion  has  different  underlying  assumptions. 
For  example  R2  assumes  a  "true"  model  exists  and  the  task  is  in  finding  it,  given  the  assumption  that 
the  "best"  model  for  this  purpose  is  that  which  minimizes  the  RSS,  adjusted  for  the  number  of 
explanatory  variables.  The  FPE  Criterion  adopts  a  more  parsimonious  position.  According  to  this 
criterion,  even  a  true  model  should  be  reduced  in  size  if  this  increases  the  predictive  quality  of  the 
model.  The  aim  of  Akaike's  Information  Criterion  (AIC)  and  the  Schwarz-Bayes  Criterion  (SBC)  is 
the  selection  of  the  model  with  the  maximum  information  available  (where  "information"  is  a 
precisely  defined  probability  concept)  and  again  do  not  concern  themselves  as  to  whether  a  true  model 
exists  or  not.  AIC  is  regarded  as  being  inconsistent  in  that  it  does  not  select  the  model  with  maximum 
information  with  probability  tending  to  I  as  T  -+  oo.  This  problem  is  overcome  by  the  SB  Criterion 
which  is  recommended  for  large  samples. 
17  Other  studies  that  compare  lag-length  selection  criteria  and  are  not  mentioned  elsewhere  in  this 
chapter  include  Kang  (1989).  Odaki  (1986)  and  Urbain  (1989). 
"  Recent  papers  that  make  use  of  this  statistic  and  are  not  mentioned  elsewhere  in  this  chapter  include 
Biswas  et  al.  (1992).  Darrat  and  Glascock  (1993).  Ghatak  et  al.  (1997),  Gordon  and  Sakyibekoe 
(1993),  Kam  and  Lin  (1998).  Kholdý,  et  al.  (1993)  and  Shoesmith  (1992). 198 
autoregressive  model.  For  example,  Batten  and  Thornton  (1984,1985)  compare  the 
FPE  Criterion  with  a  number  of  lag-length  selection  criteria  -  the  Bayesian  Estimation 
Criterion  (BEC)'9,  Pagano  and  Hartley's  (1981)  P-H  test,  the  Schwarz  Bayesian  - 
Information  Criterion  and  the  standard  F-test  -  and  conclude  that: 
"Akaike's  FPE  Criterion  performed  well  in  selecting  the  model  relative  to 
the  others.  As  a  result  it  did  a  reasonably  good  job  of  finding  an  order  for 
the  model  which  gave  evidence  of  Granger  causality,  when  such  an  order 
existed.  "  (p.  177) 
Jones  (1989)  also  finds  that  the  FPE  Criterion  outperforms  other  statistical  criteria. 
However,  in  order  to  refute  claims  that  the  results  of  the  Granger-causality  testing 
procedure  are  sensitive  to  the  number  of  lags  on  the  regressors,  other  lag-length 
selection  criteria  are  employed  on  some  of  the  models  for  comparative  purposes.  Tests 
of  the  adequacy  of  the  models  chosen  by  the  FPE  Criterion  are  also  conducted. 
Once  the  lag-length  selection  method  has  been  chosen,  there  are  a  number  of 
ways  in  which  the  estimating  model  can  be  constructed.  Utkepohl  (1982a),  for 
example,  assumed  that  the  autoregressive  lags  for  all  the  variables  were  identical. 
Caines,  Keng  and  Sethi  (198  1)  modelled  a  system  of  N  (>2)  variables  in  stages.  First, 
bivariate  autoregressive  models  were  estimated  for  each  ordered  pair  of  variables.  The 
two  variables  in  each  bivariate  autoregressive  process  were  assumed  to  have  equal  lag 
lengths  and  the  optimal  lag  length  was  determined  by  the  FPE  Criterion.  Hsiao  (1979., 
1981),  Ahking  and  Mller  (1985)  and  Erenburg  and  Wohar  (1995)  also  use  the  FPE 
Criterion  but  argue  that  the  assumption  of  equal  lag  lengths  for  all  variables  is 
restrictive.  By  allowing  each  variable  to  enter  the  equation  with  a  different  number  of 
19  As  suggested  by  Gewckc  and  Meese  (198  1  ). 199 
lags  there  is  potentially  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  parameters  to  be  estimated  and 
the  influence  of  each  variable  can  be  felt  at  different  points  in  time.  The  model 
identification  method  used  in  this  chapter  is  based  primarily  on  Hsiao  (1979,1981).  1- 
also  incorporate  several  features  from  Ahking  and  Nfiller  (1985)  and  Erenburg  and 
Wohar  (1995).  Before  this  method  of  model  identification  is discussed,  it  is  necessary 
to  provide  some  brief  background  information  about  the  FPE  Criterion. 
3.2  Ae  FPE  Criterion 
An  example  of  a  bivariate  autoregressive  model  that  I  attempt  to  identify  in  this 
chapter  is  that  for  AO,  the  growth  rate  of  TFP,  and  Al',  the  growth  rate  of  core  t 
public  investment: 
AO,  )=  a)+  ql,,  (L)  Y/  12(L))(AO, 
mc  b  V122(L))ýAIc)  t 
V21 
(L)  (22) 
where  L  is  the  lag  operator  and  v,  and  v,  are  zero  mean  white  noise  stochastic 
processes  with  constant  covariance.  The  focus  is  primarily  on  whether  the  off-diagonal 
terms  are  zero,  ie  whether  yf  , 
(L)  =0  and 
Vf  21 
(L) 
= 
The  FPE  of  the  TFP  growth  rate,  AO,  is  defined  as  the  (asymptotic)  mean  square 
prediction  error- 
E(AOt  -AOt) 
2 
-Y 
(23) 
where  AOt  is  the  predictor  of  AOt  from  (22)- 
ý=^^m^nc  (24)  Aot  a+  y/il(L)AO,  +  Y112(L)Al,  * 
The  superscripts  m  and  n  denote  the  order  of  lags  In  ql,,  (L)  and  ql,,  (L)  respectively. 
^M  ýn  (L)  and  a  are  least  squares  estimates  obtained  by  treating  observations  VII 
(L), 
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from  -A4  +I  to  0  fixed  on  the  set  of  data  (t:  t=  -M  +  1, 
---,  0,1....  T),,  where  M  is  the  a 
Priori  specified  highest  possible  order  for  V/ij,  so  m,  n:!!  ý  M  and  T  is  the  number  of 
observations  . 
20  Akaike  (1969ab)  shows  that  the  FPE  is  composed  of  two  components- 
the  first  is  a  measure  of  estimation  error,  the  second  is  a  measure  of  modelling  error. 
As  the  values  of  m  and  n  are  increased,  the  first  term  will  decrease  but  the  second  term 
will  increase  for  a  finite  number  of  observations  for  AOt  and  Al,.  Akaike  defines  the 
estimate  of  FPE  for  the  first  equation  in  (22)  by: 
FPE,  O,  =  E(AO 
t--' 
(L)A  0,  --"  (L)A[tc  - 
a)2  Yll 
I  V12 
(T2 
(, 
+m+n+])  (25) 
vT  51 
where  a,,  is  the  variance  of  v,.  An  estimate  of  u2,,  is  provided  by 
RSS,,,  (m,  n) 
(26) 
where  RSS,,,  (m,  n)  is  the  sum  of  squared  residuals: 
(L)A  0,  -^'  (L)AIc  -^2  , 
(AO,  RSS 
t 
(m,  n)  Vii 
V12  a  (27) 
t=l 
Substituting  (26)  into  (25)  and  rearranging  produces  the  estimate  of  the  FPE  forAO,  - 
FPE,,,,  (m,  n)  = 
T+m+n+l 
-  RSS, 
4,9ý  , 
(m,  n)  /T 
T-m-n-I 
(28) 
The  number  of  lags  that  minimises  the  FPE  is  the  specification  used  in  (22).  To  choose 
the  order  of  lags  in  Vf',,  (L)  and  Vf",  2(L)  by  the  minimum  FPE  is,  according  to  Hsiao 
(1981),  equivalent  to  applying  an  approximate  F  test  with  varying  significance  levels, 
The  major  difference  between  applying  Akaike's  FPE  Criterion  to  decide  whether  a 
20  In  this  chapter  lags  are  allowed  to  e.  x-tcnd  from  one  to  four  years. 201 
variable  should  be  included  in  the  equation  and  the  conventional  hypothesis  testing 
procedure  is  in  the  choice  of  significance  level.  The  conventional  choice  of  five  per 
cent  or  one  per  cent  significance  level  is  ad  hoc.  Here  the  choice  is  on  an  explicit  . 
optimality  criterion  (minimising  the  mean  square  prediction  error).  The  minimum  FPE 
is  o  tained  by  letting  m  and  n  vary  between  0  and  M 
3.3  Ihe  Modelling  Procedure 
The  procedure  used  to  identify  models  in  this  chapter  involves  the  following  steps: 
Each  of  the  dependent  variables  (productivity  growth  and  public  investment 
growth)  is  regressed  on  its  own  lags  to  determine  the  appropriate  lag  order.  For 
example,  for  the  TFP  equation: 
A  Ot  -a+  qf',,  (L)A  0,  +  ut  ,  (29) 
a  series  of  autoregressions  is  performed  by  varying  the  order  of  the  lag,  m,  in  (29)  from 
I  to  the  predetermined  maximum  lag  length  of  four  years  . 
2' 
The  lag  that  minimises  the 
following  FPE  value  is  the  appropriate  "own"  lag,  m  *- 
FPEAII(M*) 
=[(T  +m+  I)I(T  -m-  1)].  RSS(m  *)IT  (30) 
When  an  additional  lag  is  added  to  (30)  the  first  term  is  increased  but  simultaneously 
the  second  term  is  decreased.  When  their  product  (FPE)  reaches  a  minimum,  the 
opposing  forces  are  balanced. 
(11)  Bivariate  regressions  are  estimated  consisting  of  the  appropriate  own  lag 
detern-uned  in  (i)  and  lags  of  the  remaining  varlable(s).  Assunung  there  is  only  one 
other  vanable,,  the  growth  rate  of  core  infrastructure  investment,  the  equation  to  be 
"  Where  the  appropriate  lag  is  4  for  any  variable,  the  maximum  iag  'Lc,  -tgth  was  allowed  to  extend 
beyond  four  to  six  years  to  check  whether  a  longer  lag  is  appropriate.  This  was  never  the  case, 
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estimated  is 
AO  -a+qym,,  (L)AO,  +n  (L)AIc  t  12  (31) 
The  lag  order  of  this  variable  (denoted  by  n)  is  varied  from  I  to  4  and  the  following  ' 
modified  FPE  is  calculated 
FPE,,,,  (m  *,  n)  =  [(T  +m*+n+  I)I(T  -m*-n-  1)].  RSS(m  *,  n)IT  (32) 
The  appropriate  lag  length  for  the  second  variable  (n*)  is  that  which  minimises  the  FPE 
in  (32).  The  relationship  between  the  variables  can  then  be  determined  by  comparing 
(3  0)  and  (3  2).  If  FPE,,,  (m*,  n*)  <  FPE,,,,  (m*)  (ie,  the  prediction  of  A  0,  using  past 
values  of  AI'  is  more  accurate  than  without  using  past  AI')  then  it  can  be  concluded 
that  infrastructure  investment  Granger  causes  the  TFP  growth  rate,  ie  Alc  =>  AO,  22 
Similarly,  for  core  infrastructure  investment  the  following  equations  are  estimated 
, Mc  =a+  y/'  (L)Alc  +  v,  and  t  22  t 
n  (L)AO,  +  y/'  (L)Alc  AI,  c  =a 
+Y/ 
21  22  t 
(33) 
(34) 
If  FPE  SC 
(M* 
. n*)  <  FPEA,  c  (m*)  the  TFP  growth  rate  Granger  causes  infrastructure 
investment,  ie  A0=:  >  AIc.  Finally,  if  FPE,,,  (m*,  n*)  <  FPE.,  (m*)  and 
FPEA,,  (m*,  n*)  <  FPEA,,  (m*),  the  conclusion  is  that  feedback  occurs,  ie, 
AO  <--:  >  Al'.  The  above  modelling  procedure  lends  itself  easily  to  the  construction  of 
.. 
the  construction  of  which  is  discussed  in  further  detail  in  Section 
multivanate  models, 
3.8,  when  the  infrastructure  data  is  disaggregated.  In  the  two-variable  cases  in 
22  The  Granger  concept  of  causality  is  based  on  temporal  ordering.  Granger  (1969)  defines  simple 
causality  such  that  "x  causes.  v"  if  knowledge  of  past  x  reduces  the  variance  of  the  errors  in  forecasting 
v,  beyond  the  variance  of  the  errors  which  would  be  made  from  knowledge  of  past  y  alone: 
07 
2  (Y1  jyj_J... 
- 
Xt-1  I 
Xt-2- 
-  -) 
<  CT. 
2(Yjj. 
Vt_j_. 
). 
Granger  also  defines  instantaneous  causality  where  current  as  well  as  past  values  of  x  predict.  v,.  If 
,V 
is 
related  to  current  or  lagged  x  but  not  future  x,  x  is  exogenous  relative  toY.  If  x  causesY  and,  y  causes  x 
there  is  feedback  between  the  variables. 203 
Table  1.7he  FPEs  of  Fitting  a  One-Dimensional  Autoregressive  Processfor  the 
Solow  Residual  and  Growth  Rate  of  Inftastructure  Investment 
No.  IWs  A  ot  A[tc 
1  0.000252*  0.002140 
2  0.000259  0.001820* 
3  0.000287  0.001997 
4  0.000301  0.002122 
0.002427 
0.002262* 
0.002396 
0.002442 
Note:  Nfinimum  FPEs  are  denoted  by  asterisks 
which  aggregate  infrastructure  variables  are  employed,  a  simple  grid  search  over  four 
lags  was  also  carried  out  with  no  alteration  to  the  causality  test  results  obtained  using 
the  modelling  procedure. 
3.4  Results  -  Aggregate  Inftastructure 
The  FPEs  from  the  treatment  of  each  variable  (the  growth  rate  of  TFP  and  the  growth 
rates  of  core  and  total  investment)  as  one-dimensional  autoregressive  processes  are 
presented  in  Table  1.  The  number  of  own  lags  that  minimise  the  FPEs  for  AO,,  Al' 
t 
and  AIt  T  are  1.,  2  and  2  respectively.  With  the  appropriate  own  lag  lengths  determined, 
it  is  then  assumed  that  the  productivity  and  infrastructure  variables  are  controlled 
variables  and  the  relevant  second  variable  is  treated  as  the  manipulated  variable. 
Holding  constant  the  order  of  the  autoregressive  operator  on  the  controlled  variable  to 
the  one  determined  in  Table  1,  the  FPEs  of  the  controlled  variables  are  computed  by 
varying  the  order  of  lags  of  the  manipulated  variable  from  I  to  4.  The  order  which 
gives  the  smallest  FPE  is  presented  in  Table  2.  For  example,  the  FPE  for  the 
autoregressive  equation  containing  the  Solow  residual  as  the  controlled  variable  and 204 
Table  2.  FPEs  Computedftom  Including  Optimum  Lags  on  Manipulated  Variables 
Controlled  Manipulated 
Variable  a  Variable 
Solow 
Residual 
A  Ot  (1)  AIC 
t 
A  Ot  (1)  AItT 
Optimum  Lag, 
Manipulated  FPE(m  *,  nb  FPE(m 
Variable 
.  000236* 
. 
000252 
.  000242* 
. 
000252 
Core 
AIc  (2)  AO  1 
. 
001881 
. 
001820  tt 
Total 
,mT  (2)  AO  1  .  002052* 
. 
002262 
tt 
'The  number  in  brackets  indicates  the  order  of  the  autoregressive  operator  for  the  controlled  variable, 
determined  in  Table  I.  b  The  FPEs  in  the  FPE(mtn*)  column  are  the  minimum  ones  obtained  from 
inclusion  of  different  lags  on  the  manipulated  variables.  Asterisks  signify  that  there  is  a  causal 
relationship  from  the  manipulated  variable  to  the  controlled  variable. 
total  infrastructure  as  the  manipulated  variable  is  minimised  by  including  one  lagged 
infrastructure  term.  It  is  clear  from  Table  2  that  the  FPE  Criterion  does  not  impose  the 
same  number  of  lags  on  variables  that  appear  in  the  same  equation.  For  example,  both 
investment  equations  contain  a  different  number  of  lagged  terms  for  infrastructure 
investment  and  the  productivity  growth  rate.  Using  the  results  reported  in  Table  2  it  is 
possible  draw  some  conclusions  about  causality.  The  column  FPE(m  *)  contains  the 
minimum  FPEs  from  Table  1.  Where  these  numbers  are  greater  than  the  FPEs  from  the 
equations  that  include  a  manipulated  variable,  FPE(m  *,  n  *),  it  can  be  concluded  that 
the  manipulated  variable  causes  the  controlled  variable.  For  example,  for  AO,  and 
AIt  C.  treatment  of  AItc  as  the  input  reduces  the  FPE  of  the  A  0,  equation,  implying 
that  AIc  =>A  Ot 
. 
The  same  relationship  is  found  between  total  infrastructure  and 
t 
ie 
AItT 
=>  AO,.  Thus  the  conclusion  is  that  both  measures  of  productivity, 
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Table  3.  Comparison  of  Lag-Length  Selection  Criteria 
-----------  -  Alt  =>A  Ot  -----------  ----  A  Ot  =>  Aitc  ----  ------  A  Ot  =>  St,  ---- 
Criterion  AO  (AO,  Al  C)  (AO,  AIT)  Alc  (Alc,,  dO)  AiT 
(,  dj  T 
"d 
0) 
FPE  0.25157(l)  0.23602(1)*  0.241W1)*  0.1820(2)  0.1881(1)  0.2262(2)  0.2052(1)* 
AIC  0.25153(l)  0.23589(1)*  0.24137(1)*  0.1819(2)  0.1879(l)  0.2261(2)  0.2049(1)* 
HQ  0.25928(l)  0.24688(1)*  0.25262(1)*  0.1903(2)  0.1996(l)  0.2365(2)  0.2177(1)* 
RICE  0.25368(l)  0.24069(1)*  0.24628(1)*  0.1859(2)  0.1951(1)  0.2310(2)  0.2128(1)* 
SBC  0.27566(l)  0.27064(1)*  0.27692(1)*  0.2090(2)  0.2256(l)  0.2597(2)  0.2461(1)* 
Note:  Values  reported  in  the  first  three  columns  omit  the  first  three  zero  decimal  places;  values 
reported  in  the  remaining  four  columns  omit  the  first  two  zero  decimal  places.  Asterisks  signify  a 
causal  relationship;  optimal  number  of  lags  in  parentheses.  See  Section  3.1  for  the  sources  of  the 
various  tests. 
However,  when  the  issue  of  reverse  causality  is  examined,  the  two  infrastructure 
measures  generate  different  results.  No  reverse  relationship  is  found  between 
productivity  and  core  investment  (ie,  AO,  =;  ý>  AIc).  However,  there  is  evidence  of  t 
reverse  causation  between  the  Solow  residual  and  total  investment,  leading  one  to 
conclude  that  there  is  feedback  between  the  variables,  ie  A0  4ýý  AI  T 
tt 
It  may  be  argued  that  different  lag-selection  criteria  may  choose  models  of 
different  orders  that  alter  the  conclusions  drawn  about  causality.  To  check  this,  the 
23 
statistics  for  four  other  criteria  were  computed  . 
The  results  are  reported  in  Table  I 
The  first  three  columns  test  whether  the  two  infrastructure  variables  cause  the  TFP 
growth  rate.  The  first  column  contains  the  minimum  statistics  computed  from  treating 
AOt  as  a  one-dimensional  autoregressive  process;  columns  two  and  three  contain  the 
statistics  computed  from  inclusion  of  the  optimum  number  of  lagged  infrastructure 
terms. 
23  See  Ramanathan  (1993).  Section  10.6  and  Judge  et  al.  (1985).  Chapter  16.  Section  7.5  and  Section 
16.6.1  a  for  a  more  complete  discussion  of  these  alternative  criteria. 206 
In  each  case  the  two-dimensional  processes  have  lower  statistics,  providing  further 
evidence  that  AI'  =>A  0  and  'AIT  =:  >  AO 
t. 
The  results  of  the  reverse  causation  tests,,  ttt 
reported  in  the  last  four  columns,  are  also  identical  to  those  carried  out  using  the  FPE 
Criterion.  For  each  criterion  the  verdict  is  that  A0=:  >  AIT 
and  A  Ot  zA>  AItc 
.  tt 
3.5  Discussion  of  Results 
The  first  important  point  to  make  is  that  the  results  of  causality  tests  cannot  be  viewed 
in  isolation  from  economic  theory.  This  point  is  made  by  a  number  of  authors, 
including  fficks  (1979),  Simon  (1970)  and  Zellner  (1979).  Some  of  Zellner's 
comments  about  blind  faith  in  causality  testing  procedures  are  worth  quoting  at  length- 
"The  mechanical  application  of  causality  tests  is  an  extreme  form  of 
c  measurement  without  theory,  '  perhaps  motivated  by  the  hope  that 
application  of  statistical  techniques  without  the  delicate  and  difficult  work 
of  integrating  statistical  techniques  and  subject  matter  considerations  will  be 
'A., able  to  produce  useful  and  dependable  results.  That  this  hope  is  generally 
naive  and  misguided  has  been  recognized  by  econometricians  for  a  long 
time  and  is  a  reason  that  reference  is  made  to  laws  in  Feigl's  definition  of 
causation.  24  In  establishing  and  using  these  laws  in  econometrics,  there 
seems  to  be  little  doubt  but  that  economic  theory,  data,  and  other  subject 
matter  considerations  as  well  as  econometric  techniques,  including  modem 
2"  According  to  Feigl  (1953),  "The  clarified  (purified)  concept  of  causation  is  defined  in  terms  of 
predictabilitv  according  to  a  law  (his  italics)  or,  more  adequately,  according  to  a  set  of  laws,  "(p.  408). 
According  to  this  philosophical  definition  of  causality,  predictability  without  a  law  or  set  of  laws  or. 
.,  is  econometricians  might  put  it,  without  theory,  is  not  causation.  Linking  predictability  to  a  law  or  set 
C-  'I  itical  in  appraising  various  tests  of  causality  that  have  appeared  in  the  e  nomethic  0,  aws  is  ch  co 
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time  series  analysis,  will  all  play  a  role.  'Theory  without  measurement'  and 
4  measurement  without  theory'  are  extremes  to  be  avoided.  "  (p.  5  1) 
The  message  from  Hicks,  Zellner  and  Simon  is  that  if  the  results  of  causality  tests  do 
not  make  economic  sense  they  should  not  be  accepted.  The  researcher  must  then  look 
for  potential  weaknesses  in  the  analysis.  For  example,  there  is  consensus  in  the 
infrastructure  literature  (see,  for  example,  Aschauer,  1989,  and  Morrison  and 
Schwartz,  1997)  that  core  public  investment  will  have  a  greater  effect  on  productivity 
than  total  investment.  Core  infrastructure  makes  up  roughly  60  per  cent  of  the  total, 
with  the  balance  consisting  of  spending  on  publicly  owned  industrial  buildings,  schools,, 
25  hospitals,  other  buildings  and  equipment.  It  is  clear  from  Table  3  that  inclusion  of 
core  investment  leads  to  lower  mean  square  error  than  inclusion  of  total  investment, 
confirming  that  roads,  water  and  sewer  systems,  electric  and  gas  facilities  and  mass 
transit  are  the  most  productive  types  of  public  capital. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  it  is  true  that  the  TFP  growth  rate  determines 
infrastructure  spending,  neither  type  of  infrastructure  investment  is  likely  to  be  a  bigger 
beneficiary  of  productivity  growth  than  the  other.  26  If  one  supports  the  reverse 
causation  hypothesis,  all  the  components  of  the  public  capital  stock  can  be  regarded  as 
normal  goods,  demand  for  which  increases  as  income  goes  up  due  to  productivity 
gains.  However,  the  results  do  not  support  this  hypothesis.  Total  infrastructure 
investment  is  caused  by  productivity  gains,  core  investment  is  not.  In  conclusion,  the 
results  overturn  Tatorn's  (1993)  finding  that  infrastructure  does  not  cause  productivity 
and  provide  contradictory  evidence  of  reverse  causation.  This  issue  will  be  raised  again 
25  Other  buildings  Include  general  office  buildings.,  police  and  fire  stations,  courthouses,  auditoriums, 
garages  and  passenger  terminals. 
26  For  further  discussion  of  the  reverse  causation  hypothesis.  see  Section  6.3. 208 
when  tests  are  conducted  using  disaggregated  infrastructure  data.  Tatom's  analysis 
was  based  on  a  different  time  period  and  used  a  measure  of  productivity  for  the  total 
business  sector,  not  just  manufacturing.  Furthermore,  he  included  investment  data  in  . 
levels  in  his  analysis  whereas  I  use  growth  rates.  These  differences  help  explain  why  his 
results  are  different  to  those  obtained  in  this  section  using  the  aggregate  manufacturing 
Solow  residual. 
3.6  Estimating  Inftastructure's  Impact  on  Productivity 
Thus  far  only  evidence  of  the  qualitative  nature  of  the  relationship  has  been  presented. 
The  next  step  is  to  provide  quantitative  information  about  infrastructure's  impact  on 
the  TFP  growth  rate.  Two  models  are  estimated,  one  for  total  infrastructure  and  one 
for  core  infrastructure.  The  total  infrastructure  model  takes  account  of  the  feedback 
between  the  variables  and  incorporates  the  minimum  FPE  lag  lengths  determined  in 
Table  I 
AO 
t  a)+ 
AIT  b  t 
V/ 
21 
1  (L))(AO, 
12 
2T  vt 
22  t) 
(351) 
The  model  with  core  infrastructure  is 
A  0,  )=  a) 
+ 
V/  I', 
(L) 
Aic  b0 
t 
12(L))(AO, 
2  (L))ý  AI  c  Y/  22  t 
(36) 
Note  that  the  second  equation  contains  only  lags  of  the  dependent  variable  because  of 
the  absence  of  reverse  causality.  Following  Erenburg  and  Wohar  (1995),  each  two- 
equation  system  is  estimated  in  a  seemingly  unrelated  regression  (SUR)  framework  to 
gain  efficiency  by  allowing  for  the  cross-equation  correlation  of  disturbances.  This  is 
,  mportant  as  each  of  the  dependent  variables  may  be  subject  to  the  same  external 
shocks  (in  particular,  to  contemporaneous,  stochastic  disturbances  that  are  not 209 
Table  4.  Autoregressive  Estimates 
Core  Infrastructure  Model  Total  Infrastructure  Model 
Dependent  Variable.  AO  Aic  AO  AiT  tttt 
Aot-I  0.063  0.005  1.162*** 
(0.39)  (0.03)  (3.28) 
All  0.1  W*  0.152  0.095*  0.227  t-1 
(2.25)  (0.76)  (1.92)  (1.47) 
AP  0.452***  0.251  t-2 
(3.12)  (1.62) 
Constant  0.004  0.005  0.005  -0.0004 
(1.23)  (0.78)  (1,40)  (0.06) 
R20.126  0.265  0.106  0.389 
S.  E.  0.014  0.039  0.014  0.400 
Note:  j=C  (core  infrastructure)  or  T  (total  infrastructure),  depending  on  the  model;  t-stats  in 
parentheses  and  are  computed  using  heteroskedastic-consistent  standard  errors. 
Significantly  dilTerent  from  zero  at  less  than  the  I%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  5%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  10  %  level. 
captured  by  the  set  of  explanatory  variables).  Following  Latkepohl  (199  1)  this  idea  can 
be  demonstrated  by  considering  the  following  VAR(l)  system 
Aot  a)  vil 
'mc 
b0 
t) 
Yf 
12  A0,1 
mc  Yf  22 
) 
t-I 
(37) 
In  this  system  core  infrastructure  does  not  cause  TFP.  However,  the  system  may  be 
premultiplied  by  some  nonsingular  matrix 
(1  O"\ 
B= 
ß  i, 
)' 
so  that 
Aol  0+  711  /V  12 
Aot-I 
d80  AI,  Aic  77, 
(C)+(o  0) 
'A 
t,  /V  21 
r22) 
t-I 
+  '"t) 
- 
(38) 
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Aic 
f  This  model  is  just  another  representation  of  (A  Ot 
5,  ,)  as  it  has  the  same  means  and 
autocovariances  as  the  one  in  (37).  However,  the  conclusions  concerning  causality  are 
totally  different.  If  the  second  representation  actually  describes  the  true  model,  the  TFP 
growth  rate  may  affect  core  infrastructure  through  the  coefficient  8  in  the  second 
equation.  There  are  theoretical  reasons  why  TFP  is  not  likely  to  have  an  instantaneous 
effect  on  infiastructure  investment  and  thus  why,  8  =  0.27  Nevertheless,  the  possibility 
can  be  accounted  for  by  estimating  the  equations  in  a  system  framework  and  by 
allowing  for  the  possibility  that  'Y21  #0  by  including  the  minimum  FPE  lags  of  A  Ot 
from  the  single  equation  framework  even  if  the  initial  conclusion  was  AO,  : 1>  Itc 
Estimates  from  the  two  models  are  contained  in  Table  4.  Before  discussing  the 
regression  results,  it  is  possible  to  conduct  a  further  causality  test  within  this 
framework.  Geweke,,  Meese  and  Dent  (1983)  present  evidence  that  the  Granger 
causality  testing  procedure  conducted  using  a  Wald  chi-square  test  statistic 
outperforms  other  causality  tests  in  a  series  of  Monte-Carlo  experiments  . 
2'  Erenburg 
and  Wohar  (1995)  use  Wald  tests  to  draw  conclusions  about  causality  in  their  initially 
overfitted  models  . 
29Results  from  Wald  tests  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  off-diagonal 
parameters  in  (3  5)  and  (3  6)  are  zero  are  presented  in  Table  5. 
27  For  productivity  gains  to  be  converted  into  additional  infrastructure  investment  they  first  have  to  be 
appropriated  by  the  relevant  state  or  local  government.  There  may  also  be  a  lag  between  the  political 
decision  to  increase  investment  and  the  investment  taking  place. 
2"  The  authors  compared  a  number  of  different  causality  testing  procedures:  the  Wald  variant,  the 
likelihood  ratio  variant  and  the  Lagrange  multiplier  variant  of  the  Granger,  Sims  (using  a  number  of 
correctio-is  i-or  serial  correlation)  and  Sims  lagged  dependent  variable  tests. 
29  See  Appendix  E  for  an  explanation  and  comparison  of  results  obtained  using  the  Erenburg  and 
Wohar  (1995)  method  of  initially  overfitting  the  models. 211 
Table  5.  Wald  Testsfor  Zero  Restrictions 
Wald  Statistic  - 
Core  Infrastructure  Model 
I  Y/  12  0  4.17(1)** 
Total  Infrastructure  Model 
I  Y/ 
12(L)  =03.38(1)* 
1  Y/ 
21(L)  =05.66(1)** 
Note:  Degrees  of  freedom  in  parentheses. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  I%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  5%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  10  %  level. 
They  support  the  causality  test  results  of  Section  3.4,.  indicating  that  no  alterations  are 
required  to  the  models.  It  is  also  important  to  determine  whether  the  FPE  Criterion 
performs  satisfactorily  in  identifying  the  system  of  equations.  Following  Hsiao  (1981). 
Ahking  and  Nfiller  (1985)  and  Erenburg  and  Wohar  (1995),  the  adequacy  of  the 
models  was  checked  by  sequentially  overfitting  (3  5)  and  (3  6)  by  adding  one  additional 
lag  and  then  two  additional  lags  to  each  variable,  including  those  variables  that  were 
not  significantly  different  from  zero  in  the  final  models.  For  the  core  infrastructure 
model  the  Wald  test  statistics  are  respectively  5.86  (4  degrees  of  freedom)  and  9.28  (8 
degrees  of  fteedom),  indicating  that  the  extra  lags  are  not  significantly  different  ftom 
zero.  For  the  total  infrastructure  model  the  Wald  test  statistics  are  respectively  9.42  (4 
degrees  of  freedom)  and  9.43  (8  degrees  of  freedom).  Thus  both  sets  of  tests  reveal  no 
inadequacy  in  the  models. 
As  Franses  (1996)  recommends,  the  empirical  adequacy  of  the  autoregressive 
models  is  also  investigated.  Much  of  this  investigation  concems  possibly  undetected 
systematic  patterns  in  the  estimated  residual  process.  Serial  correlation  in  the  residuals 
was  tested  for  as  was  heteroskedasticity,  non-normality,  specification  error  and  the 
possibility  of  temporal  instability.  Table  6  contains  the  results  of  the  diagnostic  tests, 212 
applied  to  individual  equations  estimated  by  OLS.  It  is  necessary  to  examine  whether 
any  contemporaneous  correlation  of  the  error  terms  across  equations  is  affected  by 
serially  correlated  errors  within  individual  equations.  The  Durbin  Watson  statistic  (a  ' 
measure  of  first-order  serial  correlation)  is  not  appropriate  in  this  context  as  it  is  biased 
towards  2  because  of  the  presence  of  lagged  dependent  variables.  As  an  alternative,.  the 
Breusch-Godfrey  Lagrange  Multiplier  test  is  used  to  test  for  the  presence  of  higher 
order  serial  correlation.  Table  23  indicates  that,  except  for  lag  two  in  equation  (3),  the 
null  hypothesis  that  the  disturbances  are  serially  uncorrelated  cannot  be  rejected  for 
any  of  the  equations.  Non-rejection  of  the  normality  null  hypothesis  indicates  that  there 
are  no  outlying  observations  and  that  the  error  process  is  homoskedastic.  The  White 
heteroskedasticity  test  also  indicates  that  the  disturbances  have  constant  variance.  To 
test  for  the  possible  omission  of  important  explanatory  variables,  all  equations  were  re- 
estimated  employing  Ramsey's  (1969)  RESET  procedure.  In  this  procedure  the 
estimating  equations  are  augmented  with  additional  explanatory  variables.  If  these 
variables  are  found  to  be  jointly  insignificant  then  the  null  hypothesis  of  no 
specification  error  cannot  be  rejected.  Following  Erenburg  and  Wohar  (1995),  three 
different  tests  are  performed  using  each  of  the  four  equations:  RESET(2)  augments  the 
equation  with  fitted  values  of  the  dependent  variable  raised  to  the  power  of  2, 
RESET(3)  augments  the  equation  with  fitted  values  of  the  dependent  variable  raised  to 
the  power  of  2  and  raised  to  the  power  of  3;  and  RESET(4)  augments  the  equation 
with  fitted  values  of  the  dependent  variable  raised  to  the  powers  of  2,3  and  4.  In  each 
test  the  additional  variables  were  found  to  be  jointly  insignificant  and  so  the  null 
hypothesis  of  no  specification  error  could  not  be  rejected. 213 
Table  6.  Diagnostic  Tests  on  Individual  Equations 
Breusch-Godftey  LM  Testsfor  Serial  Correlation  -j 
-------------------------  E-qqation  -------------------------  Order:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1  0.01(1)  0.00(1)  0.28(l)  0.43(l) 
2  3.73(2)  0.01(2)  6.13(2)*  0.45(2) 
3  6.25(3)  0.26(3)  7.78(3)  0.78(3) 
White  Heteroskedasticity  Test  -Z' 
-------------------------  Equation  --------- 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
6.31(5)  6.38(5)  6.36(5) 
darque-Bera  Normality  Test  -j 
-------------------------  Equation  --------- 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
1.26(2)  1.14(2)  0.94(2) 
(4) 
9.33(9) 
(4) 
1.26(2) 
Ramsey  RESET  Test  of  Specification  Error  (F-Statistics) 
-------------------------  Equation  ----------------------------- 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
RESET(2)  0.37(1,24)  0.30(1,24)  1.25(1,24)  0.30(1,23) 
RESET(3)  0.21(2,23)  0.27(2,23)  0.79(2,23)  0.34(2,22) 
RESET(4)  0.40(3,22)  0.18(3,22)  1.12(3,22)  0.56(3,21) 
Chow  Testfor  Structural  Change  (F-Statistics) 
-------------------------  Equation  ----------------------------- 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.20(3,22)  0.25(3,22)  0.39(3,22)  0.48(4,20) 
Equation  1:  Solow  residual  dependent  variable;  core  infrastructure  independent  variable. 
Equation  2:  Core  investment  dependent  variable. 
Equation  3:  Solow  residual  dependent  variable-,  total  infrastructure  independent  variable. 
Equation  4:  Total  investment  dependent  variable;  Solow  residual  independent  variable. 
*  Rejection  of  the  relevant  null  hypothesis  (serial  independence,  homoskedasticity,  normality.  no 
specification  error,  no  structural  break)  at  the  5%  level.  Degrees  of  freedom  in  parentheses. 
Chow  tests  were  also  employed  to  check  the  temporal  stability  of  the  models.  The 
Chow  test  corresponds  to  the  midpoint  of  the  sample.  Farley,  Hinich  and  McGuire 
(  1975)  show  that  the  power  of  the  Chow  test  is  maxinused  when  the  sample  is  split  at 214 
the  midpoint.  The  null  hypothesis  that  the  two  sets  of  regression  coefficients  are 
equivalent  is  rejected  if  the  computed  F-statistic  exceeds  the  critical  value  for  (K  +  1) 
numerator  and  (TI  +  T2-  2K  -  2)  denominator  degrees  of  freedom,  where  K  is  the 
number  of  independent  variables,  T,  is  the  number  of  observations  in  the  first  sample 
and  T2is  the  number  of  observations  in  the  second  sample.  The  results  indicate  that  all 
of  the  equations  have  stable  parameters  over  the  sample  period. 
3.7  Discussion  ofResults 
The  coefficient  estimates  that  are  of  most  interest  are  those  which  quantify  the  impact 
of  core  and  total  investment  on  productivity  growth.  Although  it  is  to  be  expected  that 
total  investment  is  less  significant  than  spending  on  the  productive  core,  it  is  surprising 
that  total  investment  is  only  significant  at  the  10  per  cent  level  (for  both  the  Mest  and 
Wald  test).  After  all,  more  than  half  of  this  measure  is  directly  productive.  Turning  to 
the  size  of  the  coefficient  estimates,  they  imply  that  aI  percentage  point  increase  in  the 
growth  rate  of  core  infrastructure  investment  leads  to  an  increase  of  0.114  in  the 
growth  rate  of  total  factor  productivity  in  the  following  year.  AI  percentage  point 
increase  in  the  growth  rate  of  total  infrastructure  investment  leads  to  an  increase  of 
0.095  in  the  growth  rate  of  TFP  in  the  following  period.  The  parameter  estimates  and 
tests  of  structural  change  overturn  suggestions  from  some  analysts  that  public  capital 
increases  the  productivity  of  private  inputs  but  with  diminishing  returns  (for  example, 
Fox  and  Murray,  1993,  in  particular  cite  a  number  of  studies  showing  diminishing 
returns  ftom  infrastructure  investments).  Thus  public  sector  investment  may  have  not 
only  contributed  substantially  to  the  growth  of  factor  productivity  in  the  past,  but  as 
the  stock  of  public  capital  has  grown,  the  effect  of  additional  investment  appears  to 
have  been  positive  and  significant. 215 
It  is  to  be  expected  that  the  estimate  from  the  core  model  is  greater  than  the  estimate 
from  the  total  model.  If  core  investment  growth  were  identical  to  the  growth  in  other 
investment  the  estimates  would  be  the  same.  However,  over  the  sample  period  there 
were  years  when  core  and  other  investment  were  growing  at  very  different  rates.  For 
example,  in  seven  years  of  the  sample  period,  one  measure  experienced  positive 
growth  while  the  other  experienced  negative  growth.  'O  The  estimate  of  V2,  on 
A  Ot  implies  that  an  increase  in  the  TFP  growth  rate  of  I  percentage  point  leads  to  an 
increase  in  the  growth  rate  of  infrastructure  investment  of  1.2  percentage  points  in  the 
following  period. 
3.8  Causality  Tests  -  Disaggregated  Inftastructure  Data 
In  this  section  the  FPE  Criterion  is  applied  to  determine  whether  the  different  types  of 
core  infrastructure  (roads,  water  structures,  sewer  structures  and  other  structures) 
cause  or  are  caused  by  the  TFP  growth  rate.  Table  7  is  similar  to  Table  2  in  the  sense 
that  it  reports  the  minimum  FPEs  calculated  using  each  variable's  own  lags,  FPE(m*), 
and  the  minimum  FPEs  obtained  by  also  including  another  variable,  FPE(m*,  n*).  If 
FPE(m  *,  n  *)  <  FPE(m  *)  then  there  is  a  causal  relationship  between  the  variables.  The 
first  set  of  FPEs  tests  whether  there  is  a  causal  relationship  from  the  infrastructure 
growth  rate  to  the  TFP  growth  rate.  The  minimum  FPEs  imply  that  only  highway  and 
street  investment  affects  TFP.  Turning  to  the  tests  for  reverse  causality,  it  is  apparent 
again  that  the  different  infrastructure  measures  generate  different  results.  While  growth 
in  TFP  seems  to  lead  to  growth  in  investment  in  highways  and  water  and  sewer 
systems,  it  does  not  cause  investment  in  other  structures. 
30  The  relevant  years  were  1959,1962.1973,1974.1976,1978.  and  1984. 216 
Table  7.  Optimum  Lags  ofManipulated  Variable  and  the  FPE  of  the  Controlled 
Variable  (Disaggregated  Inftastructure  Data) 
Controlled  Manipulated  Optimum  Lag, 
Ia 
e  Variab,  Variable  Manipulated 
b  FPE(m  *,  n  FpE(  m 
Variable 
Solow 
Residual 
A  ot  (1)  AiH 
t 
1  0.000210*  0.000252 
A  ot  (1)  mw 
t  1  0.000268  0.000252 
A  Ot  (1)  Als 
t  1  0.000267  0.000252 
A  ot  (1)  AI0 
t  1  0.000267  0.000252 
Reverse 
Causality 
xH  (2) 
t 
AO  2  0.002043*  0.002270 
t 
AItw  (1)  Aot  4  0.016218*  0.017957 
Aits  (1)  Aot  2  0.019719*  0.021565 
Aito  (1)  A  Ot  1  0.019598  0.018863 
'The  number  in  brackets  indicates  the  order  of  the  autoregressive  operator  on  the  controlled  variable. 
b  The  FPEs  in  the  FPE(mtn*)  column  are  the  minimum  ones  obtained  from  inclusion  of  different 
lags  on  the  manipulated  variables.  Asterisks  signify  that  there  is  a  causal  relationship  from  the 
manipulated  variable  to  the  controlled  variable.  AI  H  is  the  growth  rate  of  investment  in  highways  and  t 
streets,  AI  w  is  the  growth  rate  of  water  structures,  AI  s  is  the  growth  rate  of  sewer  structures  and  tt 
0  is  the  growth  rate  of  other  structures.  Alt 
3.9  Discussion  of  Results 
It  is  surprising  that  road  investment  is  the  only  type  of  public  investment  that  affects 
manufacturing  productivity.  In  Chapter  3  the  other  components  of  core  infrastructure 
were  shown  to  have  a  significant  effect  on  private  sector  costs.  It  is  to  be  expected  that 
the  services  of  certain  public  utilities  and  mass  transit  will  also  affect  productivity.  The 
causality  test  results  reported  in  Table  7  do  not  reveal  whether  the  variables  have  a 
positive  or  negative  effect  on  each  other.  It  is  possible,  for  example,  that  road 
investment  has  a  negativ--  o-ffeclt  on  the  TFP  growth  rate.  For  example,  it  may  be  that 
the  m,  crage  effect  of  highway  and  street  capital  is  positive,  but  that  the  marginal 217 
effect,  given  the  current  stock,  is  negative.  Or  it  may  be  that  greater  highway 
expenditures  are  responses  to  deteriorating  road  quality  and  represent  declining 
services  from  roads.  These  issues  will  be  resolved  in  the  next  section  when  the  relevant 
autoregressive  model  is  estimated. 
The  reverse  causality  results  contradict  the  causality  test  results  obtained  earlier 
using  aggregate  data.  The  finding  there  was  that  productivity  caused  total  investment 
but  not  core  investment.  However,  the  results  reported  in  Table  7  indicate  that  three  of 
the  four  components  of  core  infrastructure  investment  are  caused  by  the  growth  rate  of 
TFP-  When  the  disaggregated  model  is  estimated  in  the  next  section  it  will  also  be 
shown  that  these  components  of  core  infrastructure  spending  are  affected  both 
positively  and  negatively  by  the  TFP  growth  rate. 
3.10  Estimating  Inftastructure's  Impact  on  Productivity  -  Disaggregated 
Inftastructure  Data 
The  next  step  is  to  estimate  the  impact  of  investment  in  roads  on  TFP.  However,  this 
time  the  construction  of  the  models  is  made  complicated  by  the  fact  that  there  are  four 
variables  (AO,,  AIH,  AIw,  and  Als  ).  In  determining  the  optimum  number  of  lags  for 
each  variable  it  has  to  be  decided  in  which  order  they  are  added  to  the  equation.  To  do 
this  I  use  the  "specific  gravity"  criterion  of  Caines,  Keng  and  Sethi  (1981).  The 
variable  that  generated  the  smallest  FPE  when  included  as  a  manipulated  variable  is 
included  first.  In  the  next  stage  the  variable  with  the  next-smallest  FPE  is  added  one 
lag  at  a  time  and  the  FPE  is  recalculated.  The  lag  length  that  generates  the  smallest 
FPE  enters  the  estimating  model.  The  outcomes  of  this  procedure,  applied  to  all  the 
equations  in  the  model,  are  summarised  in  Table  8. 218 
Table  8.  Construction  of  Estimating  Model,  Disaggregated  Inftastructure  Data 
(1) 
Dependent  Variable,  AOt 
Controlled  Variable  Manipulated  Variable 
, 
Ai  H  A  Ot  (1) 
t 
(2) 
Dependent  Variable,  AIH  t 
Controlled  Variable  Manipulated  Variable 
mH  (2)  A  0,  (2) 
t 
(3) 
Dependent  Variable,  AItw 
Controlled  Variables  Manipulated  Variable 
w  AI,  (1),  A  0'  (4)  A  Is  (2) 
t 
(4) 
Dependent  Variable,  Al' 
t 
Controlled  Variables  Manipulated  Variable 
FPE(m  *,  n  *)  FPE(m  *) 
0.0002  lo*a  0.000252 
FPE(m  tn  *)  FPE(m  *) 
0.0020428*  0.0022703 
FPE(m  tn  *lP  *)  b  FPE(m  tn  *) 
0.015477*  0.016218 
FPE(mtn*,  p*)  FPE(m*,  n*) 
'MS 
w 
, 
(1),  AI,  (4)  A  0,  (4)  0.0  12831  0.016117 
Asterisks  signify  causality,  bp*  is  the  optimum  lag  for  variable  3. 
Notes: 
1.  Model  consists  of  four  equations:  (1)  The  effect  of  road  investment  on  TFP;  (2)-(4)  The  effect  of 
different  types  of  public  investment  on  TFP.  The  model  also  takes  account  of  possible  causal 
relationships  among  the  three  infrastructure  variables. 
2.  Equation  (1)  only  contains  AI  H  because  the  FPEs  in  Table  24  indicate  that  the  other  types  of  I 
investment  do  not  Granger  cause  productivity. 
3.  Equation  (2)  contains  AO,  because  the  bivariate  FPE  with  this  variable  is  lower  than  the 
univariate  one  using  only  AIH 
. 
Bivariate  regressions  with  Xw  and  AP  produce  minimum  FPEs 
ItI 
of  0.0024105  and  0.0024071  respectively,  ie  higher  than  the  univariate  FPE.  Therefore  these 
variables  are  excluded. 
4.  Equation  (3)  contains  A0t  and  AI,  8  because  the  bivariate  FPEs  are  lower  than  the  univariate  one. 
AOt  's  FPE  is  the  minimum  one  (0.016218  compared  with  0.016555  for  AI,  3)  so  that  variable 
enters  the  model  first.  FPEs  are  than  recalculated  by  adding  lags  ofAI,  8,  one  at  a  time.  The 
minimum  FPE  (0.015477)  is  obtained  using  two  lags. 
5.  Equation  (4)  contains  AI,  Y  and  AO,  because  the  bivariate  FPEs  are  lower  than  the  univariate  one. 
AI,  w's  is  the  lower  of  the  two  (0.016117  versus  0.019719  for  AOt)  so  that  variable  enters  the 
model  first.  FPEs  are  than  recalculated  by  adding  lags  of  AO, 
,  one  at  a  time.  The  minimum  FPE 
(0.0  1283  1)  is  obtained  using  four  lags. 219 
Table  9.  Estimation  Results,  Disaggregated  Inftastructure  Data 
----------------  Dependent  Variable  ---------------- 
AO 
t 
AiH 
t 
MW 
t 
Aits 
Ao 
I 
0.119  -0.973*  1.949**  2.335** 
t-  (0.70)  (1.65)  (2.09)  (2.40) 
Ao 
2  0.893**  2.246*  3.424*** 
t- 
(2.55)  (1.78)  (3.13) 
Aot-3  -0.279  -1.418 
(0.32)  (1.65) 
Aof-4  -2.05*  1.409 
(1.72)  (1.47) 
, 
mH 
I  0.113***  0.324*** 
t- 
(2.64)  (2.66) 
xH 
2  0.450*** 
t- 
(3.89) 
, 
mw 
I 
0.207 
. 
306** 
t-  (1.13)  (2.56) 
'W 
2  -0.606***  t-  (4.68) 
, mw  3  0.060 
t- 
(0.50) 
Aiw  4  -0.446***  t- 
(3.75) 
'MS  I  -0.062  -0.264*** 
t-  (0.30)  (2.96) 
AIS  2  -0.317**  t- 
(2.02) 
Constant  0.005*  -0.001  0.022  0.03  1 
(1.50)  (0.16)  (1.25)  (1.82) 
R2  0.224  0.478  0.423  0.705 
S.  E.  0.013  0.039  0.094  0.081 
Note:  H,  W  and  S  denote  highways  and  streets,  water  and  sewers  respectively;  t-stats  in  parentheses 
and  are  computed  using  heteroskedastic-consistent  standard  errors. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  I%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  5%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  10  %  level. 
This  modelling  procedure  produces  the  following  estimating  model 
AO  'aý  'Vl',  (L)  yf  10  AOt  ut 
t  12 
0 
11  b200  AIt 
H 
vt 
t+2  22  +  (40) 
pf,  42 
tcV  31 
0  Vf  33  34(L) 
Alt  w 
'C' 
441 
AI  s 
\, 
d 
ý',  Y/  I 
(L)  0  V44(L))  AIs 
t4 
Y143(L)  t 220 
Table  10.  Wald  Testsfor  Zero  Restrictions 
Joint  Lags 
-  Coefficient  Sums 
Eguation  Test  Value  Test  Value 
I 
12(L)  =07.06(1)***  n/a  n/a 
H22 
21(L)  =07.55(2)**  i  E  V/21  =00.03(l) 
t=1 
, mw 
44 
V/ 
31(L)  =0  13.25(4)**  =00.32(l) 
V/ 
2  (L)  =05.51(2)*  34  VI'34  =03.22(1)* 
V/ 
4 
l(L)  =V2  n/a  n/a  3  34(L)  0  23.00(6)*** 
xs  4 
22.00(4)*** 
4 
4.80(1)** 
V141(L)  =0  YI'41  =0 
4  4 
V43(L)  =0  48.39(4)***  =0  6.98(1)***  41 
44 
V141(L)=  Vf43(L)  =0  79.30(8)***  n/a  n/a 
Note:  Degrees  of  freedom  in  parentheses. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  I%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  5%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  10  %  level. 
The  results  from  estimating  the  model  using  SUR  are  reported  in  Table  9.  Wald  tests 
that  the  off-diagonal  terms  in  (40)  are  zero  reject  in  favour  of  the  variables  chosen  by 
the  FPE  Criterion  (Table  10).  Some  of  the  lags  of  individual  variables  have  different 
signs,  however.  Therefore,  I  also  examine  whether  coefficient  sums  on  lagged  variables 
are  significantly  different  from  zero.  The  sum  of  the  coefficients  on  AO  in  the  AIt5 
equation  is  significantly  different  from  zero.  The  sums  of  the  AO  coefficients  in  the 
AIt'  and  AIt'  equations  are  insignificantly  different  from  zero,  indicatng  that  the 
overall  effect  of  the  TFP  growth  rate  on  public  investment  may  be  ambiguous  in  terms 
of  the  direction  of  the  effects,  despite  the  significance  of  the  joint  tests  of  the  lag 
distributions.  Closer  inspection  of  the  coefficients  reveals  a  negative  impact  of  AO  on 
AI,  '  for  the  first  lagged  value  and  a  positive  impact  for  the  second  lagged  value.  In  the 
Al,  "'  equation,  the  first  two  lags  of  A  0,  have  a  positive  impact,  the  second  two  have  a 221 
neg  ive  impact.  To  gain  further  insights  into  the  Solow  residual's  relationship  with 
public  investment,  further  tests  were  conducted  to  determine  the  joint  significance  of 
the  first  two  lags  in  the  AP  equation  (and  their  sum)  and  the  second  two  lags  (and  t 
their  sum).  The  respective  i  test  statistics  are  6.22  (2  degrees  of  freedom),  6.22  (1 
degree  of  freedom),  4.59  (2  degrees  of  freedom)  and  2.77  (1  degree  of  freedom).  The 
latter  two  statistics  are  only  significant  at  the  10  per  cent  level.  Thus  there  is  some 
evidence  that  the  TFP  growth  rate  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  growth  rate  of  water 
system  investment  after  the  first  and  second  years  and  a  negative  effect  after  the  third 
and  fourth  years.  Tests  were  also  conducted  on  the  first  and  second  lags  of  AO  in  the 
IH 
,  equation.  The  respective  J  statistics  are  3.50  (1  degree  of  freedom)  and  4.77 
(I  degree  of  freedom),  indicating  again  that  TFP  has  a  negative  effect  foRowed  by  a 
positive  effect.  These  findings  are  discussed  below.  Further  diagnostic  tests  on  the 
equations  in  the  model  reveal  that  the  disturbances  are  serially  uncorrelated, 
homoskedastic  and  normally  distributed  and  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  structural  break 
in  the  sample  or  of  specification  error  (Table  11). 
11  Discussion  of  Results 
The  coefficient  estimate  of  0.113  on  AI,  '  is  almost  identical  to  the  estimate  on 
xC 
, 
(0.114)  in  the  aggregate  infrastructure  model.  Although  roads  were  shown  to  be 
the  only  productive  type  of  core  infrastructure,  they  make  up,  on  average,  60  per  cent 
of  the  aggregate  measure  and  so  the  growth  rate  of  roads  dominates  the  growth  rate  of 
the  core  infrastructure  variable.  However,  use  of  disaggregated  data  leads  to  a  rise  in 
the  significance  of  the  infrastructure  variable  and  a  near  doubling  of  the  R2  of  the 
productivity  equation. 222 
Table  11.  Diagnostic  Tests  on  Individual  Equations 
Breusch-Godftey  LM  Testsfor  Serial  Correlation  -  X' 
----------  --------  Dependent  Variable  ------------------- 
AO  t 
AiH 
t 
mw 
t  'Ais  t 
Order:  I  0.10(i)  0.00(i)  0.03(l)  1.35(l) 
2  1.95(2)  0.25(2)  0.19(2)  1.94(2) 
3  4.86(3)  2.80(3)  0.03(3)  1.32(3) 
White  Heteroskedasticity  Test  -;  e 
------------------  Dependent  Variable  ------------------ 
AO  AiH  Ns 
tt  Aitw 
t 
8.59(5)  12.9(14)  n/a  n/a 
Jarque-Bera  Normality  Test  -j 
------------------  Dependent  Variable  ------------------ 
AOt  AItH  Altv  Ai 
tS 
0.76(2)  0.31(2)  5.11(2)  2.12(2) 
Ramsey  RESET  Test  of  Specification  Error  (F-Statistics) 
------------------  Dependent  Variable  ------------------ 
AO 
AIH  AIw  'Ais  ttt 
RESET(2)  0.05(1,24)  0.01(1,22)  1.08(1,19)  0.43(1,17) 
RESET(3)  1.21(2,23)  0.00(2,21)  1.05(2,18)  0.27(2,16) 
RESET(4)  0.83(3,22)  0.20(3,20)  0.67(3,17)  0.40(3,15) 
Chow  Testfor  Structural  Change  (F-Statistics) 
---------------------  Dependent  Variable  --------------------- 
AO  AiH  mw  Ais 
tttt 
0.33(3,22)  1.70(5,18)  0.07(8,12)  2.53(10,8) 
*  Rejection  of  the  relevant  null  hypothesis  (serial  independence,  homoskedasticity.  normality.  no 
specification  error.  no  structural  break)  at  the  5%  level.  Degrees  of  freedom  in  parentheses. 
n/a  Insufficient  degrees  of  freedom  to  conduct  test. 223 
Table  12.  Summary  of  Causality  Tests 
--------------------------  Infrastructure  Variable  -----------------------------  AiT  AIc 
AJH  A[w  AIS  'Alo  tttttt 
AI  T 
'Aj 
HA0  AI0  A01  AIC  =*  Ao  Alw  AO  AIS  ýC=  Ao  4A  AO  tttIIIfI 
Note:  T  denotes  total  infrastructure  investment  and  C  denotes  core  investment.  H,  W,  S  and  0  are  the 
different  components  of  core  investment  (Highways  and  Streets,  Water,  Sewers  and  Other  structures 
respectively) 
Like  the  estimate  on  the  core  infrastructure  variable,  the  estimate  on  Al,  '  implies  that 
an  increase  in  the  growth  rate  of  road  investment  of  I  percentage  point  increases  the 
growth  rate  of  total  factor  productivity  by  just  over  one-tenth  of  I  percentage  point  in 
the  following  period.  The  coefficient  estimates  obtained  using  aggregate and 
disaggregated  data  attribute  to  infrastructure  a  smaller  role  in  the  determination  of 
productivity  growth  than  some  of  the  production  function  studies  whose  results  were 
discussed  in  Chapter  1.  However,  the  estimates  are  similar  in  size  to  the  output  and 
cost  elasticities  obtained  by  authors  who  use  regional  data  or  solely  manufacturing  data 
(eg,  Munnell  1993  and  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas,  1994). 
The  estimates  on  lagged  A  0,  terms  do  not  make  much  sense  from  an  economic 
standpoint.  Wald  tests  of  the  estimates  in  the  AIHand  AIw  equations  establish  that  in  t 
certain  periods  increases  in  the  TFP  growth  rate  lead  to  increases  in  investment 
growth;  in  other  periods  the  effect  is  negative.  This  implies  that  certain  types  of 
infrastructure  are  both  normal  and  inferior  goods. 
Thus  far  causality  tests  have  been  performed  using  three  infrastructure 
aggregates.  The  results  of  Table  2  and  Table  7  are  surnmarised  in  Table  12.  It  is  not 
surprising  that  some  types  of  infrastructure  investment  affect  the  productivity  growth 
rate  more  than  others.  However,  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  the  evidence  of  reverse 224 
causation.  TFP  growth  causes  spending  on  some  types  of  infrastructure  but  not  on 
others.  Furthermore,  the  results  are  not  robust  to  the  use  of  data  at  different  levels  of 
aggregation.  In  summary,  it  is  difficult  from  the  evidence  presented  in  this  section  to 
support  the  view  stated  by  a  number  of  infrastructure  researchers  that  the  TFP  growth 
rate  causes  public  investment.  In  the  next  section  the  focus  moves  temporarily  away 
from  causality  testing  and  the  estimation  of  autoregressive  models  to  the  companson 
of  different  methods  of  measuring  multifactor  productivity. 
4.  Alternative  TFP  Measures 
4.1  Introduction 
The  causality  tests  and  estimations  carried  out  in  Section  3  provide  interesting  new 
evidence  concerning  infrastructure's  effect  on  productivity  growth.  The  stated  view  of 
certain  infrastructure  researchers  that  there  is  a  one-way  relationship  from  productivity 
to  infrastructure  is  overturned  -  two  aggregate  infrastructure  measures  were  found  to 
influence  the  productivity  growth  rate  over  the  sample  period.  Use  of  disaggregated 
data  reveals  which  types  of  infrastructure  are  the  most  productive  -  contrary  to 
expectations,  only  roads  are  productive.  Use  of  different  infrastructure  measures  also 
reveals  certain  ambiguities  with  respect  to  the  "reverse  relationship"  between  the 
variables.  The  results  are  not  sensitive  to  the  use  of  alternative  lag-length  selection 
criteria  or  different  causality  testing  procedures. 
Little  mention  has  been  made  of  the  other  variable  in  the  analysis,  namely  the 
productivity  growth  rate.  Although  the  SoLcw  residual  has  been  used  in  many 
infrastructure  studies,  it  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  the  residual  possibly  doesn't 225 
provi  e  an  accurate  measure  of  the  "true"  productivity  growth  rate.  In  this  section 
alternative  measures  of  TFP  are  derived  and  the  relationship  with  infrastructure  is  re- 
examined.  Hall  (1990)  argues  that  the  Solow  residual  does  not  reflect  true  efficiency 
changes  because  it  fails  the  Invariance  Theorem: 
"Under  Solow's  assumptions  the  following  theorem  holds:  The  productivity 
residual  is  uncorrelated  with  any  variable  that  is  uncorrelated  with  the  rate 
of  growth  of  true  productivity  (his  italics).  The  theorem  is  just  a  restatement 
of  Solow's  basic  result  that  the  residual  measures  the  shift  of  the  production 
function.  It  says  in  particular  that  productivity  growth  should  be  uncorrelated 
with  any  variable  that  is  a  driving  force  for  output,  provided  that  the  variable 
is  not  one  that  shifts  the  production  function.  For  example,  in  the  face  of  an 
exogenous  upward  shift  in  the  demand  for  a  particular  industry"s  output,  the 
productivity  of  that  industry  should  remain  unchanged.  Or,  if  the  price  of  one 
of  the  factors  used  by  the  industry  rises  sharply,  productivity  should  also 
remain  unchanged.  Among  U.  S.  industries  the  Solow  residual  is  correlated 
with  exogenous  product  demand  and  factor  price  movements.  The  invanance 
property  fails  conspicuously.  "  (p.  71) 
There  are  several  explanations  for  the  failure.  Some  are  related  to  the  fact  that  true 
productivity  growth  may  not  fail  invariance  but  because  of  certain  restrictive 
assumptions  (such  as  perfect  competition  and  constant  returns  to  scale)  and 
mismeasurement  of  factor  inputs,  the  measured  residual  fails  invariance.  Other 
explanations  are  related  to  the  fact  that  true  productivity  growth  may  be  procyclical. 
For  example,  Caballero  and  Lyons  (1989)  conclude  that  externalities  rather  than 
increasing  returns  within  industries  are  the  most  important  source  of  failure  of  the 226 
invariance  of  the  Solow  residual.  Diamond  (1982)  discusses  how  thick-market 
externalities  generate  increasing  returns  even  though  each  firm  may  have  constant 
returns.  In  this  section  the  merits  of  some  of  the  competing  hypotheses  are  evaluated 
and  a  measure  of  TFP  growth  is  derived  that  takes  account  of  considerations 
pertammg  to  market  power,  non-constant  returns  to  scale  and  variable  factor  utilisation 
over  the  cycle.  The  adjusted  measure  of  TFP  growth  is  used  to  generate  new 
qualitative  and  quantitative  evidence  concerning  infrastructure's  relationship  with  the 
productivity  growth  rate.  This  exercise  is  interesting  not  only  because  it  allows  one  to 
get  closer  to  the  true  relationship  between  infrastructure  and  productivity  but  also 
because  it  allows  the  results  to  be  compared  with  those  obtained  using  the  Solow 
residual  -  the  TFP  measure  of  preference  in  the  infrastructure  literature. 
4.2  Deriving  TFP  -  Cost  Shares 
Invariance  of  the  original  Solow  residual  may  fail  because  of  market  power  coupled 
with  constant  returns  or  because  entry  is  free,  but  the  technology  has  increasing 
returns.  According  to  Hall  (1990),  a  simple  strategy  can  be  used  to  distinguish  between 
the  two  explanations- 
"Under  constant  returns  to  scale  (no  fixed  costs)  the  telltale  cyclical 
behaviour  of  the  Solow  residual  should  disappear  once  a  simple 
modification  is  made  in  the  computation  of  the  residual.  The  modification  is 
to  measure  labour's  share  in  relation  to  cost  rather  than  revenue.  Because 
cost  will  be  lower  than  revenue,  the  cost-based  share  will  exceed  the 
revenue-based  share;  the  cyclicality  of  the  Solow  residual  will  vanish  once  a 
higher  share  is  applied  to  labour  growth.  On  the  other  hand,  with  fixed 227 
costs  and  free  entry,  revenue  and  cost  will  be  the  same,  so  the  cost-based 
Solow  residual  will  have  the  same  cyclical  behaviour  as  the  original 
revenue-based  one.  When  the  cost-based  Solow  residual  has  almost  as  large 
a  failure  of  invariance  as  the  original  residual,  it  means  that  technology  has 
increasing  returns.  "  (p.  75) 
To  derive  TFP  using  cost  shares,  Hall  (1990)  assumes  that  marginal  cost  A  is 
unobservable  as  the  market  price  of  output,  PQ.  If  average  cost  (AC)  is  given  by 
ACý  Tcl(?  ý  (PLL  +  PAN  +PKK)IQ, 
and  substituted  for  A  in  (15),  the  residual  becomes 
A0t  -  Aq,  - 
PL  L 
-Alt  - 
Pmm 
PLL+PmM+PKK 
PKK 
(42) 
PLL+PmM+PKK 
Am,  -  PLL+PmM+PKK 
Ak 
'« 
In  terms  of  my  other  notation,  the  TFP  growth  rate  can  be  expressed  as 
AO'  =  Aq,  -  aL'Al,  -  am'Am,  -a 
K"Akt  (43) 
tttt 
where  a"  - 
PL  LaM,  Pm  M 
and  t  PLL  +  PmM  +  PKK'  PLL+PmM+PKK 
K' 
=(I-aL'-am' 
PKK 
ttt  PLL+PmM+PKK 
Unlike  the  original  Solow  residual,  the  cost-based  residual  measures  shifts  of  the 
production  function  in  the  presence  of  market  power.  It  may  be  that  the  measure  of 
TFP  used  in  Section  3  (and  a  number  of  infrastructure  studies,  for  that  matter)  records 
false  movements  of  the  production  function  for  firms  with  market  power,  even  in  the 
presence  of  constant  returns  to  scale.  When  revenue  exceeds  cost,  because  of  pure 
monopoly  profit,  the  revenue  share  of  labour  understates  the  elasticity  of  output  with 
respect  to  labour  input.  When  some  exogenous  event  raises  labour  input  relative  to 228 
capital  input,  the  revenue-based  Solow  residual  fails  to  account  for  all  of  the  increase 
in  output  because  it  gives  too  little  weight  to  tabour. 
Hall  (1990)  performs  a  number  of  estimations  to  test  the  invariance  of  the 
original  and  cost-based  Solow  residual.  Each  TFP  measure  is  regressed  on  one  of  three 
instruments:  the  growth  rate  of  the  world  price  of  oil,  the  growth  rate  of  military 
spending  and  a  dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  I  when  the  President  is  a 
Democrat  and  0  when  the  President  is  a  Republican.  "  The  oil  price  instrument 
provides  the  strongest  evidence  against  invariance  -  in  most  of  the  one-digit  industries 
and  a  large  number  of  two-digit  industries,  changes  in  the  world  oil  price  coincide  with 
changes  in  TFP.  Hall  (1990)  concludes  that: 
"Because  factor  prices  do  not  shift  production  functions,  this  finding  is  a 
paradox  within  the  assumptions  of  Solow's  approach  to  productivity 
measurement.  "  (p.  86) 
Furthermore,  the  results  for  the  original  and  cost-based  residuals  are  very  similar, 
pointing  to  the  absence  of  large  monopoly  profits.  If  there  is  market  power,  Hall 
argues  that  it  is  probably  offset  by  fixed  costs  or  other  types  of  increasing  returns. 
These  Instruments  are  chosen  because  they  should  cause  irtipo.  nt  movements  in  output  but  "tj  be 
uncorrelated  with  the  random  fluctuations  in  productivit-NI  growth. 229 
Table  13.  How  the  Perfect  Competition  Assumption  May 
Cause  Mismeasurement  of  TFP 
Weighted  Input  Growth 
Case  I 
aL=0.7  aL=0.6  tt 
Al,  =21.4  1.2 
At  =30.9  1.2 
%AInputs  2.3  2.4 
Case  2 
Al,  =32.1  1.8 
Ak,  =20.6  0.8 
%AInputs  2.7  2.6 
4.3  Deriving  TFP  -  Market  Power 
Before  deriving  a  measure  of  TFP  that  takes  account  of  increasing  returns  to  scale,  it  is 
worth  taking  a  closer  look  at  how  failure  to  take  account  of  market  power  may  cause 
mismeasurement  of  the  productivity  growth  rate.  To  the  extent  that  firms  are  not  price 
takers  but  can  set  PQ  >  MC,  aL  from  (19)  understates  labour's  elasticity  of  output  and  t 
am  underestimates  the  elasticity  of  materials.  32  If  capital's  revenue  share  is  calculated  t 
as  the  residual  I-aL-  am  its  output  elasticity  is  overstated.  The  overall  effect  on  tt5, 
TFP  growth  depends  on  whether  the  labour  and  material  inputs  are  growing  faster  than 
capital.  To  see  the  effect  of  under-  or  overstating  input  shares,  consider  the  example 
contained  in  Table  13.  It  is  assumed  for  simplicity  that  value-added  output  is  produced 
12  Noting  that  the  elasticity  of  the  production  function  with  respect  to  labour,  for  example,  is  expressed 
as 
c.  F  L 
"": 
PL  L 
C -LQ  A0 230 
using  two  inputs,  labour  and  capital.  Assume  labour's  true  output  elasticity  is  0.7 
(capital  0.3).  Use  of  revenue  shares  may  lead  to  it  being  assigned  a  number  of,  for 
example,  0.6  (with  capital  claiming  the  residual,  0.4).  If,  as  in  case  1,  labour  input 
grows  by  2  per  cent  and  capital  by  3  per  cent,  the  true  weighted  input  growth  is  2.3  per 
cent.  This  compares  with  input  growth  of  2.4  per  cent  calculated  using  revenue  shares. 
The  incorrect  measure  of  input  growth  causes  productivity  growth  to  be 
underestimated,  since  it  is  by  definition  equal  to  output  growth  minus  weighted  input 
growth.  If  instead  labour  input  is  growing  at  a  faster  rate  than  capital,  the  false 
measure  underestimates  input  growth  and  hence  overstates  true  productivity  growth. 
If  the  assumption  of  zero  market  power  is  relaxed  the  mark  up  of  price  over  marginal 
cost  can  be  expressed  as 
PQ 
(44) 
A 
Substituting  the  value  of  A  into  the  sources-of-growth  equation  (15)  gives 
0  PL  LL  PmM  M  P,,  K  K 
-  +p  --  +p  +p  (45) 
PQQ  L  PQQ  M  PQQ  K' 
which  in  terms  of  our  other  notation  can  be  written  as 
LK 
Aq,  -  AO,  +  pa,  Al,  +  pa"Am,  +,  ua  Ak,  (46) 
tt 
Subtracting  aLAIt  +  amAm,  +  a'Ak,  from  both  sides  and  rearranging,  a  new  measure 
ttt 
of  TFP  growth  is  obtained: 
A03  =  Aq,  -a 
L'Alt  -a 
mAmt  -a 
K'Akt 
tttt 
(,  u  -  1)[a  L  (Alt  -  Ak,  )+am  (Am,  -  Ak,  )]. 
t 
(47) 
The  first  three  tenns  on  the  right-hand  side  represent  the  Solow  residual  under  the 
assumption  of  perfect  competition.  In  the  absence  of  mark(-.,  lower  p=I  and  the 
right-hand  side  collapses  to  the  original  Solow  residual,  which  is  now  denoted  A  0" 231 
AO'  =  Aq  _  aLAIt  -amAm  -atAk  tttttt 
In  the  presence  of  market  power,  the  term  (p  -  ])[.  ]shows  the  extent  of  over-  or 
under-measurement  of  the  original  Solow  residual.  Following  on  from  the  example 
containe  n  Table  13,  this  depends  on  whether  there  is  an  increase  or  decrease  in  the 
labour/capital  ratio  or  the  materials/capital  ratio. 
4.4  Deriving  TFP  -  Cost  Shares  and  Increasing  Returns  to  Scale 
The  second  assumption  used  by  Solow  (1957)  can  also  be  dropped  and  total  factor 
productivity  can  be  derived  in  the  presence  of  increasing  returns  to  scale  (IRS).  Over 
all  levels  of  output  increasing  returns  to  scale  implies  average  cost  exceeds  marginal 
cost  (ie,  AC  >  MC)  and  thus  firms  must  have  market  power  if  they  are  to  cover  their 
total  costs.  As  mentioned  in  4.2,  use  of  cost  shares  accommodates  potential  market 
power.  To  also  incorporate  increasing  returns  the  firms  cost  minimisation  problem  has 
to  be  solved.  As  Silberberg  (1978)  shows,  if  the  production  function 
Q-  OF(L,  M,  K)  is  homogeneous  of  degree  v  in  L,  M  and  K,  the  cost  function,  C*,. 
can  be  partitioned  into 
C*  (PL 
ý- 
PM 
ý, 
PK 
7 
Q)  ý-  Q"l'  -  A(PL,  Pm,  PK)7  (48) 
where  A(P,,  P,,  P,  )  is  a  function  of  factor  prices  only.  The  elasticity  of  C*  with 
respect  to  Q  is 
X*  Q-1  (49) 
CQ  Cr 
X* 
Since  A,  (49)  can  be  expressed  as 232 
2=-  (50) 
where  the  term  C*IQ  is  average  cost,  AC.  Substituting  for  A  in  the  first-order 
conditions  (12)-(14)  gives: 
0-= 
a 
007"  p 
-- 
rj  m(? 
.  and 
CM  C*  (52) 
,  14, 
0--_  KQ 
OX 
(53) 
Substituting  (5l)-(53)  into  (5)  gives 
L'Alt  Aq,  =A0,  +,  va,  +  ra  "  Am,  +,  va  "  Ak, 
tt  (54) 
Subtracting  A  0'  -  Aq,  -a  L'Alt  -a  m'Amt  -a  K'  Ak,  (the  cost-based  residual  derived  tttt 
under  CRS)  from  both  sides  and  rearranging  gives 
A04 
-  Aqt  -a 
L'Alt 
-  am'Amt  -a 
K'Akt 
_ 
(,  v  -  1)[a  L'  Alt  +a  tm'Amt  +a 
K'Akt]. 
(55)  ttttt 
Aizain  to  get  closer  to  the  "true"  productivity  growth  rate,  the  last  term  has  to  be 
subtracted  from  the  cost-based  Solow  residual.  The  productivity  expression  does  not 
provide  explicit  information  regarding  the  mark-up,  p,  since  the  new  shares  can 
accommodate  both  the  perfectly  competitive  case  (where  C*  =  PQQ)  and  the  case  of 
monopoly  power  (where  C*  <  PQQ).  However,  if  y  is  not  unity  it  can  be  concluded 
that  there  is  monopoly  power  in  the  industry. 
Employing  instrumental  variable  (IV)  techniques,  estimates  of  the  returns  to 
scale  parameter  were  obtained  using  data  for  all  20  industries  and  imposing  the  same  v 
across  equations  using  3SLS.  "  Like  the  original  Solow  residual,  the  continuous  time 
33  Usin 
ig 
data  for  all  the  industries  leads  to  a  substantial  Increase  in  the  degrees  of  freedom  In  the 
regression. 233 
formula  has  to  be  modified  for  empirical  purposes  so  that  it  is  valid  in  discrete  time. 
The  following  adjustment  is  made  to  the  cost  shares- 
aL'  =  (aL'  +a 
L' 
1)121, 
-K'  K'  K' 
t  at  =(am'+am)12,,  t  t-  ttI  at  =  (a,  +  at-  1)  /  2,  where 
LL  P  Al 
p 
K' 
a,  tt 
maa-  am')  TC  =  PL  L+  Pm  M+  PKK  TC  TC  TC 
Once  again  a  random  term  v,  is  added  to  reflect  the  stochastic  nature  of  productivity 
growth  and  can  be  viewed  as  the  sum  of  a  constant  underlying  growth  rate  plus  a 
random  component  u, 
The  estimating  equation  is 
Aqt  =  yXt  +  ut  ,  (56) 
L'Al  +- 
-K"Akt 
where  Xt  =  (at 
ta 
'Amt  +a  ).  An  IV  estimator  is  required  because  of  the  tt 
endogeneity  of  the  regressors.  Use  was  made  of  the  set  of  instruments  proposed  by 
Ramey  (1989)  and  Hall  (1990)  and  augmented  by  Caballero  and  Lyons  (1992)  and 
Basu.  (1996).  These  include  the  growth  rate  of  military  spending,  the  growth  rate  of  the 
price  of  oil  (deflated  by  the  prices  of  manufacturing  durables  and  nondurables),  and  the 
political  party  of  the  President.  These  instruments  are  chosen  because  they  cause 
important  movements  in  employment,  material  costs,  capital  accumulation  and  output 
but  are  uncorrelated  with  the  random  component  of  TFP  growth.  Note  that  estimates 
of  r  were  obtained  using  data  for  total  manufacturing  and  two  sub-aggregates  (durable 
manufacturing  and  nondurable  manufacturing).  Estimates  of  1.20,1.18  and  1.15 
respectively  all  point  to  the  existence  of  increasing  returns  to  scale.  34  This  in  turn 
implies  that  the  standard  Solow  residual  provides  an  inaccurate  measure  of  TFP 
34  t-stats  of  51.8.30.2  and  27.0  imply  that  the  estimates  are  significant  at  the  I  per  cent  level  at  least. 234 
growth.  The  growth  rate  of  weighted  input  growth  has  to  be  reduced  by  a  factor  of 
(r  -  1)  - 
The  preceding  estimation  assumes  that  adjusting  for  market  power  and 
increasing  returns  to  scale  will  result  in  a  more  accurate  measure  of  multifactor 
productivity.  However,  as  will  now  be  demonstrated,  there  is  at  least  one  other  reason 
why  the  original  Solow  residual  may  not  measure  true  efficiency  gains. 
4.5.  Adjustingfor  Factor  Utilisation 
Basu  (1996)  argues  that  estimates  of  returns  to  scale  obtained  using  the  above 
framework  are  biased  upwards  by  unobserved  factor  utilisation.  He  builds  on  Hall"s 
measures  of  TFP  growth  by  modifying  the  production  function  (1)  to  include  the  levels 
of  labour  and  capital  utilisation: 
Q,  =  OF(C,  -  L,  M,  Z,  -  Kj,  (57) 
where  C,  is  the  level  of  labour  utilisation  and  Z,  is  the  level  of  capital  utilisation, 
observable  to  the  firm  but  not  to  the  econometrician.  If  productivity  growth  is 
measured  as  output  growth  minus  input  growth,  use  of  only  L,  and  K,  may  lead  to 
overmeasurement  of  inputs  during  a  recession  and  undermeasurement  during  a  boom. 
Overmeasurement  of  inputs  implies  that  productivity  is  undermeasured  and  vice-versa, 
thus  explaining  partly  why  productivity  growth  may  be  procyclical.  Using  the  same 
methods  employed  earlier,  the  cost-based  Solow  residual  that  takes  account  of  factor 
utilisation  is  derived.  Omitting  time  subscripts,  (3)  now  becomes 
()  ü  c71,1  c)  OT  ,- 
=+  +--M+ 
L)  F(.  )  ol  (58) 
, 9F 
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which  is  the  same  as 
i9F  1-  (CL  +  LÜ)  +M+  (Zk  +  K2),  (59)  a(C  -  L)  F(.  )  All  ý(Z 
-  K)  F(.  ) 
or 
Q=o+O  dý'  CLL 
+0  i9F 
_CL 
C+ 
r9(C  -  L)  QL  4C.  L)  QC 
(60) 
mm  (9F  ZK  K  i9F  ZK  Z 
+0  +d9 
cVQM  «Z-K)QK  4Z.  K)QZ 
The  first-order  conditions  from  the  cost  minimisation  problem  are 
OF  p 
4! 5(C  -  L)  AC' 
0  OF 
= 
Pm 
,  and  (62) 
cm  A 
o'F  P,  K 
(63) 
t5(Z  -  K)  AZ 
Substituting  the  right-hand  sides  of  (6l)-(63)  into  (60)  and  substituting  PQ  for  A: 
Q=o  PL  L  PLL  C  Pmm  M  PKKK  PKKZ 
+++++  (64) 
Q0  PQQ  L  PQQ  C  PQQ  M  PQQ  K  PQQ  Z' 
which  can  be  rearranged  and  rewritten  as 
AO'  =  Aq,  -a 
L  Al,  -  amAm,  -a 
KAk 
,  -(a 
LAc,  +  a'Az,  ).  (65) 
tttttt 
The  term  (a  LAc  +a  KAZ  )  corrects  the  original  Solow  residual  (19)  for  the  growth  ttt 
rates  of  unobserved  capital  and  labour  utilisation.  If,  for  example,  labour  usage 
intensifies  but  employment  stays  the  same,  the  new  measure  of  productivity 
A06 
growth,,  t,  will  be  smaller  than  the  one  that  makes  no  adjustment  for  factor  usage, 
AOs.  Using  the  methods  employed  earlier  it  is  also  possible  to  derive  a  measure  that 
incorporates  increasing  returns  to  scale  and  cost  shares- 236 
A06  L'Alt  K'At  K'AZt  ), 
t= 
Aq,  -  y(a  +a  m',  dyn,  +a)-y  (a  ",  Act  +a  (66)  ttttt 
where  the  second  term  on  the  right-hand  side  of  (66)  equals  the  second  term  on  the 
right-hand  side  of  (54).  Thus  merely  adjusting  the  original  Solow  residual  for  imperfect 
competition  and  IRS  still  results  in  a  biased  measure  of  TFP  growth.  Changes  in  the 
intensity  of  usage  of  labour  or  capital  will  be  attributed  to  TFP  growth.  To  correct  this 
error,.  the  cost-weighted  percentage  changes  in  utilisation  rates  should  be  subtracted 
from  Hall's  measure.  The  problem  with  making  this  adjustment  is  that  Ac,  and  Az,  are 
not  directly  observable.  However,  there  is  a  solution  to  the  problem.  Changes  in 
materials  usage,  data  for  which  is  readily  available,  can  be  employed  to  measure  the 
degree  to  which  labour  and  capital  usage  vary  over  the  business  cycle.  As  Basu  notes- 
"The  idea  is  a  simple  one-  workers  putting  in  longer  hours  and  more  effort, 
or  machines  being  worked  extra  shifts,  need  more  materials  to  create  more 
output.  Materials  use  is  a  convenient  indicator  of  cyclical  factor  utilisation 
because  its  input  does  not  have  an  extra  effort  or  time  dimension.  An  hour 
worked  may  represent  very  different  amounts  of  labour  input  and  a  machine 
may  be  operated  at  different  intensities,  but  a  nail,  a  sheet  of  steel,  or  a 
piece  of  lumber  always  make  the  same  contribution  to  output:  no  amount  of 
coaxing  can  make  one  nut  fit  on  two  bolts.  "  (p.  725) 
If  cyclical  productivity  is  caused  at  least  in  part  by  unobserved  capital  and  labour 
utilization,  then  one  would  expect  materials  input  to  track  the  business  cycle  more 
closely  than  labour  and  capital.  It  is  clear  from  Figure  2  that  this  is  what  happens.  The 
graph  compares  the  growth  rates  of  materials,  weighted  capital  and  labour  and  output. 
The  coefficient  of  correlation  between  materials  and  output  is  0.99,  the  coefficient  of' 237 
Figure  2.  Growth  Rates  of  Factor  Inputs  and  Output,  1959-91 
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Note:  Labour  &  Capital  input  is  the  sum  of  the  growth  rates  of  these  inputs. 
weighted  by  their  respective  cost  shares. 
correlation  between  output  and  capital  and  labour  is  0.78.  Thus  the  initial  evidence 
points  to  cyclical  factor  utilization  as  an  important  factor  explaining  procyclical 
productivity.  The  next  step  is  to  construct  a  TFP  measure  that  incorporates  changes  in 
material  input  as  a  proxy  for  labour  and  capital  usage.  To  derive  the  relationship 
between  unobserved  capital  and  labour  inputs  and  observable  or  measured  material 
inputs,  Basu.  makes  use  of  the  following  more  restricted  production  function 
Q=  OF(V(C  -  L,  Z-  K),  H(M))),  (67) 
where  V  is  the  value-added  function  and  H  is  the  materials  function.  Both  V  and  H  are 
assumed  to  have  constant  retums  to  scale.  Note  that  the  function  FO  still  has  the  same 
properties  as  set  out  in  (1).  As  Bruno  and  Sachs  (1985)  point  out,  the  relationship 
between  relative  quantity  and  relative  price  change  can  be  expressed  in  a  simple 
manner  by  assuming  that  F(.  )  is  CES  in  V  and  H-  " 
35  See  Berndt  and  Christensen  (  1973)  for  further  discussion  of  functional  separability  and  elasticities 
of  substitution, 
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I 
+(I  -,  5)m-p  I-P,  (68) 
where  J  (0  <  (5  <  1)  is  a  distribution  parameter  and  p  (-I  <p#  0)  is  a  substitution 
parameter  which  determines  the  value  of  the  (constant)  elasticity  of  substitution.  The 
marginal  products  of  value-added  and  materials  are  respectively 
I+p 
CQ  (5 
Q) 
,  and  (69) 
O'V  op 
(-V 
I+p 
CQ  (1-(5) 
(70) 
aA4  op  m 
(  I?  ) 
The  least-cost  combination  condition: 
CV16V 
- 
PM 
CQIO-v  Pv 
can  be  expressed  as 
1-(5  (V  )I+P  PM 
(72) 
(5  M  Pv 
and  the  optimal  input  ratio  is 
15  )'/('+P)(P  )'/('+P)  p  1/(I+p) 
mm  (73) 
(1-05 
PV  pr 
where  c  is  a  constant  term.  Taking  logs  and  differentiating  gives 
dln( 
vI  dln 
p  (74) 
1m vf 
) 
(I  +  P)  pv 
Rearranging  (74)  and  using  previous  notation,  the  growth  rate  in  value-added  can  be 
expressed  as 
Av,  =  Amt  -  (4pv  -  4pt-)  , 
(75) 
t  expressed  in 
where  Ag"  and  4p'  are  changes  in  the  prices  of  value-added  and  materialsý, 
logs,  and  a=  I/(]  +p)  is  the  (constant)  elasticity  of  substitution  between  value-added 239 
and  materials.  Basu  expresses  the  Divisia  index  of  value-added  in  terms  of  changes  in 
observed  labour  and  capital  input  and  changes  in  unobserved  utilisation- 
aL'  Al,  +  Acj  +a"  (Ak,  +  Azj  Avt  tt 
aL'  +a 
K'  (76) 
tt 
Substituting  the  right-hand  side  of  (75)  into  (76)  results  in 
L'(Alt  K'  L'  K')A 
_  07  L'  K')(A  v  im  ).  at  +Act)+at  (Ak,  +Azt)=(at  +at  m  (at  +at  _A  (77)  t  pt  pt 
Substituting  (77)  into  (66)  gives 
AOB 
=  Aq,  -r 
(Am, 
-  a(a  "+  a")(Apv  -  4ptm)).  tttt  (78) 
Note  that  both  the  observed  and  unobserved  inputs  of  labour  and  capital  are  omitted 
from  (78).  Throughout  the  rest  of  the  chapter  AOB  is  referred  to  as  the  adjusted  TFP  t 
measure  or  the  Basu  residual.  In  all,  seven  TFP  measures  have  been  derived  in  this 
chapter.  A  summary  of  the  different  measures  (measured  in  discrete  terms  and 
accounting  for  the  stochastic  nature  of  productivity  growth)  is  provided  in  Table  14. 
Before  the  Basu  residual  can  be  calculated  it  is  first  necessary  to  obtain  new  estimates 
of  the  returns  to  scale  parameter  r.  Once  again  estimates  of  v  were  obtained  using  IV 
techniques  and  data  from  all  20  industries.  Applying  the  discrete  time  formulation  and 
accounting  for  the  stochastic  nature  of  productivity  growth,  the  equation  to  be 
estimated  is 
Aqt  =  rXt  +  ut  1. 
(79) 
where  X,  =  Am,  -  a(at  +  a")(Ap'  -  Ap').  To  test  the  robustness  of  the  estimates  of  ttt 
y  in  (79),  X  was  calculated  using  various  estimates  of  a,  ranging  from  0  (the  Leontief 
case)  to  I  (the  Cobb-Douglas  case).  There  is  no  consensus  in  the  literature  as  to  which 
value  is  correct.  Rotemberg  and  Woodford  (1992)  estimate  a  at  0.7,  Bruno  (1984) 
reviews  a  number  of  papers  and  reports  a  consensus  range  for  abetween  0.3  and  0.4. 240 
Table  14.7he  Different  TFP  Growth  Measures 
(1) 
Revenue  shares,  AO'  +v  Aq  a  L'Al 
_  amAmt  -a 
KAkt 
perfect  competition, 
tttt 
CRS 
(2) 
Cost  shares,  A02  +  t)  =  Aq  -a 
L'Ait 
-a  m'Amt 
-a 
K'Akt 
tttttt  CRS 
(3) 
L  -K  Revenue  shares,  +  Aqt  -  a,  Al,  -  -a,  "Am, 
_a  Ak,  AO, 
tt 
marketpower  - 
(p 
-  ])[a  L(Al, 
-  Ak,  )  +  a'  (Amt 
-  Akj]  tt 
(4) 
Cost  shares,  A04  +  t)  =  Aq  -a  L"Ilt 
-a  M"Am 
-a 
K',  Ak 
tttttttt 
(,  V  _  1)[-L'Al  -M'  -K'  IRS  at  +at  Amt+at  Akt] 
(5) 
L  -K  Revenue  shares,  AO'+  v=  Aq,  -  a,  Al,  -  amAmt  a  Ak,  tttt 
perfect  comp.,  factor  a  LAct  +a  KAZt) 
tt 
utilisation  correction 
(6) 
m  Cost  shares,  IRS,  A  06  +  t)  =  Aq,  -,  v 
L'Alt  K' 
tt 
(a  +a,  'Amt  +a  Akt  ttt 
factor  correction  -  r(a  L'ACt  +a  K'AZt 
tt 
(7) 
AOB  +  t) 
(j 
_  ;. 
(-L' 
+  -K')(,  A  v-  4m  Calculable  version  t  I=Aq,  -,  v  M,  ca,  a,  Vt  I 
of  (7) 
Basu  uses  0.7  as  his  baseline  value.  Malley  et  aL  (1998)  set  a  equal  to  0.5.  The 
estimates  are  reported  in  Table  15.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  there  is  no  longer 
evidence  of  increasing  returns  to  scale.  The  estimates  indicate  that  returns  to  scale  are 241 
Table  15.  Estimates  of  the  Returns  to  Scale  Parameter 
Aggegate 
. 
Durable  Nondurable 
a--O  0.94  0.92  0.92 
(56.2)  (31.7)  (31.3) 
a--0.3  0.95  0.93  0.94 
(52.2)  (33.5)  (33.3) 
cr--O.  5  0.95  0.94  0.95 
(61.7)  (34.7)  (34.0) 
cT--0.7  0.96  0.94  0.95 
(64.3)  (36.0)  (34.2) 
(T--  1  0.96  0.95  0.96 
(67.1)  (37.5)  (33.4) 
Note:  t-stats  in  parentheses.  Wald  tests  confirm  that  all  the  estimates  are  significantly  different 
ft  m  1. 
decreasing  (but  not  far  from  constant).  Furthermore,  the  estimates  are  very  robust  to 
changes  in  a.  The  and  (7s  were  then  inserted  into  equation  8  in  Table  14  to  obtain 
measures  of  multifactor  productivity  growth  from  1959-91.  It  is  apparent  that  Basu's 
measure  removes  much  of  the  cyclical  variation  in  Solow-based  TFP  (Table  16). 
Regardless  of  the  value  of  a,  correlation  of  the  Basu  residual  with  various  measures  of 
the  business  cycle  is  significantly  lower  than  that  of  the  Solow  residual.  Another  way  of 
comparing  the  Solow  and  Basu  measures  is  to  compute  the  variance  of  TFP  to  output 
and  hours  growth.  The  ratios  for  the  Solow  residual  are  of  a  considerably  larger 
magnitude  than  those  computed  using  the  adjusted  measure  (regardless  of  which 
estimate  of  a  is  used).  In  conclusion,  neither  imperfect  competition  nor  increasing 
returns  to  scale  appear  to  be  responsible  for  the  mismeasurement  of  TFP  growth. 
Unobserved  variations  in  factor  usage  do,  however,  have  a  significant  effect.  Of 
course,  the  fact  that  rnismeasurement  is  caused  more  by  variations  in  factor  usage  than 
increasing  returns  to  scale  is  only  of  indirect  interest  to  infrastructure  researchers. 
What  is  important  is  that  the  researcher  has  as  accurate  a  measure  of  productivity  as 
possible  that  can  be  used  to  exarnine  the  relationship  with  triffastructure. 242 
Table  16.  Correlation  Between  TFP  Measures,  Real  Gross  output  and  Production 
Li- 
n  ours  and  Variance  of  TFP  to  Output  and  Hours  Variance 
Output,  Aqt  Hours,  AHp 
Correlation  Variance  Correlation  Variance 
Solow 
A  O's  Aggregate  0.95  0.52  0.84  0.50 
Durable  0.95  0.39  0.84  0.42 
Nondurable  0.92  0.71  0.79  0.71 
Basu 
AOtB  Aggregate  0.24  0.02  0.25  0.02 
G=O  Durable  -0.09  0.02  -0.02  0.02 
Nondurable  0.43  0.14  0.41  0.14 
AOB,  Aggregate  0.19  0  02  0  16  0.02 
1  .  . 
cy--O.  3  Durable  -0.19  0.02  -0.13  0.02 
Nondurable  0.40  0.14  0.37  0.14 
AOB, 
t 
Aggregate  0.16  0.02  0.12  0.02 
(T=0.5  Durable  -0.24  0.02  -0.20  0.02 
Nondurable  0.38  0.14  0.34  0.14 
, 
AOB, 
t 
Aggregate  0.16  0.03  0.09  0.02 
cy=0.7  Durable  -0.28  0.02  -0.25  0.02 
Nondurable  0.36  0.14  0.32  0.14 
AOB,  Aggregate 
1 
0.17  0.03  0.08  0.03 
cy=  I  Durable  -0.32  0.02  -0.31  0.02 
Nondurable  0.33  0.15  0.28  0.15 
5.  Basu's  TFP  Measure  versus  Measures  Used  in  the  Infrastructure  Literature 
It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  adjusted  TFP  measure  calculated  in  the  previous 
section  with  those  used  in  previous  infrastructure  research.  36  Aschauer  (1989)  used 
two  measures  of  productivity  for  the  private  business  sector-  capital  productivity  and 
multifactor  productivity.  Output  per  unit  of  labour  was  the  dependent  variable  in 
36  The  comparison  is  made  using  adjusted  TFP  calculated  under  the  assumption  that  a=  0.7. 243 
Table  17.  Correlations  between  Manufacturing  TFP  Measures  and  Measures  Used  in 
the  Infrastructure  Literature,  1959-85. 
Aq  AOS 
AOB  Aq  AoS,  K 
ALL  'A 
OSALL 
ALL 
A  -.. 
Aq  1.00 
Aos  0.90  1.00 
AOB  0.10  0.32  1.00 
From 
Infrastructu  re 
Literature: 
Aq 
ALL 
0.95  0.87  0.10  1.00 
'dos 
0.82  0.85  0.16  0.88  1.00 
ALL 
AOS,  K 
ALL  0.92  0.89  0.07  0.96  0.93  1.00 
wjý  0.57  0.66  0.23  0.66  0.91  0.70 
Note:  Aq  is  output  growth  in  manufacturing;  AqAu  is  output  growth  for  the  total  private  business 
sector;  AO'5  is  the  Solow  residual  for  aggregate  manufacturing;  Aos  is  the  Solow  residual  for  the  total  ALL 
private  business  sector.  AOS,  K 
and  AO  S,  L  are  output  per  unit  of  capital  and  output  per  unit  of  labour  ALL  AU 
respectively  for  the  total  private  business  sector. 
Munnell.  (1990a)  and  gross  state  product  was  the  dependent  variable  in  Munnell 
(1993).  Aschauer's  productivity  measures  were  obtained  using  Mark  and  Waldorf 
(1983)  and  the  Monthly  Labor  Review  (1987).  1  used  this  data  to  replicate  Aschauer's 
two  total  private  business  sector  measures  and  to  construct  the  dependent  variable 
used  in  Munnell  (1990a).  37  Table  17  compares  the  growth  rates  of  these  measures  with 
those  calculated  for  manufacturing  in  Sections  2  and  4  for  the  period  1959-85,  the 
period  of  overlap  between  the  two  sets  of  data.  Manufacturing  output  and  the 
manufacturing  Solow  residual,  Aq  and  A  0'  respectively,  are  equivalent  to  Aq,,,  and 
AOs  except  the  latter  two  use  Aschauer's  data  for  the  whole  private  business  sector.  ALL  1, 
37  Although  the  specifications  are  the  same  as  those  used  by  Munnell,  the  dataset.  is  different  (see 
Chapter  I  for  a  comparison  of  Aschauer's  and  Munnell's  datasets). 244 
It  should  also  be  pointed  out  that  Aq  and  AO'  were  calculated  using  value-added  ALL  ALL 
data.  Clearly  the  two  sets  of  measures,  Aq  and  'AqALL  and  A  Os,  and  A  Os  are  highly  ALL,  ) 
correlated.  Trends  in  manufacturing  productivity  were  similar  to  trends  in  total 
productivity  over  the  sample  period.  It  is  also  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  Solow 
residual  used  by  infrastructure  researchers,  AOs  and  the  adjusted  TFP  measure,  ALL  " 
AOB,,  are  not  closely  correlated  (the  correlation  coefficient  has  a  value  of  0.16).  Other 
studies  that  use  measures  of  multifactor  productivity  similar  to  A  Os  include  Ford  and  ALL 
Poret  (1991),  Hulten  and  Schwab  (1991b),  Tatom  (1993)  and  Ho  and  Sorensen 
(1994).  The  measure  of  capital  productivity  used  by  Aschauer  (1989),  AOS,  K, 
was  the  ALL 
dependent  variable  of  the  regression  equation  that  has  received  the  widest  publicity  in 
the  infrastructure  literature.  The  infrastructure  variable  in  this  equation  had  an 
estimate  output  elasticity  of  0.39.  Other  studies  that  have  used  this  specification 
include  Otto  and  Voss  (1994),  Bajo-Rubio  and  Sosvilla-Rivero  (1993)  and  Berndt  and 
Hansson  (1992).  Once  again,  A 
OS,  K 
and  AOB  are  not  closely  correlated  (the  ALL 
correlation  coefficient  has  a  value  of  only  0.07).  The  low  correlations  between  the  two 
most  widely  used  measures  of  TFP  in  the  infrastructure  literature  (AO',,  and  AO"'  )  A  ALL 
and  the  Basu  residual  provide  an  early  indication  that  the  relationship  between  adjusted 
TFP  growth  and  public  infrastructure  will  be  different  to  that  estimated  in  earlier 
production  function  studies.  Munnell  (1990a)  used  labour  productivity,  AO"' 
,  as  her  ALL 
dependent  variable.  Again,  this  variable  does  not  follow  the  movement  of  AO'  very 
closely  (the  correlation  coefficient  is  0.23).  Of  course,  one  would  expect  a  measure  of 
total  factor  productivity  to  differ  from  a  measure  of  capital  or  labour  productivity. 
However.  measures  of  individual  inputs'  productivities  are  obtained  by  making  nunor 245 
adjustments  to  the  derivations  of  total  measures  such  as 
AOsALL 
and  AOs.  For  example, 
labour  productivity  can  be  derived  by  making  a  simple  adjustment  to  the  sources-of- 
growth  equation  used  to  compute  the  standard  Solow  residual.  Using  the  assumption 
of  CRS,  (5)  can  be  rewritten  as 
O-L 
=(ý+((OoTK 
k_L)). 
Q  L) 
(80) 
This  expression  shows  that  labour  productivity  growth,  (OIQ 
-LIL),  equals  TFP 
growth  plus  the  rate  of  change  of  capital  services  per  hour,  (k1K 
-  LIL),  multiplied 
by  capital's  output  elasticity,  0  iT  K) 
oWQ 
In  conclusion,,  to  the  extent  that  the  TFP 
measure  that  corrects  for  varying  factor  utilization  is  a  more  accurate  measure  of 
efficiency  gains  than  the  original  Solow  residual,  conclusions  drawn  about 
infrastructure's  relationship  with  TFP  are  potentially  seriously  flawed.  In  the  next 
section  causality  tests  are  conducted  using  the  new  TFP  measure  and  different 
infrastructure  aggregates.  The  methodology  is  identical  to  that  used  in  Section  3  with 
A  0'  and  so  the  results  are  directly  comparable. 
6.  Causality  Testing  and  Estimation  of  Autoregressive  Models  -  Adjusted 
Multifactor  Productivity 
61  Introduction 
In  this  section  causality  tests  are  conducted  using  Basu's  TFP  measure  and 
infrastructure  data  at  different  levels  of  aggregation  (total,  core  and  disaggregated).  A 246 
Table  18.  Ae  FPEs  of  Fitting  a  One-Dimensional  Autoregressive 
Processfor  the  Basu  Residual  and  Inftastructure  Investment 
No.  lags  A  OB 
t  AIc  t 
xT 
t 
1 
. 
0000602* 
. 
002140 
. 
002427 
2 
. 
0000634 
. 
001820*  . 
002262* 
3 
. 
0000702 
. 
001997 
. 
002396 
4 
. 
0000743 
. 
002122 
. 
002442 
Note:  Asterisks  signify  minimum  FPEs 
series  of  models  is  also  estimated  in  order  to  quantify  infrastructure's  impact  on 
productivity.  3"  The  results  obtained  in  this  section  are  significantly  different  to  those 
obtained  in  Section  4  using  the  original  Solow  residual.  I  also  conduct  a  number  of 
robustness  tests,  increasing  the  number  of  lags  on  the  infrastructure  terms  to  establish 
whether  this  affects  conclusions  drawn  about  infrastructure's  relationship  with  TFP. 
Further  tests  are  performed  to  determine  if  the  specifications  chosen  by  the  FPE 
Criterion  are  adequate  compared  with  models  which  exhibit  a  greater  or  smaller 
number  of  lags. 
6.2.  Results  -  Aggregate  Inftastructure 
The  first  step  is  to  determine  the  appropriate  own  lag  length  for  the  various  variables. 
From  Table  18,  the  lag  length  that  minimises  the  FPE  for  the  Basu  residual,  A 
OB,  is  1. 
t 
The  FPEs  for  AIc  and  AI'  are  the  same  as  those  reported  in  Table  1.  With  the 
tt 
appropriate  own  lag  lengths  detemuned,  each  variable  is  treated  as  controlled  and  the 
relevant  second  variable  is  manipulated.  Holding  constant  the  order  of  the 
38  once  agaim  adjusted  TFP  is  calculated  using  a=0.7.  See  Appendix  C  for  a  discussion  of  the 
robustness  of  the  results  to  the  use  of  different  values  of  cy-. 247 
Table  19.  FPEs  ftOm  Inclusion  of  Optimum  Lags  on  Manipulated  Variables 
Controlled 
Variable  a 
Basu 
Residual 
A  OB  (1) 
t 
A 
OB  (1) 
t 
Core 
Aic  t 
(2) 
Total 
AiT  (2) 
t 
'  The  number  in  brackets  indicates  the  order  of  autoregressive  operator  on  the  controlled  variable, 
determined  in  Table  18.  b  The  FPEs  in  the  FPE(mtn*)  column  are  the  minimum  ones  obtained  from 
inclusion  of  different  lags  on  the  manipulated  variables.  Asterisks  signify  that  there  is  a  causal 
relationship  from  the  manipulated  variable  to  the  controlled  variable. 
autoregressive  operator  on  the  controlled  variable  to  the  one  determined  in  Table  18, 
the  FPEs  of  the  controlled  variables  are  recalculated  by  varying  the  lag  orders  on  the 
manipulated  variables  from  I  to  4.  The  orders  which  generate  the  smallest  FPEs  are 
presented  in  Table  19.  For  example,  the  FPE  for  the  autoregressive  equation  with  A  0' 
t 
as  the  dependent  variable  and  AIT  as  a  regressor  is  minimised  by  including  one  lagged 
infrastructure  ten'n. 
Using  the  results  reported  in  Table  19  it  is  possible  to  draw  some  conclusions 
about  causality.  The  column  FPE(m  *)  contains  the  minimum  FPEs  from  Table  18. 
Where  these  numbers  are  greater  than  the  FPEs  from  the  equations  that  include  a 
manipulated  variable,  FPE(m*,  n*),  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  manipulated  variable 
causes  the  controlled  variable.  For  example,  for 
AOB 
and  AI',  treatment  of  AI,  '  as  tt 
the  input  reduces  the  FPE  of  the  AOB  equation,  implying  that  AIc  =>  A  OB.  We  find 
tI 
Manipulated 
Variable 
Aitc 
A[tT 
, 
AOB 
t 
AOB 
t 
Optimum  Lags, 
Manipulated 
Variable 
I 
I 
I 
I 
FPE(m*,  n*)b  FPE(m*) 
0.000049* 
0.000051  * 
0.001876 
0.002409 
0.0000602 
0.0000602 
0.001820 
0.002396 248 
Table  20.  Comparison  ofLag-Length  Selection  Criteria 
------------  AI  =>  A  OB  ----------  ----  AOB  =>  A[C  ---  ----  AOB  =:  >,  AIT  ---- 
tttttt 
Criterion  AOB  (AgB,  AC)  (,  doB,  AIT)  AIC  (A,  C,  AOB  T  (,  AT"doB) 
FPE  0.60187(l)  0.48788(1)*  0.50890(1)*  0.1820(2)  0.1876(l)  0.2262(2)  0.2409(l) 
AIC  0.60178(l)  0.48761(1)*  0.50862(1)*  0.1819(2)  0.1873(l)  0.2261(2)  0.2406(l) 
HQ  0.62033(l)  0.51033(1)*  0.53232(1)*  0.1903(2)  0.1990(1)  0.2365(2)  0.2556(l) 
RICE  0.60693(l)  0.49753(1)*  0.51897(1)*  0.1859(2)  0.1945(l)  0.2310(2)  0.2498(l) 
SBC  0.65951(l)  0.55944(1)*  0.58354(1)*  0.2090(2)  0.2250(l)  0.2597(2)  0.2889(l) 
Note:  Values  reported  in  the  first  3  column  omit  the  first  four  zero  decimal  places;  values  reported  in 
the  remaining  four  columns  omit  the  first  two  zero  decimal  places.  Asterisks  signify  a  causal 
relationship.  Optimal  number  of  lags  in  parentheses.  See  Section  3.1  for  the  sources  of  the  various 
tests. 
the  same  relationship  with  total  inffastructure,  ie  AIT  =>  A  OB 
. 
However,  there  is  no  t 
evidence  of  reverse  causation,  regardless  of  the  infrastructure  variable  used.  In  other 
words,  'A 
OB  ::  tý  AI  T 
and  A  0'  ::  ý>  Al' 
. 
What's  more,  these  findings  are  robust  to  the 
tttt 
use  of  alternative  tag-length  selection  criteria  (Table  20). 
63  Discussion  of  Results 
As  with  the  original  Solow  residual,  the  infrastructure  growth  rates  cause  the  TFP 
growth  rate.  Furthermore,  productivity's  prediction  error  is  reduced  more  by  including 
core  infrastructure  investment  in  the  analysis  than  total  infrastructure  investment.  This 
is  the  expected  result  because  the  components  of  the  core  are  hypothesised  to  be  the 
most  productive.  However,  the  two  TFP  measures  generate  different  results 
concerning  reverse  causation.  Use  of  the  Basu  residual  reveals  that  there  is  no  reverse 
relationship  between  productivity  and  infi-astructure.  In  Section  3  the  finding  was  that 
the  Solow  residual  causes  some  types  of  investment  but  not  others  (eg,  A 
AIT 
tt 249 
but  AO',  5  =t,  AIc).  Thus  the  new  TFP  measure  overturns  the  results  of  the  previous 
section  and  those  obtained  by  Tatorn  (1993),  who  concluded  not  only  that  TFP 
Granger  causes  infrastructure  investment  but  that  infrastructure  has  no  effect  on 
productivity.  Whereas  the  difference  between  Tatom's  results  and  those  of  Section  3 
can  be  put  down  to  econometric  technique  and  the  use  of  nonstationary  data,  the 
difference  between  the  results  contained  in  Section  3  and  those  contained  in  this 
section  can  be  explained  solely  by  the  use  of  a  different  measure  of  TFP. 
The  results  indicate  that  it  is  not  just  the  measure  of  public  capital  which 
infrastructure  researchers  should  choose  selectively.  It  is  also  necessary  to  ensure  that 
the  measure  of  productivity  growth  employed  resembles  closely  the  true  underlying 
productivity  growth  rate.  The  Solow  residual  follows  the  business  cycle  very  closely. 
However,  as  Basu  (1996)  argues,  a  portion  of  this  procyclical  behaviour  is  caused  by 
mismeasurement  of  input  usage  (labour  and  capital)  as  the  economy  expands  and 
contracts.  Thus,  adjusting  measured  TFP  for  variations  in  factor  usage  allows 
researchers  to  determine  the  true  nature  of  the  causal  relationship  between  the 
variables.  The  mixed  evidence  of  reverse  causation  disappears  and  there  is  evidence  of 
unidirectional  causality  from  infrastructure  investment  to  multifactor  productivity. 
This  finding  does  not  imply  that  infrastructure  has  an  income  elasticity  of 
zero.  39  First  it  is  worth  emphasising  that  the  growth  rates  of  productivity  and  income 
39  Empirical  estimation  of  the  demand  for  public  goods  is  a  major  focus  of  public  finance.  The 
individual's  demand  for  local  public  goods,  for  example,  can  be  derived  by  solving  the  problem: 
MaxU(X.  H,  G,  Z)  s.  t.  Q=X+PHH+PGG, 
where  H  is  units  of  housing  consumed,  PH  is  the  price  of  a  stream  of  services  available  from  housing, 
G  is  the  level  of  public  services,  PGis  the  price  of  the  public  good-  Q  is  individual  exogenous  income. 
X  is  private  consumption  per  capita  and  Z  accounts  for  variations  in  taste  among  consumers.  Solving 
the  maximisation  problem  yields  the  individual's  demand  function  for  the  public  good: 
" 
Z).  G*  =  9(Q,  PG 
Clearly.  one  of  the  factors  that  determines  the  demand  for  public  goods  is  the  level  of  income. 250 
are  different  variables.  Rewriting  (66),  it  is  clear  that  changes  in  gross  income  are 
determined  by  efficiency  gains,  changes  in  factor  input  and  changes  in  factor  input 
usage: 
Aq,  =A  0  +)K  (a  L'Al,  +am'Am,  +a  K'  Ak,  )  +,  v  (a  L'AC,  +  a"Az,  ).  tttttt 
Changes  in  inputs  account  for  most  of  the  change  in  income.  It  is  therefore  possible 
that7  in  certain  years,  A  Ot  will  have  the  opposite  sign  to  Aqt 
. 
In  fact  during  II  of  the 
years  of  the  sample  period  this  was  the  case.  Thus  while  increases  in  income  may 
increase  the  demand  for  infrastructure  services,  efficiency  gains  are  only  one 
component  of  increases  in  income.  Second,  although  demand  for  infrastructure 
services  may  increase  with  income  over  time,  this  relationship  may  not  be  apparent  in  a 
given  sample  period.  For  example,  total  non-farm  private  sector  income  in  the  U.  S. 
rose  by  38  per  cent  between  1968  and  1992.  However,  total  public  investment  fell  by 
30  per  cent  over  this  period.  Only  in  1989  did  public  investment  reach  levels  seen  in 
the  1960s,  by  which  time  national  income  had  risen  by  a  further  31  per  cent.  Although 
public  investment  did  not  keep  up  with  increases  in  aggregate  income,  total 
government  purchases  (excluding  investment)  increased  steadily  over  the  period. 
Between  1968  and  1989  total  income  grew  by  81  per  cent;  total  government  purchases 
grew  by  38  per  cent. 
These  trends  reflect  the  fact  that  during  the  Ford  and  Carter  Administrations 
nondefence  current  expenditures  were  being  driven  by  commitments  to  social  security 
and  health  programmes.  According  to  Stein  (1996),  both  presidents  were 
uncomfortable  with  large  budget  deficits  and  believed  that  the  public  shared  this 
attitude  . 
40 
As  a  consequence  nondefence  investment  suffered  during  this  period.  In 
40  See  Stcin  (,  1996).  pp.  573-582. 251 
contrast,  nonmilitary  capital  expenditures  were  a  priority  in  the  1960s.  Clearly,  a 
number  of  difficulties  not  present  in  standard  consumer  theory  arise  in  modelling  the 
demand  for  publicly  provided  capital.  The  supply  of  infrastructure  services  is 
determined  through  a  political  process.  Individuals  vote  for  elected  representatives 
who  in  turn  vote  for  public  budgets.  As  Stein  (1996)  notes: 
'Every  expenditure  program,  or  almost  every  one,  has  behind  it  a  group  of 
supporters  in  the  Congress  and  in  the  country  who  favor  expanding  it  at  all 
times,  recession  or  not.  When  the  recession  creates  an  atmosphere 
justifying  increased  expenditure  on  national  income  grounds,  the  supporters 
of  particular  programs  gain  enough  allies  to  push  some  increases  through. 
There  are  also  always  people  who  want  tax  reduction,  recession  or  not.  "  (p. 
329) 
Stein  also  points  out  that  tension  always  exists  between  the  aggregate  rule  being 
pursued  (eg,  balancing  the  budget  at  high  employment)  and  the  "lower-level"  decisions 
(about  tax  rates  and  expenditure  programmes)  needed  to  conform  to  them.  In 
conclusion,  the  finding  that  TFP  does  not  cause  public  investment  can  be  explained  by 
the  fact  that  productivity  and  income  are  different  variables,  the  relationship  between 
income  and  public  investment  may  only  manifest  itself  over  long  periods  and  the  fact 
that  the  supply  of  public  infrastructure  is  determined  by  the  political  process. 
64  Estimating  Inftastructure's  Impact  on  Adjusted  Productivity 
The  next  step  is  to  quantify  infrastructure  investment's  impact  on  the  adjusted  TFP 
growth  rate.  The  models  using  core  and  total  investment  data  are  respectively 252 
Table  21.  Autoregressive  Estimates  of  Models  Using  Basu  Residual 
Core  Infrastructure  Model  Total  Infrastructure  Model 
Dependent  variable:  AO'  t  Altc  A01,  t  AiT  t 
AOB 
t-I  0.148  0.171 
(1.15)  (1.28) 
A[t-j  0.080***  0.153  0.065***  0.280* 
(3.26)  (0.76)  (3.58)  (1.74) 
Alt-2  0.449***  0.343** 
(3.12)  (2.15) 
Constant  0.020  0.005  0.002  0.006 
(1.51)  (0.79)  (1.48)  (0.77) 
0.279  0.265  0.248  0.276 
S.  E.  0.0064  0.0387  0.0065  0.0435 
Note:  j=C  (core  infrastructure)  or  T  (total  infrastructure),  depending  on  the  model;  t-stats  in 
parentheses  and  are  computed  using  heteroskedastic-consistent  standard  effors. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  I%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  5%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  10  %  level. 
OB  AO, 
t6)=(a)+ 
y/Il(L)  YIIAL))ýA  t  '),  and  (82) 
Alc  b0  Y/ 
2  (L))ý  A[ 
Cv 
t  22  t) 
"t 
AOB  I  oB 
t  a)+  y/,,  (L)  y/  1, 
(L))(A 
(83) 
Tb02  (L))ý  Al 
Tv 
22  t, 
Lt) 
- 
t)+t 
Note  that  the  second  equation  contains  only  lags  of  the  dependent  variable  because  of 
the  absence  of  reverse  causality.  Following  Erenburg  and  Wohar  (1995),  each  two- 
equation  system  is  estimated  in  a  seemingly  unrelated  regression  (SUR)  framework  to 
gain  efficiency  by  allowing  for  the  cross-equation  correlation  of  disturbances.  The 
results  are  reported  in  Table  2  1.  Again,  the  coefficient  estimates  that  are  of  most 
interest  are  those  which  quantify  the  impact  of  the  growth  rates  of  core  and  total 
investment  on  the  productivity  growth  rate.  The  impact  of  infrastructure  investment  on 253 
Table  22.  Wald  Testsfor  Zero  Restrictions 
Wald  Statistic  -  X' 
Core  Infrastructure  Model 
I  Y/ 
12 
0 
Total  Infrastructure  Model 
I  V]2(L)  =0 
10.05(1)*** 
8.26(1)*** 
Note:  Degrees  of  freedom  in  parentheses. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  I%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  5%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  10  %  level. 
TFP  is  relatively  much  smaller  when  the  Basu  residual  is  used  in  place  of  the  Solow 
residual.  The  coefficient  estimate  for  core  infrastructure  falls  from  0.114  to  0.080.  The 
estimate  for  total  infrastructure  falls  from  0.095  to  0.065. 
Wald  tests  provide  further  evidence  that  both  infrastructure  aggregates  have  a 
significant  effect  on  the  TFP  growth  rate  (Table  22).  There  may  be  arguments  about 
whether  the  causal  relationships  implied  by  autoregressive  modelling  are  sensitive  to 
the  specification  of  the  order  of  the  autoregressive  operator.  I  checked  for  this  in  the 
two  models  by  increasing  the  number  of  lag  terms  on  the  infrastructure  variables  and 
assuming  these  specifications  were  chosen  as  the  maintained  hypotheses.  The 
parameter  matrix  for  both  models  becomes: 
I 
V4  VII(L)  12 
2 
22(L))' 
(84) 
For  the  core  infrastructure  model,  the  Wald  test  of  V  1, 
(L)  =0  (to  test  whether  AIc 
AOB 
,) 
has  a  chi-square  value  of  15.65  (4  degrees  of  freedom).  For  the  total 
infrastructure  model  the  test  produces  a  chi-square  value  of  12.46  (4  degrees  of 
freedom).  Thus,  as  with  the  original  specifications,  the  null  hypothesis  that 254 
infrastructure  investment  does  not  affect  productivity  is  rejected.  As  an  alternative,  the 
following  specification  was  taken  as  the  maintained  hypothesis: 
2 
V2  vl, 
(L) 
12(L)) 
2 
Vf 
2  V21(L) 
22(L))' 
(85) 
Tests  of  the  restriction 
V2 
12(L)  =0  produce  chi-square  values  of  9.27  (2  degrees  of 
freedom)  for  the  core  infrastructure  model  and  7.75  (2  degrees  of  freedom)  for  the 
total  infrastructure  model,  leading  to  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  again.  41 
These  tests  confirm  infrastructure  investments  importance  in  determining  TFP- 
It  is  also  important  to  determine  whether  the  FPE  Criterion  performs  satisfactorily  in 
identifying  the  system  of  equations.  Following  Hsiao  (1981),  Ahking  and  Nfiller  (1985) 
and  Erenburg  and  Wohar  (1995),  the  adequacy  of  the  models  was  checked  by 
sequenti  y  overfitting  (82)  and  (83)  by  adding  I  additional  lag  and  then  2  additional 
lags  to  each  variable,  including  those  variables  that  were  not  significantly  different  from 
zero  in  the  final  models.  For  the  core  infrastructure  model  the  Wald  test  statistics  are 
respectively  1.73  (4  degrees  of  freedom)  and  7.01  (8  degrees  of  freedom),  indicating 
that  the  extra  lags  are  not  significantly  different  from  zero.  For  the  total  infrastructure 
model  the  Wald  test  statistics  are  respectively  1.68  (4  degrees  of  freedom)  and  8.97  (8 
degrees  of  freedom).  Thus  both  sets  of  tests  reveal  no  inadequacy  in  the  models.  Next, 
the  models  were  sequentially  underfitted  by  I  lag,  where  possible.  For  the  core 
infrastructure  model,  subtracting  I  lag  term  produces  a  chi-square  value  of  8.41  (1 
degree  of  freedom),  indicating  that  the  omitted  lag  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at 
the  I  per  cent  level  at  least.  For  the  total  infrastructure  model  the  relevant  chi-square 
41  Identical  tests  conducted  using  the  standard  Solow  residual  produced  chi-square  values  of  3.89  and 
2.39  respectively.  implying  that  the  restrictions  are  accepted  (ie.  infrastructure  investment  does  not 
cause  productivity). 255 
value  is  4.20  (1  degree  of  freedom)  which  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  5 
per  cent  level  at  least. 
In  conclusion,  Wald  tests  reveal  that  AI,  '  =>  AO'  and  'Aj 
T 
=:  ý  A  OB 
,  even  if  ttt 
the  number  of  lagged  infrastructure  terms  differs  from  that  determined  by  the  FPE 
Criterion.  However,  the  over-  and  underfitting  tests  reject  in  favour  of  the  model 
identified  by  the  FPE  Criterion  and  it  is  on  these  models  that  I  rely  when  drawing 
inferences  about  infrastructure's  impact  on  productivity. 
Again  a  battery  of  diagnostic  tests  was  performed  to  confirm  the  empirical 
adequacy  of  the  models.  Serial  correlation  in  the  residuals  was  tested  for  as  was 
heteroskedasticity,  normality,  the  specification  of  the  models  and  their  temporal 
stability.  Table  23  contains  the  results  of  diagnostic  tests  applied  to  individual 
equations  estimated  by  OLS.  Breusch-Godfrey  LM  tests  indicate  that  there  is  no  serial 
correlation  present.  The  White  heteroskedasticity  test  and  the  Jarque-Bera  normality 
test  conclude  that  the  errors  are  homoskedastic  and  normally  distributed.  To  test  for 
the  possible  omission  of  important  explanatory  variables,  all  equations  were  re- 
estimated  employing  Ramsey's  (1969)  RESET  procedure.  In  each  test  the  additional 
variables  were  found  to  be  jointly  insignificant  and  so  the  null  hypothesis  of  no 
specification  error  could  not  be  rejected.  Chow  tests  were  also  employed  to  check  the 
temporal  stability  of  the  models.  The  results  indicate  that  the  productivity  equations 
and  infrastructure  investment  equations  have  stable  parameters  over  the  sample 
period. 256 
Table  23.  Diagnostic  Tests  on  Individual  Equations 
Breusch-Godftey  LM  Testsfor  Serial  Correlation  -j 
----------------------  Eq 
, 
uation  --------------------------- 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Order:  1  0.55(l)  0.00(i)  0.00(i)  1.14(l) 
2  0.67(2)  0.36(2)  0.01(2)  1.19(2) 
3  0.98(3)  0.39(3)  0.26(3)  3.21(3) 
White  Heteroskedasticity  Test  -21 
----------------------  Equation  --------------------------- 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.86(5)  1.74(5)  6.38(5)  5.70(5) 
Jarque-Bera  Normality  Test  -j 
----------------------  Equation  -------------------------- 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.98(2)  1.13(2)  1.14(2)  0.15(2) 
Ramsey  RESET  Test  of  Specification  Error  (F-Statistics) 
----------------------  Equation  --------------- 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
RESET(2)  1.64(1,24)  0.74(1,24)  0.30(1,24)  0.09(1,24) 
RESET(3)  0.85(2,23)  0.76(2,23)  0.27(2,23)  0.05(2,23) 
RESET(4)  0.56(3,22)  0.87(3,22)  0.18(3,22)  0.03(3,22) 
Chow  Testfor  Structural  Change  (F-Statistics) 
----------------------  Equation  ------------------------------- 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.59(3,22)  0.57(3,22)  0.25(3,22)  0.42(3,22) 
U- Equation  1:  Basu  residual  dependent  variable;  core  infrastructure 
Equation  2:  Basu.  residual  dependent  variable;  total  infrastructure 
Equation  3:  Core  investment  dependent  variable 
Equation  4:  Total  investment  dependent  variable 
*  Rejection  of  the  relevant  null  hypothesis (serial  independence,  homoskedasticity,  normality,  no 
specification  error,  no  structural  break)  at  the  5%  level  at  least.  Degrees  of  freedom  in  parentheses. 257 
65  Discussion  of  Results 
The  estimates  obtained  using  the  different  productivity  measures  differ  significantly  in 
relative  magnitude.  The  coefficient  on  core  investment  falls  by  35  per  cent  and  the 
coefficient  on  total  investment  falls  by  38  per  cent.  The  estimates  obtained  in  the 
models  which  use  the  Basu  residual  are  also  more  significant  than  those  obtained  in  the 
Solow  models.  In  particular,  the  coefficient  on  total  infrastructure  investment  is 
significant  at  the  I  per  cent  level  whereas  in  the  Solow  model  the  estimate  was  only 
significant  at  the  10  per  cent  level.  The  Wald  tests  also  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the 
off-diagonal  terms  equal  zero  at  higher  levels  of  significance. 
Equally  interesting  are  the  absolute  magnitudes  of  the  coefficient  estimates 
obtained  using  the  adjusted  TFP  measure.  AI  percentage  point  increase  in  the  growth 
rate  of  core  infrastructure  in  period  t  leads  to  an  increase  of  0.08  in  the  growth  rate  of 
TFP  in  period  t+1.  For  total  infrastructure,  the  increase  in  the  TFP  growth  rate  is 
only  0.065.  These  estimates  imply  that,  while  infrastructure  has  an  effect  upon 
productivity  growth,  the  impact  is  very  small.  Thus  the  decline  in  infrastructure 
investment  from  the  late  1960s  contributed  to  the  productivity  growth  slowdown  but 
was  not  the  only  factor  responsible. 
66  Causality  Tests  -  Disaggregated  Inftastructure  Data 
In  this  section  Akaike's  FPE  Criterion  is  applied  to  determine  whether  the  different 
types  of  core  infrastructure  (roads,  water  structures,  sewer  structures  and  other 
structures)  cause  or  are  caused  by  Basu's  TFP  measure.  Table  24  is  similar  to  Table  19 
in  the  sense  that  it  reports  the  minimum  FPEs  calculated  using  each  variable's  own 
lags,  FPE(m  *),  and  the  rninimum  FPE  obtained  by  also  including  another  variable 
FPE(m  If  FPE(m  *,  n  *)  <  FPE(m  *)  then  there  is  a  causal  relationship  between  the 258 
Table  24.  Optimum  Lags  ofManipulated  Variable  and  the  FPE  of  the  Controlled 
Variable  (Disaggregated  Inftastructure  Data) 
Controlled 
Variable  a 
Basu 
'doB  t 
A  0"  (1) 
t 
A  OB  (1) 
'A  19 
B  (1) 
Reverse 
Caus  "lit 
A  I,  ff  (2) 
t 
AI,  w  (1) 
AI's  (1) 
A[,  o  (1) 
'The  number  in  brackets  indicates  the  order  of  autoregressive  operator  on  the  controlled  variable. 
b  The  FPEs  in  the  FPE(m*,  n*)  column  are  the  minimum  ones  obtained  from  inclusion  of  different 
lags  on  the  manipulated  variables.  Asterisks  signify  that  there  is  a  causal  relationship  from  the 
manipulated  variable  to  the  controlled  variable.  AIH  is  the  growth  rate  of  highways  and  streets,  AI  w 
tt 
is  the  growth  rate  of  water  structures,  AIts  is  the  growth  rate  of  sewer  structures  and  AItO  is  the 
growth  rate  of  other  structures. 
variables.  The  first  set  of  FPEs  tests  whether  there  is  a  causal  relationship  from 
infrastructure  investment  to  TFP.  The  minimum  FPEs  imply  that,  as  with  the  Solow 
residual,  highway  and  street  investment  affect  the  Basu  residual.  However,  inclusion  of 
electric  and  gas  facilities  and  mass  transit  (the  "other  structures"  component)  also 
n-tinimises  the  FPE.  In  summary, 
AIH  =>  AOB,  AIO  =>  A 
OB, 
tt 
AJW  ::  ý  AOB 
t  and 
AJS:  ýý 
AOB 
t. 
Turning  to  the  tests  for  reverse  causality  reported  in  Table  24,  it  is 
apparent  again  that  the  different  TFP  measures  generate  different  results.  While  growth 
in  the  Solow  residual  causes  investment  in  highways  and  streets  and  water  and  sewer 
Manipulated 
Variable 
AIH 
t 
Aitw 
Ais 
t 
Aito 
AOB 
t 
AOB 
t 
AOB 
t 
AOB 
t 
Optimum  Lags, 
Manipulated 
Variable 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
FPE(m  *,  n 
*)  b 
FpE(M  *) 
0.0000444*  0.0000602 
0.0000606 
0.0000610 
0.0000602 
0.0000602 
0.0000564*  0.0000602 
0.002462 
0.019030 
0.022800 
0.020086 
0.002270 
0.017957 
0.021565 
0.018863 259 
systems,  the  adjusted  TFP  measure  again  provides  no  evidence  of  reverse  causation. 
Al  HA  OB  AOB  Aiw  In  summary,  Aio  4  OB 
t  51  -  4--  A  and  AP  <t  A  0'  t  31  tt 
67  Discussion  of  Results 
Thus  the  results  for  the  Basu  measure  reported  in  Section  6.2  using  aggregate  public 
investment  data  are  robust  to  the  use  of  data  for  different  types  of  public  investment. 
This  is  an  interesting  finding  because  some  researchers  (for  example,  Morrison  and 
Schwarz,  1997)  only  include  highways  and  water  and  sewer  systems  in  their  measure 
of  core  infrastructure  and  ignore  the  other  structures  component.  The  authors  ignored 
these  types  of  infrastructure  because  Munnell  (1990b)  found  "other  infrastructure"  to 
be  insignificant  in  her  production  function  studies.  42  However,.  Munnell's  variable 
included  not  only  other  structures  but  also  an  assortment  of  buildings  (hospitals, 
courthouses,  fire  stations  etc.  )  which  arguably  do  not  have  a  direct  effect  upon  private 
productivity.  43  However,  the  results  reported  in  Table  24  imply  that  one  component  of 
"other  infrastructure"  -  the  structures  component  -  is  one  of  the  most  productive  types 
of  infrastructure.  Flighway  investment  has  the  biggest  impact  on  private  productivity, 
however.  Inclusion  of  this  variable  leads  to  the  greatest  reduction  in  the  prediction 
error  of  A  Ot" 
I 
68  Estimating  Inftastructure's  Impact  on  Productivity  -  Disaggregated 
It?  frastructure  Data 
The  next  step  is  to  quantify  the  impact  of  investment  in  roads  and  other  structures  on 
-12  The  results  from  this  study  are  discussed  in  Chapter  1. 
43  Munnell's  data  is  given  particular  attention  because  it  has  been  used  by  a  number  of  other 
researchers.  eg  Eisner  (  199  1  ). 260 
the  TFP  growth  rate,  as  was  done  in  Section  6.4.  However,  this  time  the  Basu  model 
contains  three  variables 
(AOB,  AJH  and  AIO).  In  determining  the  optimum  number  of  ttt 
lags  for  each  variable  it  has  to  be  decided  in  which  order  they  are  added  to  the 
equation.  For  example,  the  equation  in  which  AO'  is  the  dependent  variable  will  t 
consist  of  I  own  lag  tern-,,  A  0', 
,  and  lags  of  AI,  '  and  AI,.  Employing  the  specific 
gravity  criterion,  the  variable  that  generated  the  smallest  FPE  when  included  as  a 
manipu  ated  variable  is  included  first.  In  this  case  we  know  from  Table  24  that  the  FPE 
for  road  investment  is  less  than  that  for  other  structures  (0.0000444  <  0.0000564),  so 
roads  are  included  first.  It  is  also  known  that  a  lag  order  of  I  for  Al,  '  minimises  the 
FPE  of  AOB 
t 
In  the  next  stage,  Al,  '  is  added  I  lag  at  a  time  (up  to  4)  and  the  FPE  is 
recalculated.  The  lag  length  that  generates  the  smallest  FPE  enters  the  estimating 
model.  The  outcomes  of  this  stepwise  procedure  are  summarised  in  Table  25.  Using 
the  information  contained  in  Table  25  the  following  model  is  obtained 
A  0')  'a)  (v  IIvI  V/1  )  AOB) 
t  t1  12  13  t 
Al"  b+0  V/ 
20  AIH  +Vt  (86) 
t  22  t 
A010  lt'  v)  00  V33)ý 
t 
The  results  from  estimating  the  model  using  SUR  are  reported  in  Table  26.  The  R2s  in 
the  AO'  and  AI,  '  equations  are  reasonably  high  for  models  that  use  differenced  data. 
The  estimate  on  AI,  '  is  significant  at  the  one  per  cent  level  at  least.  It  is  not  just  road 
investment  that  affects  TFP  in  the  Basu  model;  AI,  '  also  has  a  small  effect.  This 
variable  is  significant  at  the  5  per  cent  level  at  least.  Wald  tests  also  confirm  that  each 261 
Table  25.  Construction  of  Basu  Model,  Disaggregated  Inftastructure  Data 
(1) 
Dependent  Variable,  'AOB  t 
Controlled  Variables 
AOB  (1)"AIH 
tt 
Manipulated  Vanable 
Aito  (1) 
FPE(mtntp*)'  FPE(mtn*) 
0.0000441*b  0.0000444 
(2) 
Dependent  Variable,  AI' 
t 
Controlled  Variable 
IH 
,' 
(2) 
Manipulated  Variable  FPE(m  *,  n  *) 
'119 
B  (2)  0.0024619 
(3) 
Dependent  Variable,  AP 
t 
Controlled  Variable 
Aito  (1) 
Manipulated  Variable  FPE(m  *,  n  *) 
AItH  (1)  0.019724 
FPE(m  *) 
0.0022703 
FPE(m  *) 
0.018863 
Notes:  ap*  is  the  optimum  lag  for  variable  3  ;b  Asterisks  signify  causality. 
I.  Equation  (1)  contains  AIH  and  AIO  because  the  bivariate  FPEs  (0.0000444  and  0.0000564 
respectively)  are  lower  than  the  univariate  one  (0.0000602).  The  variable  with  the  lower  FPE 
(AI,  H)  is  included  first  and  lags  of  AIO  are  added  one  at  a  time.  The  minimum  FPE  (0.0000441) 
is  obtained  from  using  one  lag. 
FP  A  2.  Equations  (2)  and  (3)  contain  only  own-lag  terms.  Even  the  minimum  bivariate  Es  (for  OB 
in  the  AIH  equation  and  AIH  in  the  A1,0  equation)  exceed  the  univariate  FPEs  (ie,  0.0024619  > 
0.0022703  and  0.019724  >  0.018863).  The  equations  are  included  in  the  model  as  each  of  the 
dependent  variables  may  be  subject  to  the  same  stochastic  shocks. 
type  of  infrastructure  investment  Granger  causes  the  TFP  growth  rate  (Table  27). 
However,  it  is  only  possible  to  reject  the  hypothesis  y/,,  =  0  at  the  10  per  cent  level. 
Again,  there  may  be  arguments  about  whether  the  causal  relationships  implied  by 
C7 
autoregressive  modelling  are  sensitive  to  the  specification  of  the  order  of  the 
autoregressive  operator.  I  checked  for  this  by  individually  increasing  the  number  of  lag 
terms  on  AI,  "  and  A1,0  and  assuming  these  specifications  were  chosen  as  the 262 
Table  26.  Estimatio 
-n 
Results,  Disaggregated  Inftastructure  Data 
Dependent  Variable:  AOB  AP 
t 
AIO 
t 
AoB 
t-I  0.082 
(0.68) 
A[ff 
t-I  0.078***  0.436*** 
(3.05)  (3.19) 
Ar  t-2  0.275** 
(2.30) 
AI0 
t-I 
0.014**  -0.383** 
(2.31)  (2.52) 
Constant  0.003  0.001  0.043* 
(2.07)**  (0.09)  (1.73) 
R2  0.397  0.385  0.139 
S.  E.  0.006  0.043  0.130 
Note:  H  and  0  denote  highways  and  streets  and  other  structures  respectively;  t-stats  in  parentheses 
and  are  computed  using  heteroskedastic-consistent  standard  effors. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  1%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  5%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  10%  level. 
Table  27.  Wald  Testsfor  Zero  Restrictions 
Wald  Statistic  -,  e 
Equation: 
AOB  0 
t  12 
1 
=o 
13 
1 
12 
113 
15.95(1)*** 
3.21(1)* 
21.43(2)*** 
Note:  Degrees  of  freedom  in  parentheses 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  I%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  5%  level. 
Significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  10  %  level. 263 
maintained  hypotheses.  For  tests  on  the  growth  rate  of  road  investment  the  matrix  of 
lagged  coefficients  was  assumed  to  be 
II)(I(222 
vil  Yf 
12  Y' 
13  Y/ 
II  Y/ 
'12 
yl'13  Y/ 
II 
V12  V 
13 
00 
Y/ 
2 
V21  yf 
2 
Y/ 
2  22 
1 
22 
0 
and  2  22  23  (87) 
0  Y/  33) 
00  Y/ 
1222 
33  Y/ 
31  Of 
32  Vf 
33 
The  chi-square  values  from  testing  the  hypotheses  V2  =  0,  V4  =0  and 
Vf2  =  0,  are  12  12  12 
19.68  (2  degrees  of  freedom),  19.71  (4  degrees  of  freedom)  and  12.27  (2  degrees  of 
freedom).  Thus,  as  in  the  original  specification,  the  null  hypothesis  that  road 
investment  does  not  affect  productivity  is  rejected.  For  tests  on  the  growth  rate  of 
investment  in  other  structures  the  matrix  of  lagged  coefficients  was  assumed  to  be 
112114222  VII  Y/  12  Y/  13  V11  Y/  12  13  11  12  13 
0200  Y/ 
20 
and 
Y/ 
21 
Y/ 
2 
yf 
2 
(88)  22  22  2  22  23 
00001222 
33)  33)  ýVf  31  32  33 
The  chi-square  values  for  testing  the  hypotheses  V2  =  0,  V4  =0  and 
Yf 
2=0 
are  13  13  13 
respectively  2.60  (2  degree  of  freedom),  4.30  (4  degrees  of  freedom)  and  2.20  (2 
degrees  of  freedom).  Thus,  unlike  the  original  specification,  the  null  hypothesis  that 
other  structures  investment  does  not  affect  productivity  cannot  be  rejected.  These  tests 
confirm  road  investment's  importance  in  determining  TFP  but  show  that  the  results 
obtained  using  other  structures  investment  are  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  lag 
specification.  To  determine  whether  the  FPE  Criterion  performs  satisfactorily  in 
identifying  the  system  of  equations,,  the  adequacy  of  the  original  models  was  checked 
by  sequentially  overfitting  (86)  by  adding  1,2,3  and  4  additional  lags  to  each  vanable, 
including  those  variables  that  were  not  significantly  different  from  zero  in  the  final 
model.  The  respective  Wald  test  statistics  are  6.89  (9  degrees  of  freedom),  19.30  (18 
degrees  of  freedom),  29.53  (27  degrees  of  freedom)  and  60.29  (36  degrees  of 264 
freedom),  all  indicating  that  the  extra  lags  are  not  significantly  different  from  zero  and 
that  there  is  no  inadequacy  in  the  models  chosen  by  the  FPE  Criterion. 
In  conclusion,  Wald  tests  reveal  that  AI  H 
=::  ý  A  OB 
,  even  if  the  number  of  tt 
lagged  infrastructure  terms  differs  from  that  determined  by  the  FPE  Criterion.  The 
results  for  AIto  are  quite  sensitive  to  the  specification  of  the  lag  operator.  However, 
the  overfitting  tests  reject  in  favour  of  the  model  identified  by  the  FPE  Criterion  and  it 
is  on  this  model  that  I  rely  when  drawing  inferences  about  the  impact  of  other 
structures'  investment  on  the  TFP  growth  rate. 
As  before,  a  number  of  diagnostic  tests  were  conducted  on  the  equations  in  the 
final  model.  The  test  statistics  reported  in  Table  28  imply  that  the  model  does  not 
suffer  from  serial  correlation,  heteroskedasticity,  non-normality,  n-fisspecification 
problems  or  structural  breaks. 
69  Discussion  of  Results 
Again  the  two  TFP  measures  generate  coefficient  estimates  that  differ  significantly  in 
relative  magnitude.  For  example,  the  coefficient  on  lagged  roads  investment  in  the 
Basu  model  is  almost  40  per  cent  smaller  than  that  estimated  using  the  Solow  residual. 
The  adjusted  TFP  estimate  implies  that  if  the  growth  rate  of  highway  and  street 
investment  increases  from,,  say,  2  per  cent  to  3  per  cent,  the  TFP  growth  rate  will 
increase  from,  say,  - 
2  per  cent  to  2.078  per  cent  in  the  following  period.  The  estimate 
on  AP  implies  that  if  the  growth  rate  of  investment  in  utilities  and  mass  transit 
t 
increases  by  I  percentage  point  in  period  t,  the  TFP  growth  rate  will  increase  from, 
say,  2  per  cent  to  2.014  in  period  t+1.  This  does  not  imply  that  additional  road 
investment  is  5.6  times  (0.078/0.014)  as  productive  as  investment  in  other  structures. 265 
Table  28.  Diagnostic  Tests  on  Individual  Equations 
Breusch-Godftey  LM  Testsfor  Serial  Correlation  -  X2 
---------  Dependent  Variable  --------- 
, 
AOB  AIH  AI0  ttt 
Order:  1  0.18(l)  1.53(l)  0.00(i) 
2  0.26(2)  2.68(2)  3.65(2) 
3  2.34(3)  4.12(3)  3.79(3) 
White  Heteroskedasticity  Test  -j 
---------  Dependent  Vaiiable  --------- 
H  AOtB  Alt  AIto 
13.9(9)  8.31(5)  0.61(l) 
darque-Bera  Normality  Test-  Z' 
---------  Dependent  Variable  --------- 
AOB  so 
t 
AItff 
t 
0.66(2)  1.62(2)  0.45(2) 
Ramsey  RESET  Test  of  Specification  Error  (F-Statistics) 
-----------  Dependent  Variable  ----------- 
AOB  mH  AI0 
ttt 
RESET(2)  0.25(1,23)  0.44(1,24)  2.14(1,25) 
RESET(3)  0.44(2,22)  3.25(2,23)  2.80(2,24) 
RESET(4)  0.31(3,21)  2.10(3,22)  1.89(3,23) 
Chow  Testfor  Structural  Change  (F-Statistics) 
-----------  Dependent  Variable  ----------- 
AOB  AIff  AI0 
ttt 
0.23(4,20)  1.63(3,22)  0.63(2,24) 
*  Rejection  of  the  relevant  null  hypothesis  (serial  independence,  homoskedasticity,  normality,  no 
specification  error,  no  structural  break)  at  the  5%  level.  Degrees  of  freedom  in  parentheses. 
Road  investment  is  by  far  the  largest  component  of  total  investment.  It  also  accounts 
for  most  of  the  core  infrastructure  investment  that  took  place  over  the  sample  period 
(exactly  60  per  cent).  On  average  over  the  sample  period  the  level  of  road  investment 266 
was  4  1/2  times  higher  than  investment  in  other  structures.  Thus  identical  growth  rates 
represent  very  different  levels  of  investment.  It  is  known  from  the  FPEs  reported  in 
Table  24  that  roads  are  more  productive  than  other  structures  but  not  by  the  kind  of 
multiple  that  an  uncritical  comparison  of  the  coefficient  estimates  would  imply. 
That  roads  are  the  most  productive  type  of  public  investment  is  a  new  finding 
in  the  distinct  body  of  research  exploring  the  possible  relationship  between  public 
capital  and  factor  productivity.  44However,  this  result  would  come  as  no  surprise  to 
those  researchers  who  specialise  in  the  analysis  of  the  economic  effects  of 
transportation  capital.  For  example,  a  report  by  the  Federal  Highway  Administration 
(1992)  argues  that: 
"Productivity  in  virtually  every  sector  of  the  economy  is  affected  by  the 
performance  of  the  nation's  highways,  because  this  affects  the  efficiency 
with  which  commodities  and  industry  personnel  are  carried  by  motor 
vehicles.  "  (p.  15) 
A  study  by  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  (199  1)  noted  that: 
"The  limited  available  evidence  shows  that  retums  to  public  investments 
vary  widely  for  different  types  of  infrastructure.  Cost  benefit  analysis  finds 
substantial  returns  to  some  increases  in  federal  spending  for  highways 
carefully  selected  highway  projects  would  yield  high  rates  of  retum.  -)  45 
Fisher  (1997)  reviews  15  studies  that  analyse  the  relationship  between  various 
44  In  fact,  some  authors  such  as  Evans  and  Karras  (1994)  have  found  that  the  highway  capital  stock 
and/or  highway  investment  is  insignificant. 
45  Quoted  by  the  Federal  ffighway  Administration  (1992).  p.  15. 267 
transportation  measures,  such  as  per  capita  highway  spending,  on  economic 
development,  as  measured  by  changes  in  foreign  investment,  employment,  income  or 
the  number  of  firms  and  concludes  that- 
"Of  all  the  public  services  examined  for  an  influence  on  economic 
development,  transportation  services,  and  highway  facilities  especially, 
show  the  most  substantial  evidence  of  a  relationship.  Of  the  15  studies 
reviewed,  a  positive  effect  of  highway  facilities  or  spending  on  economic 
development  is  reported  in  10  (or  nearly  70  per  cent),  with  that  effect  being 
statistically  significant  in  eight  of  the  cases.  "  (p.  54) 
Although  road  investment  is  the  most  productive  type  of  public  investment,  it  is  clear 
from  the  size  of  the  coefficient  estimate  reported  in  Table  26  that  it  is  only  one  of 
several  contributing  factors.  Many  other  factors  may  have  affected  TFP  growth  over 
the  period,  including  workers'  years  of  schooling 
46 
,  the  level  of  unionization 
47 
, 
agglomeration  and  scale  effects.  If  it  is  assumed  that  the  depreciation  rate  of  highways 
and  streets  remained  constant  over  the  sample  period,  from  Chapter  2  it  is  known  that 
the  growth  rate  of  investment  is  broadly  equivalent  to  the  growth  rate  of  the  capital 
stock.  Thus  the  coefficient  estimates  reported  in  Table  26  can  be  compared  with 
estimates  of  public  capital's  output  elasticity  obtained  in  production  function  studies. 
Clearly  the  estimates  reported  in  Table  26  are  significantly  lower  than  those  reported  in 
the  literature  review  in  Chapter  1. 
It  is  also  necessary  to  comment  on  the  finding  that  infrastructure  investment 
affects  productivity  growth  with  a  lag  of  only  one  year.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  some 
46  See  Moomaw  and  Williams  (199  1). 
"  See  Kendrick  and  Grossman  (1980). 268 
infrastructure  spending  will  only  affect  productivity  with  a  considerable  lag  because  of 
the  time  between  the  allocation  of  funds  and  completion  of  the  project.  However,  the 
finding  of  a  short  time  lag  for  aggregate  core  infrastructure  can  possibly  be  explained  - 
by  the  fact  that  spending  on  highways  and  streets  is  the  largest  component  of  core 
infrastructure  spending  (60  per  cent  during  the  sample  period)  and,  as  the  FPEs  and 
coefficient  estimates  make  clear,  has  the  most  significant  effect  on  productivity  growth. 
Much  of  the  spending  on  highways  and  streets  is  in  the  form  of  current  maintenance 
and  upgrading  of  sections  that  do  not  meet  minimum  standards.  There  is  a  relatively 
short  time  lag  between  allocations  being  made  and  these  tasks  being  completed. 
According  to  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  (199  1)  the  expected  rate  of  return  from 
keeping  highways  in  their  current  condition  is  between  30  and  40  per  cent;  the  return 
on  selected  new  urban  construction  is  between  10  and  20  per  cent  and  the  return  from 
upgrading  roads  that  do  not  meet  minimum  service  or  safety  standards  is  between  3 
and  7  per  cent. 
7.  Disaggregated  TFP 
In  Section  3.8  and  Section  6.6  the  public  investment  data  was  disaggregated  so  that  the 
most  productive  types  of  infrastructure  spending  could  be  identified.  However,  all  tests 
and  estimations  have  so  far  been  performed  using  manufacturing  data  at  the  aggregate 
level  only.  The  U.  S.  manufacturing  sector  is  made  up  of  a  medley  of  industries, 
producing  goods  as  diverse  as  shoes  and  computers,  and  car  tyres  and  cigarettes.  It  is 
important  for  policyrnakers  to  identify  which  industries  are  affected  most  by 
infrastructure  spending  as  that  may  help  explain  the  mixed  fortunes  of  the 269 
manufacturing  sector  in  the  post-war  period.  For  example,  average  output  growth  was 
5.9  per  cent  per  year  in  the  chemicals  industry  in  the  period  up  to  1973,  the  highest 
among  all  manufacturing  industries.  After  1973  average  annual  growth  fell  to  1.7  per 
cent  per  year. 
The  question  that  may  be  asked  is  whether  this  slowdown  was  influenced  by 
the  infrastructure  slowdown  that  took  place  at  approximately  the  same  time,  or 
whether  it  was  caused  by  other  industry-specific  factors.  In  this  section,  data  at  the 
two-digit  SIC  level  is  used  to  determine,  by  the  FPE  Criterion,  which  industries  are  the 
major  beneficiaries  of  infrastructure  investment.  For  comparative  purposes  two  sets  of 
TFP  measures  are  calculated: 
A08"  20,...,  39,  and  t 
AOB,  i  20,...,  39 
t 
(89) 
The  first  set  consists  of  industry-specific  Solow  residuals,  the  second  set  consists  of 
individual  industry  Basu  residuals.  Although  AO`  is  my  preferred  productivity  t 
measure,  Solow  residuals  are  calculated  for  comparative  purposes  and  to  determine 
whether  the  results  obtained  in  Section  4  are  robust  at  different  levels  of  industry 
aggregation.  Calculating  these  measures  is  a  straightforward  procedure  based  on  (2  1). 
Estimating  individual  industry  Basu  residuals  is  slightly  more  involved.  First, 
estimates  of  the  returns  to  scale  parameter  vi,  i=  20,...,  39  have  to  be  obtained  using 
IV  techniques.  The  estimates  are  reported  in  Appendix  C.  Once  returns  to  scale  have 
been  estimated,  TFP  growth  rates  for  each  of  the  20  industries  are  obtained  using  the 
following  variation  of  (78) 
Bli  Ii_ji  (AMi 
_  Cr(-L',  i  +-  K'j  i-  4m,  i 
AO,  +of  =  Aqf  I  a,  a,  )(4p,  v' 
I 
))  i=20,...,  39.  (90) 270 
Differences  between  the  industries  are  immediately  apparent.  Apart  from  the  wide 
divergence  in  estimates  of  the  returns  to  scale  parameter  (these  range  from  0.83  to 
1.44)  the  correlation  matrix  reveals  that  correlation  between  the  TFP  measures  is  very 
ioW.  48 
The  next  step  is  to  test  for  causality.  First,  using  each  industry's  productivity 
AOB,  '  C  growth  rate  (both  AO"  and  t 
')  the  appropriate  'own"  lag  length,  m*,  is 
determined  by  minimising  the  FPE  of  the  univariate  autoregressive  process.  This  is 
then  compared  with  the  minimum  FPE  of  the  bivariate  equation,  FPE(m  *,  n  *),  obtained 
by  including  the  growth  rate  of  core  infrastructure  investment.  The  results  are 
summarised  in  Table  29.  The  tests  carried  out  using  Solow  residuals  are  generally 
disappointing.  When  aggregate  manufacturing  data  was  used  in  Section  3  the 
conclusion  was  that  the  growth  rate  of  core  infrastructure  investment  causes  the 
growth  rate  of  multifactor  productivity.  However,  when  the  manufacturing  data  is 
disaggregated,  evidence  of  a  causal  relationship  largely  disappears.  Only  seven  of  the 
20  industries  are  affected  by  public  investment.  Thus  evidence  of  causality  obtained 
using  Solow's  (1957)  measure  of  TFP  is  not  robust  to  the  use  of  either  disaggregated 
infrastructure  or  productivity  data.  Turning  to  the  results  presented  in  the  second 
column  of  Table  29,  use  of  the  adjusted  TFP  measure  provides  evidence  that  core 
infrastructure  investment  affects  productivity  in  only  40  per  cent  of  nondurable  goods 
industries  but  70  per  cent  of  durable  manufacturing  industries.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  Nadiri  and  Mamuneas  (1991)  obtained  a  similar  result  using  a  completely 
48  1  am  not  alone  in  finding  diverse  TFP  growth  rates  among  industries.  Using  Solow  residuals, 
Fernald  (  1997)  obtained  average  TFP  growth  rates  ranging  from  -0.8  per  cent  per  year  to  3.8  per  cent 
per  year  for  the  period  1953-89.  Jorgenson.  Gollop  and  FraumeM  (1987)  also  found  that  TFP  growth 
rates  vary  %N,  idely  among  industries. 271 
Table  29.  Results  of  Individual  Industry  Causality  Tests 
Jos,  i 
--------  ---------- 
joB,  i 
Durable  Goods  Industries 
sic24  Lumber  &  wood 
sic25  Furniture  &  fixtures 
sic32  Stone,  clay  &  glass 
sic33  Primary  metals 
sic34  Fabricated  metals 
sic35  Industrial  machinery  &  equip. 
sic36  Electronic  &  electric  equip. 
sic37  Transportation  equipment 
s1c38  Instruments  and  related 
siC39  fvfiscellaneous  manufacturing 
Nondurable  Goods  Industries 
sic20  Food  and  kindred  products 
sic2l  Tobacco  products 
sic22  Textile  mill  products 
sic23  Apparel  and  other  textile 
sic26  Papa  and  allied 
sic27  Printing  and  publishing 
sic28  Chemicals  and  allied 
sic29  Petroleum  and  coal  products 
sic30  Rubber  &  misc.  plastics 
sic3l  Leather  and  leather  products 
FPE(mtn*)  FPE(m*)  FPE(mtn*)  FPE(m*) 
.  00065(1,1)* 
. 
00073(l) 
.  00027(1,1)* 
. 
00033(l) 
. 
00054(2,1) 
. 
00050(2) 
.  00025(1,1)* 
. 
00026(l) 
.  00046(2,1)* 
. 
00056(2) 
.  00010(1,3)* 
. 
00014(l) 
.  00092(1,1)* 
. 
00099(1) 
. 
00021(2,1)* 
. 
00030(2) 
.  00037(2,1)* 
. 
00041(2) 
. 
00029(3,1) 
. 
00027(3) 
.  00076(1,1)* 
. 
00078(l) 
.  00031(1,1)* 
. 
00032(l) 
. 
00045(2,1) 
. 
00044(2) 
. 
00054(4,1) 
. 
00050(4) 
. 
00067(l,  l) 
. 
00066(l) 
.  00018(1,2)* 
. 
00020(l) 
. 
00050(2,2) 
. 
00049(2) 
.  00114(1,4)* 
. 
00117(l) 
. 
00136(l,  l) 
. 
00133(l) 
. 
00096(l,  l) 
. 
00092(l) 
. 
00014(l,  l) 
. 
00013(l) 
. 
00026(l,  l) 
. 
00024(l) 
. 
00116(l,  l) 
. 
00109(1) 
. 
00147(l,  l) 
. 
00138(l) 
. 
00047(3,1) 
. 
00044(3) 
.  00035(1,1)* 
. 
00035(l) 
. 
00025(l,  l) 
. 
00024(l) 
. 
00025(l,  l) 
. 
00024(l) 
. 
00053(3,1) 
. 
00051(3) 
. 
00015(2,1) 
. 
00014(2) 
. 
00051(l,  l) 
. 
00048(l) 
. 
00016(1,1)* 
. 
00017(l) 
.  00097(2,1)* 
. 
00104(2) 
.  00101(1,1)* 
. 
00105(l) 
.  00173(1,3)* 
. 
00197(l) 
.  00220(1,3)* 
. 
00240(l) 
. 
00067(l,  l) 
. 
00065(l) 
. 
00069(l,  l) 
. 
00067(l) 
. 
00093(l,  l) 
. 
00089(l) 
. 
00126(3,1) 
. 
00119(3) 
Note:  Asterisks  signify  a  causal  relationship. 
different  econometric  approach.  Estimating  a  translog  cost  function  for  U.  S. 
manufacturing  from  1956-86,  it  was  found  that  infrastructure  cost  elasticities  vary 
considerably  across  two-digit  industries.  The  authors  conclude  that 
"There  is  no  discernible  pattern  except  that  the  magnitude  of  the  elasticities 
tend  to  be  higher  in  durable  manufacturing  sectors.  "  (p.  17) 
The  interesting  question  is  why  infrastructure  affects  durable  manufacturers' 
productivity  more  than  that  of  nondurable  producers.  There  are  a  number  of 
differences  between  the  two  types  of  industries.  From  Table  32  in  Appendix  C  it  can  be 
seen  that  estimates  of  the  returns  to  scale  parameter  are  considerably  higher  for 
nondurable  goods  industries  than  for  durable  producers.  The  average  estimates  of  y  are 272 
Table  30.  fptive  Statistics  of  Industries  (mean  values  1958-91) 
aL'  t  am'  t  a 
K' 
t  Aqt  A/,  Am,  Ak, 
Durable 
sic  24*  0.236  0.650  0.113  0.021  -0.001  0.021  0.015 
sic  25*  0.335  0.592  0.073  0.023  0.007  0.022  0.032 
sic  32*  0.285  0.533  0.182  0.011  -0.005  0.008  0.014 
sic  33*  0.199  0.644  0.156  0.002  -0.015  0.002  0.007 
sic  34  0.304  0.597  0.099  0.016  0.004  0.015  0.030 
sic  35*.  0.334  0.564  0.103  0.029  0.006  0.029  0.040 
sic  36  0.346  0.557  0.097  0.046  0.019  0.036  0.051 
sic  37*  0.234  0.674  0.092  0.021  -0.003  0.019  0.020 
sic  38*  0.389  0.502  0.110  0.047  0.014  0.042  0.051 
sic  39  0.315  0.599  0.086  0.020  -0.001  0.018  0.028 
Average  0.298  0.591  0.111  0.024  0.003  0.021  0.029 
Nondurable 
sic  20  0.124  0.800  0.076  0.019  -0.005  0.014  0.021 
sic  21  0.125  0.789  0.086  0.001  -0.022  -0.006  0.043 
sic  22*  0.225  0.658  0.117  0.019  -0.013  0.018  0.012 
sic  23  0.306  0.651  0.043  0.014  -0.089  0.011  0.026 
sic  26  0.210  0.633  0.157  0.026  0.003  0.023  0.039 
sic  27*  0.409  0.482  0.109  0.021  0.015  0.023  0.031 
sic  28*  0.182  0.641  0.177  0.036  0.005  0.030  0.028 
sic  29*  0.045  0.868  0.087  0.021  -0.010  0.024  0.014 
sic  30  0.274  0.593  0.134  0.046  0.023  0.038  0.044 
sic  31  0.314  0.632  0.054  -0.020  -0.037  -0.019  -0.001 
Average  0.221  0.675  0.104  0.018  -0.013  0.016  0.026 
Note: 
atL'=  cost  share  of  labour 
a,  "  =  cost  share  of  materials 
ii,  '  =  cost  share  of  capital 
Aq,  =  growth  rate  of  output 
Al,  =  growth  rate  of  labour 
Amt  growth  rate  of  materials 
Ak,  growth  rate  of  capital 
B 
Industries  that  exhibit  a  causal  relationship  with  infrastructure  investment  using  AO, 
1.14  and  1.0  respectively.  However,  estimates  of  Y  obtained  using  aggregate  durable 
and  nondurable  data  are  far  more  uniform  (see  Table  15),  indicating  that  the  difference 
in  estimates  of  returns  to  scale  can  be  put  down  to  econometric  issues  rather  than 
inter-industry  differences.  49There  are,  however,  a  number  of  structural  differences 
49  Causality  tests  were  also  conducted  using  TFP  measures  calculated  using  the  estimates  of  v  obtained 
using  aggregate  durable  and  nondurable  data.  There  is  no  difference  in  the  results  obtained  using  the 
different  estimates. 273 
between  the  industries.  Table  30  provides  a  summary  of  some  of  the  key  descriptive 
statistics  of  the  20  manufacturing  sub-sectors.  The  table  contains  summary  information 
on  the  cost  shares  of  labour,  materials  and  private  capital  and  the  average  annual 
growth  rates  of  gross  output,  labour,  materials  and  capital.  The  main  difference 
between  the  cost  bills  of  the  two  industry  groupings  is  that  materials  account  for  a 
greater  share  in  nondurable  industries  than  in  durable  industries.  Wages  account  for  a 
greater  share  of  total  costs  in  durable  industries.  It  is  also  clear  that  output  grew 
considerably  faster  in  industries  that  produce  durable  goods  (2.4  per  cent  per  year 
compared  with  1.8  per  cent  in  nondurable  industries).  Although  materials  make  up  a 
greater  share  of  the  cost  bill  in  nondurable  industries,  growth  in  this  input  was  higher  in 
durable  industries.  Labour  input  grew  by  only  0.3  per  cent  per  year  in  durable- 
producing  industries  and  actually  shrank  in  nondurable  industries.  The  capital  stocks 
grew  at  approximately  the  same  rate.  Ignoring  the  durable-nondurable  division,  more 
important  differences  are  revealed  by  comparing  industries  in  which  AIc  =>  AO"  with 
industries  in  which  AI'  i;  ý>  AO'.  The  first  major  difference  is  that  output  growth  in  the 
former  was  higher  than  the  latter  in  the  period  1959-73  50 
,  when  infrastructure 
investment  was  high;  output  growth  was  lower  in  the  former  than  the  latter  in  the 
period  1974-91,  when  infrastructure  investment  was  lower 
.51 
The  second  major 
difference  is  that  industries  in  which  AI'  ==,  >  A  OB  are  significantly  more  capital 
intensive  than  industries  in  which  AIC  ::  ý  A  OB 
. 
The  average  share  of  capital  in  costs  is 
26  per  cent  higher  in  industries  which  show  evidence  of  a  causal  relationship.  The 
reason  infrastructure  affects  productivity  in  industries  that  employ  more  capital  may  be 
50  3.6  %  per  year  versus  3.3  %  per  year. 
51  11.7  %  per  year  compared  with  15.3  %  per  year. 274 
because  public  and  private  capital  are  complements.  52  Thus  if  increased  public 
investment  enhances  the  marginal  productivity  of  private  capital,  capital  intensive 
industries  will  enjoy  the  largest  productivity  gains. 
Further  evidence  that  public  and  private  capital  are  complements  can  be  found 
by  analyzing  a  specific  component  of  the  private  capital  stock,  more  specifically  motor 
vehicle  shares.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  the  most  vehicle-intensive  industries  are  the 
ones  that  benefit  most  from  core  infrastructure  investment.  This  is  because  investment 
in  streets  and  highways  makes  up  the  greater  proportion  of  total  core  investment  and, 
as  Fernald  (1997)  points  out,  if  roads  are  productive  then  industries  that  use  roads 
intensively  should  benefit  more.  There  are  no  direct  measures  of  industry  road  use. 
However,  given  the  complementarity  between  roads  and  vehicles,  vehicle  use  provides 
an  indirect  measure  of  road  usage.  Table  31  ranks  the  industries  by  average  vehicle 
share  and  there  is  some  evidence  that  the  most  vehicle-intensive  industries  are  the  ones 
that  benefit  most  from  infrastructure  investment.  Among  the  10  most  vehicle-intensive 
industries,  there  is  evidence  of  a  causal  relationship  between  infrastructure  and 
productivity  in  seven.  Among  the  10  least  vehicle-intensive  industries,  there  is  evidence 
of  a  causal  relationship  between  infrastructure  and  productivity  in  only  four.  This  result 
is  not  surprising  in  light  of  the  evidence  in  Section  6  that  roads  are  the  most  productive 
type  of  public  capital.  Although  some  explanations  have  been  given  as  to  why 
infrastructure  affects  TFP  more  in  some  industries  than  others,  any  findings  obtained 
using  disaggregated  productivity  data  should  be  treated  with  caution.  This  is  because 
the  more  disaggregated  the  manufacturing  data  the  more  difficult  it  is  to  identify  a 
relationship  with  an  aggregate  national  measure  such  as  public  investment.  For 
example,  even  if  a  reverse  relationship  exists  between  infrastructure  investment  and 
52  Studies  that  uncovered  a  complementary  relationship  are  listed  in  Chapter  1. 275 
Table  31.  Comparison  of  Causality  Test  Results  and  Average 
Vehicle  Shares  by  Industry 
Industly  Average  Vehicle 
Share  Causalily 
sic  32  Stone,  clay  and  glass  2.8  AIC  AOB,  32 
sic  24  Lumber  and  wood  1.7  AIC  AOB,  24 
sic  20  Food  and  kindred  1.3  AiC  #,,  doB,  20 
sic  29  Petroleum  and  coal  1.0  mC  =:  ý  AoB,  29 
sic  26  Paper  and  allied  0.9  'MC  -;  t,  doB,  26 
sic  28  Chemicals  and  allied  0.7  AIC 
'doB, 
28 
sic  33  Primary  metals  0.6  XC  AoB,  33 
sic  25  Furniture  and  fixtures  0.6  'djC 
AOB,  25 
sic  27  Printing  and  publishing  0.6 
'Mc 
AoB,  27 
sic  21  Tobacco  products  0.5  AI 
C  AOB,  21 
sic  34  Fabricated  metals  0.5  xC  doB,  34 
sic  36  Electronic  and  electric  0.5  'NC 
AoB,  36 
sic  38  Instruments  and  related  0.4  AIC  AOB,  38 
sic  39  Miscellaneous  0.4  xC  AoB,  39 
sic  35  Industrial  machinery  0.3  NC  AoB,  35 
sic  37  Transportation  equip.  0.3  'MC 
=,,  joB,  37 
sic  22  Textile  mill  products  0.3  AIC 
'dOB, 
22 
sic  23  Apparel  &  textile  0.3  'MC 
AoB,  23 
sic  30  Rubber  and  misc.  0.2  xC  =kjoB, 
30 
sic  31  Leather  products  0.2  'dic  =kA6?  B,  31 
Note:  Industries  ranked  according  to  vehicle  shares  taken  from  Fernald  (1997).  53 
productivity,  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  detect  using  disaggregated  manufacturing 
data.  A  change  in  the  printing  and  publishing  industry's  productivity,  holding  constant 
productivity  in  all  other  industries,  is  unlikely  to  have  a  noticeable  effect  on  the 
accumulation  of  capital  by  the  public  sector. 
Nevertheless,  the  above  test  results  are  an  interesting  adjunct  to  the  findings 
obtained  using  aggregate  manufacturing  data.  To  date  no  research  using  disaggregated 
data  for  the  private  business  sector  has  shown  any  consistent  pattern  among  industries 
53  Vehicle  shares  are  calculated  following  Hall  and  Jorgenson  (1967)  and  Hall  (1990),  multiplying  the 
current  value  of  the  stock  of  vehicles  by  an  estimate  of  the  user  cost  of  capital. 276 
with  respect  to  the  role  of  public  capital.  54  However,  the  results  reported  in  this  section 
suggest  that  the  services  provided  by  core  infrastructure  may  have  a  varying  impact  on 
TFP  growth  rates  because  of  differences  in  private  factor  intensities  within  industries. 
8.  Conclusion 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  has  been  to  establish  whether  public  investment  Granger  causes 
productivity  growth  or  whether  causation  runs  in  the  opposite  direction.  By  carrying 
out  a  wide  variety  of  tests  and  estimations  using  aggregate  and  disaggregated  TFP  and 
public  investment  data,  I  have  also  attempted  to  identify  the  most  productive  types  of 
infrastructure  and  whether  infrastructure  investment  accounts  for  a  substantial  portion 
of  the  variation  in  the  productivity  growth  rate.  Another  important  issue  which  this 
chapter  attempts  to  shed  light  on  is  the  extent  to  which  some  manufacturing  industries 
benefit  more  than  others  from  infrastructure  spending.  The  results  indicate  that 
infrastructure  is  a  policy  variable  with  important  supply-side  effects.  However, 
policymakers  have  to  be  selective  in  their  spending  -  only  a  few  types  of  public  capital 
are  directly  productive  and  not  all  industries  will  benefit. 
Two  different  measures  of  multifactor  productivity  were  employed  in  the  analysis. 
Using  the  standard  Solow  residual  the  following  results  were  obtained: 
1.  Core  infrastructure  investment  and  total  investment  Granger  cause  the  productivity 
growth  rate.  Evidence  of  reverse  causation  is  ambiguous,  however.  Productivity  causes 
54  Studies  that  analyse  the  role  of  public  capital  on  different  industries  and  sectors  include  Dalenberg 
and  Partridge  (1995),  Luce  (1994)  and  Papke  (1991).  Apart  from  using  different  econometric 
approaches.  the  authors  examine  infrastructure's  effect  on  employment  and  investment  rather  than 
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total  investment  but  not  core  investment.  The  results  are  not  sensitive  to  the  use  of 
alternative  lag-length  selection  criteria. 
2.  Using  disaggregated  infrastructure  data  the  finding  is  that  only  investment  in  roads 
determines  the  productivity  growth  rate.  Again  the  evidence  of  reverse  causation  does 
not  make  economic  sense.  In  particular,  tests  on  sums  of  coefficients  reveal  that  the 
Solow  residual  has  both  a  negative  and  positive  effect  on  some  types  of  investment. 
Although  the  Solow  residual  is  used  widely  in  the  infrastructure  literature  it  is 
arguably  not  the  best  measure  of  TFP  growth  available  to  researchers.  If  the  "true" 
productivity  growth  rate  is  less  cyclical  and  has  lower  variance,  the  Solow  residual  may 
distort  the  true  relationship  between  infrastructure  and  productivity.  Basu  (1996)  has 
shown  that  a  productivity  measure  can  be  calculated  that  takes  account  of  increasing 
returns  to  scale  and  variable  factor  utilisation  over  the  cycle.  The  following  are  the 
major  findings  obtained  using  this  measure- 
1.  Increasing  returns  to  scale  are  not  a  major  cause  of  mismeasurement  of  TFP. 
Adjusting  for  the  in  e  it  nsity  of  labour  and  capital  usage  makes  a  substantial  difference, 
however.  The  correlation  between  the  Basu  residual  and  the  manufacturing  Solow 
residual  and  Solow  residuals  used  in  previous  infrastructure  research  is  very  low. 
2.  The  adjusted  TFP  growth  rate  is  caused  by  core  and  total  investment.  Core 
investment  is  more  productive  than  total  investment.  When  the  infrastructure  data  is 
disaggregated,  the  finding  is  that  both  investment  in  roads  and  other  structures  Granger 
causes  the  Basu  residual. 
3.  There  is  no  evidence  of  reverse  causation  using  any  of  the  infrastructure  measures. 
This  does  not  imply  that  infrastructure  is  not  a  normal  good.  TFP  growth  is  only  one 
component  of  income  growth  and  the  results  may  be  sensit've  to  the  particular  sample 
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4.  When  the  manufacturing  data  is  disaggregated  it  is  found  that  public  investment 
determines  the  productivity  growth  rate  in  some  industries  but  not  others.  The  most 
capital-intensive  industries,  in  particular  those  with  the  highest  vehicle  shares,  are  the 
biggest  beneficiaries  of  infrastructure  investment. 
5.  Quantitative  evidence  of  infrastructure's  impact  on  the  TFP  growth  rate  was  also 
obtained.  The  different  infrastructure  aggregates  have  a  small  but  significant  effect  on 
the  TFP  growth  rate.  Core  infrastructure  investment  has  a  more  significant  effect  than 
total  investment;  road  investment  is  the  most  productive  component  of  the  core. 
However,  the  estimates  are  very  small  compared  with  others  obtained  in  previous 
infrastructure  research.  Thus  I  would  not  agree  with.,  for  example,  Aschauer  (1993) 
that  up  to  a  quarter  of  the  productivity  growth  slowdown  can  be  explained  by  the  fall 
in  infrastructure  investment.  Nor,  however,  would  I  agree  with  Tatom  (1993)  or 
Hulten  and  Schwab  (1991a)  and  Jorgenson  (1991)  that  the  relationship  between  the 
variables  runs  in  the  opposite  direction  or  is  purely  spurious.  It  is  likely  that 
infrastructure  investment  has  a  positive  effect  on  private  productivity  but  this  effect  is 
quite  small,  smaller  even  than  that  implied  by  the  regional  production  function  and  cost 
function  studies  discussed  in  Chapter  1. 
Overall,  the  results  show  that  researchers  must  not  only  take  care  choosing 
which  measure  of  infrastructure  to  include  in  the  analysis  (total,  core,  or 
disaggregated)  but  must  also  choose  the  "secondary  variable"  with  care.  Although 
many  of  the  different  results  obtained  by  infrastructure  researchers  (for  example,  those 
of  Tatom,.  1993,  compared  with  those  of  Section  3)  can  be  attributed  to  differences  in 
infrastructure  data  and  econometric  technique,  the  differences  between  the  results 
obtained  in  Section  3  and  Section  6  can  be  attributed  solely  to  the  use  of  different  TFP 
measures. 279 
In  conclusion,  it  is  worth  highlighting  some  of  the  weaknesses  of  the  approach  used  in 
this  chapter  and  some  possible  avenues  for  future  research.  First,  although  the 
methodology  allows  for  dynamic  effects  of  inftastructure  investment  on  productivity,  it 
is  not  possible  to  identify  any  long-run  relationship  between  the  variables.  This  would 
require  formal  economic  modelling  of  the  productivity  effects  of  infrastructure.  A 
general  equilibrium  framework  would  allow  recognition  of  the  fact  that  increases  in 
infrastructure  investment  may  lead  to  alterations  in  the  allocation  of  resources  and  alter 
factor  prices. 
Second,  the  focus  in  this  chapter  is  only  on  the  importance  of  the 
manufacturing  sector,  whose  share  of  total  U.  S.  output  has  been  on  the  decline  since  at 
least  the  1970s',  whereas  infrastructure  is  likely  to  affect  production  possibilities  in 
many  other  sectors  as  well.  However,  because  the  data  is  in  differences  (growth  rates) 
there  is  no  danger  of  underestimating  infrastructure's  importance  simply  because  the 
manufacturing  sector  is  only  one  component  of  the  private  business  sector.  However, 
to  the  extent  that  different  factors  determine  productivity  growth  in  the  manufacturing 
and  non-manufacturing  economy,  the  results  are  of  less  use  to  policymakers  wishing  to 
measure  the  total  supply-side  effects  of  infrastructure  investment. 
Finally,  although  it  is  an  improvement  on  traditional  measures  of  technical 
progress,  m  its  residual  form  Basu's  measure  is  still  what  Abramovitz  (1993)  describes 
as  a  "grab-bag"  -a  cover  for  other  sources  of  growth  (both  tangible  and  intangible) 
besides  technological  advance.  He  argues  that  such  residuals  provide  "some  sort  of 
measure  of  our  ignorance"  upon  which  researchers  should  focus  their  attention.  For 
According  to  the  Survey  of  Current  Business  (1996),  real  GDP  in  the  U.  S.  increased  at  an  average 
annual  rate  ot'2.6  per  cent  from  1977-94.  The  gross  product  of  all  major  sectors  increased  over  this 
period,  with  growth  rates  ranging  from  4.9  per  cent  for  wholesale  trade  to  0.9  per  cent  for  mining. 
Manufacturing  output  increased  2.3  per  cent  per  Year,  0.3  per  cent  per  year  less  than  the  total. 280 
example,  in  future  work  the  labour  and  capital  cost  share  terms  in  Basu's  measure 
could  be  adjusted,  thereby  altering  the  size  of  the  residual,  to  take  account  of 
improvements  in  the  quality  of  capital  and  tabour.  Other  sources  of  growth  are  not  as  ' 
simple  to  hamess. 281 
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Appendix  A 
Data  Sources 
Mapufacturin  g  Data 
The  following  data  for  each  industry  are  from  the  NBER  Manufacturing  Productivity 
Database  (see  Bartelsman  and  Gray  (1996)  and  http:  //www.  nber.  org/productivity.  htrnl)-. 
L  Total  employment  (1,000s) 
PL  Total  compensation  of  employees  (millions,  $current) 
Hp  Hours  of  production  workers  (millions  of  hours) 
M  Real  cost  of  materials  inputs  (millions,  $1987) 
K  Real  capital  stock  (beginning  of  year,  millions,  $1987) 
Q  Real  shipments  (millions,  $1987) 
PQ  Price  deflator  for  value  of  shipments  (1987=1) 
PM  Price  deflator  for  value  of  materials  (1987=1) 
User  Cost  of  Capital 
The  rental  price  of  private  capital  is  similar  to  the  measure  constructed  in  Chapter  3 
(r  -I-  UZ 
J-U 
The  only  difference  is  that  z,  the  present  value  of  capital  consumption  allowances, 
contains  an  extra  term,  co 
z= 
P(I-O).  l  ) 
+  p) 
.7 
where  w  is  a  dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  0.5  in  1962-63  and  0  elsewhere. 
Under  the  Long  Amendment  (1962-63)  firms  were  required  to  reduce  the  depreciable 
base  of  their  assets  by  half  the  amount  of  the  investment  tax  credit  (see  Nadiri  and 
Mamuneas,  1994). 
The  subscript  i  denotes  either  industries  20-39  or  the  three  manufacturing  aggregates 
(total,  durable  and  nondurable),  depending  on  which  measure  of  TFP  is  being 
calculated. 
The  physical  capital  deflator,  qj,  is  calculated  by  dividing  the  current  capital  stock  by 
the  constant  ($1987)  capital  stock.  This  data  was  obtained  from  the  BEA  diskettes, 
Fixed  Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth  in  the  United  States,  1925-1994.  The  individual 
industry  or  aggregate  economic  depreciation  rates,  8j,  were  constructed  using  data 
from  the  same  source. 
i,  the  investment  tax  credit,  u,  the  corporate  income  tax  rate,,  The  remaining  van 
and  p,  the  capital  consumption  allowance  rate  are  identical  to  those  used  in  Chapter  3. 290 
Instruments 
Defence  Spending  (billions,  chained  $1992)  from  1959  is  taken  from  the  February 
1997  Economic  Report  of  the  President,  Table  B2  p.  303.  Based  on  quantity  indices 
(1992=100)  provided  by  the  Department  of  Commerce,  movements  in  the  quantity 
index  series  were  spliced  to  the  billions  of  chained  1992  dollar  series  to  obtain  the  1958 
value. 
The  oil  price  (spot  US$/barrel)  from  1965  onwards  is  taken  from  the  1995 
International  Financial  Statistics  Yearbook.  This  measure  is  calculated  as  the  average 
of  the  prices  of  UK  Brent  (light),  Dubai  (medium)  and  Alaska  North  Slope  (heavy), 
equally  weighted.  Pre-1965  oil  prices  were  calculated  from  the  1983  International 
Financial  Statistics  Yearbook  as  the  average  of  the  following  blends-  Saudi  Arabian 
(Ras  Tanura);  Libyan  (Es  Sidra)  from  1961;  and  Venezuelan  (Tia  Juana),  equally 
weighted. 
The  Political  Party  of  the  President  was  obtained  from  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica, 
1992. 
Public  C4pital  Data 
All  public  capital  data  was  obtained  from  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  Fixed 
Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth  diskettes.  All  data  is  measured  in  millions  of  $1987. 
Core  infrastructure  investment  data  is  the  sum  of  state  and  federal  spending  on 
highways  and  streets,  water  and  sewer  systems  and  "other  structures"  (electric  and  gas 
facilities  and  mass  transit).  Total  infrastructure  investment  is  the  sum  of  state  and 
federal  non-military  spending  on  equipment  and  structures,  excluding  spending  on 
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Appendix  B 
Model  Stability  Tests 
Following  Liltkepohl  (1991)",  to  ensure  that  the  various  estimated  systems  are  stationary  I  computed  the  roots  of  the  characteristic  polynomials  and  checked  whether  the  moduli  lie  outside  the  unit  circle.  In  each  case  the  stability  condition  was  satisfied.  Consider  (86),  the  three-dimensional  VAR  (2)  model  for  A  tqB  and  disaggregated 
infrastructure  data:  t 
AOB  -a-  AOB  V/ 
12  V/ 
13  t-I 
0o  0-  AOB  V 
H  t-2  t 
tb+0 
yf 
20  AIH  +V 
0 
22  t-I  22  t-2  t 
tj 
-C-  -00 
V/ 
33  t- 
-  -0 
00 
t-2 
et  I  "10  1  1,110 
The  reverse  characteristic  polynomial  is 
10  0-  -VIII--00  0-  - 
11 
V/ 
12  V/ 
13 
det  0100  V/'  0  A-  02 
02, 
22  22 
00100000 
33_ 
which,  after  substituting  the  relevant  parameter  estimates,  is  found  to  be- 
1-0.135A-0.0399Aý  -0.1017Aý  +0.00862ý. 
The  roots  of  this  polynomial  are 
Al  =  1-91),  A2  =  12.251, 
A3= 
-  1.17  - 
"90'2  A4  =-1.17  +  1.90i 
. 
The  modulus  of 
A3 
and 
A4  is  IA31 
= 
I'OZ41=  ý1.1  7'  +1.902  =  2.23.  Since  all  roots  lie 
outside  the  unit  circle  the  model  satisfies  the  stability  condition: 
7  det[I  -V/,  /'  - 
T22ý]  #0 
where  I  is  the  3x3  identity  matrix  and  V/,  and  V/2are  the  3x3  parameter  matrices  for 
order  I  and  order  2  variables  respectively.  It  can  therefore  be  concluded  that  the  three 
series  fluctuate  around  constant  means  and  their  variance  does  not  change.  The  same 
test  was  conducted  on  each  of  the  remaining  models.  For  example,  for  the  aggregate 
infrastructure  model  of  focus,  the  bivariate  model  with  AO'  and  AIc,  the  roots  are  t 
-  1.671,1.3  3  and  6.75,  which  are  all  greater  than  I  in  absolute  value. 
5t)  See  pages  9-13. 292 
Appendix  C 
Results  from  IV  Estimation 
-  Disaggregated  TFP  Data 
Table  32  contains  individual  estimates  of  the  returns  to  scale  parameter  for  the  20 
manufacturing  industries.  Wald  tests  were  conducted  to  test  whether  the  ý-s  are 
significantly  different  from  unity.  Except  for  SIC  26  and  37, 
-  none  of  the  estimates  was  found  to  be  significantly  different  from  unity.  This  finding  may  be  because  each  of  the 
estimations  in  Table  32  contains  far  fewer  degrees  of  freedom  than  the  3SLS 
estimations  performed  using  aggregate  data. 
Table  32.  Estimates  of  Returns  to  Scale,  SIC  20-39 
Durable  Goods  Industries  Cr=0.0  0.3  0.5  0.7  1.0 
sic24  Lurnber  and  wood  0.97  0.98  0.98  0.99  1.00 
sic25  Furniture  and  fLxtures  1.00  1.02  1.02  1.03  1.04 
sic32  Stone,  clay  and  glass  0.90  0.92  0.93  0.94  0.96 
sic33  Primary  metals  0.99  0.98  0.96  0.95  0.94 
sic34  Fabricated  metals  1.12  1.12  1.12  1.12  1.13 
sic35  Industrial  machinery  and  equipment  0.96  0.95  0.94  0.94  0.93 
sic36  Electronic  and  other  electric  equipment  1.18  1.16  1.15  1.13  1.11 
siC37  Transportation  equipment  0.83  0.84  0.85  0.86  0.87 
sic38  Instruments  and  related  products  1.12  1.10  1.08  1.07  1.05 
sic39  Miscellaneous  manufacturing  industries  1.03  1.04  1.04  1.05  1.06 
Nondurable  Goods  Industries 
sic2O  Food  and  kindred  products  1.20  1.20  1.21  1.21  1.22 
sic2l  Tobacco  products  1.44  1.41  1.39  1.37  1.34 
sic22  Textile  null  products  1.08  1.09  1.09  1.09  1.09 
sic23  Apparel  and  other  textile  0.91  0.93  0.94  0.95  0.96 
sic26  Paper  and  allied  1.21  1.19  1.17  1.16  1.14 
sic27  Printing  and  publishing  0.85  0.89  0.91  0.95  1.00 
sic28  Chermcals  and  allied  1.25  1.22  1.20  1.18  1.15 
sic29  Petroleum  and  coal  products  1.11  1.10  1.09  1.08  1.06 
sic3o  Rubber  and  misc.  plastics  products  1.11  1.11  1.11  1.11  1.10 
sic3l  Leather  and  leather  products  1.33  1.32  1.32  1.32  1.31 
Note:  Based  on  standard  Wests  all  of  the  estimates  of  v  are  significantly  different  from  zero  at  less  than  the  1% 
level,  except  SIC21. 293 
Appendix  D 
Comparison  of  Elasticities  of  Substitution 
In  Section  6a  value  of  0.7  was  used  for  a,  the  (local)  elasticity  of  substitution  between 
value-added  and  materials.  To  check  the  robustness  of  the  causality  tests7  further  tests 
were  conducted  using  a=  0.3  (see  Bruno,,  1984)  and  a=  0.5  (see  Malley  et  al.,  1998). 
As  the  results  reported  in  Table  33  make  clear,  there  is  very  little  difference  between 
the  different  variables.  The  FPEs  are  of  a  similar  magnitude  to  those  reported  in  Table 
19  and  the  same  lag  order  is  chosen  for  each  of  the  variables.  In  other  words  the  results 
imply  that  causation  is  still  unidirectional,  ie  AII  =:  >,  AOB 
Table  33.  Optimum  Lags  of  Manipulated  Variable  and  FPE  of  Controlled  Variable. 
Controlled  Manipulated  Optimum  Lag, 
Ia*b  FpE(  Variab  e  Variable  Manipulated  FPE(m  *,  nm 
Variable 
u=  0.3 
AOB  (1)  Aic  1  0.000046*  0.000057 
tt 
A[  c  (2)  AOB  1  0.001877  0.001820 
tt 
u=  0.5 
, 
AOB  110.000047*  0.000058 
t  Aitc 
AItc  (2) 
AOB  1  0.001874  0.001820 
t 
'  The  number  in  brackets  indicates  the  order  of  autoregressive  operator  on  the  controlled  variable, 
determined  in  Table  19.  b  The  FPEs  in  the  FPE(m  *,  n  *)  column  are  the  minimum  ones  obtained  from 
inclusion  of  different  lags  on  the  manipulated  variables.  Asterisks  signify  that  there  is  a  causal 
relationship  from  the  manipulated  variable  to  the  controlled  variable. 294 
Appendix  E 
Comparison  of  Model-Building  Techniques 
The  method  used  to  construct  the  estimating  models  is  based  primarily  on  Hsiao 
(1981).  Ahking  and  Miller  (1985)  and  Erenburg  and  Wohar  (1995)  used  a  slightly 
different  model-building  method,  including  variables  even  if  this  did  not  lead  to  a 
lowering  of  the  final  prediction  error.  Thus  the  models  were  deliberately  overfitted 
initially.  Diagnostic  checks  (F-tests  and  Wald  tests  respectively)  were  then  used  to 
arrive  at  the  final  models  and  draw  conclusions  about  causality.  In  comparison,  in 
Section  3  and  Section  6  variables  are  only  included  in  the  autoregressive  models  if  they 
lower  the  prediction  error.  To  ensure  that  the  choice  of  model-building  technique  does 
not  affect  conclusions  drawn  about  causality,  the  total  and  core  infrastructure  models, 
(82)  and  (83),  were  re-estimated  after  including  variables  that  lead  to  increases  in 
prediction  error.  Thus  using  information  contained  in  Table  19  the  initial  matrices  of 
lag  operators  for  the  two  models  are  given  respectively  by 
12(L))  and  2  (L))' 
2  22 
12 
2  ýVML) 
22 
(L)  (91) 
Wald  tests  of  the  hypothesis  V/'  , 
(L)  =0  with  I  degree  of  freedom  produce  chi-square 
values  of  0.78  for  the  core  infrastructure  model  and  0.32  for  the  total  infrastructure 
model.  Hence  the  restrictions  are  accepted,  confirming  the  adequacy  of  the  final 
models  and  the  conclusion  AO'  4>  Al'  and  'AOB  ::  ý  AIT 
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Conclusion: 
Summary  of  Findings,  Comparison  of  Empirical 
Approaches,  and  Avenues  for  Future  Research 
I.  Introduction 
The  aim  of  this  thesis  has  been  to  analyse  the  role  of  public  capital  in  private 
production  in  the  United  States,  in  particular  the  roles  of  the  different  types  of 
infrastructure.  Two  different  empirical  approaches  were  used  to  answer  a  number  of 
questions,  in  particular  the  questions  of  causality  and  optimality.  Does  infrastructure 
cause  total  factor  productivity?  Did  the  cost  savings  enjoyed  by  firms  warrant 
additional  investment  in  roads,  water  and  sewer  systems  and  other  structures  over  the 
sample  period.  On  the  question  of  optimality,  one  of  the  most  important  insights  is 
that,  even  if  the  public  sector  decides  to  cut  infrastructure  investment,  a  shortage  of 
this  type  of  capital  may  not  develop  if  there  are  changes  to  other  variables  that 
influence  the  decision-making  process  of  private  producers.  Another  important  insight 
obtained  from  the  cost  function  study  is  that,  regardless  of  whether  there  is  a  surplus 
or  shortage  of  total  infrastructure,  the  optimal/actual  ratios  of  the  different  types  of 296 
capital  may  be  moving  in  opposite  directions.  On  the  question  of  causality,  one  of  the 
most  important  insights  is  that  infrastructure  causes  the  productivity  growth  rate  but 
some  types  of  investment  (roads  in  particular)  are  more  productive  than  others.  The 
study  in  Chapter  4  also  reveals  that  conclusions  drawn  about  infrastructure's 
relationship  with  total  factor  productivity  depend  on  the  assumptions  underlying  the 
derivation  of  the  latter  measure.  In  the  sections  that  follow  the  approaches  and  results 
of  each  of  the  two  major  studies  are  summarised  and  discussed.  Some  of  the 
weaknesses  inherent  in  each  are  also  considered  and  opportunities  for  further  research 
are  mentioned. 
2.  Summary  of  Empirical  Approaches  and  Results 
Chapter  3:  Calculating  Optimal  Public  Capital  Stocks 
The  cost  function  approach  is  utilised  because  of  the  advantages  it  has  over  the 
production  function  approach  and  because  it  provides  a  convenient  framework  for  the 
calculation  of  optimal  capital  stocks.  Data  for  the  total  private  business  sector  is  used 
to  take  account  of  the  fact  that  there  are  a  number  of  sectors  that  are  Rely  to  benefit 
from  the  infrastructure  stock.  Use  of  a  short-run  cost  function  allows  the  optimal 
infrastructure  stock  to  be  calculated  simultaneously  with  the  optimal  private  capital 
stock.  The  motivation  for  calculating  the  optimal  quantity  of  each  type  of 
infrastructure  is  that  if  there  is,  for  example,  a  shortage  of  core  infrastructure,  this  does 
Iya  general  increase  in  public  investment.  Some  of  the  individual  infrastructure  not  justif 
stocks  may  be  in  surplus  while  others  are  in  shortage.  Furthermore,  some  types  of 297 
infrastructure 
may  be  moving  towards  a  state  of  underprovision  while  others  are 
moving  towards  a  state  of  overprovision. 
APart  from  calculating  the  stocks  of  total  and  disaggregated  infrastructure  that  ' 
are  optimal  to  the  U.  S.  private  business  sector,  this  chapter  contributes  the  following 
to  the  already  well-established  cost  function  literature-  an  analysis  of  the 
responsiveness  of  the  optimal  capital  stocks  to  pre-tax  and  tax-ad  usted  factor  prices;  i 
31 
use  of  the  wealth  of  depreciation  data  available  from  the  BEA;  and  calculation  of 
Divisia  indexes  for  private  and  public  capital  in  the  United  States.  The  latter  reveal  that 
the  average  quality  of  private  capital  increased  over  the  sample  period  because  of  the 
relative  increase  in  equipment  investment  but  the  quality  of  public  capital  remained 
unchanged. 
Using  the  Generalised  Leontief  specification,  two  cost  function  models  were 
estimated,  one  using  aggregate  infrastructure  data,  the  other  using  disaggregated  data. 
Each  model  was  estimated  using  both  the  pre-tax  and  tax-adjusted  price  of  labour.  The 
estimation  results  and  diagnostic  tests  are  satisfactory,  with  most  estimates  significant 
at  the  I  per  cent  level  at  least.  Wald  tests  reject  in  favour  of  including  the  various 
infrastructure  variables  in  the  models.  Estimating  the  disaggregated  infrastructure 
model  consumes  a  large  number  of  degrees  of  freedom  and  there  is  some  evidence  of 
multicollinearity.  While  this  affects  the  efficiency  of  the  parameter  estimates,  they 
remain  unbiased  and  the  pattern  of  the  optimal/actual  ratios,  which  is  one  of  the  main 
focuses  of  the  analysis,  is largely  unaffected. 
The  estimates  from  the  cost  function  models  are  inserted  into  the  optimal 
capital  stock  equations,  along  with  data  on  the  level  of  output  and  factor  input  prices. 
optimal  infrastructure  elasticities  w-C  also  calculated  using  these  parameter  estimates 
quantity  of  and  variables.  The  elasticities  illustrate  the  responsiveness  of  the  opti  I 298 
infrastructure  to  changes  in  factor  input  prices  (labour  and  private  capital).  The  finding 
is  that  infrastructure  and  labour  are  substitutes  and  infrastructure  and  private  capital 
are  complements.  A  similar  finding  is  obtained  using  the  individual  road,  water  and 
sewer  and  other  structures  stocks.  The  output  elasticities  of  the  different  infrastructure 
aggregates  (evaluated  at  the  optimum)  were  also  estimated.  These  reveal  that, 
although  infrastructure  has  a  positive  effect  on  output,  its  role  is  much  smaller  than 
that  which  the  vast  majority  of  aggregate  production  function  studies  attribute  to  it. 
Highways  and  streets  have  the  highest  output  elasticity  followed  by  water  and  sewer 
systems  and  other  structures. 
When  the  optimal  capital  stocks  are  calculated  the  finding  is  that,  in  spite  of  the 
infrastructure  slowdown  from  the  early  1970s,  there  was  never  a  shortage  of  core 
infrastructure  during  the  sample  period.  In  fact,  on  average,  there  was  a  small  surplus 
of  this  type  of  capital.  The  user  cost  of  private  capital  increased  substantially  from  the 
early  1970s  and,  because  G  and  K  are  complements,  this  led  to  a  fall  in  the  desired 
quantity  of  public  capital,  G*.  When  the  core  is  disaggregated,  the  finding  is  that  each 
of  the  individual  stocks  was  never  undersupplied  over  the  sample  period.  The  average 
optimal/actual  ratio  for  roads  was  0.96;  the  average  ratio  for  water  and  sewers  was 
0.92  and  the  average  ratio  for  other  structures  was  0.86. 
Without  attributing  too  much  importance  to  the  levels  of  the  ratios,  it  is  also 
clear  from  Figure  12  in  Chapter  3  that  the  ratios  were  moving  in  different  directions  at 
different  times  during  the  sample  period.  Furthermore,  comparison  of  the  period  when 
the  public  capital  stocks  were  growing  rapidly  (1959-72)  with  the  period  of  slower 
growth  (1973-94),  reveals  that  the  infrastructure  slowdown  caused  only  a  small 
movement  in  the  optimaUactual  ratios  for  water  &  sewers  and  other  structures  towards 
a  state  of  underprovision.  Roads  became  more  oversupplied  over  this  period. 299 
It  was  also  illustrated  that  the  different  ways  of  treating  the  input  prices  of  public  and 
Private  capital  and  labour  for  tax  purposes  have  an  effect  on  the  results  but  not  a  very 
substantial  one.  This  does  not,  however,  detract  from  the  importance  of  analysing  the 
direction  Of  taxation  effects.  Although  the  results  obtained  in  Chapter  3  make  a 
contribution  to  the  already  well-established  body  of  cost  function  research  there  are  a 
number  of  issues  that  have  to  be  addressed  in  future  research,  especially  with  respect 
to  the  use  of  value-added  data,  the  construction  of  the  user  cost  of  public  capital  and 
the  time  lag  between  public  outlays  and  responses  by  producers.  It  may  also  be  argued 
that  more  experimentation  is  required  with  alternative  functional  forms. 
Chapter  4:  Using  Adjusted  Measures  of  Productivity  to  Resolve  the  Causality  Issue 
This  chapter  attempts  to  contribute  to  the  infrastructure  literature  by  using  a 
framework  that  has  not  received  much  attention  in  the  infrastructure  literature:  the 
construction  of  autoregressive  models  that  introduce  dynamic  effects  from 
I  --.  C- 
uni  astructure  investment.  A  variety  of  statistical  techniques  are  employed  in  the 
chapter  to  test  for  causality  between  total  factor  productivity  and  public  investment. 
Furthermore,  the  focus  moves  to  the  productivity  literature  and  the  derivation  and 
estimation  of  a  TFP  measure  that  incorporates  possible  increasing  returns  to  scale  and, 
by  making  use  of  manufacturing  materials  usage  data,  adjusts  for  vartable  labour  and 
capital  utilisation  over  the  cycle.  Once  again  use  is  made  of  disaggregated  public 
investment  data 
Although  manufacturing  is  only  one  sector  that  is  likely  to  derive  benefits  from 
the  public  capital  stock,  the  effect  of  public  capital  is  not  underestimated  per  se  using 
the  causality  testing  approach,  because  data  in  differences  (growth  rates)  is  used.  To 300 
the  extent  that  manufacturing  and  total  private  TFP  differ,  extrapolation  of  the  results 
is  not  justified.  Interesting  insights  are  gleaned,  however,  by  comparing  the  results 
obtained  using  the  original  Solow  residual  and  adjusted  TFP  and  because 
manufacturing  is  arguably  one  of  the  sectors  that  benefits  most  from  infrastructure 
investment. 
In  constructing  the  adjusted  TFP  measure,  instrumental  variable  techniques  are 
employed  to  obtain  an  estimate  of  the  returns  to  scale  parameter.  The  finding  is  that 
returns  to  scale  are  increasing  when  Hall's  modified  residual  (which  uses  cost  shares 
instead  of  revenue  shares  to  take  account  of  market  power)  is  estimated,  but  close  to 
constant  when  variable  factor  utilisation  is  also  incorporated.  The  correlation  between 
the  adjusted  TFP  measure  and  the  business  cycle  is  very  low,  as  is  its  relative  variance. 
The  new  TFP  measure  is  then  used  to  analyse  the  relationship  between  the 
growth  rates  of  public  investment  and  TFP.  The  FPE  Criterion  is  used  to  determine  the 
appropriate  number  of  lags  and  the  model-building  technique  allows  each  variable  to 
enter  the  model  with  a  different  number  of  lags.  A  selection  of  other  lag-length 
selection  criteria,  that  usually  choose  larger  or  smaller  numbers  of  lags  than  the  FPE 
Criterion,  are  also  used  to  test  the  sensitivity  of  the  results.  Two  causality  testing 
procedures  are  used.  The  first  compares  the  minimum  FPEs  from  adding  infrastructure 
variables  to  lags  of  TFP.  The  second  takes  the  form  of  Wald  tests  carried  out  on  the 
off-diagonal  terms  in  the  autoregressive  models.  An  examination  of  the  parameter 
estimates  from  the  autoregressive  models  also  allows  the  direction  of  causation  to  be 
determined  and  provides  quantitative  evidence  of  infrastructure  effects.  The  SUR 
estimation  results  are  subjected  to  a  battery  of  diagnostic  tests,  including  under  and 
overfitting  tests  that  determine  the  adequacy  of  the  models  chosen  by  the  FPE 
II  in  Criterion  and  tests  that  establish  the  sensitivity  of  the  causality  results  to 301 
the  number  of  lagged  infrastructure  terms.  Using  adjusted  TFP  the  finding  throughout 
is  that  an  increase  in  the  investment  growth  rate  causes  an  increase  in  the  productivity 
growth  rate.  Roads  are  the  most  productive  type  of  infrastructure  investment,  followed 
by  investment  in  other  structures.  Water  and  sewer  systems  are  found  to  have  no  effect 
on  TFP-  Contrary  to  the  stated  view  of  a  number  of  infrastructure  researchers,  there  is 
no  evidence  of  reverse  causation.  The  quantitative  evidence  points  to  a  smaH  but 
statistically  significant  role  for  infrastructure  in  determining  the  productivity  growth 
rate.  When  the  TFP  data  is  disaggregated  the  finding  is  that  some  industries  benefit 
more  from  infrastructure  investment  than  others,  especially  those  that  are  capital 
intensive  and  use  roads  most  intensively. 
As  the  philosophical  literature  on  causality  makes  clear,  it  is  important  not  to 
accept  the  results  of  causality  testing  procedures  uncritically.  The  results  obtained 
using  the  adjusted  TFP  measure  do  conform  to  certain  researchers'  expectations, 
however.  The  core  is  found  to  reduce  prediction  error  more  than  the  total  measure, 
roads  affect  productivity  more  than  the  other  types  of  public  investment  and  the  results 
obtained  using  individual  industry  data  seem  to  be  explained  by  differences  in  industry 
structure. 
Tests  and  estimations  were  also  carried  out  using  the  original  Solow  residual  to 
provide  comparative  evidence.  Although  this  is  arguably  an  imprecise  measure  of  TFP 
growth,  it  is  still  used  in  much  empirical  work  in  the  infrastructure  literature. 
Differences  between  the  results  I  obtain  using  the  Solow  residual  and  other 
researchers'  results  can  be  attributed  to  differences  in  econometric  technique. 
However,  any  differences  in  the  results  I  obtain  using  the  Solow  residual  and  the 
adjusted  TFP  measure  can  be  attributed  solely  to  the  choice  of  productivity  measure. 302 
Using  the  original  Solow  residual  there  is  some  evidence  that  infrastructure  causes  TFP 
but  the  results  are  not  as  statistically  significant  as  those  obtained  using  the  new 
measure.  There  is  also  some  evidence  of  reverse  causality  but  it  is  not  robust  to  the  use 
of  disaggregated  infrastructure  data.  Sums  of  coefficient  tests  also  indicate  that  TFP 
has  both  a  positive  and  negative  effect  on  certain  types  of  infrastructure  investment. 
These  results  lead  me  to  question  the  appropriateness  of  the  Solow  residual  as  a 
measure  of  factor  productivity.  Infrastructure's  quantitative  effect,  though  not  as 
statistically  significant,  is  larger  than  that  of  the  adjusted  measure.  A  battery  of 
diagnostic  tests  was  carried  out  to  ensure  that  the  difference  in  results  can  be  attributed 
solely  to  the  use  of  different  estimates  of  total  factor  productivity. 
Although  I  conclude  that  there  is  no  evidence  that  productivity  Granger  causes 
infrastructure,  in  the  long  run  it  is  to  be  expected  that  increases  in  income  will  lead  to 
increases  in  the  stock  of  public  capital.  The  fact  that  such  an  effect  could  not  be  found 
can  be  explained  by  the  finding  that  the  residual  and  income  were  moving  in  different 
directions  in  certain  years  of  the  sample  period  and  possibly  by  the  fact  that  the  supply 
of  infrastructure  is  determined  by  a  political  process.  In  the  1970s  the  "Great  Society" 
welfare  programmes  took  precedence  over  the  enhancement  of  future  public  services. 
Although  increases  in  infrastructure  investment  may  have  only  a  short-term 
effect  on  the  productivity  growth  rate,  a  possible  drawback  of  the  approach  followed 
in  this  chapter  is  that  it  ignores  any  long-run  relationship  between  the  variables. 
Although  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis,  there  has  not  been  adequate  analysis  of 
infrastructure  effects  within  a  general  equilibrium  framework. 303 
Similarities 
and  Differences 
The  different  empirical  approaches  followed  in  this  thesis  each  facilitate  the  answering 
of  a  number  of  questions.  It  is  also  worthwhile  investigating  how  the  results  obtained 
from  the  different  approaches  vary.  The  cost  function  study  in  Chapter  3  uses  a  formal 
specification  of  the  determination  of  firms'  costs.  As  the  dual  to  the  production 
function,  the  cost  function  reflects  technology,  incorporates  the  optin-fising  behaviour 
of  firms  and  represents  the  dependence  of  costs  on  the  level  of  output.  It  also  makes 
available  a  wide  variety  of  analytical  statistics  that  reveal  how  changes  in  private  sector 
variables  affect  optimal  capital  measures.  The  autoregressive  framework  used  in 
Chapter  4  incorporates  dynamic  effects  and  treats  each  variable  as  endogenous  within  a 
multivariate  framework.  There  is  no  specification  of  the  relationship  between 
infrastructure  and  TFP.  Nevertheless,,  within  this  framework  meaningful  economic 
hypotheses  can  be  tested. 
In  the  literature  survey  in  Chapter  I  it  was  mentioned  that  the  assumption  that 
public  capital  enters  the  production  function  as  a  fixed  unpaid  factor  of  production  has 
important  implications  for  the  calculation  of  total  factor  productivity  measures.  An 
example  was  provided  of  how  the  Solow  residual  would  have  to  be  stripped  of 
infrastructure  to  derive  a  more  accurate  measure  of  TFP.  In  Chapter  3  the  cost 
function  embodies  the  assumption  that  public  capital  enters  the  production  function  as 
a  fixed  unpaid  factor  of  production.  However,  the  manufacturing  production  function, 
from  which  the  various  TFP  measures  are  derived  in  Chapter  4,  makes  no  such 
ri  I  is 
assumption.  Gross  output  depends  on  labour,  materials  and  p  ivate  capital  only,  it  * 
easy  enough  to  derive  many  of  the  alternat've  producýlvity  measures  wIth  G  included 
as  a  production  factor,  although  empirical  implementation  is  somewhat  more 304 
cOrnPlicated.  It  appears,  therefore,  that  there  is  scope  for  further  research  into  the 
transtnission  mechanism,  ie,  how  public  capital  affects  the  private  production  process, 
and  using  growth  accounting  techniques. 
Another  difference  between  the  studies  is  that  Chapter  3  uses  capital  stock 
measures;  Chapter  4  uses  investment  measures.  Investment  measures  were  used  to 
prevent  some  of  the  problems  that  arise  when  causality  tests  are  conducted  using  non- 
stationary  variables.  The  difference  between  stock  and  flow  growth  rates  can  be 
attributed  mainly  to  composition  effects  (changes  in  the  depreciation  rate  caused  by 
changes  in  the  asset  mix).  However,  this  difference  is  not  as  significant  when  use  is 
made  of  disaggregated  infrastructure  data,  the  analysis  of  which  forms  the  backbone  of 
this  thesis. 
One  difference  between  the  disaggregated  infrastructure  results  of  chapters  3 
and  4  is  the  finding  that  investment  in  water  and  sewer  systems  is  a  significant  variable 
in  the  cost  function  models  but  does  not  have  a  significant  effect  on  TFP.  There  is  a 
possibility  that  these  types  of  capital  have  a  significant  effect  on  non-manufacturing 
production  only,  but  this  does  not  seem  realistic.  The  water  and  sewer  variables  used  in 
the  two  analyses  also  differ  in  certain  respects.  A  joint  measure  was  used  in  the  cost 
function  analysis  to  preserve  degrees  of  freedom,  individual  measures  were  used  in 
Chapter  4.  This,  however,  was  not  the  reason  for  the  difference  in  the  results.  It  may 
be  that  the  average  effect  of  water  and  sewer  capital  is  positive  but  that  the  marginal 
effect  is  zero,  which  becomes  apparent  in  an  analysis  that  makes  use  of  variables' 
growth  rates. 
Despite  the  differences  in  the  approaches  there  are  a  number  of  similarities  in 
the  re 
It  is  a  significant  variable 
,  Suits.  The  general  finding  is  that  infi-astructure  matters 
,  rowth  rate  of  total  factor  prodtictivitv. 
in  the  cost  function  models  and  it  causes  the  Ly 305 
Each  study  urges  caution  from  policymakers  in  certain  respects,  however. 
Infrastructure 
may  be  a  significant  variable  in  the  cost  function  models  but  even  the 
prolonged  decline  in  public  investment  from  1968-82  had  little  affect  on  the  optimality 
of  the  public  capital  stock.  Furthermore,  infrastructure  is  found  to  have  a  positive  and 
highly  statistically  significant  effect  on  the  growth  rate  of  TFP.  However,  the 
quantitative  effect  is  very  small.  This  finding  would  probably  come  as  no  surprise  to 
many  productivity  researchers,  who  attribute  the  productivity  growth  slowdown  to  a 
variety  of  factors. 
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